Gau rakshaks' (cow protectors) rise under Modi/BJP: Is there a more sinister agenda?

In November 2017, Reuters published an investigative report Cash Cows: Emboldened by Modi's ascent, India's cow vigilantes deny Muslims their livelihood by Zeba Siddiqui, Krishna N. Das, Tommy Wilkes and Tom Lasseter. This report explains that, along with the physical threat, cow protection movement is also an economic threat to the Muslim minority. Due to the Hindus' aversion to the killing of cattle, the slaughtering, animal transport and hides businesses had been primarily in the hands of Muslims. These businesses are now all under threat. The slaughterhouses are being closed. The cow vigilantes not only beat and kill Muslims but also take away the cattle and these cattle are later sold to Hindus. So, assets are transferred from the poor indigent Muslim minority to Hundi majority, making Muslims more destitute.

Some excerpts of the report are reproduced below (full report can be accessed here):

The beating that ended Pehlu Khan’s life was televised nationwide. Cell phone video captured a group of men punching and slinging Khan around the middle of a road in north India, stomping on him and then slamming the 55-year-old farmer down on concrete as he begged for mercy. 

Khan had been stopped by the lynch mob of right-wing Hindus as he rode home from a market in April with two cows and two calves in the back of a truck. The crowd was furious at the sight of a Muslim transporting animals held sacred by Hindus, according to the accounts of his sons and two fellow villagers who were also attacked. Before the men beat Khan so badly that he later died, breaking his ribs in multiple places, they screamed that he was planning to slaughter the cattle for beef. 

Outside the frame of the video, something else was happening: Pehlu Khan’s cows were seized. They were hauled off to a nearby Hindu-run shelter that takes in cattle snatched from Muslims and sells them. 

Assaults meted out in broad daylight against India’s Muslim population, some 14 percent of the country’s 1.3 billion people, have sparked concern about the direction the country is taking under Hindu nationalist Prime Minister Narendra Modi. There has been another, less noted dimension to the violence: The theft from Muslims and redistribution to Hindus of cows that provide crucial income in the Indian countryside. 

Such scenes clash with India’s image as an investor darling in Asia and the pro-business message Modi broadcasts to foreign investors. But three and a half years after his electoral victory, the cow seizures illustrate how the nation’s right-wing Hindu factions that propelled Modi to power are now shaping India and stirring religious upheaval. 

Having stoked Hindu nationalist passions in his bid for the highest office, it’s unclear to what extent Modi can now control them. The bands of right-wing Hindus who seize the cows are operating essentially as private militias. They are undeterred by the prime minister’s public calls on them to end the violence. States governed by Modi’s party have seen a marked increase in cow theft from Muslims as well as funding for cow shelters that in many cases take in the stolen cattle. 

Interviews with nationalist Hindu leaders and militia members across the country reveal an impatience for Muslims to demonstrate obeisance to the Hindu majority. 

There are no official statistics for how many cows have been stolen from Muslims in incidents involving such groups since Modi’s Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) came to national power in 2014. Reuters’ reporting across India, though, puts actual numbers on the extent of the cow theft. It also provides the first in-depth look at how the actions of cow vigilantes are leading to further economic marginalization of the country’s Muslim minority. 

In northern India, the leadership of just two of the main organizations of “gau rakshaks” – right-wing Hindu cow vigilantes, or literally “cow protectors” – said they have taken about 190,000 cows since the year of Modi’s election, some in the presence of police and almost every single one of them from Muslims, the reporting shows. 

Separately, Reuters surveyed 110 cow shelters or farms, known as “gaushalas,” across six Indian states that were led by BJP chief ministers from before or just after Modi’s 2014 election win. The survey found an increase of 50 percent in their cattle holdings - from about 84,000 head before Modi came to power in 2014 to more than 126,000 today.
The survey, conducted by phone and in person, covered a fraction of the thousands of cow sheds nationwide.It was not possible to determine how much of the 50 percent increase was due to cow vigilantes, because record-keeping in many cases is non-existent. But of the 110 cattle facilities surveyed, all but 14 said they receive cows from the Hindu vigilante groups. About a third said they sell or give cows away, nearly all to Hindu farmers and households.

In a separate survey, Reuters found that only three of 24 cow facilities in four states not ruled by a BJP chief minister said they sold or gave away cattle - mainly to Hindus - after receiving them. While cattle stock has risen about 40 percent in these gaushalas since Modi took office, only a small part of the increase was due to vigilantes. In many of the cases, cows were donated to the shelters for religious reasons or purchased from cattle markets for fear they would be slaughtered.... 

Cow slaughter is illegal in most of India, while committing cruelty to cattle by transporting them crammed into small spaces is outlawed across the country. Slaughtering buffalo, an animal not considered holy, is allowed, fueling a multi-billion dollar meat export industry that is dominated by Muslims. Penalties for killing a cow differ from state to state, with most ranging from six months to five years in prison....
People involved in snatching cattle from Muslims speak with a triumphant sense that their moment in history has arrived. “Everyone in this world is born Hindu. They are turned into Muslims when they are circumcised and Christians when they are baptized,” said Dinesh Patil, a district head of the Bajrang Dal group in the southwestern state of Maharashtra.

The Bajrang Dal organization is closely linked to the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), the nation’s umbrella right-wing Hindu organization. The RSS argues the purity of India was soiled by the foreign intervention of Muslims and then Christians beginning in the 8th century. The RSS helped create Modi’s political party, and the prime minister himself first attended the group’s meetings as a child.

At the complex he manages, Patil said that almost every one of the 1,700 cows grazing outside was “rescued by the Bajrang Dal” from “these Muslim slaughterers.” Patil described how a degree of law enforcement sanction is conferred on the cattle seizures: His group takes the cows and hands them over to the police, who then deliver the cattle to his facility. “The entire investigation and catching of the culprits is done by us,” Patil said.
The police, he added, “have to listen to us because the BJP is in power.” 

Told of Patil’s comments, Bipin Bihari, second-in-command of police for Maharashtra, said: “In a way their work supports the police. It eases our work. If they have some information on some illegal activities, they can share it with us, and we act on it. But they are not allowed to take the law into their hands.”.... 

Reuters found no evidence of a formal plan by the BJP to use cow vigilante groups to engineer the seizure and transfer of cows from Muslims to Hindus.

But in states where the BJP has taken power, cow seizures have ramped up. In the absence of official data on the number of cows taken, Reuters reporting and a review of past incidents show that the largest vigilante groups and the cattle seizures are concentrated in BJP-led states.

One organization of cow vigilantes in the northern state of Haryana has a golden cow with crossed swords and two AK-47s beneath it as its logo. The leaders of the Gau Raksha Dal, or cow protection group, say they have captured up to 120,000 across the country since beginning their campaign in 2013. Most of that activity was carried out after Modi’s victory in 2014, which was followed by a BJP chief minister taking office in Haryana later in the year.





Source: Cash Cows: Emboldened by Modi's ascent, India's cow vigilantes deny Muslims their livelihood

Dinesh Arya, state head of the Gau Raksha Dal, acknowledged his group is breaking the law. Arya produced a list of 27 criminal complaints lodged by cattle traders against his members that he said were still pending. “Seizing cattle is not legal and we know that well. We are not authorized to do this, it’s the police department’s work,” Arya said.

But he claims a higher calling: “Our religion has given us the right to stop our mother being butchered,” he said, referring to “gau mata,” or mother cow. “We have forcefully taken that right.” 

Outside his office, a truck converted into a “mobile cow ambulance” used to transport seized cattle bore a bullet hole – the aftermath of a recent gun battle with Muslim “cattle smugglers,” Arya said. 

Modi has at least twice publicly criticized cow vigilantism. “Do we get the right to kill a human being in the name of cow? Is this ‘gau bhakti’? Is this ‘gau raksha’?” he declared in a speech in June, using the Hindi phrases for cow devotion and cow protection. “Violence is not the solution to any problem,” he added. 

The Supreme Court has also addressed the issue. In September, the court ruled that central and state governments must deploy police officers to prevent cow vigilante violence.

On the ground, some Hindu activists aren’t heeding Modi’s calls. The leader of a group of cow vigilantes, which claims 10,000 members concentrated mostly in western and northern Indian states, said they were unmoved by the prime minister’s condemnation of what he called the vigilantes’ “anti-social activities.” 

“The cow protection movement totally belonged to the BJP before 2014,” said the group’s leader, Pawan Pandit, a part-time software engineer. “Now groups like ours have the momentum.” 

Pandit said networks of vigilantes operating under his Bhartiya Gau Raksha Dal – or Indian cow protection group – captured as many as 60,000 cows in the three years before Modi came to office. Since 2014, Pandit said, the group has grabbed more than 100,000 cows, often working with police.....

This lawlessness extends beyond the 18 states Modi’s BJP now controls directly or with coalition partners. In the southern state of Telangana, one of 11 states where the BJP is not in power, a man named Purushottam Gupta was arrested shortly after Modi gave a speech in August last year condemning cow vigilantes. Gupta had refused a court order to hand back 20 cattle seized by cow vigilantes and kept them with some 5,000 other cows at a facility next to the ashram where he is the de facto deputy head. Gupta said he was released the same day he was arrested and that the cows have yet to be returned to their Muslim owners.

India’s laws against cow slaughter predate Modi’s administration, and cow vigilantes were operating in India before Modi came to power. At the federal level, the BJP’s predecessor, the relatively liberal Congress party, funded the cow sheds via a federal animal welfare association at higher levels than Modi. Spending from the association’s four main gaushala grants, the primary source of federal funding for the facilities, was about 150 million rupees for the 2010-11 fiscal year, compared with some 58 million for 2015-16, the most recent period available. 

But at the state level, BJP politicians have in many cases sharply increased funding for the cattle shed facilities through government bodies. In Haryana, the state where Pehlu Khan lived, the Gau Seva Aayog, or cow protection commission, went from allotting 18.5 million rupees to cow sheds in the 2014-15 fiscal year, when a BJP chief minister took over, to more than 37 million for 2016-17. In Rajasthan, the state where Khan was killed, funding doubled from about one billion rupees in 2013-14, as the BJP captured the state, to more than 2.3 billion rupees in 2016-17, according to a state official... 

For Hindus, the cow has long been holy. In ancient scriptures, it is celebrated for its ability to nurture humanity and is compared to deities.  

During Modi’s Hindu nationalist administration, the cow has taken on additional political significance. In his campaign for office, Modi referred to the danger of a “pink revolution” under the relatively liberal Congress party, the domain of the Nehru-Gandhi dynasty. 

It was a play on Congress’ “green revolution,” under which agricultural output increased, suggesting the party had allowed the production and export of meat including beef to surge. 

Those in hardline Hindu groups supporting Modi frequently complain that Congress and its allies looked the other way when it came to illegal cow slaughter operations run by Muslims to gain favor with that community at the polls. Two spokespeople for Congress did not respond to questions from Reuters.

In May, Modi’s government banned the trade of cattle for slaughter. The measure mostly affected the buffalo industry, as killing cows for meat was already forbidden in most states. But the move was seen by many Muslims as a ploy to further squeeze them out of the multibillion dollar beef and leather industry, which employs millions in India. India’s Supreme Court in July suspended the government measure, effectively lifting the ban on the trade of buffalo for slaughter.

The list of cow rakshak attacks from September 2015 to June 2017 that caught media attention can be read in the article Una, Alwar and Delhi cow vigilantism: A list of 'gau rakshak' attacks since 2015 Dadri lynching. 

Religious nationalism in 19th century Europe

Hugh McLeod in his article, "Christianity and nationalism in nineteenth-century Europe" (International Journal for the Study of the Christian Church, Vol. 15, No.1, 2015) discusses the 19th century European nationalisms, the relationship between Christianity and nationalisms and religious support for the First World War in all the European countries.

McLeod argues that nationalism was one of the most influential ideologies in 19th century Europe, along with socialism, liberalism and conservatism. Nationalism was sometimes allied with liberalism and at other times with conservatism. Socialists were also not devoid of nationalist sentiments. 

Mcleod distinguishes between three types of nationalisms in nineteenth-century Europe:

Nationalism 'from below': The nationalism of the subject peoples, living within the great European Empires, that asserted their right to more autonomy or independence

Unification nationalisms: The nationalism of the people, who belonged to the same culture but were divided into numerous small states, that sought to form a unified nation-state for these 

Nationalism ‘from above’: The nationalism propagated by the governments through the education

system, etc. in their own countries so that their people are ready to defend or attack and do not fall prey to nationalism 'from below.'

Mcleod explains, with examples, why nationalism and Christianity were so close and overlapping in 19th century Europe or, in other words, why religious nationalism was so popular at that time:

Many of the classic histories of nationalism see it as an essentially secular ideology – even as a ‘political religion’, substituting for a declining Christianity. The French Revolution does indeed demonstrate this possibility. But more often nationalists made free use of Christian symbols and concepts, and churches willingly embraced nationalist ideologies. 

Benedict Anderson famously defined the nation as an ‘Imagined Community’, whereby people felt an affinity with millions of others, whom they had never met and with whom they might have little in common, because they belonged to the same ‘nation’. But this ‘Imagined Community’ could not be created out of nothing. Its basic building blocks were shared language and/or shared historical memories. Even the language sometimes had a significant religious dimension, as is shown by the importance of translations of the Bible in the history of many languages. The historical memories nearly always had a significant religious dimension. The alliance between religion and nationalism was two-edged in its implications both for nationalism and for Christianity – as I shall argue. But it was uniquely potent as a means of inspiring both devotion to the nation and loyalty to the church. As regards the latter, it is well known that, in an era of increasing secularisation in many parts of Europe, loyalty to the church reached its highest levels in countries such as Ireland, where the links between religious and national identities were closest. Conversely, secularisation progressed much more rapidly where nationalism had a predominantly anti-church or anti-religious character....  

When nationalists pointed to shared experiences of oppression or of unity against external foes, these experiences were more often than not associated with religion. For example, in the eyes of Irish nationalists, the clearest example of British oppression was offered by the anti-Catholic Penal Laws ..... For English nationalists, on the other hand, the proudest moment in their national history was the defeat in 1588 of the Spanish Armada.... 

The national heroes whom they revered more often than not had an evident religious significance. The greatest figures in Spanish history were Ferdinand and Isabella, ‘The Catholic Monarchs’, who had not only united the nation, but had forced Muslims and Jews either to convert or to leave....  

Nationalists liked to celebrate distinctive national values and virtues, and very often these were seen as having religious roots. Thus nineteenth-century Britons frequently claimed that their political power, their economic success and their free institutions were all rooted in Protestantism. In a typical sermon of 1898, Dr Welldon, headmaster of Harrow School and later Bishop of Calcutta, claimed that ‘wherever there was a nation that was stationary and retrogressive it was Catholic, wherever there was a people that was progressive and Imperial it was Protestant’.... 

Nationalists celebrated the art, architecture, literature, music and folklore of their people, and very often these were shaped by specific religious traditions. A classic case is the French Catholic revival of the years around 1900, which was strongly coloured by nationalism.... An important part of this rediscovery was the realisation that French history and culture were so deeply imbued with Catholicism, that to be truly French it was necessary also to be Catholic. 

Nationalists also drew on ideas of national mission or chosenness. Many nineteenth century Britons believed that the British Empire had been providentially ordained to facilitate the spread of the pure Protestant gospel. Sometimes, as in France there were two rival versions of this national mission: one pointing to France’s historical identity as ‘The Eldest Daughter of the Church’, while the other focused on ‘Liberty, Equality, Fraternity’.... 

More commonly, as in Britain, explicitly religious and more secular understandings of national mission, rather than being in opposition to one another were mutually reinforcing, offering a repertoire of justifications for national pride and national power which could be drawn upon separately or in combination as the situation demanded. The historian of missions, Andrew Walls, highlights the immense popularity of the poetry of Rudyard Kipling, whose justification for British (and American) imperialism as ‘The White Man’s Burden’, though not explicitly Christian, drew on biblical language and examples in a way that both Christian and agnostic readers found inspiring.

Meanwhile priests and pastors were often strongly influenced by nationalist ideas and gave them influential support through sermons, through ‘national’ hymns, through the teaching in church schools, through Christian youth organisations. 

Anniversaries of notable battles, as well as royal birthdays and jubilees provided occasions for special services with patriotic sermons and sometimes the composition of new hymns with patriotic themes. For example Queen Victoria’s jubilees in 1887 and 1897 were marked by numerous special services at which imperial themes played a big role. The year 1913 saw the anniversary of the Prussian uprising against Napoleon and special services were held in many German churches.... Walls notes a new category of ‘national hymns’ entering British hymn-books in the 1880s, and observes that it was then that hymn-books began to include the national anthem. The Swedish historian Alf Tergel refers to the popularity in the early years of the twentieth century of hymns by J.A. Eklund, bishop of Karlstad. In ‘Our Fathers’ Church’ he recalled Sweden’s decisive role in the Thirty Years’ War, and then went on to appeal to ‘Christian youth’ to ‘battle for God’s glory in the North’..... 

In Britain Christian youth organisations with military trappings proliferated in the years 1880–1914. The prototype was the Boys’ Brigade (BB), founded by a Glasgow Presbyterian in 1883, and also popular in the English and Welsh Free Churches. This aimed to attract members through the wearing of uniforms and military ranks, and marches through the street banging drums and blowing bugles, and carrying dummy rifles....

Again in France there were rival Catholic and Republican youth organisations in these years, but both were imbued with the nationalist spirit.... For Catholics and republicans alike, politics and religion were closely bound together and could not be clearly separated, and neither could be separated from devotion to an idealised Catholic or Republican France.

There were many reasons for the strongly nationalist colouring of much European Christianity in the nineteenth century, but among these reasons we should remember that priests and pastors could not be entirely detached from their social environment. It would indeed be crudely reductionist to suppose that clergymen thought and behaved exactly like other members of their social class, but it would be equally unrealistic to suppose that they lived entirely within a clerical sub-culture. Protestant clergy, in particular, who had been educated at university with future doctors and lawyers, and who also married and had children, were especially likely to be influenced by their family and by those of their parishioners with whom they mixed socially. Furthermore, both Protestant and Catholic clergy were highly politicised in this period, and were influenced not only by their families but by the political circles in which they moved...

German Empire Standard (1871-1918) with motto, Gott mit uns (God with us)

Source: Wiki Commons

Of course, religion and nationalism did not always agree and there were tensions as Mcleod explains:

In spite of many affinities, the relationship was two-edged. Religious sentiments and symbols could nearly always be drawn upon by nationalist orators and organisers – but churches were institutions with their own doctrines and interests which could contradict the nationalist agenda. 

A striking example was the conflict between Italian nationalism and the papacy. Enthusiasts for Italian unification initially hoped that the pope might give his blessing to their cause. But it soon became clear that Pius IX was completely opposed.... In response to papal obstruction, a nationalist movement that had initially been strongly influenced by Catholicism took on a strongly anti-clerical dimension.  

The church might also be strongly committed to nationalist objectives, while condemning the methods that some nationalists used. Here the classic example would be the persistent tensions between the Irish Catholic Church and the revolutionary wing of Irish nationalism, from the Fenians in the 1860s to the Provisional IRA in our own times. 

Moreover the alliance between religion and nationalism, while extremely effective in countries that were more or less religiously homogeneous, could raise problems within religiously divided nations, where appeals to the religion of the majority risked alienating minorities. Indeed there is a fundamental tension between a religion such as Christianity, which claims to have a message for all of humankind and in which ‘there is neither Jew nor Greek’, and the claims by nationalists that everyone’s first loyalty should be to his or her own people. 

So in the later nineteenth century many nationalists were seeking new bases for national identity which were religiously neutral and which circumvented confessional differences.... Sometimes this meant a focus on language, or even on sport.... But most often the search for alternative bases for national identity meant recourse to the newly fashionable racial ideas, which gained intellectual authority from trends in anthropology and in Social Darwinism.... In Great Britain the dominant imperialism of the later nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was legitimated by belief in a national mission to bring civilisation and good government to less favoured regions of the world. This was often linked to Protestant Christianity and its plethora of overseas missions. But increasingly this religiously based concept of national mission was supplemented by, or even replaced by, claims for the racial superiority of the ‘Anglo-Saxon peoples’.... 

National churches were not surprisingly those readiest to identify with ‘the nation’. These national churches included most obviously the ‘people’s churches’ (Volkskirchen) of Germany and Scandinavia, the Churches of England and Scotland, the Greek Orthodox or Russian Orthodox Churches – but also the Catholic Churches of France and Spain which saw themselves as churches of the nation, or those of Ireland and Poland which claimed to speak for a nation as yet denied nationhood. Overt opposition to the nationalist agenda was most likely to come from minority churches, whether because of uncertainty as to how far they were really part of the national project – or whether the experience of being in a minority (and often of discrimination arising from this) tended to make such churches readier to question mainstream values and conventional wisdom. Thus in Germany the Catholic Church was more cautious than the Protestants in its support for militarism and imperialism....

McLeod's article demonstrates that religious nationalism was almost as popular in the 19th century Europe as it is now in Asia and North Africa.

Church and State in Nicaragua

Ian Bateson has written an interesting article in Foreign Affairs informing his readers how Daniel Ortega, the President of Nicaragua, has cozied up to the Catholic Church since 2006, despite having an adversarial relationship from the 1970s to the 1990s (See Church and State in Nicaragua: Letter From Managua). Nicaragua was ruled by Samoza family from late 1930s to 1979. The Samoza dictatorship was supported by the US and the Catholic Church. It was the US Marines which supported the first grab of power by the Samozas and the support remained strong for forty years. The Catholic Church also had cordial relations with Samozas. It was recognized as the official religion in the 1950 Constitution. As Bateson explains, Church had no problem with Somozas and did not want godless socialists/communists to succeed until the late 1970s when it started criticizing Anastasio Samoza:

There has never been a real separation of church and state in Nicaragua. Under the Somoza family, a dynasty of brutal U.S.-backed dictators who ruled the country from 1936 until 1979, gifts and favors flowed freely from the country’s rulers to its religious leadership, which rarely criticized the government. As late as 1977, as a revolution brewed against Anastasio Somoza, church leaders led masses across the country to pray for the ailing president’s health.

Ortega, a socialist and an atheist, led a revolutionary insurgency against Samoza rule. He was the head of the Sandinista National Liberation Front (Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional, FSLN), was trained in Cuba and had Cuban support in his fight against the government. In 1979, the Sandinistas were able to overthrow the Somoza government and Ortega ruled Nicaragua until 1990. His time in power was difficult as the US was bent on ending his government. President Reagen supported the Contras, who were fighting a vicious civil war against Ortega's government, even when ordered not to do so by the Congress. This resulted in the biggest political scandal during the Reagan administration (the Iran Contra Affair). The Catholic Church also opposed Ortega and Sandinistas for most of their time in power and defrocked the priests that supported them. The Catholic bishops accused the Sandinistas of supressing Church's teachings, allowing abortions and violating human rights while the Sandinistas accused the Church of toeing US line and ignoring the widespread atrocities of the Contras. Ortega lost the election in 1990 and was out of power. He moderated his policies but still lost the 1996 and 2001 elections. However, recognizing the power of the Church, Ortega adopted conservative policies before the 2006 elections, Bateson writes:

As Ortega turned on the men of the cloth he once worked with, he found allies among other church figures. Cardinal Miguel Obando Bravo is one of them. Like Cardenal, Obando’s relationship with the FSLN has transformed. In the 1980s, Ortega’s government accused Obando of being the “arch enemy of the revolution” and of seeking to obtain U.S. support for anti-government contras. The animosity was mutual and longstanding: days before the 1996 presidential election, which Ortega lost, Obando delivered a church sermon in which he likened Ortega to a biblical snake.

That relationship underwent a reversal in 2005. That April, the Vatican accepted Obando’s resignation as head of the Archdiocese of Managua, and Obando’s relations with Ortega warmed. Months later, he officiated Ortega and Murillo’s marriage, and the next year, he campaigned for them during the run-up to the 2006 presidential election. 

It is not clear why Obando changed his position. Some have speculated that he did so to protect Roberto Rivas, a man many believe to be his biological son, from official pressure. “Obando was forced to cozy up to Ortega because of the corruption of Rivas, who is a kind of adopted son of [Obando]… Rivas made millions of dollars illicitly and put the cardinal in an awkward position,” the former Education Minister and Opus Dei minister Humberto Belli told El País in 2009.

Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega and Cardinal Miguel Obando in Managua, May 2009.
Source:  Church and State in Nicaragua: Letter From Managua

If Obando’s motivations were unclear, there is little ambiguity about the advantage his support gave the Ortegas. As the demand for religious policies, such as bans on abortion, grew in Central America, the blessing of the Nicaraguan church’s former leader gave Ortega the credibility to lead that movement in his country. “In the past, [the Ortegas] were against the church, but then they understood that made them unpopular,” Cristiana Chamorro, a daughter of former President Violeta Chamorro, who defeated Ortega in the 1990 elections, said in May. “Now, [Obando] is the family priest.”

But after years in political exile, Ortega needed to prove his conservative religious credentials before the 2006 elections. So 11 days before the vote, he threw his party’s support behind a proposed ban on all forms of abortion—one that would imprison women and healthcare professionals involved in ending pregnancies. Lawmakers passed the measure quickly, before Ortega won the presidency.

Since then, Ortega has consolidated his power, establishing control of the legislature and the courts by outmaneuvering the opposition. Most media outlets are in the hands of the government or its allies. Nicaragua’s electoral commission has consistently issued rulings that favor Ortega’s party, and in 2014, Nicaraguan lawmakers passed a constitutional amendment removing presidential term limits.

The full article can be read here. In 2016, Ortega won the third presidential election in a row.

Pakistani deep state again using Islamists?

Though religious nationalism was, for a large part, responsible for the creation of Pakistan, Pakistan has seen ebbs and flows of religious nationalism. For instance, Pakistani state tried to limit religious nationalism to symbolism in the early part of Pakistani history. The leadership, like in many other Muslim-majority countries, was generally secular and did not want religious law implemented in Pakistan. 

However, after the separation of East Pakistan, the state leadership decided to use Islam. The instrumentalization of Islam led to Islamization in the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s. The main culprit in this area was General Zia who used Islamists to kill, maim and threaten the democrats. The militancy he introduced and the violence he allowed the Islamists to do, both inside and outside Pakistan, was unmatchable. He not only changed the society but also the military (he is the longest-serving chief of Pakistan Army, from 1976-88), making it more religious and adept at using Islamists for achieving their institutional objectives. 

One of Pakistan military's main institutional objectives is to control Pakistan's defense and foreign policies and intervene in any other area they like until Pakistani democrats are mature (notwithstanding its own efforts to not let the politicians attain maturity). Two other institutional objectives are keeping the Kashmir issue alive and working for a friendly government in Afghanistan. For all these objectives, Islamists come in handy. Because Islamists have difficulty collectively winning more than 10% of popular elections, they do not like democracy and are usually ready to destabilize democratically elected governments. Two examples of such destabilizations are in 1977 and 1996. Not surprisingly, they are also ready to support the military-led governments to implement their agenda as coming to power through the ballot box is a long shot dream. They supported both General Zia and General Musharraf martial laws and were rewarded with unprecedented power. Islamists also share Pakistani military's suspicions about India and think that "Hindu" India and "Muslim" Pakistan can never be friends. Both of them want India out of Kashmir. Therefore, Islamists are used by the Pakistani military to create problems for India in Indian-held Kashmir. Similarly, in Afghanistan, the interests of the Pakistani military and Islamists are aligned. The Pakistani military wants a friendly government, which accommodates Pashtuns. Islamists want the Taliban in power who are mostly Pashtuns. The Taliban are also against "Hindu" India, like the Pakistani military. 

Currently, Pakistan is going through another period of visible civil-military tensions. Both the civilian government and the military are looking for allies and support. When the military started its military operation, Zarb-e-Azb,  against militant Islamists in June 2014, there was a hope that the more than three decades old alliance between the military and the Islamists have finally been broken. This notion gained strength after the Army Public School massacre in which around 150 children died at the hand of Islamist militants in a military-managed school. However, currently, it appears that military has again decided to use Islamists to destabilize/defeat the civilian government. What has changed is that along with the old Islamists, the military is now working with some newly created or refurbished Islamist outfits. 

Milli Muslim League (MML) is the latest incarnation of the Jamat-ud-Dawa (JD) and Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT). It is a new political party. Its creation was announced in August 2017. Ostensibly, the reason for the creation of this new party is to make Pakistan a real Islamic state. The MML president Saifullah Khalid said to the reporters on the MML launch, “We have decided to make a new political party, so that Pakistan is made a real Islamic and welfare state” (See JuD launches political party to contest upcoming polls).

The creation of the MML, however, also serves two objectives, both close to the heart of Pakistan's military. First, it promotes the legitimization of the JD and LeT as a legitimate political party and decreases pressure on Pakistan to ban all its activities. Second, it divides the vote bank of PML(N) which is the ruling party as well as leading center-right party in Pakistan and which is currently in a tussle with the military for civilian ascendency.

Poster of Milli Muslim League clearly showing the picture of Hafiz Saeed

Source: Ibcurdu.com

Tehreek e Labaik Pakistan (TLP) is a sign of increasing Barelavi militancy. In Pakistan's history, Deobandis have long been linked with extremism and militancy but Barelvis, which also follow Imam Abu Hanifa and hence belong to the same Hanafi sect as Deobandi Muslims, were considered to be more mellow, syncretic, acquiescent and peaceful. Barelvis were thought to be folkish, believers in local spirits and saints and less interested in power as compared to Deobandis, who were considered dogmatic, believers in high religion and interested in implementing Sharia. This is, of course, a general description and at the individual level, there were always militant Barelvis as well as amenable Deobandis in Pakistan.

Barelvi militancy showed its strength in the anti-Ahmadi movement in the 1950s and then again reared its head in the mid-1970s when anti-Ahmadi movement 2.0 was in full swing. However, with the declaration of Ahmadis as non-Muslim, the militancy again decreased. The third resurgence of Brelavi militancy was mostly concentrated in and around Karachi in the 1990s. The organization leading it was Sunni Tehrik or Sunni Tehreek. The ST, which was recently renamed the Pakistan Sunni Tehreek, was formed in 1990 to prevent the mosques and madrasas of the Barelvi school of thought in Karachi from being “captured” by Deobandi and Ahle Hadith groups.

Analysts believe Barelvi groups; especially the ST, have started politically exploiting the issue of blasphemy and the execution of Qadri has provided them with an opportunity to show their strength to counter the growing influence of Deobandi and Ahle Hadith groups in the country. The ST's slogan was ‘Tauheen rasalat ki ek saza, sar tan se juda."(See Ditching the tag of mysticism, Barelvi militancy rears head in form of Sunni Tehreek).

The TLP is a new Islamist political party but is very similar to the ST. It has made its name for inciting violence and promoting militancy. The TLP claims on its website that it will work to make Pakistan an Islamic state through gradual and legal struggle:

Tehreek e Labaik Pakistan also known as TLP is an Islamist political party. Its objective is to make Pakistan an Islamic state, governed by Shariat e Mohammadi, through a gradual legal, and political process. (See TLP website)

But its actions and statements belie such claims. The TLP was formed in 2015 in Karachi but gained support in 2016 after the hanging of Mumtaz Qadri, who had killed Punjab province's governor in 2011. Since then, it has been involved in protests, rallies and sit-ins, the most famous of which was in front of parliament (Who is leading this sit-in?)  in March 2016. Another of their rallies, in January 2017, disrupted traffic in Lahore.

TLP poster/banner

Source: Tehreek Labbaik Official (facebook page)

The nexus of military intelligence agencies and the TLP or Tehreek-e-Labaik Ya Rasoolullah appears to have formed or strengthened after the disappearance of five bloggers in January 2017. These bloggers were liberal men who were critical of religious extremism and military's involvement in the political affairs of Pakistan. They were not involved in any kind of blasphemous activities. However, when they were picked up by the security/intelligence agencies, they were decried on the social media as anti-Islam bloggers who also wrote or promoted blasphemous ideas/writings. The abductors find it convenient to link the bloggers with blasphemy as in Pakistan, more than sixty people, who were accused of blasphemy, have been killed by vigilantes. Once one is accused of blasphemy in Pakistan, one is a sitting duck. As expected, the TLP immediately came out in support of jailing or killing bloggers. The chastened bloggers were released after a few weeks but the secret alliance of military with TLP appears to become closer. In recent elections, there were reports that TLP candidates were supported by the intelligence agencies. At present, in November 2017, the TLP has again resorted to "dharna politics" and have cut-off one part of Islamabad from the other for the last ten days.

A rightwing corporation has taken over Israel

Akiva Eldar argues that a rightwing coalition, led by Prime Minister Netanyahu, has taken over Israel. He contends that this corporation has ignored the interests of the owners of Israel (Israeli Jews and Israeli Arabs) and made a small minority, the rightwing settlers and their supporters in Israel, the major beneficiary of Israeli state's largesse. The latest evidence of this takeover is the pledge by PM Netanyahu that 800 million shekels ($226 million) would be spent on upgrading security measures along West Bank roads that are only used by settlers, are not in Israel, and bypass the Arab villages. This pledge is problematic at many levels. Israeli settlements are against international law. These settlements and roads leading to them are an illegal confiscation of the future Palestinian state's lands. Helping settlements will make a two-state solution even more improbable. Furthermore, these roads discriminate against Palestinian Arabs who are not allowed to use them. Finally, the funding discriminates against both Israeli Jews and Arabs as projects to improve their quality of life are put on back burner to support settlers who do not live in Israel. An excerpt from the article is reproduced below (You can read it in full Israeli right’s anti-democratic laws penetrate everywhere)

The accepted definition of a corporation is “a legal entity that is separate and distinct from its owners.” The main goal of the entity headed by Netanyahu is to entrench the rule of the right wing over the entire land of Israel, including the occupied territories. To promote this goal, the corporation is crushing — one by one — the fundamentals of democracy, foremost among them the principle that the citizens of Israel, including its minorities and the guardians of its democracy, are the owners of the corporation.

The takeover of the corporation of the State of Israel is being executed in incremental fashion, using legislation and sanctions, making it a little less democratic, a little more Jewish. The plethora of laws and sanctions make a mockery of Israeli democracy. Viewed separately, each of these initiatives is a yawn; taken together, this accumulation of legislation should make every Israeli lose sleep.
Following are select examples:

• The “loyalty in culture” bill aims to authorize the Ministry of Culture to withhold funding from cultural institutions for other than professional reasons. Regev is conducting a crusade against institutions she deems disloyal to the state and its values by curtailing their funding.

• Finance Minister Moshe Kahlon is working to withdraw the tax exemption of Amnesty International. Israel will thus join the dubious elite club of governments that persecute human rights activists, such as Turkey, Thailand, Russia and Iran.

• Minister of Public Security Gilad Erdan is working to formulate sanctions against entities that call for a boycott of Israel or of settlements.

• Education Minister Naftali Bennett is seeking authorization to ban certain speakers from appearing before school students. Bennett has acted to withhold funding from the play “A Parallel Time” by the Arabic-language Al-Midan Theater and to ban the novel “Borderlife” by Dorit Rabinyan from the literature matriculation exam. He has also suspended funding for organizations dedicated to pluralistic Judaism. At Bennett’s request, professor Asa Kasher has compiled an ethics code for universities, which includes establishing a unit to oversee political activity in academic institutions and prohibits lecturers from expressing political views or calling for an academic boycott of Israel.

• The so-called Expulsion law initiated by the prime minister authorizes Knesset members to oust their peers, risking abuse of power by a political majority against a political minority.

• The so-called Muezzin law limits the use of public address systems in mosques during the early morning hours.

Netanyahu is turning the state prosecutor’s office, the police and the media into punching bags. Justice Minister Ayelet Shaked is conducting an aggressive campaign against the Supreme Court and the separation of powers. Bennett has mobilized the school system for a religious, right-wing brainwashing of the country’s youth. The Knesset and Attorney General Avichai Mandelblit have managed to scuttle some of the more outlandish proposals, such as the “French law” that would have precluded criminal probes of an incumbent prime minister. But the notion that a prime minister is above the law has already become a legitimate issue for discussion.

The Regulation law that enables the theft of Palestinian lands in order to turn them over to Jews — legalizing West Bank outposts constructed on private Palestinian lands — is likely to be struck down by the Supreme Court. However, its invalidation will simply provide Netanyahu with ammunition against the “leftist traitors” who petitioned against the bill. Proposed legislation banning left-wing nonprofits from receiving donations from foreign countries has been blocked, as expected, by pressure from the European Union. Never mind. This is yet another opportunity for Netanyahu to bolster his claims that the Europeans are anti-Semites.

However, the Nationality law dwarfs all other initiatives. The proposed bill is the biggest existential threat to the challenge of coexistence — between the twin founding visions of the state as equally Jewish and democratic.

Source: Latuff's Cartoons

Mr. Eldar's contentions were corroborated by the lavish celebrations to mark the fiftieth anniversary of settlements in September 2017 where Netanyahu not only said that settlements are here to stay but also announced an increase in the construction of houses for settlers:

Israel has hosted a lavish ceremony marking 50 years of Jewish settlements in the occupied West Bank and Golan Heights. 

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu vowed the settlements would never be removed, even though they are illegal under international law.

"There will be no more uprooting of settlements in the land of Israel," he said at the ceremony, held in a settlement in the West Bank, south of Jerusalem.
"It's not the way to make peace."

Reporting from the Palestinian village of Al Kader, Al Jazeera's Harry Fawcett said that "nearly 600,000 settlers live in the occupied West Bank including East Jerusalem." 

On Wednesday, Netanyahu had promised that a further 3,300 settlement units would be approved next month, bringing the total number of settlement units constructed to 7,000 in the year 2017 alone. (See Netanyahu on settlements: 'We're here to stay, forever')

Israel's Shirat Hayam registry: Making it easier to decide who is Jewish and who is not

Isreali Chief Rabbinate issues certificates to hotels. restaurants and other food outlets confirming that kosher food is being sold there. The Rabbinate does not issue a kashrut certificate to a place where a non-Jew has unmediated access to food preparation. This policy restricts non-Jews' employment in the large service industry.  Recently, the policy was made more strict as now non-Jews cannot even serve food in establishments having the Rabbinate certificate. This, of course, means problems for thousands of people who have emigrated to Israel as Jews but are not recognized as Jews by the Israeli Rabbinate.

The bigger problem, according to Seth Farber, is, however, the two-year old Shirat Hayam registry of the Rabbinate which will check employees data and ensure that only Jews are employed in food establishments with their certificate. Following is an excerpt from the article (read the whole article Big Brother and the Rabbinate): 

In the context of the Knesset hearing, the question of “how do you know someone is Jewish” was put to the Religious Affairs Ministry. Unabashedly, the representative of the Carmiel (where some 40% of the population are immigrants from the FSU [former Sovet Union]) religious council said that the prospective worker is asked to present his or her identity number and then it is run against the “Shirat Hayam” national marriage registry. “The worker isn’t spoken to,” said the representative.

“The regulations say that the person with authority to look at this information” is charged with checking if the worker is Jewish. If someone isn’t certified by the rabbinate as Jewish, the establishment may be denied a kashrut certificate.

The Shirat Hayam registry is a relatively new phenomenon. It has only been in use for about two years, and was meant to ease the registration process for couples whose parents were married in Israel by making their parents’ ketubot, or Jewish marriage contracts, accessible. This in turn would allow the rabbinate to register couples for marriage without them having to produce additional paperwork (letters of Jewishness, etc).

But what is abundantly clear is that the Shirat Hayam registry – which by plan will be adopted by all of the local religious councils within the coming year or two – is essentially a tool meant to track everyone’s status. 

What’s even worse is that the information in the Shirat Hayam system extends well beyond whether you are registered as a Jew. It also identifies whether there was ever a conversion, divorce or adoption in your family, whether questions related to your personal status have ever been raised by a rabbinical court, or whether you have ever been married before. And all of this information is available to a clerk, who – going unchecked – is using it for purposes that you never agreed to or that were never intended. Indeed, Big Brother is here and he is sitting at the desk of your local religious council.
The evidence provided by the testimony in the Knesset highlights the fact that the rabbinate has launched a campaign to weed out anyone who has struggled to prove his or her Jewishness (and perhaps those who haven’t yet bothered). The information in the system is already – after two years – being abused, and it’s clear that this is only the beginning.

Databases which contain personal information about all of us are dangerous in the hands of criminals, but they might even be more dangerous in the hands of ideologues who believe that it is acceptable to use the information to advance their agenda. I’m worried about people stealing our personal information from the rabbinate’s database, but I’m even more worried about those who have access to it already.

The most intriguing part of 1984 and the fact that “Big Brother is watching” is that everyone goes about their business as if this is a good thing for society.

A Kashrut Certificate

Source: High Court strikes a blow to Chief Rabbinate's Kashrut-licensing monopoly

One would tend to agree with Seth Farber (that registry is a bigger problem) also because the Israeli  Supreme Court decided in September 2017 to allow other organizations to issue its own certificates about food preparation according to Jewish laws(though not Kashrut certificates which can still only be issued by the Chief Rabbinate). So, the authority of the Rabbinate on food establishments has decreased a bit (See  High Court strikes a blow to Chief Rabbinate's Kashrut-licensing monopoly).

More on the tussle between and merging of Islamic and Persian identity in Iran

The tussle between the Islamic/Shiite identity and the Persian ethnolinguistic identity is continuing. Since the 19th century or even before, Iranians are debating which of their two identities is real and authentic and which one is affected and false or which one is dominant and which one is recessive. The Iranian state also sways, sometimes moving in one direction and then in the opposite direction. During the time of Pahlavi dynasty (1925-79), the Persian identity remained the ascendant and principal identity but since the Islamic Revolution, the Islamic identity became the paramount identity while Persian identity became recessive and invisible.

However, during the last decade, it appears the pendulum has changed direction again. The Persian identity is rising and there has been an attempt by the elite to appropriate it, without rejecting the Islamic identity. Former President Ahmadinejad was the first one from the top elite of the Islamic regime to also acknowledge/lay claim on the Persian identity (See blog post Afraid of Ahmadinejad). He loaned the famed Cyrus Cylinder from the British Museum in 2014 and exhibited it in Iran,  taking pride in ancient Persian history, while not discarding his Islamic identity (He claimed, without much evidence, that Cyrus was mentioned in the Holy Quran). Last year, there was more evidence that the people and political elite are embracing the Persian identity and do not consider it contradictory to their Islamic identity. In October 2016, thousands of Iranians visited Cyrus's tomb and President Rouhani joined the celebrations via Instagram, “Persepolis is one of the invaluable and unique remains of the ancient history of this land, which demonstrates the antiquity of the civilization, the ingenuity, the wisdom, and the management skills of the great people of Iran, as well as their monotheism.” (See blog post Is Persian Identity rising again in Iran?). The last part of the message establishes a link between Cyrus and Islam (i.e. monotheism) and makes sure that Rouhani is not accused of rejecting Islam. This embracing of both identities is new for the elite but many Iranians have no problem doing it. As explained in a previous blog post, in the Iranian society, many groups embrace both religious and ethnolinguistic identities:

However, it would be a mistake to consider both groups as mutually exclusive and some scholars, even partisans, do not completely reject the arguments of their rivals. Except for the opinionated, the difference between the two groups is whether the emphasis is placed on religion or ethnolinguistic characteristics as the primary constituent to the Iranian identity.

For example, many Persian nationalists claim that Islam in its true form is only practiced (i.e. Shia/Twelver sect Islam) in Iran and Islam was saved from Arabs and others only by Iranians. So, they view Islam as part of Iranian identity but do not accept that Islam gave Iranians a new identity. Instead, they claim that it was Iranians, a group at a much higher level of civilization than Arabs, that saved Islam by adopting it, otherwise, Islam's achievements would have been few and it would have been far less successful. 

Similarly, Islamic nationalists accept that Iranian Islam (Twelver sect) is superior and give homage to ethnolinguistic identity perspective by arguing that Iranians have a special affinity with the true religion, Islam, as they are special, seekers of what is true and right. For them, the Aryan/Iranian/Shiite Islam was and is the real Islam while the Semitic/Arab/Sunni Islam is the adulterated false version, despite Prophet Muhammad being an Arab. (See blog post Iranian 'Persian-National' Identity)

Source: Shrine of Sahabi Salman Al Farsi (The Persian)

Amir Taheri's article informs us how efforts to bring Iran and Islam closer has led to the renovation of the tomb of Salman Farsi (Salman, the Persian), who was a Persian and one of the earliest non-Arab converts of Islam and a confidant of Prophet Muhammad (PBUH). He also talks about the recent popularity of non-Islamic names in Iran:

The current new fascination that many in Iran feel for Salman is part of the movement for “Iranian Islam” which has been gaining ground in the past few years. Iranian history in the past 15 centuries has often see-sawed between religion and nationalism. The rise of one has often been accompanied with the decline of the other and vice versa.

“Partly because of dissatisfaction with the role of (Shi’ite) clerics in politics, Iran is experiencing a growing anti-religious trend,” says Mehrangiz Bayat, a Tehran researcher.
That analysis is backed by some prominent clerics. For example, Grand Ayatollah Shubeir Zanjani, one of the top clerics in Qom, warned last week that involvement in politics had contributed to the decline of the authority and popularity of the Shi’ite clergy in Iran.

Ultra-nationalists, including pan-Iranists who dream of reviving the Sassanid Empire in one form or another, have seized the popular disaffection with the ruling clergy as template for attacking Islam as “an alien Arab religion imposed on Aryan Iranians by the sword.” They ignore the fact that the mass of Iranians converted to Islam long after the 80-year-old Arab occupation of parts of Iran had ended. The concept of the “Iranian” or ”Aryan Islam” has been launched to counter the claim of “alien Islam”....

According to reports, which cannot be independently verified, the “brain” behind the idea of an “Aryan Islam” is an obscure cleric named Hassan Yaaqubi who, although he has never been seen or heard in public, is supposed to have authored more than 40 books.
Other clerics have tried to promote the idea of an “Aryan Islam” by claiming that Hussein Ibn Ali, son of Ali Ibn Abitaleb and Fatimah, married Bibi Shahrbanu a daughter of the last Sassanian King Yazdegerd, initiating a fusion of Islam and Iran. “All descendants of Hussein have Iranian blood in their veins,” says Ayatollah Sobhani. “This means an unbreakable human bond exists between Islam and Iran.”

Iranian nationalists, however, reject that idea and claim that Bibi Shahrbanu, whose shrine near Tehran attracts millions of pilgrims every year had been taken a captive and never converted to Islam.

Another cleric, Ayatollah Husseini Qazwini, claims that Iran’s Islam bond was strengthened by the Twelfth Imam, known as the Hidden Mahdi al-Montazar, emerged from his Long Absence in secret and married a girl from Tehran, ensuring the continuation of the “sacred line of Ali” with generation after generation of people with “Iranian blood in their veins.”

However, the traditional Iranian conflict between nationalism and religion seems set to intensify. According to government sources, more and more Iranians now use non-Islamic names for their new-born children. That has led to a decision by the Central Registration Office at the Ministry of Interior last Thursday to toughen rules for using “non-Islamic” names.

Spokesman for the registration office Seyf-Allah Abutorabi told a press conference that the ministry would also help those who wish to replace their non-Islamic names to do so with a minimum of bureaucratic hassle. (See Iranians Debate the Reality of ‘Aryan Islam’)

Poland and the Catholic Church

Catholicism is generally considered the most vital ingredient of Polish identity. It is argued that during the last five centuries, the Polish state fought battles against the Russians (Orthodox Christians from the East), Ottomans (Muslims from the South) and Germans and Swedes (Protestants from the North and West), so defending Poland or defending the Catholic Church became one and the same and Catholicism formed the basis of Polish nationalism. Poland was partitioned between its neighbours in 1785 and did not exist as a state till 1918. During the nineteenth century, with the state gone, Church gained more importance. Catholic priests played a key role in Polish insurrections against occupiers. However, contrary to what is portrayed, Church was not the only expression of Polish resistance and, during the occupation, while priests supported the insurrections, the Holy See asked Poles to accept the Russian Tsar as their divinely anointed emperor. In 1945, its liberty was again compromised when it became a Communist state. During the post-1945 dark period, the Catholic Church was at the forefront, strengthening the myth that the Catholic Church was essential to Poland. Cardinal Stefan Wyszyński, Archbishop of Warsaw (1948-81), was the undisputed leader of the resistance against Nazis and Communists for decades and the fall the Communist regime (1945-89) was aided by the selection of another Polish Cardinal Karol Wojtyła as Pope John Paul II in 1978. The Catholic leadership, unsurprisingly, promoted the religious nationalism. Cardinal Stefan Wyszyński once said that "nowhere else is the union between Church and nation as strong as in Poland." Pope John Paul II declared, "Without Christ, it is impossible to understand the history of Poland." The charismatic "Polish Pope" made the Church very popular and the linkage between Poles and their faith is still strong: 99% of the Polish children are baptised, 93% of weddings are also solemnized in Church and between 90% and 98% of the Poles will affirm their belief in the Catholicism. The national myth and the present demography helps make most Poles believe that Poland was always homogeneously Catholics, with few 'foreigners'. However, in reality, Polish state has always been ethnically and religiously heterogeneous. In the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, Poland (or Poland-Lithuania) was a diverse nation, with Jewish, Orthodox, and Protestant communities. Ethnic Poles lived with Ukrainians, Belarusian, Prussians, Lithuanians, Jews and Livionians. It was only after the Counterreformation movement that Catholics established their hegemony and not only physically banish some non-Catholics from the Polish state but also expelled them from the state's historical narrative (See Faith and Fatherland: Catholicism, Modernity, and Poland). During the interwar years, when the Catholic Church again became dominant, it again tried to establish its hegemony and tried to restrict the religious freedoms of minorities.

Largest Catholic Church in Poland: Basilica of Our Lady of Licheń
Source: Christian Tourism

The present-day Poland is very homogeneous. Ninety eight percent of the population belong to Polish ethnicity and around ninety percent are Catholics. However, this homogeneity is a recent phenomenon. Even before the Second World War, Catholics only had a two-thirds majority in Poland.  In 1921, newly revived Poland, "Rome's most faithful daughter," had 62.5% Roman (Latin) Catholic, 11.8% Eastern Rite Catholic, 11% Greek Orthodox, 10.8% Jewish, and 3.7% Protestants citizens. The war, change of borders, and voluntary migrations and forced deportations bequeathed Poland its religious and ethnic homogeneity. Ukrainians and Belarusians became part of Soviet Union and Germans were either killed in the War or fled or were expelled later on. Jewish minority was either destroyed in the Holocaust or fled. The homogeneity of Poland was further aided by the migration of Poles from Kresy ((Eastern) Borderlands), an area that was part of pre-WWII Poland but was annexed to the Soviet Union after 1945. 

In the 1990s, after democratization and defeat of communism, Catholic Church's influence increased. For instance, abortion, which was legal since 1956, was made illegal, except for few exemptions, in 1993. The Polish law on abortion is one of the most restrictive in Europe. The Church vigorously campaigned for the bill. Even the Pope came from Rome to campaign for the bill. There was such emotional support for the bill that its opponents felt threatened but the religious right was even then not happy with the law: 

Lawmakers approved the measure in January after heavy lobbying by the Roman Catholic Church and in a climate of such emotion and intimidation that virtually all state hospitals had already stopped performing abortions. Gynecologists who perform the procedure say they are targets of threats and attacks by militant anti-abortion campaigners...

Bishop Tadeusz Pieronek, the associate general secretary of the Polish Bishops' Conference, said that the church was unhappy with the law as passed because "the principle 'Thou shalt not kill' does not allow any exceptions."

Halina Nowina-Konopka, a member of Parliament from the Christian National Party, said the law did not go far enough.

"It just regulates when you can kill and when you can't," she said. "It devalues human life in that it makes one life worth less than another. It's like ancient Sparta where they threw individuals who were less fit off the cliffs." ( See Tough Abortion Law Provokes Dismay in Poland)

Not only this law is still on the books, but there also have been attempts to ban abortion completely.

In 1993, the Polish state signed a concordat with the Church. This agreement was declared as a model for other post-communist countries by the Pope. The important thing to note was that the concordat was agreed and signed before the new constitution. Therefore, the Polish Constitution (1997) had to conform to the concordat, not the other way round. In fact, several drafts of the constitution had to be adjusted to conform it to the concordat. The concordat has been criticized for various reasons. Once signed, the concordat ended any possibility of constitutional separation of church and state. It also ended the equality of all religions before the state. The Catholic Church acquired a special position within the state because of its special relationship. Under concordat, the state promised to provide Catholic religious education in state schools if requested. The Church also made state declare seven religious days as public holidays. The state also accepted the role of Catholic military chaplains, administered by the (Catholic) military bishopric, in the Polish military forces. The controversial rightwing Radio Marya was also protected under the concordat (See Polish concordat (1993): Text and criticism)

The 1997 Constitution also shows several elements of religious nationalism. The preamble mentions God twice and the following sentence emphasizing Christian heritage of Poland:

Beholden to our ancestors for their labours, their struggle for independence achieved at great sacrifice, for our culture rooted in the Christian heritage of the Nation and in universal human values, 

The following articles go against the principle of the secularity of state:

Article 25(4): The relations between the Republic of Poland and the Roman Catholic Church shall be determined by the international treaty concluded with the Holy See, and by statute. 

Article 53(3): Parents shall have the right to ensure their children a moral and religious upbringing and teaching in accordance with their convictions. The provisions of Article 48, para. 1 shall apply as appropriate.

Article 53(4): The religion of a church or other legally recognized religious organization may be taught in schools, but other peoples' freedom of religion and conscience
shall not be infringed thereby. 

Article 104(2): Deputies, before the commencement of the performance of the mandate, shall take the following oath in the presence of the Sejm:
"I do solemnly swear to perform my duties to the Nation diligently and conscientiously, to safeguard the sovereignty and interests of the State, to do all within my power for the prosperity of the Homeland and the  well-being of its citizens, and to observe the Constitution and other laws of the Republic of Poland."
The oath may also be taken with the additional sentence "So help me, God."

Article 130: The President of the Republic shall assume office upon taking the following oath in the presence of the National Assembly:
"Assuming, by the will of the Nation, the office of President of the Republic of Poland, I do solemnly swear to be faithful to the provisions of the Constitution; I pledge that I shall steadfastly safeguard the dignity of the Nation, the independence and security of the State, and also that the good of the Homeland and the prosperity of its citizens shall forever remain my supreme obligation."
The oath may also be taken with the additional sentence "So help me, God." 

Article 151: The Prime Minister, Deputy Prime Ministers and ministers shall take the following oath in the presence of the President of the Republic:
"Assuming this office of Prime Minister (Deputy Prime Minister, minister) I do solemnly swear to be faithful to the provisions of the Constitution and other laws of the Republic of Poland, and that the good of the Homeland and the prosperity of its citizens shall forever remain my supreme obligation."
The oath may also be taken with the additional sentence "So help me, God." (See The Constitution of the Republic of Poland of 2nd April 1997)

Secularization of Quebec Nationalism

Before the 1960s, Quebec's nationalism was a cocktail of ethnolinguistic and religious sentiments. It was difficult to define Quebec's nationalism without explaining the differences between Catholicism and Protestantism and without reminding the reader about the Catholic struggle for equal rights in Protestant-majority Canada and previously in the British Empire that was based on Anglican nationalism. Roman Catholic Church was the main part and defender of Quebec's culture. However, during the 1960s, many long-term developments and events lead to the "Quiet Revolution" that considerably weakened the link between Catholicism and Quebec nationalism. The religious nationalism declined and became more implicit after the end of Maurice Duplessis era (Quebec's Premier 1936-39 and 1944-59).

Source: Francophone Nationalism in Québec


David Seljak in his article "Why the Quiet Revolution was “Quiet”: The Catholic Church’s Reaction to the Secularization of Nationalism in Quebec after 1960" explains the secularization of the Quebec identity. However, it is important to note that the secularization was not complete:

One of the most important issues was the Church’s acceptance of the secularization of French-Canadian nationalism. If the Quebec state had the power to make the reforms of the 1960s “revolutionary,” then the Church had the power to make the revolution “quiet” – or not. Its reconciliation to the new nationalism has helped to determine the shape of Quebec culture and society after 1960.

While the British North America Act implicitly gave the Catholic Church a semi-established status in the province of Quebec, the two most important motors of modernization, democratic political structures and capitalist economic institutions, remained outside of its control. Consequently, despite its important role in Quebec society, the Church was most often in the position of reacting to social change. From 1900 to 1930, the Church responded to industrialization and modernization with what Guindon has called an “administrative revolution,” an unprecedented campaign tocreate new institutions and bureaucracies to meet the needs of French Catholics in every realm of modern urban life. Besides multiplying its institutions which provided education, health care, and social services, the Church promoted the growth of Catholic labour unions, farmers’ cooperatives, credit unions, pious leagues, newspapers, radio and television shows, films, and Catholic Action groups for workers, students, women, farmers, and nationalists. This project was encouraged by Pope Pius XI, who founded the Catholic Action movement to encourage Catholics to form “intermediary bodies” or voluntary associations to mediate between individuals and the state apparatus. Conservative Catholics dreamed that these bodies would eventually reclaim all those functions in society that had been wrenched from the Church’s control.

While other peoples met the challenges of industrialization and modernization with programs of what sociologist Karl Deutsch has called “nation-building,” French-Canadian nationalists embarked on an aggressive programme of “church-building” with the goal of creating an “Églisenation” (nation-Church) rather than a nation-state. While they encouraged state intervention in specific projects (such as the colonisation of the hinterlands of Quebec), French Canadian nationalists usually preferred to resolve conflicts by creating religiously inspired social structures rather than appealing to state power. For example, in the Church’s corporatist response to the Depression, the actions of the state were limited to those realms where the first agents of society (the family and the Church) were as yet incapable of fulfilling their responsibilities. Typically, French-Canadian nationalism was marked by a certain anti-étatisme and apolitisme. Because it was rooted in a profoundly conservative, clerical, Catholic triumphalism, this nationalism could be xenophobic, intolerant, and repressive, as evidenced by its crusades against Jews, socialists, and Jehovah’s Witnesses in the name of religious and national solidarity. Despite the anti-modern discourse that its authors employed, this bureaucratic revolution ironically promoted the modernization of French Quebec society including that of the Church itself and French-Canadian nationalism. This modernization was certainly problematic. Critics drew attention to the gulf between the modern, multicultural, urban, industrial reality of Quebec society and a conservative Catholic ideology centred on rural values, ethnic solidarity, religion, and a rejection of politics and the state. These critics, including those who participated in the Catholic Action movements, grew suspicious of the traditional nationalism and some even rejected nationalism altogether.

The rapid changes of the 1960s, known as the Quiet Revolution, grew directly out of the type of society that was formed in Quebec after 1867. After World War II, a “new middle class” of university-trained bureaucrats increasingly occupied important positions in the immense bureaucracy that the Church had created. While educated in Catholic culture and values, members of this clerically dominated bureaucracy were simultaneously socialized into modern, rational and democratic values. Thus, they were uncomfortable with the conservative, undemocratic practices of the Duplessis regime and with the complicity of the Church in those practices. They demanded the rationalization of the bureaucracy that oversaw education, health care, and social services. They also demanded its democratization and protested against its “clericalism,” understood as the best positions being reserved for Church officials. Consequently, the new nationalism was defined as much against the Catholic Church as the Anglophone business elite.

The ascent to power of these elites was assured when the Parti libéral du Québec (PLQ) took power in June of 1960. Inspired by a secular and modernizing nationalism, the Lesage government introduced a number of measures that radically redefined the role of the state. It took over the functions of the Church in education, healthcare, and social services. Through the nationalization of hydro-electric utilities and the creation of crown corporations, the PLQ sought both to expand the influence of the government in the economy and to increase the presence of French Canadians in the upper levels of that economy. The state bureaucracy increased at a tremendous rate, growing by 42.6 percent between 1960 and 1965. While the changes adopted by the Lesage government mostly satisfied the interests of the new middle class and francophone business people, some sought to promote a more democratic, humane, and participatory society. The Liberal government introduced more progressive labour legislation and important social welfare reforms. Supporters of the government’s reforms attacked both traditional religious nationalism and laissez-faire liberalism. In doing so they created a new political nationalism that was adamantly secular, state-centred, and optimistically oriented to Keynesian liberalism or even social democracy. 

While accepting these reforms, Catholics attempted to find ways of adapting Church structures and Catholic thinking to the new context. Given the history and theology of the Catholic hierarchy in the 1950s, this reaction was by no means the obvious route to take. Even in the early 1960s, the bishops condemned the attack on traditional French Canadian nationalism in the very popular book, Les insolences de Frère Untel. Even though, led by Cardinal Paul-Émile Léger, they had accepted the urbanization of Quebec society and reluctantly had given up the strategies of colonization and corporatism, the bishops’ traditional paternalistic attitude, obedience to Rome, moralizing spirit, and confusion between Catholicism and conservative ideology had remained intact. Yet by 1970, the bishops had largely reconciled themselves to the autonomy of the state, the liberty of individual consciences in political questions, and the legitimacy of the new nationalism. The early opposition and later reconciliation of the bishops was paralleled in many sectors in the Church.

This reconciliation would have been impossible without the coincidence of the Quiet Revolution with the Second Vatican Council. In Quebec, the Church’s redefinition of its relationship to modernity had three immediate consequences. First, it took the wind out of the sails of the conservative rejection of the new society. It made the project of the traditional nationalists impossible – since the Church hierarchy now refused its designated role as spiritual and cultural leaders of the attack on modernity. Second, it allowed Catholics – and even clergy and bishops – to support some projects of the Quiet Revolution in spite of their “laicizing” agenda. Finally, it inspired a new concern for development and social justice among Quebec Catholics. The Council affirmed the new direction of Catholic social teaching laid out by Pope John XXIII. Catholics sought to remain relevant to Quebec society and to participate, as Christians, in the important struggles of their society.

This new social teaching, along with the reflections of the Catholic Church in Latin America, would lead to the emergence of a faith and justice movement in the 1970s. Influenced by this teaching, the Church in Quebec could develop a sustained ethical critique of the new society and the new nationalism while affirming their liberating aspects. Taken together these three developments meant that Quebec society avoided the painful cultural schism between Catholics and modernizers (both liberal and radical)that has marked other Catholic societies

First of these two events was the