Military and Populism: A Global Tour with a Special Emphasis on the Case of Pakistan

 Pakistan army chief General Qamar Bajwa and Prime Minister Imran Khan in Miranshah

Source: Khyber TV

Abstract

Although populism has become a focus of research in the last decade, there hasn’t been much academic work on how militaries around the world have reacted/acted to the rise of populist leaders. There is some timeworn research on the relationship of militaries in Latin America with various left-wing populist governments and leaders from the 1930s to 1970s. Given that populism was largely understood in the context of left-wing politics, with the rise of right-wing populism, the literature on the military and populism needs to be advanced by studying the relationship between right-wing populism and the military. This article aims to address this gap by looking at the right-wing populism case study of Pakistan, where the military has actively participated in the rise of a religious populist leader. To situate the case study within the larger literature of the military and populism, the dynamics and history of military associations with populism and populist leaders are revisited in the article’s first part.

The article can be read at European Center for Populism Studies

Pakistan, Sectarianism and Malik Ishaq's Death

Sectarianism has been on the rise for at least three decades as discussed in the last blogpost (See Rise of sectarianism and Pakistani Religious Nationalism). Due to the low capacity, ignorance or benign neglect of the Pakistani law enforcement agencies, the hydra of sectarianism got stronger and stronger and like in the case of mythical creature, banning one sectarian organization resulted in creation of two or more new ones. This is the story till 2015 which has the potential to be a game changer for Pakistan's fight against sectarianism.

However, before discussing what is happening in 2015, it is worthwhile to mention two developments that led to the changes that are witnessed in the current year. First, Nawaz Sharif, a right wing conservative and a sympathizer of Pakistani Taliban (mainly Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)) rhetoric, came to power in 2013 and tried to start talks with the TTP. After months of negotiations, the talks failed to take off ground as terrorist acts continued, making it clear to everyone, except the diehard supporter of the TTP, that the TTP are not interested in peace. Secondly, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif appointed General Raheel Sharif (no relation of Nawaz) as the new Chief of Army Staff in November 2013. Compared to  his predecessor General Kayani, General Raheel had a different opinion regarding how to react to the TTP's attacks on Pakistani state assets. General Kayani usually did not immediately react to the TTP attacks. However, soon after his appointment, General Sharif started responding to every major terrorist act by promptly bombing terrorist hideouts in the tribal areas. After it became clear that talks are useless, General Sharif started a large scale military action against the TTP in North Waziristan in June 2014. The TTP responded to this action by more terrorism. On 16th December 2014, seven TTP terrorists entered an army-administered school in Peshawar and killed 145 people, including 132 teenage students (See Peshawar School Massacre). 

The year 2015 thus started with a major change in Pakistani elite mindset. For the first time in nearly three decades, everybody agreed that religious extremism is a threat to Pakistan's existence. After this massacre, any sympathy for the TTP in the public space ended and even diehard TTP supporters, almost all religious parties, had to support strict action against Taliban. It was decided by the civilian and military leadership that a comprehensive National Action Plan (NAP) would be devised to end all kinds of terrorism, including sectarian violence. Special military courts were established under 21st Amendment in the 1973 Constitution to speedily convict and sentence those involved in religious terrorism. Under NAP, it was also decided to ban and take strict action against those making hate speeches and publishing hate pamphlets, books etc. (See Pakistan announces a national plan to fight terrorism, says terrorists’ days are numbered). Some specific points related to sectarianism in the NAP are reproduced below:

1. We will act against literature, newspapers and magazines that are spreading hate, [ideas of] beheading people, sectarianism, extremism and intolerance.
2. Banned organizations will not be allowed to operate under another name.
3. Action is being taken to stop religious extremism and to protect religious minorities.
4. The registration and regulation of seminaries (madrassas) is being planned.
5. Decisive action is being taken against elements that spread sectarianism.

However, while there were visible changes regarding NAP implementation in other areas, action against sectarianism was halfhearted at best. Gruesome sectarian violence resumed; banned sectarian organizations continued to operate; and hate literature remained available in print as well as on social media. Just one month after unveiling of the NAP, on 30th January 2015, more than sixty people were killed in Shikarpur, Sindh in a bomb blast inside Shia mosque (See At least 60 killed in blast at Shikarpur imambargah). Two weeks later, on February 13, twenty people were killed in an attack on a Shia mosque in Peshawar (See Pakistan Battles Rising Sectarian Violence). On May 13, forty three Shia Ismailis were killed in Karachi when gunmen attacked their bus (See 43 killed in attack on bus carrying Ismailis in Karachi).   

So, there was widespread skepticism about Pakistani state's commitment to stop sectarianism. It was argued that various political parties and the military continue to see sectarian militias as allies in promoting their agendas. For example, Arif Rafiq, an expert on sectarianism in Pakistan, said to German broadcaster DW (See Examining Pakistan's growing sectarian violence):

The military as well as civilian politicians need to ease out of partnerships with groups that foment hate toward Shiites and other minorities in the country. The longer Pakistan's leaders continue to directly or indirectly aid hate groups, the longer it will be struggling to put out the fires started with its own hands. 

Source: BBC

So, killing of Malik Ishaq in 29th July, one of the most notorious sectarian militant leader, who boasted of killing more than hundred Shias, was against the run of the play. Not only Malik Ishaq was killed but his two sons and his second-in-command was also killed by the police. Malik Ishaq was in and out of jail for most of the last fifteen years, accused of being involved in hundreds of sectarian incidents but he was not convicted as witnesses and judges were threatened by him and his organization. It is widely believed that Malik was killed in a staged fight by police as he could not be convicted in a court. (See Malik Ishaq: Pakistan Sunni militant chief killed by police).

Does this means Pakistani state has finally decide to take on sectarian militants? It is too early to come to definite conclusion. However, things and events are snowballing. Army action in North Waziristan led to the Peshawar massacre which led to action against religious militants all across the country. While attacks by the TTP decreased, sectarian militancy continued, making the NAP a mockery as far as sectarian violence was concerned. There was pressure from public and media to punish sectarian militants. So, Malik Ishaq was killed. The cycle is continuing as according to many analysts Malik Ishaq's killing has led to the death of Punjab Home Minister Shuja Khanzada in a terrorist attack on 16th August (See Punjab home minister Shuja Khanzada killed in terror attack). Khanzada was not an ordinary minister. He was a close confidant of Prime Minister's brother Shahbaz Sharif, who is the Chief Minister of the Punjab province. He was also close to military hierarchy as he was himself an retired army officer, who had served in Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and Military Intelligence. His death was widely condemned and both political and military authorities promised to bring his murderers to justice. 

Why street protests work in Pakistan?

Daniel Markey recently wrote an article on the success of street protests in Pakistan?' (See Why street protests work in Pakistan?). His main arguments is that democratically elected leaders in Pakistan face such protests not only because they face very difficult challenges and weak political institutionalization but also because of their own tendencies to centralize power.

By rights, however, Sharif (and Zardari before him) should not face such a high deficit of popular legitimacy as the one that loomed over Musharraf's tenure. Whatever the flaws of national elections in 2008 and 2013, they were better than what came before, or at least no worse. It is hard to accept that the motivating energy behind the latest round of protests is truly a consequence of voting irregularities. No, today's opposition leaders Imran Khan and Tahir-ul-Qadri are opportunistically latching on to whatever charges can be leveled against Prime Minister Sharif and company. Vote rigging, like corruption, is a perennially effective club to wield against most Pakistani politicians and their parties. 

Part of Sharif's present vulnerability to popular protests can be explained by his own policy missteps that have dissipated enthusiasm for his rule. His dealings with the army, for instance, have been rife with tensions over the Musharraf case and the timing of negotiations and military operations against the TTP. In addition, although Pakistan's economy is no worse off than it was before Sharif assumed office (and by many measures, it is probably stronger), the common Pakistani has seen little material benefit. To be fair, even the best schemes for new power plants and Chinese-financed infrastructure cannot be realized overnight, but decades of unfulfilled promises by Pakistani politicians have jaded the public. The summertime heat and persistent power outages undercut Sharif's appeal as a can-do businessman, his calling card in the last election. 

 Yet lots of democracies face setbacks; the anti-incumbent theme of "throwing the bums out" is a universal rallying cry. In countries where democratic institutions are firmly entrenched, however, opposition parties work through parliamentary and electoral systems to accomplish those ends. It is primarily in democratic systems where institutions are weak and ineffective that unconventional forms of political participation, like street protests, are the norm. At least, this is the principal finding of an insightful political analysis comparing democratic states across Latin America by the Inter-American Development Bank in 2009.

By this logic, Nawaz Sharif's main failing -- the one that makes him most vulnerable to street protest today -- is his lack of investment in the institutionalization of democratic politics. That deficit is indeed glaring. Sharif's critics are right to chastise his do-nothing parliament and hyper-centralization of political authority in the hands of a tiny group of cronies.

I argued in my comments that what Markey is saying is right but the role of Pakistan's military cannot be ignored. It is one of the main reasons why such protests (with proportionally very small number of people) succeed:

A more pertinent question is why such SMALL street protests work in Pakistan. The current protest marchers in Islamabad  are around fifty thousand. Pakistan's population is more than 180 million. So, the question is why 0.003% of population can topple a government. Governing through parliament is important and there is no doubt that Nawaz Sharif' has centralized power but many other world leaders have a similarly centralized power and faced big protests and still continue to rule. Two prominent examples are Erdogan and Putin. Both these leaders have a centralized style of governance and faced proportionally bigger protests but still continue to rule. 

It is true that in countries where democratic institutionalization is weak, unconventional forms of political participation (e.g.  street protests) are the norm but do they topple governments? A pertinent example in that of Mexico where in 2006, there were large protests against vote rigging, similar to what is happening in Pakistan now. What was the end result? The Mexican government patiently waited and eventually protests ended.
There is also no need to resort to ruthless force as the Mexican example shows. Protesters in Mexico city camped for months. Pakistani government has to just wait and there is every reason to believe that Imran Khan supporters (who have a more valid case for protest) would fizzle out.
So, why Pakistani government is worried? The answer is history of military involvement in politics and the perception in Pakistan that military is not happy with Nawaz Sharif. This perception of military's displeasure emboldens Sharif's opponents and makes many others to hedge their bets or go against Sharif to protect their interests. For example, most of the news channels in Pakistan report news with a clear bias against Sharif government. They hardly question the legitimacy of having 0.003% of people demanding dissolution of national assembly, using undemocratic means.
Perhaps looking at Turkey in 1997 and in 2013 will clarify my contention. In 1997, a democratically elected government was toppled one year after being elected only by a memorandum by the Turkish military. In 2013, a democratically elected but much more centralized (and maybe more corrupt too) are not toppled. The main difference in 1997 and 2103 was the absence of military's political power in 2013.  

Mahathir and Erdogan: Similarities and use of nationalism

A lot has been written about the superb economic stewardship of both leaders and it has certainly been crucial for their popularity and electoral success. However, not many people know of another key ingredient behind their success – their management of ‘nationalism’.

My article published on Express Tribune Blog. A portion is reproduced below, rest can be read at Will Sharif be able to follow Mahathir and Erdogan?

Like Pakistan, the basis of nationalism is still open for debate in both Malaysia and Turkey. There are ethnic nationalists, religious nationalists and a large group of civic nationalists fighting over the raison d’être of their respective countries.

Mahathir and Erdogan both used this disagreement to their advantage and led coalitions of different nationalists at different times in their careers. Both adopted civic, ethnic or religious nationalism as the situation demanded.

Source: Will Sharif be able to follow Mahathir and Erdogan?

Mahathir began his career as an ethnic nationalist but later won popularity and even premiership as a Malay nationalist. He wrote a controversial book, The Malay Dilemma, to promote special policies for the people of Malaysia. However, once he attained power, he moved to the centre and tried to win overall Malaysians. And by the end of his rule, he started propagating a form of ethnoreligious nationalism, highlighting the special role of Malays and Islam in the creation of Malaysia.

On the other hand, Erdogan began his political career as a civic nationalist and despite his Muslim roots, presented himself as a leader for all Turkish people. He disparaged discrimination on the basis of ethnicity, gender or religion. However, in order to curtail the power of the Turkish military, he later became an ethnic nationalist and unashamedly claimed to be the redeemer of the ethnic nationalism of Ataturk and the early Turkish Republic.

His current stance is that of an ethnoreligious nationalist fighting against the world for his country, just like Mahathir near the end of his career.