Why a secular party is not allowed in Egypt?

Ahmed Fouad's article in Al-Monitor Is Egypt ready for a secular party? is about a recent attempt to form a secular party in Egypt. It is called Egyptian Secular Party (الحزب العلماني المصري). The article also traces three previous attempts to start such a party in Egypt. All of these attempts failed as Fouad explained:

1. In 2004, Mohsen Lotfi al-Sayed and other intellectuals submitted incorporation request for a secular party Hizb-Masr al-Um (Mother Egypt Party). This request was rejected by the chamber of political parties’ affairs. After removing the reference to secularism from the incorporation charter and changing the name to Al Hizb al-Masri al-Liberali (Liberal Egyptian Party), another request was submitted but it was also rejected by the Mubarak administration.
2. In 2011, novelist Alaa Hamed claimed that he wanted to start a secular party but was attacked by some Salafi leaders of Zifta city. Zifta residents denied his claim but no party was established. Fouad informs that Hamid was convicted of blasphemy in 1990 because of his book, The Void in a Man’s Mind: God’s Trial,
3. In July 2013, after President Morsi's ouster in a coup, Shiite leader Bahaa Anwar called for the establishment of a secular Fajr Party and demanded disbanding of all religious parties. The name of the party was later changed to Secular Egypt Party but again no party was registered.

Egyptian Secular Party is formed by a group of people, most well-known of which is Hesham Ouf. Ouf is an Egyptian businessman and his previous political experience is limited to owning a marketing research firm that worked for Mohamed ElBaradei’s and Amr Moussa’s campaigns in the 2012 presidential elections. Egyptian Secular Party, according to New secular party to 'challenge religious dominance', wants to separate religion from politics, abolish religious education, and limit the power of Al-Azhar University that according to the party has become a state within a state.

Egyptian Secular Party formation has been widely criticized. Its leaders have been called crazy, atheists, extremists and collaborators and its agenda has been declared unconstitutional and against religious values of the Egyptian people. The charge of unconstitutionality is based on two grounds. First, secularism is a termed a religion (as Islam, Judaism etc.) and as Egyptian constitution bans all religion-based political parties, it is declared that a secular party is also unconstitutional. Second, secular party is deemed unconstitutional because it is against sharia, which is a part of the Egyptian constitution.

Fouad is not very enthusiastic about this latest attempt to establish secular party because of the lack of support from the Egyptian state:

The chances of establishing the party remain remote, especially in light of the lack of a clear position by the state. Establishing the party anytime soon could be difficult, given the question of its constitutionality and opposition from those who consider it a violation of religious beliefs.

With it strong stance against political Islam and religion-based parties, it appears strange that Sisi's administration is not only not promoting this party but also reluctant to register it. Registering this party would have paid dividends outside Egypt as many Western governments would have more inclined to consider President Sisi a liberal and support him. However, the attitude of Sisi administration is non-committal. Why governments against political Islam are not supporting secularism when it also helps them improve their international standing and prospects of aid?

The main reasons appear to be an increasing mixing of Islam with nationalism and a general anger against the Western governments in the Muslim societies. These reasons can also be considered as a form of nativism that rejects the Western influences (but accepts its technological, scientific accomplishments) and searches for authenticity. Secularism, in this discourse and environment, is linked with the West, extreme liberalism and atheism and thus becomes illegitimate on two grounds. First, it is wrong because it is linked with the West which is termed as source of most of the troubles; hence the use of terms collaborators and traitors for secularists. Second, it is castigated because it is against Islam that is considered a 'native' religion and an Arab religion. Both these arguments are obviously false as there is a rich tradition of secularism in Islam and one can be a deeply religious Muslim as well as a secularist.

Muslim/Islamic secularism appears to be an oxymoron but it is not. Nader Hashmi in Islam, the State, and Political Authority: Medieval Issues and Modern Concerns (edited by Asma Afsaruddin) talks about a Muslim secularism which accepts (political, not philosophical) secularism 'while still maintaining a commitment to the principles and rituals of Islam.' This indigenous secularism is authentically Islamic, based on Islamic precepts, but is functionally secular. State is not against religion and religious groups are allowed in the public/political sphere but civil rights of minorities, women and others are rigorously protected.

Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na'im in his book Islam and the Secular State: Negotiating the Future of Shari`a  goes further and claims that secularism and secular state are more consistent with Sharia and history of Muslim societies than Islamic state and Sharia enforcement as a state law (p-268)

Despite criticism, Ouf is hopeful that his party would be registered:

The Constitution bans religious political parties, yet there are religious political parties operating. Why would the (government) committee then ban a secular political party, established in accordance with the Constitution?

Is General Sisi leading a coalition of civic nationalists?

Crown Center of Brandies University has posted an interesting brief on the US-Egypt relations ( See "Resetting" U.S.-Egypt Relations). The authors talk about the competing narratives of the US and Egyptian policymakers about the events since July 2013 and the gap and lack of understanding about the other side. The US policymakers see the last few months as the return of military authoritarianism and the abandonment of democracy. Although the mistakes of President Morsi are acknowledged by the US and the US government has refused to label the military takeover as a coup, nevertheless, it is hesitant to engage fully with the current Egyptian regime because it is clearly undemocratic. Banning of protests and mass killing of protesters has further alienated the US policymakers.

Egyptians, however, see the events of last ten month in a completely different light. They feel that July 2013 was a revolution against authoritarianism (comparable to January/February 2011 revolution) and saved Egypt from becoming a theocratic state. Muslim Brotherhood is considered a front for terrorists and its actions since July 2013 have left no doubt in Egyptian policymaker's minds that Brotherhood is against Egyptian national interest. Many Egyptians feel angry at the suspension of the US aid and consider that US/Obama administration bent on bringing Morsi back, completely ignoring Egyptian public opinion.

Source: Egypt's General al-Sisi: The man behind the image

What is interesting from our perspective is authors, Abdel Monem Said Aly and Prof. Shai Feldman, call the group, opposed to Muslim Brotherhood and leading Egypt now (defining the competing narrative), as 'Egypt's civic nationalists' or madaniyya and define them as follows:    

Egyptian civic nationalists accept Islam as the religion of the state, as stipulated in all Egyptian constitutions since 1923, but insist that all laws be enacted by the peoples’ elected representatives in Parliament, and that disputes be adjudicated by the judiciary—that is, by civilian courts. Accordingly, they objected strongly to Article 4 of the constitution proposed by the Muslim Brotherhood in 2012, providing that laws enacted would be subjected to review by al-Azhar University, which would be entrusted with verifying that they were consistent with Sharia law. They also objected to Article 219, which limited interpretation of Sharia law to a narrow school of Sunni thought, insisting instead that this task be left to the High Constitutional Court.

There are several problems with this labeling. First, the Salafist Al-Noor Party and al-Azhar University administration were part of the coalition that General Sisi used to topple President Morsi. These groups can hardly be defined as civic nationalists. Both of them argued for more role of religion in the constitution and were supporters of the Article 4. Second, although a large part of the group that supported July 2013 coup/revolution was civil nationalists, many were not. Egyptians criticized Morsi and Brotherhood not only because of their religious orientation but also due to the lack of governance and rising poverty, inequality and inefficiency. The dire economic conditions in Egypt played a prominent role in persuading Egyptians to join protests against Morsi (See Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi’s Biggest Challenge? The Economy, Stupid). To argue, without evidence, that all or most of the Egyptians joining the protests were angry because of Morsi/Brotherhood's religious nationalism is not correct. Moreover, since July 2013, it is clear that it is the Egyptian military that is controlling the state and civic nationalists are being used. Whenever civil society/nationalists tried to reign in the military or increase their freedoms, they were brutally suppressed (See Egypt another step backward on civil-society and Egypt’s Death Sentences, Ban of ‘April 6' Criminalize Political Opposition).  Therefore, the argument that Obama administration is not understanding civil nationalists' narrative is again not correct. Obama administration is willing to work with civil nationalists and has tried to accommodate them but military junta's undemocratic and brutal campaign against all types of opposition (including civic nationalists) cannot be ignored.

In conclusion, the brief tries to explain a very complex situation in terms of Islamists and civic nationalists. This simplifying attempt can be termed as simplistic at best and deceiving at worst. It extends the 'clash of civilizations' narrative, despite clear evidence to the contrary.      

Egyptian Politics, Islam and Muslim Brotherhood

This week an Egyptian academic and journalist Atef Said posted a blogpost on Immanent Frame: Secular, Religion and the Public Sphere. The blogpost is about the current impasse in Egyptian politics and Muslim Brotherhood future (See Three Observations on Religion, Politics and the Muslim Brotherhood).

Said made three observations. Commenting on 'Religion and Politics', he argued that religion is not out of Egyptian politics because General Sisi is himself arguing that he is saving moderate Islam from extremism and has tried to woo Salafi Al-Nour party; Sisi has also received religious endorsements; and despite somewhat less than the Constitution approved in 2012, Islam remains part of new constitution. Secondly, Said does not see an explicit participation of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) in electoral politics in the near future. Said argues that although MB was banned under Mubarak too, it is different than under general Sisi because of anti-MB hysteria promoted by the current military regime; alienation and (possible) dissatisfaction of MB youth with electoral politics because of recent severe repression; and absence of any negotiations between MB and regime, a contrast to MB's negotiated electoral participation under Mubarak. Finally, Said called for a new theoretical framework to explain the four paradoxes of MB politics. MB is both an organization and a movement; it is both religious and political; it is working for both a democratic state and a Islamic state; and it is dogmatic internally and pragmatic externally.

My comments on the post are reproduced below.

An interesting article that highlights the present paradoxes and contradictions of Egyptian politics but shies away from taking sides, a difficult task in the current polarized atmosphere.

I would, however, like the author to use his detailed knowledge of Egyptian society and wider Muslim world in a more clear way. For example, while talking about religion and politics in the current Egypt, he ignores the similarities of what is happening in Egypt now with what happened under other authoritarian regimes in the past. What Sisi is doing is nothing new. Starting from Reza Shah Pahlevi of Iran (1925-41), authoritarian regimes have often posed as defender of moderate/real Islam against extremism (i.e. Islam of their enemies). They have often gotten endorsements from some religious authorities and Islam has remained part of constitutions/national identities. Other rulers that followed this trend were Afghanistan’s King Amanullah Khan (1919-29), Pakistan’s General Ayub Khan (1958-69), Iran’s Muhammad Reza Pahlevi (1941-79), Qaddafi (1969-2011), General Musharraf of Pakistan (1999-2008) and of course Egypt’s Nasser and Sadat.

Nasser’s absence is particularly conspicuous as author is himself Egyptian and we can learn a lot about what is happening now to MB from what happened to MB under Nasser. Author’s second observation offers three reasons why politics were possible under Mubarak but are not possible under Sisi:

• There is anti-MB hysteria

• MB’s youth are alienated because of repression and may opt for violence instead of electoral politics

• MB’s political participation under Mubarak was negotiated

All three of these elements were present under Nasser in the late 1950s and 1960s. Supporters of General Sisi compare him to Nasser and while Sisi is different from Nasser (due to the absence of vision, ideology and other endearing features), he is a Nasser redux in terms of his relationship with MB. Nasser banned MB; used extreme repression against them; and courts under him sentenced hundreds of MB supporters to death, including Sayyid Qutb.
Author is right to call for a new theoretical framework to analyze MB and its politics. This framework can learn from research on West European Communist parties. These ‘anti-system’ parties faced all the four paradoxes that MB faces today:

• West European Communist parties were both parties and movements as becoming a member had strict requirements and some negative consequences;

• West European Communist parties were both ideological and political. Doctrinal purity regularly clashed with the reality of politics.

• Communist ideology had some anti-democratic features so these parties were both for and against democracy. They were trying to bring a worker’s revolution while running in elections;

• West European Communist parties were internally dogmatic but had a pragmatic behavior externally. Internal debate was not encouraged in these parties but their leaders were ready to form coalitions with other political parties.

In ‘When Victory Is Not an Option: Islamist Movements in Arab Politics’, Nathan J. Brown explores the contradictions in Islamist organizations and compares them with Communist and Green parties.