When two religious nationalisms fight, is it different?

There are many examples of intractable world conflicts where it appears that two religious nationalisms are fighting each other. India- Pakistan, Northern Ireland and Israel-Palestine conflicts immediately come to mind. It has been argued that resolution of these conflicts has been more difficult because of the presence of religious nationalisms. The main reason given is that as religious nationalists (believing they are following God's orders or believing that even if they suffer now, they would get big rewards later) are less ready to make compromise, resolution of conflicts in which they are fighting each other is improbable, if not impossible.

Are these conflicts different than those conflicts where ethnic nationalisms are fighting each other or a civic nationalism is fighting with a religious nationalism? 

This question is important because to resolve conflicts, one has to first understand them. However, to answer it, one has to believe or at least accept that religious nationalisms are different and distinct from other types of nationalisms. Looking around, one can see most of the religious nationalisms have developed an ethnic dimension, if they didn't had it from the start. Jews have always been proud of a separate ethnic identity. There are Jews who think themselves only ethnically Jewish, so is their identity religious or ethnic? (See how this issue confounded researchers surveying American Jewry Who counts as a Jew?) Similarly, Irish and Scots have strong attachment to their ethnicities and religious identity has been the dominant collective identity for Iranians more recently but a belief in Persian/Iranian identity is not far from surface.

It is more like there are many ethno-religious nationalisms, rather than pure religious nationalisms as Omer and Springs in Religious Nationalism: A Reference Handbook (2013)

Another related issue is mixing of territorial nationalism and religious nationalism. Many conflicts that were initially only territorial later developed religious justifications because the two combatants belonged to different religions. 

Was Northern Ireland conflict religious/sectarian from the start and always remained so? Keeping in view that both Israelis and Palestinians were initially led by secular leaders/parties/organizations for decades, it can questioned whether the initial conflict between them was defined by their religions? Similarly, India has always claimed to be a secular entity, so claiming that the Indo-Pakistan conflict is between rival religious nationalisms does not seem right.

I personally think that religious identity is just like other collective identities. When conflicts become entangled with identities, they become difficult to resolve. A long-term conflict between two groups links the identities of the groups with the conflict and an explanation of the bad behavior of the 'other' becomes part of both collective identities. These collective identities are difficult to change. Leaders and elites, who might (or might not) have once promoted the social construction of 'other', would find that re-interpretation or re-orientation of collective identity based on mutual respect was not easy as Dov Waxman argues in Democracy and Conflict Resolution: The Dilemmas of Israel's Peacemaking (2014)

National identities cannot just be revised at will. Attempts by policymakers and political elites to redefine national identities from above are by no means always successful and risk provoking fierce domestic opposition, as Rabin’s assassination tragically demonstrates.

One can also give the example of Mahatma Gandhi who was killed by a Hindu nationalist when Mahatma was perceived to be working against Hindus interests. Benazir Bhutto can also be thought of the victim of religious nationalists who thought Bhutto was trying to change/damage their interests/identity.   

        

'Al Bakistan': Is Pakistan being Arabized?

A few days ago, a column discussed Pakistan being Arabized (See Ahlan Wasahlan, Al Bakistan!). The main evidence presented was the sighting of a large number of cars with the word 'Al Bakistan' on their license plates. Al Bakistan is the translation of probably 'The Pakistan'. The author, Sheharyar Rizwan, further informed that there were also cars with license plates showing 'Al Bunjab' that probably means 'The Punjab', a province of Pakistan. Mr. Rizwan showed concern that Pakistan was becoming an Arab colony.

A couple of years ago Pakistan was hit by a sign that it may have actually taken the first (or possibly 15th) step towards becoming an Arab colony, at least culturally. 

However, later in the article, Mr. Rizwan himself presented evidence which demonstrated 'Al Bakistan' has more to do with being cool and being different than with Arabization.

Source:  Ahlan Wasahlan, Al Bakistan!

Another evidence presented by Mr. Rizwan was religious affairs minister's statement that Arabic would be made compulsory in schools. After reading that statement (See Counter Terrorism: 'Arabic to be a compulsory subject'), it is clear that it is more a wish than an order of the minister. Education was a provincial subject even before the 18th Constitutional Amendment was passed and since that amendment, provinces have been pretty adamant about not allowing the federal government to infringe on their rights. So, there is little hope of Arabic being a compulsory subject in the near future. 

However, coming to the larger point, is making a foreign language compulsory in schools or allowing car license plates or some billboards in a foreign language, makes a country a colony of another country? If one accepts this argument, then Pakistan never became independent because English is not only compulsory in Pakistani schools but it is still the official language of the country. So, Pakistan is still a British colony according to this twisted logic.  

But why Mr. Rizwan is not afraid of the prevalence of English language in Pakistan (even himself writing in English) while worrying sick about few hundred license plates in Arabic? The issue here, I think, is the idea that more Arabic will mean more Islamization. Both the author of the article and the minister of religious affairs seem to believe in this notion. The minister argued that learning Arabic would mean people would understand Quran, [become more ethical/moral] and thus would reject terrorism and sectarianism. So, the minister presented Arabic teaching as a counter-terrorism measure. 

However, minister's argument is difficult to understand considering the fact that sectarianism is more prevalent in madrassa students than public/private schools students, despite the fact that madrassa students read more Quran and know more Arabic. Moreover, Osama bin Laden, all the 9/11 hijackers and many other terrorists were Arabic-speakers.  

Similarly, Mr. Rizwan's fear is also irrational as making Arabic compulsory is not easy. General Zia did that but not even public schools followed his orders/instructions. There is simply no appetite for learning Arabic now and even if it is, there are not enough Arabic teachers. Pakistani society has certainly become more conservative over the last few decades but that has less to do with Arabic (as Arabic is not still compulsory) than with other developments such as the rise of the middle class which is traditionally more conservative than the elites.  

I feel that using Al Bakistan on number plates and saying Ramadan (instead of Ramazan) is a hypocritical way of dealing with our insecurities that stem from the chasm between our beliefs and our behavior. Or it might simply be a way to look different/cool as Mr. Rizwan has suggested.

Learning Arabic is not a bad idea as it is an international language and may provide new opportunities to Pakistanis who work in Arab countries in large numbers.    

Iranian 'Persian-National' Identity

In religious nationalist states, the basis of national identity is usually contested. As religious nationalism is a dominant theme, a large number of groups claim a specific religion or sect as the basis of national identity. However, this view is always contested by others who claim the ethnic, linguistic or simply territorial basis of national identity.

The debate about Iranian identity has always featured two broad groups: the Persian nationalists and the Islamic nationalists. The Persian nationalists claim that Iranian identity has an ethnolinguistic basis. Iranians were Iranians long before Islam came to Iran. In contrast, the Islamic nationalists contend that Islam has become the primary constituent of Iranian identity since Iran was conquered by Arabs in the 7th century. 

However, it would be a mistake to consider both groups as mutually exclusive and some scholars, even partisans, do not completely reject the arguments of their rivals. Except for the opinionated, the difference between the two groups is whether the emphasis is placed on religion or ethnolinguistic characteristics as the primary constituent to the Iranian identity.

For example, many Persian nationalists claim that Islam in its true form is only practiced (i.e. Shia/Twelver sect Islam) in Iran and Islam was saved from Arabs and others only by Iranians. So, they view Islam as part of Iranian identity but do not accept that Islam gave Iranians a new identity. Instead, they claim that it was Iranians, a group at a much higher level of civilization than Arabs, that saved Islam by adopting it, otherwise, Islam's achievements would have been few and it would have been far less successful. 

Similarly, Islamic nationalists accept that Iranian Islam (Twelver sect) is superior and give homage to ethnolinguistic identity perspective by arguing that Iranians have a special affinity with the true religion, Islam, as they are special, seekers of what is true and right. For them, the Aryan/Iranian/Shiite Islam was and is the real Islam while the Semitic/Arab/Sunni Islam is the adulterated false version, despite Prophet Muhammad being an Arab.

Source: Wikimedia Commons 

Afshin Matin-Asgari gives a detailed account of the debate within the Persian nationalist camp in her chapter, 'The Academic Debate on Iranian Identity: Nation and Empire entangled' in Iran Facing Others, edited by Abbas Amanat and Farzin Vejdani (2012). 

Matin-Asgari's chapter gives a comprehensive overview of the different authors and their positions on Persian nationalism, I will try to give a summary here. Matin-Asgari contends that from the late 19th to late 20th century, Persian nationalists -_ the ethnolinguistic camp__ was the dominant thesis in Iranian identity debate. This camp was influenced by Orientalists (such as German Ernst Herzfeld and British Edward Granville Browne) who linked Iranians with Aryans and old Persian empires with the modern state of Iran and claimed a continuity over centuries/millennia. Archaeological discoveries in the 19th century also helped in the strengthening of this thesis. Called the 'Aryan Neo-Achaemenid nationalism', its proponents believed:

1. Iranian identity is ancient, with an archaic core existent for thousands of years. 
2. The Persian language is at the center of Iranian identity. Persian language has been dominant in Iranian territory for centuries and has a major contribution in making non-Iranian inhabitants, immigrants, and conquerors, Iranians. 
3. Since at least Achaemenid times (6th century-4th century BC), Iranian and Persian identities are synonymous. The Persian language has preserved Iranian identity and/or 'the spiritual unity of Iranian history'. 
4. Iranian identity has a racial component based on (Aryan) racial affiliation. 
5. The 'national religion' of Iran was Zoroastrian and Islam is an imposition but Iranian have changed Islam to make it fit their 'Persian Psyche'.

Iranian Flag with Ahura Mazda(God of Zoroastrianism)

Source: Wikimedia Commons

Based on the ethnolinguistic superiority of Iranians and taking pride in ancient 'Persian' empires, this paradigm __ not surprisingly __ takes a dim view of Arabs. Arabs are considered inferior and uncivilized. For example, Abbas Ashtiyani, a 20th century nationalist wrote:

The Iranians spent a hundred years of severe humiliation under the yoke of Arab domination...Yet he did not give up on acquiring knowledge, something that Arab then lacked..

This Persian nationalist thesis, an orthodoxy in the field of Iranian Studies according to Matin-Asgari, has been challenged lately.

1. Mostafa Vaziri rejected the notion of ancient Iranian identity and claimed that pre-modern usage of term 'Iran' referred to a geographic entity only.
2. Austrian scholar Bert Fragner argued that the Persian language is central to Iranian consciousness but Persian was initially a language of the elite and a small portion of people living in today's Iran. It was more a ' Persian linguistic hegemony as crafted and sustained via dominant elite cultures, and not as a "national" heritage shared by a homogeneous Iranian people'. 
3. Italian scholar Gherardo Gnoli argued that 'Iran' as a political concept was an imperial project started by Sassanids( 3rd century -- 7th century).
4. Tavakoli-Targhi contended that Iran was re-imagined in the 19th century in line with the rising consciousness. Various terms like millet, siyaset, and Iran were 're-articulated'. The 'Iranzamin' of ancient texts has quite different boundaries from modern Iran. He also challenged Persian language link with today's Iran.

These challenges forced the at least some of the Persian nationalists to moderate their thesis and they accepted that many dynasties ruling Iran, including the Greeks and Parthians, were not Iranian so there is no seamless continuity from ancient to modern. There is also some acceptance of the argument that 'Iran' in pre-modern times was an imperial, not a national, conception and Persian might not be the language of most people living in Iran in the past. However, most Persian nationalists have not been able to accept the new research and so their thesis continues to suffer from contradictions.

Matin-Asgari suggests the issues in Persian nationalist thesis can be resolved by abandoning the essentialist 'continuity' aspect and accepting that

1. Pre-modern Iran was an imperial concept and imperial Iran was multi-lingual and multi-ethnic, with a shifting heartland.
2. Persian linguistic hegemony did not create ethnic and national homogeneity across history.

An interesting article. Author's position on Iranian nationalism is close to Smith's argument about nationalisms in general i.e. nationalism is neither strictly primordial nor wholly imagined. It appears both Persian nationalist and religious nationalist Iranians are moderating their positions and accepting that the other side is not completely off base. Moderation of Persian nationalist thesis has been discussed above and religious nationalists moderation could be seen in Ahmadinejad's politics in his second term, discussed in this blog on 8th February, 2014.

Government Restrictions on Religion and Violence

In January 2014, Pew released its annual report on restrictions on religion around the world. It showed that religious hostilities reached a six-year high in 2012, the year in-focus (See Religious Hostilities Reach Six-Year High).

One of the interesting aspect was comparing the countries that scored high on social hostilities based on religion index and countries that scored high on high restrictions on religion index in 2011 and 2012. One would think that an increase in restrictions on religion would lead to more social hostilities based on religion, resulting in same countries scoring high on both indices. Not true. Although, many countries score high in both  areas (understandable as religion is very important in these countries), it appears different factors drive the two indices.

Take a look at the top ten countries on the government restrictions on religion index in 2011 and 2012. What drives this index? It appears one of the main factors is a perception in the decision-making elites of these countries that they can defy international norms of religious liberty and equal rights for religious minorities with impunity.  There are three types of countries in this list:

1.     Countries that are too small. Elites might think that what they are doing will not be detected and discussed on international media i.e. they are flying under the radar. So, there would be no repercussions. Maldives and Eritrea are examples of such countries.

2.     Countries that are too important. Elites in these countries might think they can get away with murder because international community needs them. Saudi Arabia, China and Egypt  are examples of such countries. Afghanistan can also be added in this list because international community desperately wants to show Afghanistan as a success after wasting thousands of lives and spending billions of dollars.

3.     Countries that are not considered proper members of international community. They are pariah states, often under international sanctions. Iran, Syria and Somalia are examples of such countries. North Korea would also be in this list but it was not included in the Pew survey because of lack of reliable, verifiable data. 

Government Restrictions on Religion

	2011	2012
1	Egypt	Egypt
2	Saudi Arabia	China
3	Iran	Iran
4	China	Saudi Arabia
5	Indonesia	Indonesia
6	Maldives	Maldives
7	Afghanistan	Afghanistan
8	Algeria	Syria
9	Syria	Eritrea
10	Somalia	Somalia

One odd-man out is Indonesia. How come a nation which prides itself on its civic nationalism of Pancasila have so many religious restrictions? I think most of these restrictions are at the local level or third tier of government, below federation and provinces. The upper levels more or less continue to follow a less religious line. This may be the reason why such high restrictions on religion have not become an issue both inside and outside Indonesia.

Now, take a look at the top ten countries on the social hostilities based on religion index in 2011 and 2012.  What drives this index? Two main factors are state’s monopoly over use of means of violence and decision-makers’ lack of courage and/or subterfuge. Based on these factors, one can divide the countries in the list into two groups of countries, though it should be clear that these factors are not mutually exclusive.

1.     Countries where state does not have monopoly over usage of mean of violence. Violence by different types of groups is common and one of these groups are religious groups. Examples of such states are Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, Somalia, Sudan, Palestinian Territories, Nigeria and many parts of India.

2. Countries where decision-maker do not have courage and maybe using subterfuge. Such decision-makers can again be divided into two types. Those who agree with discrimination and violence against religious minorities but cannot only say or support such action as this will go against their/state’s international image so they allow illegal actions to continue while publically condemning them. The other type of decision-makers are those who support equal rights of religious minorities but cannot openly act against majority religious groups because of fear of political backlash. Examples of countries that fall into this group are Israel, India, Pakistan, Indonesia and maybe Iraq.

Social Hostilities

	2011	2012
1	Pakistan	Pakistan
2	India	Afghanistan
3	Russia	India
4	Israel	Somalia
5	Indonesia	Israel
6	Iraq	Iraq
7	Nigeria	Palestinian Territories
8	Somalia	Syria
9	Sudan	Russia
10	Palestinian Territories	Indonesia

From religious nationalism aspect, while Iran and Saudi Arabia are high on the list in the government restriction on religion list, Israel and Pakistan are high on the social hostilities list. What does it tells us about these states?

All these states give importance to religion and give preference to the dominant religious group. Whether these state fall in the first or second list depends on their control of violence in their own territory and their relationship with the international community, or more accurately, international powers. For states based on religious nationalism, following matrix maybe an accurate picture.

Religious nationalist states, government restrictions and social hostilities

	Control violence	Cannot control violence
Defy international community	Government restrictions: High Social hostilities: Moderate	Government restrictions: High Social hostilities: High
Cannot defy international community	Government restrictions: Moderate Social hostilities: Moderate	Government restrictions: Moderate Social hostilities: High

Erdogan, Gulen and Power of Nationalism?

Not long ago, Turkey was an island of stability with Europe facing financial collapse on one side and Middle East experiencing revolutions on the other. Not any more. Since Gezi Park protests last year, Turkey has been rocked by regular protests and scandals that have made people worry about Turkey's political and economic stability. Erdogan's support and his ability to win elections has been questioned by analysts both outside and inside Turkey. This year is particularly crucial with local, presidential and possibly general elections happening before December. What might also be decided this year is whether Turkey would have a parliamentary or presidential system and whether the Kurdish 'problem' will be resolved after almost eighty years. Not surprisingly, this year is being called Turkey's year of destiny (See 2014: Turkey's year of destiny).

What has particularly made the coming local elections on March 30 a wide open contest is the rift within the pro-Islam or pro-religious camp. Gulen/Hizmat movement and Erdogan's AKP supported each other from 2002 to 2012, despite some differences. They won local elections, general elections and constitutional referendums together and defeated the political force that had dominated Turkey since independence, the Turkish military. AKP promoted organizations linked with Hizmet and these organizations in turn delivered money, support and votes.

So, how important are March 30 election results? To bring down the hype, following are the percentages of votes AKP got in the local and general elections since 2002.

General election 2002:  34.3%

Local election    2004:  42.2%

General election 2007:  46.6%

Local election    2009:  38.8%

General election 2011:  49.8%

Looking at the these figures, it is obvious that a dip in AKP votes on March 30, while important and certainly disheartening for AKP and invigorating for the opposition, does not means the end of Erdogan. AKP lost support in 2009 local elections and its vote remained below 40% mark but it still won big in 2011 general election. For my wish (i.e. Gul takes over AKP from Erdogan) to be granted, the dip in votes would have to be big, maybe around 30% with the loss of municipalities of Ankara and Istanbul.  

The situation is, of course, different now than in 2009 when last local elections were held. Two groups, youth and the religious, that supported AKP before are now divided. What is perplexing for many is Erdogan's strategy to win in 2014? 

One can disagree about Erdogan's morals or corruption but not about whether he wants to win this year. Again, very few will argue with the statement that Erdogan is one of the most intelligent and savvy political leaders of the Turkish Republic. So, if most analysts can understand that a little humbleness, a little less confrontational talk, and a little sympathetic attitude toward opposition can help him win again, why can't he understand this simple equation? Moreover, this is not a new strategy for him; he practiced it from 2002 to 2010. 

One way to make sense of this situation is to argue that Erdogan has changed. He has become arrogant after all these years in power. We have seen this happening before, haven't we? Popular leaders, at the height of their power, making stupid mistakes and sinking into obscurity and oblivion.

Another way to make sense of this situation is to see a method in the madness of 'prince of Istanbul'. As a student of Turkish nationalism, what I find pretty interesting was Erdogan's reference to a 'second war of independence'. Add it to his constant refrain about conspiracies/foreign powers and one can clearly see that Erdogan is trying to use 'Sevres Syndrome' (the fear of dismemberment of Turkey by foreign powers as they did in the Treaty of Sevres [1920] after World War I). For an Erdogan supporter, and maybe many other Turks, it can be seen as a coded message, a dog-whistle. Add to it the fact, how Erdogan policies during the last decade map Turkish history hundred year before Sevres. Maybe it is a figment of my imagination but do read.

The 19th century Ottoman history was all about Westernization and 'modernization'. Even Sultan Abdul Hamid II (Reign: 1876-1909), who is usually considered an Islamist, did not stop the Westernization project. Ottomans gradually gave Christian minorities in Europe more rights in the hope that they would not rebel and Empire will remain intact. However, most of the Christians did rebel and the West supported them. Ottomans were left with only their Asian/African possessions by the end of Balkan Wars. Ottomans/Committee of Union and Progress then tried to save this rump empire but Arabs, despite being Muslims, revolted and again Western powers supported them. Ottoman Turks were only left with Anatolia. However, outside powers were not ready to even allow Turks to have Anatolia and invaded Turkish mainland and forced the Ottomans to sign the Treaty of Sevres. It was Ataturk who then fought with the West and saved the current Turkish state. 

Now, relate this history to Erdogan's twelve year rule. He first tried to cozy up to Europeans/West. Although he was an Islamist, he introduced many reforms that to Westernize the country so that Turkey could join the European Union (EU). However, despite his efforts, French and Germans made it clear that Turkey could not join EU. Then, Erdogan changed his direction and tried to have good relations with Muslim countries. He was berated and castigated by the 'White Turks' as well as by the West, but he continued to try to have good relations with Iran, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Libya etc. However, he was also rejected by the Muslim Arabs and Iran. His outstretched hand was rejected by the 'outside powers' both in the West and the East, just like Ottomans were rejected a century before. And now, like at the time of independence, as Erdogan keep saying in his speeches, foreign powers are not ready to leave Turkey to Turks and are trying to destroy Turkey financially. 

Many have described all this talk of 'outside powers', which now includes even foreign airlines, as nonsense.

Erdogan has called it a second “independence struggle,” invoking the real war that Mustafa Kemal Ataturk fought to prevent Greece, France, Britain and Russia from carving up the heart of the collapsed Ottoman Empire in the early 1920s. He’s even hinted that the U.S. ambassador in Ankara is behind an international conspiracy to unseat him. Nonsense of this sort threatens Turkey’s most important security relationship -- and who will it convince in any case? The investigators may be politically motivated, but the evidence they’ve collected is reaching the public and the wrongdoing they seem to have uncovered can’t be so easily dismissed.(See Turkey Needs Erdogan’s ’Master Period’ to End)

However, it is important remember that Sevres Syndrome is still powerful in Turkey. Turkish society have been described as ultra-nationalist. Surveys have consistently shown that a majority of Turks believe that Western powers are trying to dismember Turkey as they have done in the past (See Turkey: A Conspiratorial State of Mind and Sevres Syndrome). Who are these Turks who believe in these conspiracy theories? Are they voters of CHP, AKP or MHP? Clearly, majority of AKP voters and most of the MHP voters belong to this group. So, Erdogan is trying to mobilize his base. People do not come to vote in local elections and economy is also not doing that well so how to get your people to come out to vote--you play to people's innate/instinctive fears. 

So, how can Hizmet outplay Erdogan? It cannot change the Sevres Syndrome in the next few months, so it can highlight its Turkish and Islamic credentials to show that it is not part of a foreign conspiracy. So, are interviews/articles in Western media the best strategy, considering the fact that majority in Turkey do not read them and probably mistrust them? I do not know. What do you think? Here is what Erdogan said about foreign media a few days ago, clearly implying conspiracy:

My dear brothers, these [media] organizations have always stolen the will of this country. They are stealing the resources and energy of our country...Is it only the BBC? Also The Wall Street Journal. Who are the bosses of these newspapers? Who owns these newspapers? (See Troubled Turkey Looks to Conspiracy Theories for Answers)

What about the power of nationalism and the national myths, such as Sevres Syndrome? How can these be countered? Turkey is, of course, not unique. Many in India and Pakistan also believe other countries have set their minds to destroy them. Putin uses nationalism and fear of West/foreigners to continue to rule. As Emre Erdogan writes 

This situation is not unique to Turkey. You can replace “Turkey” and “Turks” with another nationality’s name in the region; the meaning does not change. A historical narrative based on a highly exploited trauma and the close proximity of potential enemies seems to be the norm for nation states, particularly in this part of the world. (See The Unbearable Heaviness of of Being a Turkish Citizen)

Pakistani Rulers and Council of Islamic Ideology

In states based on religious nationalism, guiding religious discourse and decisions is extremely important for the state. As national identity is based on religion, religious decisions have widespread implications, affecting the economy, social relations and political set-up.

Looking at Iran and Saudi Arabia, we see a religious establishment closely aligned with the state, safeguarding its interests. In Iran, religious establishment controls the state so state interests are well-protected. Since the Revolution, Iranian religious establishment has changed its religious preferences many times keeping in view state needs. Religious establishment has even rejected marjas and Imam Khomeini's own family to protect what it perceives as interests of the state (See Khamenei vs. Khomeini).

Family planning is just one example of prioritization of state needs over religious rules. After Revolution, Imam Khomeini called for more children so that there is a bigger Islamic nation. However, by the end of the 1980s, the state had realized that it cannot cope with the population explosion resulting from this policy. So, the religious establishment changed its stance and started propagating family planning and this resulted in the most successful family planning project in human history.

The election of current Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei was another example of how loyalty to the state was preferred over religious credentials. Ali Khamenei was not a Marja or Grand Ayatullah at the time of his election as Supreme Leader and Iranian constitution required the Supreme Leader to be one. The religious establishment had the option of electing a Marja or Grand Ayatollah but it elected Khamenei and went for the more problematic course of amending the constitution to make Khamenei's lesser religious credentials acceptable/legal. 

In Saudi Arabian religious establishment has been so close to the monarchical state that members of the establishment have been called bureaucrats. In the 1990s, when there were protest and misgiving in Saudi Arabia about the presence of the US forces, religious establishment supported the state wholeheartedly. This was the main reason why the state was able to defeat the opposition to its rule and policies. Previously, religious establishment supported state against puritanical Ikhwans in the 1920s despite Ikhwans being very religious. Again, in the 1960s, it supported state when television was first introduced in the kingdom, despite its own misgivings and protests in the kingdom, in which even a prince (nephew of the king) was killed. 

Pakistan is perhaps the only state based on religious nationalism that does not have a religious establishment. There is only one body, Council of Islamic Ideology (CII), of less than twenty members that can be termed as state's representative on matters pertaining to religion. As in the case of the countries discussed above, the purpose of this small religious establishment/CII  is to advise the government on religious injunctions and to vet laws passed by the Parliament. However, as is clear from above, one of the unwritten purposes of the religious establishments is to defend the state policies from an attack from the right. Like in other states based on religious nationalism, CII has largely supported state's decisions, However, more recently, CII  has been ambiguous in supporting state policies. In the last one year, it has given three decisions that are completely at odds with the vision of the state. Following are the decisions in brief:

1. In September, CII decided the DNA cannot be the primary evidence in rape cases (See CII rules out DNA as primary evidence in rape cases). This was completely out of tune with international practice and with the trend of increased protection of women. 
2. In March, CII decided that first wife's permission is not necessary for second marriage. This was a major concession won by Pakistani women back in the 1960s (See First wife's nod for 2nd marriage un-Islamic: Council of Islamic Ideology). No major political party supports this decision. In fact, this issue was not even on the radar of religious parties.
3. Again in March, CII decided that there is no minimum age for marriage. Children can be married at any age. The only issue is the consummation of marriage and that should be delayed until puberty of both parties (See Laws prohibiting underage marriage not Islamic: Council of Islamic Ideology ). This is again a major step backwards. According to CII decision, children can be married in their cribs and marriage can be consummated in early teens. 

Why this is so? And what is the solution?

The recent decisions of the CII can be seen in terms of short-term politics. The CII is currently chaired by Maulana Sherani, who is also the provincial head of Jamiat Ulema Islam-Fazal-ur-Rehman Group (JUI-F) (See CII Chairman Profile). Since the May 2013 elections, JUI-F pressure was rejected by the Federal Government headed by Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif in at least three areas. First, JUI-F wanted Nawaz Sharif to form a coalition government with them in the Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa province. Nawaz Sharif rejected their overtures and allowed the majority party, Tehreek-e-Insaf, to form a government in Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa. Second, JUI-F wanted to join both the central/federal and Balochistan government. While Nawaz Sharif invited them to join federal government, he accepted the request of Baloch nationalists (heading the coalition government in Balochistan) not to be forced to accept JUI-F as a coalition partner. Finally, Nawaz Sharif didn't give importance to JUI-F chief Fazal-ur-Rehman in his negotiations with Taliban. All these factors might have forced JUI-F to make life difficult for Nawaz Sharif by coming up with such decisions. However, this theory flounders when we take into consideration the fact that three JUI-F members joined the federal cabinet just a month ago (See JUI-F Represented: Three new ministers take oath).

Source: Slice of cake: JUI-F demands share in Balochistan cabinet

A more plausible explanation of what is happening is the change in the chairman's education. Maulana Sherani is only the second person appointed as chairman CII, who does not have a Western styWestern-style Earlier Maulana Kasur Niazi remained chairman CII for only four months in the mid-1990s. However, Maulana Niazi had a much more pluralist outlook and criticized conservative ulema all his life and was in turn criticized by them. So, from 1962 to 2010, when Maulana Sherani became chairman CII was headed by men who were not only scholars of Islam but also had  knowledge of the modern world and requirements of the state. Maulana Sherani was first one to break this trend. 

The next logical question is how Maulana was able to break the trend. The answer lies in the ineptness of the last government. while chairmanship of CII had been used as political largesse to be distributed to supporters before, it was never given before to traditional ulema. This was the first time a traditional alim was made chairman CII and the state and the people of Pakistan will suffer the consequences. 

It's time Pakistani rulers realize that chairman CII is not like the chairman of a steel mill or president of a university. It is a much more important position. Without a religious establishment, this is the only institution that protects the state from any attack from the right or the left. When national identity of  a state is based on religion, it's better for that state and its rulers to give importance to religious institutions. 

Even before these decisions, there were calls to abolish the CII (See DNA Controversy: Abolition of Council of Islamic Ideology demanded). However, as discussed above, state needs CII. A far more easier step and the right step is to appoint such members and chairmen who have a more anti-traditional and pluralist outlook. More women members will definitely decrease the bias and misogyny that one can see in the latest decisions of CII. It is worthwhile to mention that the constitution stipulates that there should be at least one woman member of CII and the only member of present CII died in August last year. So, these decisions are illegal as CII is incomplete according to the Constitution of Pakistan. 

Buddhist nationalism in Sri Lanka and Burma

Ian Harris in his book, Buddhism and Politics in Twentieth Century Asia, argues, Buddhist religious estblishment (Sangha) is as interested in politics as other religious orders. He writes:

Buddhism has often been characterised as an entirely other-worldly religion with a Gnostic distaste for the worldly order. Furthermore, the intensely individualistic flavour of the Buddha's spiritual message has led some to suppose that its attitude towards the political order should be lukewarm, to say the very least. Such views are well-attested in the scholarly community, as well as among Buddhist themselves. From this perspective, Buddhism presents a passive and detached face to worldly affairs in stark contrast to the Semitic religions, such as Christianity and Islam, which are both 'strongly oriented to the reconstruction of the world and very militant in this pursuit' (Eisenstadt 1993, 22). However, this stereotyped cannot be further than the truth. Of course, there are, and always have been, Buddhist ascetics who shun the settled world...But most members of the monastic order have decided to live close to regions of permanent settlement....Under these conditions, the temptation to influence the political process in a direction conducive to the continued well-being of the Buddha's teaching and the maintenance of stable Buddhist institutions have always seem attractive to some.

Buddhist nationalism in Sri Lanka was discussed in a previous blog. Here, we compare and discuss the links between Sri Lankan and Burmese Buddhist nationalism. Both these nations are showing a change in Buddhist nationalism recently. 

As Burma or Myanmar is opening itself to the world and possibly liberalizing and democratizing, religious nationalism is gaining ground. Buddhist Sangha had good relations with the U Nu governments, who was the first Prime Minister of Burma (U Nu was Prime Minister of Burma from 1948 to 1956, from 1957 to 1958 and from 1960 to 1962). So, when there was a military coup d'état, led by General Ne Win, in March 1962, Sangha protested. The Burmese military suppressed these protests and controlled the Buddhist order during its rule, making it largely apolitical till the late 1980s. From 1988 to early 1990s, there were again large scale anti-regime protests attended by monks and others but after that brief activity, there was again an apolitical period for Sangha as it was tightly controlled by the military government. Now, again there is a period of activity but the focus of hatred has changed from the military government to Muslims, particularly Rohingyas who are considered non-Burmese, in addition to being non- Buddhist. 

In Sri Lanka, Buddhist nationalism considers itself triumphant on having won a long war. It has been proven 'right' in its stand of not giving concessions to the Tamils as Lord has given victory to the 'Buddhist' nation. With the vanquished Tamil Hindus, not much of an enemy, the new target is Muslims. 

In an interesting blog on This Is the Modern Axis of Buddhist Hate, Jake Scobey-Thal gives us an update on newly emerging links between the Buddhist nationalists of Sri Lanka and Burma. He particularly focuses on Ashin Wirathu, the Burmese monk called the 'bin Ladin of Buddhism' and Gnanasara, the Sri Lankan monk heading the campaign against Muslims.

As governments of both these countries are weak and not interested in challenging the radical brand of Buddhist nationalism propagated by Wirathu and Gnanasara, Scobey-Thal thinks their militant politics are here to stay. 

It is difficult not to see the commonalities between the Buddhist nationalisms discussed and other militant religious nationalisms. One can recognize the holy land (Burma) and the peaceful majority  (Buddhist Burmese) that is under threat from a tiny but 'vicious' militaristic minority (Muslim Rohingyas).    

A report on a recent conference on Burmese media discussed the issue of Buddhist nationalism and its consequences for Muslims. Mon Mon Myat, an investigative journalist, highlighted the role of powerful military, monks, and media (Burmese journalist beseeches brethren: Stop with the Muslim hate speech)

Besieged by a fear that Muslims will take over Myanmar, Buddhist nationalists as well as some monks have urged people to boycott Muslim-owned businesses and successfully lobbied the government to draft controversial laws, including one that will restrict Buddhist women from marrying Muslim men. No similar restrictions are being planned for Buddhist men.“The two strongest institutions in our country - the military and monk organisations - are driven by men, and promote nationalism and religion. That influences our media coverage,” Mon Mon Myat said on Tuesday at the second day of an international media conference organised by Hawaii-based East-West Center.“I found that in the local media coverage, there are few voices on Muslims’ view. I think some owners worry their circulation may decrease if they are seen as sympathetic to the Muslims.” 

Malaysian Malaysia and Algerian Algeria

Malaysia and Algeria are two multi-ethnic nations. Both got independence from Europeans and attained their present boundaries in the 1960s. Both are dominated by a majority ethnic group that has controlled the state since then. As I was reading about Algeria what stuck me was the similarity of slogans of minorities in both countries. In Malaysia in 1960s, Lee Kwan Yew (before Singapore was expelled from Malaysia) called for a 'Malaysian Malaysia', not a Malay Malaysia or Chinese Malaysia or Indian Malaysia. Lately, opposition alliance has picked up this theme and called for changes in the Malaysian state (see Lee Kuan Yew's 'Malaysia for Malaysians'). In Algeria, minorities, mainly Berbers, called for Algerie algerienne (an Algerian Algeria) (see Religion, Ethnicity and State Formation in Algeria). They resisted Arabization of Algeria after independence.

Of course, these countries are dissimilar. For one, minorities in Malaysia are much more distinct and numerous as compared to Algeria. Possibly, because of that, discrimination in Malaysia has been incorporated in the legal regime, while in Algeria it is much more general and subtle. In Malaysia, minorities are acknowledged and then discriminated. In Algeria, Berbers are rarely acknowledged as a separate ethnic community. There are many reasons for this situation in Algeria. First, many Berber do not know or see themselves as separate from their Arab neighbors because inter-marriage is quite common and many Berbers have been Islamized and Arabized. Second, many Algerians see talk of Berber rights as attempts by outside powers to divide the nation, just as French tried to do (and failed) during the War of Independence. 

Recently, both countries have tried to accommodate some of the minorities demands. Malaysia has decreased preferences for Malays or Bhumiputras while Algeria has has recognized Tamazight (Berber language) as national language.

The question from our frame of reference is whether the ethnic identity (Malay/Arab) is the main force behind the domination of majority or is it Islam?  

   

Place of Islam in Turkish Nationalism

In his book, Islam, Secularism and Nationalism in Modern Turkey: Who is a Turk?, Soner Cagaptay unpacks the role of Islam in Turkish nationalism. He argues that there were three overlapping categories of Turkishness. The first category and the most inclusive one is based on territory. Anybody living in Turkey is Turkish as given in 1924 Constitution. The second category is based on religion and it can be traced back to Ottoman millet system as articulated in the 1930s textbooks and ruling party (CHP) documents. The third and the most exclusive category was based on ethnicity or a combination of religion and ethnicity.

Cagaptay also explain these categories as three concentric circles.

The above circles, however, hide many complexities. While Islam was an important marker of Turkish nationalism, it was a highly controlled Islam. Turkish government privileged only nominal Islam over other religions. Similarly, while Turkish ethnicity was prized, Turkish language was also important and non-Turks were told to learn Turkish language, if they want to be part of the inner-most circle. So, the inner-most circle can also be described as ethno-linguistic. 

All non-Muslims living in Turkey were also not equal. All kinds of Christians were considered beyond assimilation so they were in the exterior part of the outer-most circle. Armenians were considered the most anti-state so they maybe considered at the edge of outer-most circle. Jews were, however, considered loyal and not beyond assimilation. They were asked to learn Turkish (and adopt Turkish names) so that they can join the inner circles. There were also differences between non-Muslim Turks. Arabs, because of their 'treachery' during World War I, and Kurds, because they resisted assimilation, were ranked lower in termed of Turkishness as compared to Bosnians, Albanians. Bulgar Muslims, Tartars etc.  

The probable vision of future in the minds of Kemalists might be