Malta, LGBT rights, abortion, & religious nationalism

Malta, a small island nation in the Mediterranean Sea, has a national identity that is strongly influenced by Catholicism. The religious culture of Malta can be traced back to the Order of the Knights of the Hospital of St. John of Jerusalem (also called the Knights Hospitaller and the Knights of Malta) which participated in the Crusades and were given the control over Malta in 1530 because of their contribution and devotion to the religious cause. Knights Hospitaller had an interesting history. A religious order created in the 7th century to take care of the Christian pilgrims and sick in the Holy Land (Jerusalem) it became a military order by the turn of the millennium. It also expanded and had properties donated to them or built by them all over Europe. After the fall of Jerusalem (1187) to Saladin and later of Kingdom of Jerusalem (1291), the Knights moved to Cyprus and then captured Rhodes to become Knights of Rhodes in the 14th century. Here, the Knights primary opponents were Barbary pirates and Muslim Turks. The Ottomans were eventually able to able to defeat Knights after almost fifty years of a military campaign in 1522. The Knights were allowed to withdraw from Rhodes and after seven years were given the control of Malta by the Spanish monarch, courtesy a former knight and Pope Clement VII in 1530 for a symbolic annual tribute of a single Maltese falcon. From 1530 to 1798, the Knights of Malta, as they were called, ruled and shaped life in Malta. Napoleon defeated them in 1798, on the way to the Egyptian invasion. Later, Malta came under the British in 1814 and became independent in 1964.

Philip Barker in his book, Religious Nationalism in Modern Europe: If God be for Us, contends that Malta's Catholic identity, acquired under the Knights, was crystallized under the rule of the religious "other." First, it was Muslim Turks, then anticlerical French, and finally, for the next one and a half century, it was Protestant Britain. Due to the domination of religious other, "Catholicism is central to self-perception" of the Maltese. Unsurprisingly, Maltese politics is influenced by the majority religion and Article 2 of the Constitution makes Catholicism the state religion of Malta, gives the Church the duty and the right to teach people morality, and makes religious teaching mandatory in all public schools.

One can argue that, like in Ireland and Poland, Catholicism is an integral part of Malta's nationalism. Religious nationalism until recently accepted and proclaimed. The preeminance of the Catholic Church could be seen in state ceremonies. For instance, in Maltese courts, a person under aoth also has to kiss a cross presented to him/her (minorities are allowed to kiss their own holy books or the Maltese constitution). All incoming Prime Minister tradiotnally kiss a cross after taking oath. In January 2020, after taking the oath, the new PM Robert Abela also kissed the cross. And it was quite a scandel when Alfred Sant, a Labour PM, refused to kiss the cross in 1996. 

An interesting article in The Economist (Malta leads the way for gay and transgender rights in Europe) rightly argues that the tiny island "is deeply Catholic and hardly an oasis of liberalism." Usually, it is Northern and Western European countries that come up with policies that are then followed by Eastern and Southern European countries. Sometimes, the latter adopt these policies on their own accord but, at other times,  they have to be pushed. Many Eastern European countries, for instance, adopted liberal policies when these policies were made a requisite condition for entry into the European Union. 

Malta is conservative country but changes are happening and the hold of religious elements, particularly the Catholic Church, is decreasing. In 2011, Malta legalized divorce after a long hard fight. It required a national referendum to decide the issue. In 2013, the Labour Party, a center-left party defeated the center-right Nationalist Party. The Labour Party took power after fifteen years. Since then, Labour Party has come up with several liberal policies. First, in 2016, Malta became the only country in Europe to ban conversion therapy for gays. Second, in July 2017, Malta made the language in the official documents gender-neutral. Gendered terms, such as father, husband, wife, and mother, were removed from the country’s Marriage Act and all other laws. Next, in August 2017, Malta legalized same-sex marriage. Some would, however, argue Malta has been liberal since the early 2000s. Gays were allowed to openly serve in the military in 2002 and discrimination based on gender identity and sexual orientation have been criminalized since 2004.

Source: Malta leads the way for gay and transgender rights in Europe

Today, Malta is recognized as one of the most gay-friendly countries in the world. This may be taken as an indication of decrease of religious nationalism and many would hope that Malta would soon become a secular country. However, although the hold of the Catholic Church has wanned, it is still very influential. Exihbit 1: Malta is the only country in the EU that still bans abortion entirely. Even in case of incest, rape or danger to mother's life, abortion is not allowed. 

And the new PM Abela is not oging to change things. He sees no reason why the constitution should be amended and Roman Catholicism removed as Malta's official religion. He said:

Malta is a secular state, but the constitution also affords a strong, fundamental freedom that everyone is entitled to his religion of choice...While I believe in a secular society, where there is a distinction between the State and religion, and the autonomies are respected, we share common values and I wanted to send a message.

Abela is also for strict policy against abortion. He has made clear that he would not support any changes in the law regarding abortion (Malta Today).

Pakistan, Internet Freedoms and Digital Blasphemy

Pakistani Constitution guarantees freedom of religion (Article 20), freedom of speech (Article 19), freedom of assembly (Article 16), freedom of movement (Article 15), and the right of free trial (Article 10A) but throughout most of its history, these freedoms and rights have been unavailable to most of its citizens. No one expects much under a martial law government or when a general is "legally-elected" president. However, when there is a democratic government, like today, when the military is not formally controlling the government, one expects the constitution would be given importance. Unfortunately, this is not true. Minorities, particularly Ahmadis, face persecution and prosecution. To make things more horrible, the Government of Pakistan, is now attempting to silence Ahmadis overseas.  

Aysha Khan in her article, titled Pakistan attempts to prosecute Ahmadi US citizens for digital blasphemy, informs us about the legal notices issued to US citizens:

Pakistani authorities have asked leaders of the American Ahmadiyya Muslim community to take down its official website, claiming that the U.S.-based site violates Pakistan’s strict blasphemy laws and new cybercrime regulations.

The Pakistan Telecommunication Authority said in a legal notice issued on Dec. 24 to the Ahmadiyya Muslim Community USA’s spokesmen, Amjad Mahmood Khan and Harris Zafar, that failure to remove the website TrueIslam.com would result in fines of up to $3.14 million or criminal sanctions, including possible 10-year-prison sentences.

“This is a new frontier in persecution of Ahmadi Muslims in the digital space,” said Khan, a lawyer in Los Angeles who has testified before Congress about blasphemy and religious freedom. “Pakistan wants to impose its abominable blasphemy laws on the whole world by targeting U.S. citizens and U.S. websites.”

Brad Adams, who heads Human Rights Watch’s Asia Division, said “censoring Ahmadis and using blasphemy laws to airbrush them from Pakistani society” is part of the “widespread and rampant discrimination and social exclusion” Ahmadis face in Pakistan.

In Pakistan, home to about 4 million Ahmadis, the constitution and penal code declare members of the Ahmadiyya sect non-Muslims and impose harsh penalties — including death — for those who call themselves Muslims or publicly engage in religious activities. Ahmadis accepts the sect’s 19th-century founder, Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, as the messiah and as a subordinate prophet to the Prophet Muhammad, a belief many Muslims consider blasphemous.

“This is a malicious attempt to chill free speech and expression by a Muslim American website,” attorney Brett Williamson of O’Melveny & Myers, which is representing TrueIslam.com pro bono, wrote in a letter to PTA on Monday (Jan. 11).

He described the takedown notice as “legally infirm, but also patently absurd in its reach.”

The website is registered and hosted in the U.S. and is aimed at an American audience. Zafar and Khan are both U.S. citizens and the threat of extradition is virtually nil, but both have relatives in Pakistan and say penalties would make it impossible to travel there.

Law professor Arturo Carrillo, who directs George Washington University Law School’s Global Internet Freedom Project, said this case shows that the Pakistan government is now using its controversial cybercrime laws in an effort “to repress online expression and content emanating from outside the country’s borders because the government has deemed it to be undesirable and unlawful.”

PTA officials did not respond to requests for comment.

In 2016, Pakistan enacted digital regulations that allowed authorities to block online content in the “interest of the glory of Islam.” Last year, the government passed blanket censorship laws that would allow authorities to order tech companies to remove digital pornography, blasphemy and anti-state content, drawing ire from Google, Facebook, Twitter and other platforms.

But human rights experts say the takedown notices also come amid increased targeting of Ahmadis’ online religious expression. 

One day after issuing the takedown notice to TrueIslam.com, PTA also sent notices to Google and Wikipedia, threatening penalties and prosecution if the platforms failed to remove “sacrilegious content” associated with the Ahmadi sect’s beliefs.

PTA said it was responding to complaints regarding an “unauthentic” Ahmadi translation of the Quran on the Google Play Store; “misleading” search results that returned the Ahmadi leader Mirza Masroor Ahmad’s name when the term “Khalifa (caliph) of Islam” was searched; and “deceitful” Wikipedia articles that suggested that the Ahmadi caliph is Muslim.

Officials also demanded that all internet service providers serving Pakistan block content from Ahmadi websites, including TrueIslam.com, the English-language magazine Al Hakam and the international satellite TV network MTA. 

Five of Pakistan’s top Ahmadi leaders have also had cases filed against them in recent weeks over religious activity on WhatsApp, Khan told Religion News Service.

Earlier in December, Khan told a hearing of the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom that extremists in Pakistan were intent on using the country’s cyber crime statutes to initiate blasphemy cases against Ahmadis.

But this latest action, Khan told Religion News Service, is “a very slippery slope in terms of what this could mean for other minorities. We’re the canaries in the coal mine. This would mean any potential website or digital content that is quote-unquote blasphemous can be the subject of criminal prosecution.”

USCIRF Commissioner Johnnie Moore described the takedown notices as “recklessly brazen” and said he expected fierce bipartisan condemnation from both the Trump and Biden administrations.

“Surely, the Pakistani government doesn’t intend on threatening American citizens within the United States?” Moore asked. “Surely, Prime Minister Imran Khan doesn’t want this controversy, now?”

 

Source: Battle for the internet

And if you thought that was the end of it. It is not. The Government of Pakistan intends to be more cruel as far as internet freedoms are concerned. The censorship will increase further and things will get worse. Asif Shehzad, in his Reuters story, explains what the government wants to do next (you can read the full story New internet rules to give Pakistan blanket powers of censorship):

Pakistan is all set to roll out new internet rules that critics say will give the government wide powers of censorship after rejecting requests from social media companies for consultation.

Muslim-majority Pakistan already has media regulations that adhere to conservative social customs. Last month, the Pakistan Telecommunication Authority (PTA) blocked TikTok for failing to filter out “immoral and indecent” content.

The new rules were approved initially by Prime Minister Imran Khan’s cabinet in February.

They give the PTA “removal and blocking” powers of digital content that “harms, intimidates or excites disaffection” towards the government or poses a threat to the “integrity, security and defence of Pakistan”.

A service provider or social media company could face a fine up to 500 million rupees ($3.14 million) for non-compliance, which would in turn trigger a mechanism preventing the uploading and live streaming, particularly related to “terrorism, hate speech, pornography, incitement to violence and detrimental to national security”.

A platform has to act within 24 hours or, in case of an emergency, six hours to remove content. The rules also empower the telecom authority to block an entire online system.

PTA spokesman Khurram Mehran told Reuters the rules were meant for a better coordination with foreign-based social media companies, which usually “don’t respond to legal requirements”.

Any platform that has more than half a million users in the country will have to register with the PTA within nine months and establish a permanent office and database servers in Pakistan within 18 months.

The new rules shocked rights activists who complained that there had been no consultation.

“The expansion of these powers is just horrendous,” Nighat Dad, a digital rights activist, told Reuters.

“The consultation never occurred,” said Jeff Paine, managing director, Asia Internet Coalition (AIC), a joint forum of social media platforms, urging the government to “work with industry on practical, clear rules”.

The AIC said in a statement: “The draconian data localisation requirements will damage the ability of people to access a free and open internet and shut Pakistan’s digital economy off from the rest of the world.

“It’s chilling to see the PTA’s powers expanded, allowing them to force social media companies to violate established human rights norms on privacy and freedom of expression.”

 

Vaccine for Holocaust survivors living in other countries but not for Arab Israelis & Palestinians living under Israeli occupation?

Israel is planning to provide Coronavirus vaccine shots to Holocaust survivors living anywhere in the world. Israeli Diaspora Affairs Minister Omer Yankelevich on 12th January announced this new policy. Erin Ben-Moshe in her article Israel explores plan to provide free vaccines to Holocaust survivors worldwide reports Yankelevich's statement:

“During this global crisis, we have an opportunity to support Holocaust survivors whose resilience continues to guide and inspire humanity today,” said Yankelevich. “It is our collective obligation to safeguard this treasured yet vulnerable population in the spirit of mutual responsibility.”

“Now is the time for all of us, Jewish institutions and leaders from across the world, to come together in this operation,” she said. “Together, we can ensure that Holocaust survivors are efficiently vaccinated, wherever they live.”

However, Ben-Moshe also informs that there are no definite plans yet on how to manage vaccination of around 130,000 Holocaust survivors outside Israel (around 200,000 are Israelis):

As of now, there is no definite plan to finance and manage the vaccination project, including the involvement of Jewish philanthropic networks. Solutions for other expected hurdles, such as obtaining permits from foreign governments and the purchase of vaccines by the ministry, are also being examined. The statement also notes that vaccines for this initiative will be acquired separately and in addition to Israel’s current supply.

Nathan Jeffay in his The Times of Israel article, Israeli group sparks debate with plans to vaccinate world’s Holocaust survivors, has collated other questions raised about this scheme. The first objection is from the agency that is supposed to distribute the vaccine:

Shalom Corps was set up a few months ago by Israel’s Diaspora Affairs Ministry and the Jewish Agency. While Diaspora Affairs Minister Omer Yankelevich has waxed lyrical about the plan, the Jewish Agency only learned about it through the media, and has not echoed her enthusiasm.

“It’s quite an undertaking,” a Jewish Agency spokeswoman told The Times of Israel on Wednesday. “We weren’t aware of it and haven’t had a chance to properly look into whether it’s feasible.”

Haaretz cited an anonymous source familiar with the Jewish Agency’s reaction saying that officials in the organization were “shocked” and “outraged” when they saw a story on the idea, which they called “abhorrent.”

 

... the source who spoke to Haaretz regarding discussions in the Jewish Agency said it would be “unfeasible, illegal, immoral, diplomatically disastrous and an absolute impossibility” to interfere with the way individual countries distribute vaccines by creating special provision for Jewish Holocaust survivors.

Strict regulations, which vary from country to country, govern medical procedures, and while experts say some do permit private vaccination for select individuals, the plan could run into legal issues in other jurisdictions.

While Israel is planning to vaccinate Holocaust survivors that are citizens of other countries and most of them are most likely vaccinated by their governments in the next few months (most of the Holocaust survivors live in the rich Western countries, which have advanced health systems and already secured large amounts of vaccine doses, and are prioritizing vaccination of their older population, which also includes Holocaust survivors), it has shown far less concern about Palestinians under its occupation or even its own Arab Israeli population:

In the midst of the fanfare surrounding Israel’s vaccine campaign, Palestinian activists and rights groups have criticized Israel for not offering the vaccine to the millions of Palestinians living under occupation in the West Bank and Gaza. 

Under Article 56 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, Israel is required as an occupier to “ensure the adoption and application of the prophylactic and preventive measures necessary to combat the spread of contagious diseases and epidemics” — in this case, the COVID-19 vaccine. 

Israel has deflected such criticisms, saying the obligation to vaccinate Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza lies in the hands of the Palestinian Authority (PA). 

Meanwhile, Israeli leaders insist that they are vaccinating all Israeli citizens, regardless of race or ethnicity, equally and fairly — including the state’s 2 million Palestinian citizens. 

But that just might not be true, human rights advocates have pointed out. 

While Palestinians citizens of Israel qualify, just as Jewish Israelis do, to receive the vaccine and would not be turned back at a clinic simply because they are Palestinian, rights groups are claiming that there are other sinister mechanisms of discrimination at work when it comes to Israel and its distribution of the COVID-19 vaccine. 

Adalah — The Legal Center for Arab Minority Rights in Israel has slammed Israel’s emergency medical service for failing to provide vital COVID-19 information, including facts relating to the vaccine, available in Arabic. 

The website of Magen David Adom (MDA), the emergency service responsible for informing the Israeli citizenry on everything from COVID-19 guidelines and updates, how and where to get tested, and vital information regarding the vaccine, currently only provides information and updates in Hebrew and English.

This, Adalah says, is unacceptable, and marginalizes millions of Palestinian citizens of Israel, who make up 20% of the population and primarily speak Arabic. 

“In Israel, Magen David Adom is basically the equivalent of the Red Cross,” Adalah attorney Sawsan Zaher told Mondoweiss. “All of the essential information that they provide is not available at all in Arabic.”

Zaher told Mondoweiss that she believes, as someone who has been documenting and fighting against discrimination against Palestinian citizens of Israel for years, the failure to provide vital information regarding COVID-19 and the vaccine in Arabic is “not a coincidence.”

“There is a policy of systematic racial discrimination against Arab citizens in Israel,” Zaher said, and the failure of official bodies like MDA to cater to all citizens is just one small example of that policy. 

Zaher pointed to Israel’s 2018 Nation State Law, which among other provisions declared that only Jews have the right to self-determination, as a template for discrimination against Palestinians “on all levels.”

“Having the Jewish Nation State Basic Law… which stated that Israel is the homeland of the Jewish people, excluded the Palestinian citizenry from the preamble and the definition of who the citizens are,” Zaher said.

“This exclusion is providing constitutional legitimacy to discrimination of Palestinians on all levels,” she said, including, for example, “not providing a very important website in Arabic which is vital.

“Unfortunately this [discrimination] is seen not only on high level policies, but basic policies and decisions like providing information in Arabic or making sure all campaigns on COVID-19 awareness are provided equally in Palestinians and Arab towns,” Zaher said. 

The implications of not having accurate COVID-19 information in Arabic are potentially devastating and far-reaching for Palestinian communities in Israel, where reports have indicated widespread misinformation regarding the virus and the vaccine. 

With no official Arabic-language platforms to educate people on the vaccine and combat existing misinformation, advocates fear that it could lead to significant cases of Palestinians in Israel refusing to get vaccinated, therefore putting the community at greater risk. 

The implications of such discriminatory practices when it comes to the coronavirus, Zaher says, are “a matter of life and death.” (Israel says vaccine equally available to all citizens. But is that really the case?)

Five stages of Kurdish nationalism

M. Hakan Yavuz divides the rise of Kurdish nationalism into five stages and argues that

The state's policies are the determinant factors in the evolution and modulation of the Kurdish ethno-nationalism. The major reason for the politicization of Kurdish cultural identity is the shift from multi-ethnic, multi-cultural realities of the Ottoman empire to the nation-state model.

Yavuz contends that there is nothing natural about the development of Kurdish nationalism as is true of other nationalisms. Kurdish nationalism has an 'ethnie' that Smith seems necessary for any nationalisms and this ethnie has been used by Kurdish ethnic entrepreneurs to mobilize Kurds. The Kurds are, however, divided along the tribal, linguistic, region,al and religious lines. These divisions, which have been sustained due to rugged, mountainous geography, have been a major reason for weakness in Kurdish nationalism.

Yavuz declares the tribal structure as the core depository of Kurdish identity and argues that it has both helped and harmed Kurdish nationalism.

This tribal structure played a dual role: it prevented the formation of a Kurdish unity by keeping them fragmented, and preserved a heightened Kurdish particularism vis-a-vis the Turks, Persians, and Arabs.

Kurdish nationalism started to take shape due to the centralization policies of the Ottoman empire (1878-1924); it acquired an ethnic bent/consciousness under Kemalist reforms (1925-61); later influenced by the broader Turkish political struggles, class consciousness, and leftist dominated it (1962-83); the 1980 coup led to a military struggle (1983-99); and finally the capture of Ocalan and end of Kurdish insurgency has moved it to its present/last stage.

Stage 1: Anti-centralization Revolts and Politicization of the Islamic Identity

Centralization and modernization of the Ottoman empire led to revolts in Kurdish areas. However, one should be cautious in calling them national revolts as they were primarily local. As modernization reforms decreased the hold of tribal ties/loyalties, Sufi networks, like Naksibendi and Kadiri, increased their influence and Kurdish ethnic awareness rose in the forms of Islamic consciousness. While putting revolts against its policies, the Ottoman state also decided to use Kurds (and their Islamic consciousness) and Sultan Abdulhamid II formed the Hamidiye Regiments to counter Russians and Armenians. However, Islam didn't become a crucial part of Kurdish nationalism as it is part of Turkish nationalism.

Stage 2: National Secularization (1925-61)

The way the Ottoman empire was partitioned and the annulled Treaty of Sevres has left deep scars on the collective memory of Turks. British support for the Kurdish state and the inclusion of Kurdish autonomy in the unfair treaty is not forgotten.

After the war, Turkey became a predominantly Muslim nation and cosmopolitan Ottomanism gave way to secular nationalism that abhorred diversity. Ottoman legacy, however, resulted in a paradox that is still unresolved:

Due to the Ottoman legacy, Turkey embodies an irresolvable paradox in the foundation of the Republic in the 1920s. On the one hand, the state, formed as a result of demographic Islamization of the country, used Islam to unify diverse ethnolinguistic groups; on the other hand, it defined its 'progressive' civilizing ideology, known as Kemalism, in opposition to Islam.

However, the Turkish state wanted to promote its own brand of Islam that was not acceptable to both Turks and Kurds. The end of Caliphate in 1924 was one of the main reasons for the first Kurdish rebellion, known as the Sheik Said rebellion, and so it was based on ethnoreligious nationalism. Due to the authoritarian approach of the Turkish state and its promotion of Turkish ethnic nationalism, there were two more Kurdish revolts (the revolt of Agri in 1930-31 led by Ihsan Nuri Biltis and  Zaza/Alevi Kurds revolt in 1937-38 around Dersim).

Stage 3: Secularization of the Kurdish Question through Socialism (1961-83)

As Kurds became more educated, the tribal and religious leaders slowly lost their power and intellectuals became the new leaders. The Turkish state was always aligned with the West but, during the 1950s, it became a partner by joining NATO and sending its forces to support the US forces in the Korean War. The Kurdish intellectuals, like many other university students in the West, were disillusioned with the West and expressed their Kurdish grievances in socialist idioms. With the Turkish state in the Western camp, socialism seemed to be an apposite ideology for all those oppressed by the Turkish state, including the Kurds. Kurds, particularly Alevi Kurds, took a leading part in Leftist magazines (such as bilingual Turkish-Kurdish Deng and Dicle-Firat), political parties (such as Labor Party), and groups (such as Revolutionary Cultural Society of the East (DDKO is its Turkish acronym)). After the 1970 coup, the Labor Party and DDKO were outlawed. The repression continued as well as the ambush and sabotage in the 1970s. In November 1978, Kurdistan's Workers Party (PKK) was formed, with Abdullah Ocalan as its head. The 1980 coup declared radical Islam, the Left, and Kurdish nationalism as key threats to the Turkish state. Repression increased and all avenues of cultural expression were blocked. The terrorist activities of the PKK moved even outside Turkey as a Turkish consulate in France was bombed in November 1980. The key achievement of the PKK during this period was taking tribe and Islam out of Kurdish nationalism.

Stage 4: Emergence of PKK (1983-99)

The return of (partial) democracy did not change the state repression and the PKK militant campaign. The PKK during this time got help from other countries. Syria allowed it to establish training camps and Western European countries gave space for organization and propaganda. The PKK attacked not only the hybrid regime and its supporters but also Turkish nationalism. This increased Kurdish consciousness and politicization of Turkish nationalism. The killings and terrorist activities of PKK continued in the 1980s and 1990s. The target was not only the Turkish state but also Turkish civilians and Kurdish civilians who did not identify with the PKK. There were some unilateral ceasefires by the PKK but they did not last long. Later, Syria stopped its support for the PKK and the Turkish military used the Regional State Emergency Governorate (OHAL) which included almost all the Kurdish majority provinces to take special measures, ignoring normal constitutional protections, to defeat the PKK which even used children and female suicide bombings to fight them. The Turkish state also helped create Islamic Kurdish hit squads which killed PKK supporters in broad daylight, with state support. The scars of this conflict were deep and affected every person in the region.

PKK Flag

Source: Wikipedia

Stage 5: Kurdish problem as a European problem (2000- )

In 1998, Turkey increase its pressure on Syria and threatened to retaliate militarily if it did not completely stop helping the PKK. Turkey was emboldened by close support from the US and Israel and the Syrian military's problems because of old equipment and the non-availability of spare parts after the collapse of the USSR. Syria caved in and an agreement was signed with Turkey ending support to the PKK. Ocalan was forced out of Syria and Lebanon and was eventually captured from Kenya, with the US support. The PKK tried to up the ante and increase violence but it failed. Ocalan during his trial praised Ataturk and said that he was ready to serve the Turkish state and termed democratic struggle as the only feasible solution to the Kurdish question. He was awarded a death sentence that was later commuted to a life sentence. In its 7th Extraordinary Congress, the PKK gave up armed struggle and several of its members surrendered to Turkish authorities. After being declared a "candidate state" by the EU in December 1999, the pressure on the Turkish state also increased. It had to implement several decisions by the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) had given several decisions against its brutal tactics against Kurds and it also had to be more concerned about human rights, rule of law, and minority rights. This led to a series of measures to allow cultural expression of the Kurdish minority in Turkey. The PKK also toned down its secularism and accepted Islam as part of Kurdish nationalism to increase its support.

Source: BBC

Yuvaz's article was written in 2001 so it ends with the hope that the situation will improve. With the arrival of the AKP and Erdogan on the scene, initially things improved but soon there was another insurgency in 2004. In 2009, Erdogan initiated a new social contract with the Kurdish minority ("Kurdish Opening") and took several measures to recalibrate the Kurdish-Turkish relations. However, relations again deteriorated and in 2015, the Turkish state and the PKK was fighting each other again. The misery of the Kurdish people is continuing. 

Role of non-religious parties in Islamization of Pakistan

Nadeem Farooq Piracha (NFP) has written a very detailed and excellent article on non-religious parties' role in Islamization of the government (Role of non-religious parties in fanning religious extremism). He calls it "fanning religious extremism" but the examples he gave and the speeches he cited cannot all be termed as religious extremism. NFP starts with the 1953 Ahmadi riots in Punjab that were covertly supported or encouraged by the then Chief Minister Mumtaz Daultana, who was not religious but wanted to be the Prime Minister of Pakistan. Others have argued that this instrumentalization of Islam for political ends in Pakistan much earlier than 1953. Some scholars point towards the passage of Objectives Resolution in March 1949 as the first instance of using Islam for political ends by non-religious parties and non-practicing leaders. Most Indian scholars, of course, term the whole independence movement of Pakistan as an example of using Islam to fan division, hatred, and communalism, all for mundane political objectives. 

The "selling of religion for political ends," as Pakistan's first President Iskander Mirza termed it while abrogating Pakistan's first (1956) constitution, continues unabated from 1953 onwards. General Ayub's tenure (1958-69) is considered by many as the apex of Islamic modernism. The article also hints at agreeing with this idea especially before 1965. However, digging a little deep, one can see that Ayub was not really against using Islam for his own political ends. Islamic modernism was employed by Ayub Khan to promote the development agenda of his regime. The fact that he included, not one (as in the 1956 Constitution) but two constitutional bodies to research on Islamic history, law, philosophy, etc., and to advise the government in the 1962 Constitution (articles 199 to 207) bespeaks of his willingness to instrumentalize Islam. We can agree that Ayub was not fanning extremism but he was also instrumentalizing Islam. Bengalis would also point out to his using of Islam to denigrate them and to deny them their political, democratic, and civil rights in Pakistan. Ayub infamously wrote in his book, Friends, Not Masters, "In addition, they [East Pakistanis] have been and still are under Hindu cultural and linguistic influence." Inferior Muslims (Bengalis) were, of course, not allowed to rule superior Muslims (West Pakistanis), even if the inferior ones are in majority. 

Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto's story of caving in to religious parties or his unfortunate attempt to steal their thunder is often told as a modern-day replication of a Greek tragedy. Bhutto is proclaimed as a non-religious hero, who started with a secular vision, but was eventually defeated by the nefarious Islamist forces. The reality is, as always, more complex. Bhutto did pay homage to religious sentiment from the start, much before he came to power. The slogan of "Islamic socialism" was used by the Pakistan People's Party (PPP) and Bhutto himself during the 1970 election campaign. Furthermore, as NFP informs in his article, Bhutto was forced to adopt religious clauses in the new 1973 Constitution and later other Islamization measures, including declaring Ahmadis non-Muslim, not only by the religious parties but also by non-religious parties which allied with religious parties in order to dent Bhutto's popularity and defeat him.

Source: Role of non-religious parties in fanning religious extremism

The 1990s saw Nawaz Sharif's Muslim League led the charge towards Islamization. Islam was used to browbeat and defeat PPP. Not surprisingly, the name of the opposition alliance, cobbled together by the military and led by Sharif, was Islami Jamhori Ittihad (Islamic Democratic Alliance). Benazir was portrayed as Western and not truly Muslim. She was linked with India and Israel.

After the restoration of democracy in 2008, using Islam for political purposes by the non-religious parties declined a bit. However, this changed when the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI), led by Imran Khan, and many other parties decided to support religious parties protest against an amendment in the Finality of Prophethood declaration by the electoral candidates. The PTI continued to smear Sharif, even after the amendment was taken back and the law minister resigned, of not really believing in the finality of prophethood. In addition to the help of the military, this usage of Islam to defame its opponent was crucial in its win in Punjab.

Hence, NFP is right. Non-religious parties have been using Islam to get a political or electoral advantage. The million-dollar question is why they are doing it? And why they have succeeded at least in some cases? Is it because of Pakistan's religious nationalism?

March 2021 Israeli elections and "fifty shades of right"

Israel is going to have its fourth national Knesset elections in two years in March 2021. Whether this election will result in a stable government is anybody's guess. However, one thing is certain, rightwing will dominate the Knesset and the new government, irrespective of how long they last. This will be a case of "fifty shades of right." This means that any meaningful solution to the Israel-Palestine issue is unlikely, to say the least.

Following are excerpts from my article Upcoming Israeli elections and its impact on Palestinians published in Naya Daur: 

National elections will be held in Israel in March 2021 and these elections will again be dominated by the rightwing, making a solution of the Palestinian issue unlikely or impossible. This article unpacks why Israel is having the fourth national election in two years. Later, it analyzes the politics of various rightwing leaders and parties regarding the Palestinian issue to see whether this election can lead to a solution to the Israel-Palestine conundrum...

Today, Israel’s political space is dominated by rightwing parties, which Eran Globus’s an Israeli analyst termed, “fifty shades of right.”  The major rightwing party is the Likud party. It has been in government since 2009, with Netanyahu as PM. This party is expected to win the most seats (28 or 29) in the coming elections. Most of the rightwing parties, except religious parties, have come out of Likud as their leaders have been part of Likud and served in Netanyahu administrations. The most recent and the most important breakaway party is called “New Hope” and is led by Gideon Sa’ar, who until last month was a Likud member for 17 years and was Netanyahu’s Minister of Education (2009- 13) and Minister of Interior (2013-14). New Hope is expected to win the second largest number of seats (17 or 18) in the Knesset.

 Source: hk3.news

 

Yamina, the party/coalition that is expected to win the third largest number of seats (between 12 and 14) is again led by someone who was tutored by Netanyahu for a number of years. Nafteli Bennet entered politics in 2006 as Chief of Staff to the then Leader of Opposition Netanyahu and served him until 2008. He then served as leader of an Israeli settler organization before forming his own political party and remained minister with different portfolios in Netanyahu-led governments.

 

Two key religious parties, Shas and United Torah Judaism, expected to win seven or eight seats each, are also loyal allies of Netanyahu and are likely to support him in forming the next coalition government. Shas represents the Sephardic and Mizrahi Jewish people (from Middle Eastern and North African countries) while the United Torah Judaism represents Ashkenazi Jewish people (from European countries). While most of the supporters of these parties are Ultra-orthodox religious Jewish, some modern orthodox and secular Jewish people also support them.

 

Next, we have Yisrael Beytenu, a party led by Avigdor Lieberman, another Netanyahu protégé.  From 1993 to 1996, when Netanyahu was the party leader, Lieberman served as Director-General of the Likud. After the Likud party won the election and Netanyahu was the Prime Minister, Lieberman became the Director-General of the PM's Office for a year (1996-97). In 1999, he formed his own party, Yisrael Beytenu, and has been part of numerous rightwing governments under Ariel Sharon, Ehud Olmert, and Netanyahu. Yisrael Beytenu is expected to win five or six seats in March. As the table below shows, the rightwing is going to dominate the March 2021 elections winning between 76 and 82 of the total 120 Knesset seats.

 

 

Public Opinion Polls for March 2021 elections: Expected number of seats

Party	Minimum	Maximum
Likud	28	29
New Hope	17	18
Yamina	12	14
Shas	7	8
United Torah Judaism	7	7
Yisrael Beytenu	5	6
Total Rightwing seats	76	82

 

 

Many people think that Netanyahu is the biggest obstacle to peace in the Middle East. It might be true in the past but now there are numerous obstacles to peace. The leadership of all the parties discussed above has at various times opposed giving any concessions to the Palestinians. Lieberman resigned numerous times whenever even a small concession was given to the Palestinians. He was dismissed by PM Sharon for his harsh opposition to Gaza disengagement in 2004 and resigned in 2008 for resuming peace talks with Palestinians and again in 2018 for ending the brutal Gaza War. He has also given many statements against Palestinians and Israeli Arabs which were considered racist by many analysts. Bennet, the leader of the Yamina party, as mentioned above, served as leader of an Israeli settler organization and has been opposed to a Palestinian state and to the freezing or uprooting of illegal Jewish settlements. Similarly, Gideon Sa’ar of the New Hope party has always been to the right of Netanyahu. He has been a recalcitrant opponent of the two-state solution (calling it once a two-state illusion) and has shown an inability to show genuine concern for Palestinian rights. Religious parties, Shas and United Judaism, do not have a clear policy on the two-state solution but are against the division of Jerusalem and the freezing of Israeli settlements, making them unlikely partners in a peace deal.

 

The discussion above clearly shows that the new Israeli government will not be supportive of the two-state solution, so the ordeal of the Palestinians is, unfortunately, going to continue. The election campaign will force these parties to move more to the right to outflank each other, resulting in extreme and intransigent positions regarding a Palestinian state.