Hindu Civilizationism: Make India Great Again

Abstract

Hindu civilizationism is more than a century old phenomenon that has been steadily gaining strength. Its recent amalgam with populism has made it ascendant, popular, and mainstream in India. This paper explores how Hindu civilizationism is not only an essential part of the Hindutva and BJP’s narrative but also the mainstay of several government policies. The “other” of the BJP’s populist civilizationist rhetoric are primarily Muslims and Muslim civilization in India and the aim is to make India “vishwaguru” (world leader) again after 1200 years of colonialism. The evidence of this heady mixture of civilizationism and populism is numerous and ubiquitous. This paper analyzes topics such as Akhand Bharat, the golden age, denigrating Mughals, Hindutva pseudoscience, and Sanskrit promotion to highlight the evidence.

Article

1. Introduction

Civilizationism uses a religio-civilization classification of people to define national identity. Territorial nationalism is deemphasized as the nation is imagined beyond national boundaries. Citizens, who are considered part of the civilization-nation based on religion, are asked to defend or save their civilization which is considered under threat. The state becomes a means to achieve the objective which is civilizational longevity and success.

This civilizational rhetoric has become more common as populist leaders around the world have used it to attract voters who are dissatisfied with the dominant ideologies and established mainstream parties. Numerous authors have pointed out how rightwing populist European parties and leaders defined self and the other not in national but in broader civilizational terms. Christian civilization, Christian heritage, or Judeo-Christian civilization and traditions are considered in crisis and under threat from Islam and Muslims. The “patriots” are told they have only two choices, act or go extinct (Brubaker 2016, 2017; Kaya and Tecmen 2019; Ozzano and Bolzonar 2020; Yilmaz and Morieson 2021; Marchetti et al. 2022).

Populism is generally considered a thin ideology that attaches itself to rightwing or leftwing ideologies to give coherence, strength, and program to its rhetoric. Yilmaz and Morieson (2022a) have identified civilizationism as another thick ideology that populism attached itself to. Civilizationism, for them, is an idea that divides and categorizes people based on “civilizations” that are primarily based on religion. This is different from the usual division of people based on nations and populists’ framing of “the people” as people of a country.

Hindu civilizationism, like in many other countries, is closely associated with rightwing nationalism and populism. Hindutva (literally Hindu-ness) is a popular political ideology that defines Indian values and nationalism primarily in terms of Hinduism and Hindu civilization, lays claim that only Hindus have the right to rule in India, and aims to replace a secular Indian constitution with a Hindu state (Hindu Rashtra). Hindutva political parties, organizations, and social movements raised the flag of civilizationism before Indian independence in 1947, and more than a century later, they are still its torchbearers. The ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) is just the latest and most successful of the political rightwing conservative organizations. In terms of making Hindu civilizationism popular, the BJP plays second fiddle to almost a hundred-year-old Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), a militant Hindutva organization.

Hindu civilizationism, therefore, is not a new phenomenon. It started as part of Hindu revivalism in the early 19th century. Hindu revivalists, such as Raja Ram Mohan Roy, the founder of Brahmo Samaj, wanted to reform Hinduism and Hindu society so that it could rise above the social evils and iniquitous rituals and regain its position as a great civilization. Later, in the last century, civilizationist organizations were formed whose main objectives were political even when they were not working as a political party. For a long time, from the 1940s to the 1970s, these organizations and the political parties they supported remained unpopular. However, civilizationists started winning elections at the state level in the 1980s and won national elections in the late 1990s. They ruled India under Prime Minister Vajpayee (1999–2004) but as they did not have the majority of Lok Sabha seats, they were always dependent on other parties and could not fully implement their agenda. The second decade of the 21st century brought a sea change in their fortunes as, like many rightwing civilizationists in other countries, they discovered an affinity between their ideology and populism. The embrace of populism under Prime Minister Modi made them the supreme political force and, currently, Hindu civilizationism is the dominant ideology in India. PM Narendra Modi has trounced the opposition in the 2014 and 2019 national elections and he is by far the most popular leader in India, most likely to win the 2024 national elections (Pradhan 2022).

Modi riding a chariot reminiscence of ancient Hindu Gods, Avatars, Rajas and Hindu civilization

Source: Narendra Modi Twitter

During the last decade, Hindu civilizationism rhetoric has been rising steadily, with the support of populism. The people-elite divide of populism has been used to discredit the Congress Party and Nehru-Gandhi dynasty. Similarly, the people-outsider divide, another regular feature of populist politics, was used to declare Hindus as the only original inhabitants of India and Muslims and Christians as outsiders. Fear, threat, and crisis were used by Modi, like other populists, to force ordinary Hindus to be afraid (Hindu khatray main hai: Hindus are in danger) and act as advised by Modi. Finally, Modi’s image as the only strong, decisive leader in India was carefully crafted, as in the case of many other populist leaders, to sway voters (Modi hai to mumkin hai: If there is Modi, then it is possible) (Sinha 2021; Saleem 2021; Saleem et al. 2022; Yilmaz and Morieson 2022b).

The othering of Muslims and other political forces as anti-nationals and non/fake Hindus is increasing in India. Hinduism has been presented as under threat from Muslims despite Hindus being close to eighty percent of the Indian population. Indians are being made to believe that Muslims and Westerners are again plotting to subjugate Hindus as they did many times during the previous twelve hundred years. The BJP has achieved what was unimaginable a few decades ago (Varshney 2019; Amarasingam et al. 2022).

However, it must be clear that Modi is not more civilizationist than previous civilizationists. The key difference between Modi and Hindu civilizationists of the 1960s and 1970s is the degree of populism, not the degree of civilizationism. Like Modi, Hindu civilizationists of the 20th century were also talking about Akhand Bharat, the golden Vedic age, oppressive Muslim/Mughal invaders, superiority of Hindu civilization, and Sanskrit promotion. Hindutva party manifestos of Hindu Mahasabha and Bharatiya Jana Sangh give ample evidence of civilizationalism (Saleem 2021). Populists are quite successful in the use of transnational solidarity today due to a number of reasons, such as revolution in information and communication technologies, globalization, increase in economic inequality and distrust in democratic institutions in numerous countries, rise in ethnic/religious attachments with the concurrent decline in liberalism, etc. However, they were not the first ones to use transnational solidarity. For instance, between 1987 and 1989, during the Ram Mandir movement, hundreds of thousands of bricks were donated for the eventual construction of Ram Mandir in Ayodhya. These bricks were donated in response to a campaign by the Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP), a Hindutva organization. The Ram Mandir movement and VHP campaign were pro-Hindutva and Hindu civilizationist. They were also transnational as bricks for the mandir were donated not only by people living in India but also by people of 55 other countries of the world (Udayakumar 1997; Hindustan Times 2021)....

In the following section, the prominence of Hindu civilizationism in present day India and Hindutva leaders’ consistent efforts to prove the grandeur and glorious achievements of Hindu civilization will be shown. The section will also demonstrate how Hindu civilizationism is being promoted by denigrating Muslim civilization and its achievements. Most of the papers on civilizationism focus on Christian-majority and Muslim-majority countries. This paper analyzes civilizationism in India, a Hindu-majority country. The key theoretical contribution of this paper is that it presents the evidence that civilizationism as a concept is as applicable and functional in a Hindu majority country as it is in Christian, Jewish, and Muslim majority countries.

Rest of the article can be read here.

Malta, LGBT rights, abortion, & religious nationalism

Malta, a small island nation in the Mediterranean Sea, has a national identity that is strongly influenced by Catholicism. The religious culture of Malta can be traced back to the Order of the Knights of the Hospital of St. John of Jerusalem (also called the Knights Hospitaller and the Knights of Malta) which participated in the Crusades and were given the control over Malta in 1530 because of their contribution and devotion to the religious cause. Knights Hospitaller had an interesting history. A religious order created in the 7th century to take care of the Christian pilgrims and sick in the Holy Land (Jerusalem) it became a military order by the turn of the millennium. It also expanded and had properties donated to them or built by them all over Europe. After the fall of Jerusalem (1187) to Saladin and later of Kingdom of Jerusalem (1291), the Knights moved to Cyprus and then captured Rhodes to become Knights of Rhodes in the 14th century. Here, the Knights primary opponents were Barbary pirates and Muslim Turks. The Ottomans were eventually able to able to defeat Knights after almost fifty years of a military campaign in 1522. The Knights were allowed to withdraw from Rhodes and after seven years were given the control of Malta by the Spanish monarch, courtesy a former knight and Pope Clement VII in 1530 for a symbolic annual tribute of a single Maltese falcon. From 1530 to 1798, the Knights of Malta, as they were called, ruled and shaped life in Malta. Napoleon defeated them in 1798, on the way to the Egyptian invasion. Later, Malta came under the British in 1814 and became independent in 1964.

Philip Barker in his book, Religious Nationalism in Modern Europe: If God be for Us, contends that Malta's Catholic identity, acquired under the Knights, was crystallized under the rule of the religious "other." First, it was Muslim Turks, then anticlerical French, and finally, for the next one and a half century, it was Protestant Britain. Due to the domination of religious other, "Catholicism is central to self-perception" of the Maltese. Unsurprisingly, Maltese politics is influenced by the majority religion and Article 2 of the Constitution makes Catholicism the state religion of Malta, gives the Church the duty and the right to teach people morality, and makes religious teaching mandatory in all public schools.

One can argue that, like in Ireland and Poland, Catholicism is an integral part of Malta's nationalism. Religious nationalism until recently accepted and proclaimed. The preeminance of the Catholic Church could be seen in state ceremonies. For instance, in Maltese courts, a person under aoth also has to kiss a cross presented to him/her (minorities are allowed to kiss their own holy books or the Maltese constitution). All incoming Prime Minister tradiotnally kiss a cross after taking oath. In January 2020, after taking the oath, the new PM Robert Abela also kissed the cross. And it was quite a scandel when Alfred Sant, a Labour PM, refused to kiss the cross in 1996. 

An interesting article in The Economist (Malta leads the way for gay and transgender rights in Europe) rightly argues that the tiny island "is deeply Catholic and hardly an oasis of liberalism." Usually, it is Northern and Western European countries that come up with policies that are then followed by Eastern and Southern European countries. Sometimes, the latter adopt these policies on their own accord but, at other times,  they have to be pushed. Many Eastern European countries, for instance, adopted liberal policies when these policies were made a requisite condition for entry into the European Union. 

Malta is conservative country but changes are happening and the hold of religious elements, particularly the Catholic Church, is decreasing. In 2011, Malta legalized divorce after a long hard fight. It required a national referendum to decide the issue. In 2013, the Labour Party, a center-left party defeated the center-right Nationalist Party. The Labour Party took power after fifteen years. Since then, Labour Party has come up with several liberal policies. First, in 2016, Malta became the only country in Europe to ban conversion therapy for gays. Second, in July 2017, Malta made the language in the official documents gender-neutral. Gendered terms, such as father, husband, wife, and mother, were removed from the country’s Marriage Act and all other laws. Next, in August 2017, Malta legalized same-sex marriage. Some would, however, argue Malta has been liberal since the early 2000s. Gays were allowed to openly serve in the military in 2002 and discrimination based on gender identity and sexual orientation have been criminalized since 2004.

Source: Malta leads the way for gay and transgender rights in Europe

Today, Malta is recognized as one of the most gay-friendly countries in the world. This may be taken as an indication of decrease of religious nationalism and many would hope that Malta would soon become a secular country. However, although the hold of the Catholic Church has wanned, it is still very influential. Exihbit 1: Malta is the only country in the EU that still bans abortion entirely. Even in case of incest, rape or danger to mother's life, abortion is not allowed. 

And the new PM Abela is not oging to change things. He sees no reason why the constitution should be amended and Roman Catholicism removed as Malta's official religion. He said:

Malta is a secular state, but the constitution also affords a strong, fundamental freedom that everyone is entitled to his religion of choice...While I believe in a secular society, where there is a distinction between the State and religion, and the autonomies are respected, we share common values and I wanted to send a message.

Abela is also for strict policy against abortion. He has made clear that he would not support any changes in the law regarding abortion (Malta Today).

Is there a separation of church and state in Islam?

Millions of people, both Muslims and non-Muslims, even scores of academics, believe that in Islam, there is no separation of church and state. They point out to Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) being a prophet as well as the head of the state. The period of the first four righteous caliphs, the Rashidun (632-661), is also presented as evidence.  The presence of close links between Muslim kings and ulema (scholars of Islam) and the implementation of Sharia by Muslim sovereigns strengthens the case and finally, views of noted Islamists and examples of governments of Iran and Saudi Arabia are used to close the argument.

Several assumptions are made in these arguments that have no basis in history. These assumptions are based on applying a normative framework based on European experience on Islam. Understanding Islamic religion and history using European and Christian experience as the model will, unsurprisingly, lead to distorted and/or sub-optimal results. Following is an example of Muslims and Islam being considered copies of Christians and Christianity and Christian history of Europe being considered a model for Muslims to adopt:

Consider the most famous waves of Christian violence, in the 16th and 17th centuries. Wars of religion devastated Europe, killing huge percentages of national populations. States disintegrated and acts of terror were commonplace. The main impetus for these wars was the question of which Christian sect - Protestantism or Catholicism - would rule each state. Clergy had great amounts of political power, dispensing law and owning huge tracts of land. Nationalism was, as yet, weak. The question of which religion would dominate in which area was also the question of who would rule. 

Eventually Europe’s religious wars calmed down, and a solution was reached. In the Peace of Westphalia, it was agreed that governments - not clergy - would get to decide which religion would prevail in their territories...

Nowadays, the Middle East is embroiled in a set of conflicts that look a bit reminiscent of the European Wars of Religion. A few powerful, cohesive states - Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey - are fueling proxy wars in anarchic areas like Iraq, Syria, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Somalia, Libya, and Yemen...Just as the European Wars of Religion featured Christians mostly killing Christians, the Islamic Wars of Religion feature mostly Muslims killing other Muslims...The obvious solution, it would seem, is for Islam to come to the same collective realization that Christianity came to after 1648 - that church and state make for a volatile mix, and should be separated. (Source: Noah Smith: Islam Needs To Separate Church and State)

The antagonistic relationship that Christianity had with the state for its initial three hundred years has no parallel in Islam, whose relationship with the state was without serious disagreements. Furthermore, and more importantly, there has never been a church in the form of the Catholic Church in Islamic history. One can search far and wide and will not find it. There has never been a pope, with his bishops, in Islamic history that could speak for God. In medieval Europe, there was one Pope (except for a few decades) and many rulers, making the Pope's opinion and approval important. In almost all Muslim realms, in contrast, there was one king and scores of Muslim scholars to choose from. There were many kings who may have been excommunicated by Muslim clerics but since there was no central religious authority so there were few repercussions for the king (excommunicating clerics, however, suffered imprisonment, exile, and even execution for their transgression). Kings and emperors always had many more clerics to endorse them than those who reject them.    

Graham E. Fuller, in his book A World Without Islam (2012) brilliantly unpacks the differences between sway and power of the Catholic Church and the lack of anything similar in the Islamic history (as given in Separation of “church and state” in Islamic history):

Islam actually had no parallel to the intimate links between church and state in the West, where the church itself wielded great political and economic power.  While Islamists today — those speaking for forms of political Islam — constantly emphasize the indissoluble unity of religion and state in Islam (din wa dawla), in fact, this perception is largely a modern ideological construct: state power in Islam was virtually always distinct from the clerics.  Religious officials in Islamic states never appointed leadership or controlled the state.  (Clerical domination of the state in today’s Iran is a glaring exception, a modern Shi‘ite innovation.)  Even in Saudi Arabia the monarchy in most contexts is far more powerful than are clerical institutions.

To be sure, the legitimacy of Muslim rulers historically depended upon their implementation of Shari‘a law, at least in theory, but a great deal of the time rulers did not seriously implement its spirit, and they rarely could be overthrown for such religious lapses.  In fact, some medieval Muslim clerics inadvertently dispensed virtual carte blanche authority to misrule by secular powers by declaring that anarchy (fitna) was worse even than oppressive rule (dhulm).  Indeed, no sultan or Muslim ruler in Islamic history ever kneeled to ask forgiveness before a grand mufti in the way that Henry IV was forced to do before the pope in 1077 in Canossa for challenging papal authority on some key secular matters. Henry VIII of England had to break with Rome entirely simply to secure the divorce he sought from his wife.  Thus, intimate linkage between religious and state power marked most of Christian history in a way that has had no parallel in Islam.  (122-123)

And this lack of a Church, with a capital C, in Islam is not a historical development. It is what flows from the Quran and the Sunnah (of the Prophet), two basic sources of Islam. Nowhere in the Quran is there mention of the establishment of a Church. Similarly, the Prophet, in his life, did not establish a Church. Islam propagates a direct relationship between an individual and her God, enjoins Muslims to study the Quran and seek guidance from it. Clearly, this set-up does not favor the establishment of a powerful church and a priesthood that can rival kings. 

Historically, after the Prophet, the religious authority of the leader was withdrawn. The Rashidun, whose period is considered to be a model, to be emulated by all future leaders, by the Sunnis, did not have religious authority. They did introduce some new things or promoted some actions but their decisions regarding religion were always contested and remain contested today. They did not have the religious authority of a prophet, not even a pope. There were many companions of the Prophet who were considered equally or more well-versed in Islamic precepts and edicts than the four caliphs. It is nor without reason that the four righteous caliphs never claimed to be in communication with God or receiving any direct instructions (like the Prophet did). The Prophet also clearly told in his lifetime that after him, there would no revelation. The door of revelation, the direct communication with God, was permanently closed for all times to come after him. There is also no claim for a superior esoteric knowledge that the leader will have had over and above others. None of the caliphs claimed it. Although Shiites do believe Ali, the last of the Rashidun, had superior esoteric knowledge of divine rules, he ruled for only four years and what to say of his religious authority, his temporal authority was contested like none of the other three previous caliphs. During his whole tenure, he fought to end a rebellion and he was martyred before the rebellion ended.

If Rashidun could not (or did not) claim religious authority, the caliphs that came afterward had no choice but to leave religious authority in the hands of clerics. The caliphs after Rashidun were not very different from Christian or Hindu kings. They had attained power not because of their close association with Islam or the Prophet, but due to their superior military might and political acumen. They knew it and most of the Muslims under than knew it so there were not many attempts to enforce something different. Of course, there were few dynasties that did claim divine right to rule, such as the Fatimids, but their religious authority was never completely accepted in their own realm, what to say in the whole Muslim world.

The relationship between Muslim kings and emperors on one hand and the chief judge (Qazi ul-quzat) and chief law interpreter (Shiekh ul-Islam) -- two powerful positions generally reserved for clerics -- was mostly similar to the relationship between the king and the (grand) vizir. Vizirs had authority but they served at the pleasure of the king. The king could appoint any of the scholars of Islam to the above-mentioned posts and usually, the selection was based on scholar's acceptance of the sovereign's authority. 

The king had to publically follow Islam and enforce Sharia. But here again, kings had options. They could suspend or ignore rules they did not like. They could also publicly flaunt their non-acceptance of some parts of Sharia and get away with it. Most of the Muslim kings murdered their rivals (including their brothers, nephews, etc.) and fought wars against other Muslim kings, leading to the deaths of thousands of Muslims. Many of them drank alcohol and had harams full of women. 

Unsurprisingly, there is also an Islamic tradition of God-fearing, learned, and illustrious clerics avoiding and refusing any relationship with the rulers. All founders of the five major schools of thought of Islam (Imam Abu Hanifa, Imam Shafa'i, Imam Malik, Imam Hanbal, and Shiite Imam Jaafar) had an antagonistic relationship with their state authorities. A few of them, such Imam Abu Hanifa, were offered the posts of chief faqih (interpreter of law) and/or chief judge but they refused. There are also some hadiths (sayings of the Prophet) that discourage people from accepting powerful appointments or having a close relationship with rulers:

Whoever goes to the gates of the ruler will endure trail/temptation. A person does not move closer to the ruler except that he moves further away from Allah. (Source: Musnad Ahmad 8619)

He who has been appointed a judge among the people has been killed without a knife. (Source: Sunan Abu Dawud 3571)

The rule of ulema or theocracy is a concept alien to Islam. Medieval Islamic texts, many written by clerics themselves, almost never present clerics as an alternative to a bad or unislamic ruler. The concept of Walayet-e-Faqih or guardian jurist (developed by Imam Khomeini and later enshrined in the Iranian Constitution) is a new concept even in the long Shiite tradition. Even now, many of the Shiite clerics both inside and outside Iran reject this concept.  

The above discussion also invalidates the last argument. The Islamists and the governments of Iran and Saudi Arabia might claim that there is no separation of church and state in Islam but it is clearly not the case. Therefore, they can keep justifying their desires or their actions by pointing to something imaginary but their proclamations do not make it real. Some rudimentary knowledge of the Quran, the Sunnah, and Islamic history settles the question that the church and state are separate in Islam.

  

Is "Trumpism" a new kind of nationalism?

Baylor University released the results of the fifth wave of the Baylor Religion Survey in September 2017 (See American Values, Mental Health and Using Technology in the Age of Trump). It is one of the most extensive surveys that is regularly conducted on religious attitudes in the United States. Around 11000 adults, chosen randomly from a stratified sample, were asked to respond to the survey and the 1501 complete responses were used for the analysis. 

The survey was conducted in the first few months of Donald Trump's presidency and, besides regular concerns, the survey focused on Trump voters. The survey found that people who voted for Trump in November 2016 generally believed:

• Themselves to be "very religious;"
• That the US is or was a Christian nation; 
• Muslims are a threat to America;
• In gender traditionalism; 
• In an Authoritative God. (p-6 of the Baylor Religion Survey (BRS) report)

From this information, the report writers conclude that a new form of nationalism is visible:

This collection of values and attitudes form the core ethos of what we might call Trumpism. It is a new form of nationalism which merges pro-Christian rhetoric with anti-Islam, anti-feminist, anti-globalist, and anti-government attitudes. (p-7 of the BRS report)

Is "Trumpism" a new kind of nationalism? Trumpism is a new phenomenon and journalists, analysts and academics are still trying to understand it and see where it fits in the political firmament.  Some are calling it a new type of conservatism and the biggest transformation of the conservative movement since the 1960s (See Is Trumpism the New Conservatism?), others tussle with the issue and argue that Trump is not a true conservative but he believes in true conservatism and is governing or will govern like a true conservative i.e. there will be no new type of conservatism as Trumpism will soon merge in the mainstream conservative movement (See Is Donald Trump a conservative? We asked the CPAC faithful).

So, again, is Trumpism a new kind of nationalism? The characteristics of Trump voters identified above give us a clue.

Source: BRS Wave 5, 2017

First, survey analysis shows that most of the Trump voters consider themselves to be very religious. Religion is important for them and many of them are evangelical Christians. 

Source: BRS Wave 5, 2017

Second, generally, Trump voters believe that America was or still is a Christian nation. The survey statistics show that almost 60% of Americans believe that American is or was a Christian nation, a sign of the overall strength of religious nationalism in the US. 

Source: BRS Wave 5, 2017

Most of the those who believed in Christian nationalism voted overwhelmingly for Trump in 2016. The report also acknowledges the strength of religious/Christian nationalism in the US and its association with Trumpism but did not call Trumpism a type of religious nationalism.

Source: BRS Wave 5, 2017

The BRS survey results also showed that Republicans generally subscribe more to religious/Christian nationalism than independents or Democrats. This survey result can be interpreted as indicating that Trumpism is not much different from the mainstream Republican Party that is currently moving closer to Christian nationalism. 

Source: BRS Wave 5, 2017

The third characteristic of the Trump voters, based on BRS survey results, was their Islamophobia or fear of Muslims. Generally, Americans feel threatened by both Muslims and conservative Christians. However, most conservative Christians, who voted for Trump, fear Muslims more than any group. 

Source: BRS Wave 5, 2017

Fear of other religions or "othering" of religions that are different from one's own is a characteristic of religious nationalists. Clearly, if one feels one's religion is the basis of nationalism, then people who do not believe in one's religion cannot be part of one's nation even if they live next door and speak the same language. The following graph demonstrates that people who believe that America was or is a Christian nation consider refugees from the Middle East, who are almost all Muslims, a terrorist threat.

Source: BRS Wave 5, 2017

The fourth characteristic of Trump voters is gender traditionalism i.e. men and women have different roles in life. Gender traditionalism is also associated with the belief that marriage is between a man and a woman. These characteristics are also associated with Christian nationalism in the US.
Source: BRS Wave 5, 2017

Source: BRS Wave 5, 2017

Source: BRS Wave 5, 2017

These characteristics are associated with religious nationalism worldwide. In fact, religious nationalists belonging to different traditions (Christian, Jewish, Hinduism, Islamic, etc.), though bitter enemies of each other, agree on this issue.

Finally, Trump voters generally believe in an "authoritative God." The concept of authoritative God was given by Baylor University professors Paul Froese and Christopher Bader in their book,  America's Four Gods: What We Say about God — & what that Says about Us, published in 2010. Matt Young explains the thesis of the book and the four types of God.

The thesis of the book is, in essence, that classifying people according to their religious denomination (or lack thereof) tells you little about, for example, their politics or their views on science. Instead, Froese and Bader classify people according to the kind of God they believe in: authoritative, benevolent, critical, and distant (not to mention none).
Froese and Bader pose 2 questions, “To what extent does God interact with the world? To what extent does God judge the world?” As a result of interviews and surveys, they conclude that

Americans differ radically in their beliefs about how closely God guides and judges their lives. These two dynamic dimensions of belief reveal four distinct images of God:

1. The Authoritative God—one who is both engaged and judgmental [31%]
2. The Benevolent God—one who is engaged but not judgmental [24%]
3. The Critical God—one who is not engaged but judgmental [16%]
4. The Distant God—one who is not engaged or judgmental [24%]
[5. Atheist [5%]]

But most important, do these different Gods matter? Unequivocally, yes. A person’s God is a direct reflection of his level of moral absolutism, his view of science, his understanding of economic justice, his concept of evil, and how he thinks we should respond to it. And these powerful relationships exist regardless of where he lives, the color of his skin, the amount of money he makes, how many years he has spend [sic] in school, or the church he attends.

Simply put, America’s four Gods lie at the heart of our moral, cultural, and political disagreements. (See America's Four Gods)

Froese and Bader argue that belief in a specific type of Church (or religion) is not a sure prediction of belief in a specific type of God. However, there is some statistical association, for instance, between belief in a distant God and belonging to "nones."

Coming back to Trumpism, most of the Trump voters believe in an authoritative God and those who believe in an authoritative God are more likely to be religious nationalists. Survey results revealed that those believe in an authoritarian God are more likely to want the declaration of the US as a Christian nation and are not likely to favor the strict enforcement of separation of church and state.

Source: BRS Wave 5, 2017

Source: BRS Wave 5, 2017

Is Trumpism a new type of nationalism, then? The above discussion indicates that of the five characteristics of Trumpism identified by the BRS Wave 5, at least four are also the characteristics of religious nationalism. So, Trumpism does not appear to be a new type of nationalism. 

God in US State Constitutions

According to some studies, the church-state relationship in the US is unique in the world as it is the only country in the world which neither regulates the practice any religion nor passes any religious legislation. However, as argued in this blog previously, this was not always the case. Religion and state were intertwined for decades at the sub-national level. For example, several US states had religious tests for public office and minority religions faced persecution (See American Secularism: A historical view of separation of the Church and the State in the US). For example, currently, 37 states have Blaine amendments forbidding public funds from being used for sectarian schools. These amendments in the state constitutions were made in the late 19th century because of anti-catholicism fervor that was rampant in the US at that time. The original Blaine amendment at the federal level was proposed by James G. Blaine, who served as Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives (1869-1875), but it failed to pass. The sub-national (state) legislatures, however, took the cue and passed similar amendments at their level (See Blaine Amendment(s) and the separation of church and state in the US). 

Reading the history of "wall of separation" between church and government in the US, it is clear that the impregnable wall was constructed recently, in the mid-twentieth century. Moreover, the wall is still quite weak at the state level and it is quite possible that, if President Trump had an opportunity to appoint one or two more conservative Supreme Court judges, the strict separation may give way to a more lenient separation, particularly at the state level. 

Why religion plays a much larger role at the sub-national/state level than at the national level? One reason was the powerful hold of religion on people in colonial America. Another reason can be the significant role of religious elite in the creation of various states in colonial America. All the New England colonies (except Rhode Island) were founded by Puritan Calvinist Protestants and in each of them, the Congregational church was the established church. The mid-Atlantic and Southern colonies, like New York, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia, were established by Crown land grants and, like Great Britain, had the Church of England as the established church. Pennsylvania (founded by the Quakers), Delaware, New Jersey and Rhode Island did not have an established church but majority denomination played a significant role even in these territories. Maryland initially did not have an established church but later Church of England was proclaimed as the established church. 

Even after the US independence and the adoption of the US Constitution and Bill of Rights, many states continued to have established churches. The US founding fathers accepted the first amendment not only to limit religion role in the federal government but also to allow states to keep their established churches, without jeopardizing the new federal structure. They had no intention, at least in the near future, to stop religion's role in the state governments.

During the last two hundred years, the role of religion has decreased in all of the US states.  As explained in a previous blog post, the US Supreme Court has become very strict in maintaining the wall of separation, both at the federal and state level  (See American Secularism: A historical view of separation of the Church and the State in the US). However, references to God and the divine written in all states constitutions earlier are still very much part of them. Is it because such references are patriotic, ceremonial and inspirational and not theological or ritualistic, similar to what the US federal courts decreed about the US national motto (In God we trust)? Maybe.

Pew Research Center analysis has done a very interesting study about the mentioning of word God, divine, Providence, etc. in the state constitutions (See God or the divine is referenced in every state constitution). Following are few of the interesting results:

• In every state constitution, God or the divine is mentioned at least once;
• In total,  God or the divine is mentioned nearly 200 times in the 50 state constitutions; 
• More than two-third of the state constitutions (34) refer to God more than once;
• God, as a word, appears 116 times in state constitutions;
• Massachusetts' constitution refers to God eight times, more than in any state constitution. New Hampshire and Vermont are at the second place, with six references each. It is very surprising as these three states are among the least religious in the US;
• In addition to references to God, there are also 46 references to “almighty,” 14 references to a Supreme or Sovereign Being, seven to the “Creator,” four to “divine,” and three to “Providence;” 
• The word “Christian” appears seven times in the state constitutions;
• Surprisingly, some state constitutions still explicitly prohibit those who do not believe in God from holding public office. However, these bans have not recently been enforced.

Source: From the Pew's article referred above

The strict American secularism is around fifty years old. Frequent references to God or divine in the state constitutions can provide the basis for the breaking or (at least) undermining of the wall of separation. 

Blaine Amendment(s) and separation of Church and State in the US

Blaine-type amendments are in the news because recently the US Supreme Court gave a decision against their strict interpretation. This has implications for church-state relations in the US.

Blaine-type amendments are named after Maine Representative James G. Blaine (1830–93) who served as Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives (1869-1875), United States Senator (1876-1881), and the US Secretary of State (1881 and 1889–1892). He failed to get the Republican nomination for President in 1876 and 1880 but was nominated in 1884. He was defeated by Grover Cleveland in the general election. 

When Republican lost the majority in the House in 1874 elections, Blaine decided to focus on his presidential ambitions. President Grant's speeches on the desirability of good public education that was devoid of sectarian dogmas perhaps gave Blaine the idea. As he had married a Catholic, he was also liable to suffer from anti-catholicism fervor that was rampant in the US in the late 19th century. So, an amendment that was clearly against the Catholic parochial schools was definitely helpful to his political fortunes. Blaine moved the amendment in 1875. The text of the proposed amendment, which would have expanded the First Amendment, was as follows:

No State shall make any law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; and no money raised by taxation in any State, for the support of public schools, or derived from any public fund therefor, nor any public lands devoted thereto, shall ever be under the control of any religious sect, nor shall any money so raised, or lands so devoted be divided between religious sects or denominations.

The amendment failed to pass the Congress. The House passed it by the required two-third majority (180 votes for and 7 votes against) but it could not pass the same hurdle in the Senate(28 votes for and 16 against). However, despite the failure, many states decided to add similar amendments in their own constitutions. This process was speeded up in the West when the Congress made it a pre-condition for admission into the Union in 1876. Currently, 37 states have Blaine-type amendments forbidding public funds from being used for sectarian schools. These amendments are not similar. 

Blaine Amendments differ primarily in two ways. First, some Blaine Amendments forbid funding of religious education while others more broadly forbid funding of all religious organizations. Second, some Blaine Amendments prohibit only direct funding while others prohibit both direct and indirect funding. Direct funding involves the state actually giving aid to a religious organization. Indirect funding involves the state giving aid to a religious organization through a third party, such as a family that uses state funding to send its children to a religious school. The least restrictive Blaine Amendments, such as the one in Kentucky, forbid only direct funding of religious education; the most restrictive Blaine Amendments, such as those in Florida and Georgia, prohibit both indirect and direct funding of any religious organization. (The Blaine Game: Controversy Over the Blaine Amendments and Public Funding of Religion)

Source: Answers to Frequently Asked Questions About Blaine Amendments

For more a century, Blaine-type amendments in State constitutions were not an issue. However, the start of school choice and voucher movement has changed all that. In June 2017, the US Supreme Court ruled in favor of a daycare center run by Trinity Lutheran Church, Columbia, Missouri, thus diluting Missouri's Blaine-type amendment. The daycare had requested a grant from a state program to use scrap tires for its playground surface but was denied because of the Blaine-type amendment.

What are the implications of this decision?

It will affect the success/funding for school voucher programs but, more importantly, it will have implications for separation of church and state in the US:

The big deal is what it may mean for voucher programs. Even though the issue in Trinity Lutheran v. Comer was playground equipment, some see the court’s 7-2 decision in favor of the church as a sign that school voucher programs, which both President Trump and Education Secretary Betsy DeVos support, would survive future legal challenges. Currently, more than a dozen states have school voucher programs that involve religious schools.
“This decision has implications beyond scrap tires and church playgrounds,” Michael Bindas, an attorney with the Institute for Justice, said in a statement. “The Court’s reasoning sends a strong signal that, just as the Court would not tolerate the use of a Blaine Amendment to exclude a religious preschool from a playground resurfacing program, it will not tolerate the use of Blaine Amendments to exclude religious options from school choice programs.”
But don’t plan a funeral dirge for the Blaine Amendments yet. Secular groups have pledged to fight. Americans United for Separation of Church and State called the ruling “harmful.”
“The religious freedom protections enshrined in state constitutions are worth more than resurfacing a playground,” the Rev. Barry Lynn, AU’s outgoing executive director, said in a statement. “This ruling threatens to open the door to more taxpayer support for religion, which is at odds with our history, traditions and common sense.” (The ’Splainer: What is the Blaine Amendment and did SCOTUS kill it?)

Many scholars have advocated striking own of the Blaine-type amendments because of their anti-Catholicism and anti-religion bias as well as an unnecessary restriction and intrusion. Philip Hamburger is the Maurice and Hilda Friedman Professor of Law at Columbia Law School has penned a lengthy piece arguing against Blaine-type amendments (Prejudice and the Blaine amendments). Others have, however, contended that these amendments are essential for the public education system and the separation of church and state. Former assistant education secretary in the administration of President George H.W. Bush, Diane Ravitch, who supported school choice earlier but has now become a public school advocate has blogged in favor of Blaine-type amendments (Ravitch: Why the Supreme Court should not force the public to pay for religious schools). An article in the New Republic explains why this decision is important for the state-church relationship and how the new Justice Neil Gorsuch might affect the Supreme Court's decision (Neil Gorsuch Is Poised to Swing a Landmark Church-State Case). Melissa Rogers, who was director of the White House Office of Faith-based and Neighborhood Partnerships under President Obama, thinks the ruling will have consequences but a lot depends on lower courts (Six issues to watch in the Supreme Court’s Trinity Lutheran case).