Showing posts with label Mughals. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Mughals. Show all posts

Friday, March 17, 2023

Hindu Civilizationism: Make India Great Again

Abstract

Hindu civilizationism is more than a century old phenomenon that has been steadily gaining strength. Its recent amalgam with populism has made it ascendant, popular, and mainstream in India. This paper explores how Hindu civilizationism is not only an essential part of the Hindutva and BJP’s narrative but also the mainstay of several government policies. The “other” of the BJP’s populist civilizationist rhetoric are primarily Muslims and Muslim civilization in India and the aim is to make India “vishwaguru” (world leader) again after 1200 years of colonialism. The evidence of this heady mixture of civilizationism and populism is numerous and ubiquitous. This paper analyzes topics such as Akhand Bharat, the golden age, denigrating Mughals, Hindutva pseudoscience, and Sanskrit promotion to highlight the evidence.


Article

1. Introduction

Civilizationism uses a religio-civilization classification of people to define national identity. Territorial nationalism is deemphasized as the nation is imagined beyond national boundaries. Citizens, who are considered part of the civilization-nation based on religion, are asked to defend or save their civilization which is considered under threat. The state becomes a means to achieve the objective which is civilizational longevity and success.

This civilizational rhetoric has become more common as populist leaders around the world have used it to attract voters who are dissatisfied with the dominant ideologies and established mainstream parties. Numerous authors have pointed out how rightwing populist European parties and leaders defined self and the other not in national but in broader civilizational terms. Christian civilization, Christian heritage, or Judeo-Christian civilization and traditions are considered in crisis and under threat from Islam and Muslims. The “patriots” are told they have only two choices, act or go extinct (Brubaker 2016, 2017; Kaya and Tecmen 2019; Ozzano and Bolzonar 2020; Yilmaz and Morieson 2021; Marchetti et al. 2022).

Populism is generally considered a thin ideology that attaches itself to rightwing or leftwing ideologies to give coherence, strength, and program to its rhetoric. Yilmaz and Morieson (2022a) have identified civilizationism as another thick ideology that populism attached itself to. Civilizationism, for them, is an idea that divides and categorizes people based on “civilizations” that are primarily based on religion. This is different from the usual division of people based on nations and populists’ framing of “the people” as people of a country.

Hindu civilizationism, like in many other countries, is closely associated with rightwing nationalism and populism. Hindutva (literally Hindu-ness) is a popular political ideology that defines Indian values and nationalism primarily in terms of Hinduism and Hindu civilization, lays claim that only Hindus have the right to rule in India, and aims to replace a secular Indian constitution with a Hindu state (Hindu Rashtra). Hindutva political parties, organizations, and social movements raised the flag of civilizationism before Indian independence in 1947, and more than a century later, they are still its torchbearers. The ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) is just the latest and most successful of the political rightwing conservative organizations. In terms of making Hindu civilizationism popular, the BJP plays second fiddle to almost a hundred-year-old Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), a militant Hindutva organization.

Hindu civilizationism, therefore, is not a new phenomenon. It started as part of Hindu revivalism in the early 19th century. Hindu revivalists, such as Raja Ram Mohan Roy, the founder of Brahmo Samaj, wanted to reform Hinduism and Hindu society so that it could rise above the social evils and iniquitous rituals and regain its position as a great civilization. Later, in the last century, civilizationist organizations were formed whose main objectives were political even when they were not working as a political party. For a long time, from the 1940s to the 1970s, these organizations and the political parties they supported remained unpopular. However, civilizationists started winning elections at the state level in the 1980s and won national elections in the late 1990s. They ruled India under Prime Minister Vajpayee (1999–2004) but as they did not have the majority of Lok Sabha seats, they were always dependent on other parties and could not fully implement their agenda. The second decade of the 21st century brought a sea change in their fortunes as, like many rightwing civilizationists in other countries, they discovered an affinity between their ideology and populism. The embrace of populism under Prime Minister Modi made them the supreme political force and, currently, Hindu civilizationism is the dominant ideology in India. PM Narendra Modi has trounced the opposition in the 2014 and 2019 national elections and he is by far the most popular leader in India, most likely to win the 2024 national elections (Pradhan 2022).

Modi riding a chariot reminiscence of ancient Hindu Gods, Avatars, Rajas and Hindu civilization

Source: Narendra Modi Twitter

During the last decade, Hindu civilizationism rhetoric has been rising steadily, with the support of populism. The people-elite divide of populism has been used to discredit the Congress Party and Nehru-Gandhi dynasty. Similarly, the people-outsider divide, another regular feature of populist politics, was used to declare Hindus as the only original inhabitants of India and Muslims and Christians as outsiders. Fear, threat, and crisis were used by Modi, like other populists, to force ordinary Hindus to be afraid (Hindu khatray main hai: Hindus are in danger) and act as advised by Modi. Finally, Modi’s image as the only strong, decisive leader in India was carefully crafted, as in the case of many other populist leaders, to sway voters (Modi hai to mumkin hai: If there is Modi, then it is possible) (Sinha 2021; Saleem 2021; Saleem et al. 2022; Yilmaz and Morieson 2022b).

The othering of Muslims and other political forces as anti-nationals and non/fake Hindus is increasing in India. Hinduism has been presented as under threat from Muslims despite Hindus being close to eighty percent of the Indian population. Indians are being made to believe that Muslims and Westerners are again plotting to subjugate Hindus as they did many times during the previous twelve hundred years. The BJP has achieved what was unimaginable a few decades ago (Varshney 2019; Amarasingam et al. 2022).

However, it must be clear that Modi is not more civilizationist than previous civilizationists. The key difference between Modi and Hindu civilizationists of the 1960s and 1970s is the degree of populism, not the degree of civilizationism. Like Modi, Hindu civilizationists of the 20th century were also talking about Akhand Bharat, the golden Vedic age, oppressive Muslim/Mughal invaders, superiority of Hindu civilization, and Sanskrit promotion. Hindutva party manifestos of Hindu Mahasabha and Bharatiya Jana Sangh give ample evidence of civilizationalism (Saleem 2021). Populists are quite successful in the use of transnational solidarity today due to a number of reasons, such as revolution in information and communication technologies, globalization, increase in economic inequality and distrust in democratic institutions in numerous countries, rise in ethnic/religious attachments with the concurrent decline in liberalism, etc. However, they were not the first ones to use transnational solidarity. For instance, between 1987 and 1989, during the Ram Mandir movement, hundreds of thousands of bricks were donated for the eventual construction of Ram Mandir in Ayodhya. These bricks were donated in response to a campaign by the Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP), a Hindutva organization. The Ram Mandir movement and VHP campaign were pro-Hindutva and Hindu civilizationist. They were also transnational as bricks for the mandir were donated not only by people living in India but also by people of 55 other countries of the world (Udayakumar 1997; Hindustan Times 2021)....

In the following section, the prominence of Hindu civilizationism in present day India and Hindutva leaders’ consistent efforts to prove the grandeur and glorious achievements of Hindu civilization will be shown. The section will also demonstrate how Hindu civilizationism is being promoted by denigrating Muslim civilization and its achievements. Most of the papers on civilizationism focus on Christian-majority and Muslim-majority countries. This paper analyzes civilizationism in India, a Hindu-majority country. The key theoretical contribution of this paper is that it presents the evidence that civilizationism as a concept is as applicable and functional in a Hindu majority country as it is in Christian, Jewish, and Muslim majority countries.

Rest of the article can be read here.

Sunday, April 6, 2014

Shiaphobia: Is there evidence of millennium-long tradition of Shia persecution in South Asia?

National identity is mainly about setting boundaries and creating two groups, ‘us’ and ‘them’. ‘Us’ are the good guys, having all the noble qualities and inheritors of a marvelous civilization. ‘They’ are the bad guys, always cheating and scheming to defeat the good guys. Obviously, these two groups cannot be alike (otherwise there is no need of a separate nation), so their differences are highlighted. Complex world of interactions spread over centuries between the two groups is simplified. Narratives expounding the differences go into great lengths in telling people how these two groups were always very dissimilar. This focus on differences sometimes leads to politics of purity (or as according to Freud, the ‘narcissism of small differences’) and even ‘us’ group is scrutinized and some people are declared not pure or worthy enough to be part of ‘us’. 

Not surprisingly, in states based on ethnic nationalism, the focus of scrutiny is on ethnicity while in states based on religious nationalism, religion is center of emphasis as it is the main marker of national identity. This issue was discussed in this previously (See Religious Nationalism and Sectarianism)

Pakistan, being a state based on religious nationalism, has to deal with sectarianism.  


Kunwar Khuldune Shahid wrote an interesting article on Shiaphobia (See Shiaphobia). In this article,  he presents the evidence of a ‘millennium-long tradition of Shia persecution in this region’. Please read the article and following are my comments. 

Before commenting on the article, I want to clarify that I am against the persecution of minorities in Pakistan and ashamed of how Pakistani state has collaborated with militant groups involved in the harassment and oppression of minorities, including Shias. So, I share author’s concern about the recent upturn in horrible incidents against Shias.

However, as a budding historian, I feel it necessary to point out that (as senator Moynihan said) author is entitled to have his own opinion but not his own facts. I suppose author does not like creating long narratives by picking and choosing facts as he starts his article with the phrase, ‘When Muhammad bin Qasim was busy becoming the first Pakistani 1,200 years before the country actually came into being’, however, he commits the same mistake.

Let’s start with Mahmud of Ghazni. In his history of Mahmud’s reign, Persian Shia historian Mahmud Qasim Hindu Shah Ferishte, while giving account of Mahmud’s one of the earlier attack on Multan, writes that Mahmud decided to attack Multan’s Ismaili ruler Abul Fateh because he failed to pay tribute as Abul Fateh’s father and grandfather used to do. Later, when Mahmud was about to defeat Abul Fateh, Abul Fateh pleaded and Mahmud went back to Ghanzi with the promise of twenty thousand gold mohurs, enforcement of sharia and renouncement of Ismaili faith. It was only in a later expedition that he captured Multan and killed Ismailis. Sultan Mahmud also fought with other Sunni Muslims rulers during his lifetime and killed many Muslims, so it is difficult to prove that he was killing people because of their religion or because he wanted power and gold. The account by Ferishte shows loss of tribute was certainly a big part of what Mahmud was doing. So, author’s claim that it was a pre-mediated Shia genocide seems to be somewhat exaggerated.

Again claim that Shias were persecuted from 16th to 19th century is difficult to accept. Except for Aurangzeb, there is not much evidence that other Great Mughals (1526-1707) were trying to systematically persecute Shias. As Humayun was helped by Iranian Shias regain his throne, it is difficult to think he would persecute Shias and Akbar was certainly not persecuting any major religion.

After Aurangzeb, Mughals generally lost their power and were unable to pursue any policy in the whole of their empire as provincial governors became the main decision-makers in their own areas. So, claim for systematic persecution is improbable in the later Mughal period (1707-1856), although some individual rulers/governors might be doing it.

I also find it difficult to believe that there was a campaign against Shias during the 1950s to 1970s. There were some incidents but the proof of a campaign is not there. I personally think most of the groups that later on led the anti-Shia front were busy against Ahmedis. However, if author has more evidence to prove his theory, everyone would be happy to consider it.

Since 1980s, I agree that Shia phobia has increased in strength in both state and society and this is reprehensible. Moreover, involvement of Pakistan in Syria would be disastrous for country to say the least. We have enough troubles already. We should return the few billion dollars and say, ‘Thanks, but no thanks’.

However, there is not much evidence of ‘millennium-long tradition of Shia persecution in this region’.