Malaysian Malaysia and Algerian Algeria

Malaysia and Algeria are two multi-ethnic nations. Both got independence from Europeans and attained their present boundaries in the 1960s. Both are dominated by a majority ethnic group that has controlled the state since then. As I was reading about Algeria what stuck me was the similarity of slogans of minorities in both countries. In Malaysia in 1960s, Lee Kwan Yew (before Singapore was expelled from Malaysia) called for a 'Malaysian Malaysia', not a Malay Malaysia or Chinese Malaysia or Indian Malaysia. Lately, opposition alliance has picked up this theme and called for changes in the Malaysian state (see Lee Kuan Yew's 'Malaysia for Malaysians'). In Algeria, minorities, mainly Berbers, called for Algerie algerienne (an Algerian Algeria) (see Religion, Ethnicity and State Formation in Algeria). They resisted Arabization of Algeria after independence.

Of course, these countries are dissimilar. For one, minorities in Malaysia are much more distinct and numerous as compared to Algeria. Possibly, because of that, discrimination in Malaysia has been incorporated in the legal regime, while in Algeria it is much more general and subtle. In Malaysia, minorities are acknowledged and then discriminated. In Algeria, Berbers are rarely acknowledged as a separate ethnic community. There are many reasons for this situation in Algeria. First, many Berber do not know or see themselves as separate from their Arab neighbors because inter-marriage is quite common and many Berbers have been Islamized and Arabized. Second, many Algerians see talk of Berber rights as attempts by outside powers to divide the nation, just as French tried to do (and failed) during the War of Independence. 

Recently, both countries have tried to accommodate some of the minorities demands. Malaysia has decreased preferences for Malays or Bhumiputras while Algeria has has recognized Tamazight (Berber language) as national language.

The question from our frame of reference is whether the ethnic identity (Malay/Arab) is the main force behind the domination of majority or is it Islam?  

   

Place of Islam in Turkish Nationalism

In his book, Islam, Secularism and Nationalism in Modern Turkey: Who is a Turk?, Soner Cagaptay unpacks the role of Islam in Turkish nationalism. He argues that there were three overlapping categories of Turkishness. The first category and the most inclusive one is based on territory. Anybody living in Turkey is Turkish as given in 1924 Constitution. The second category is based on religion and it can be traced back to Ottoman millet system as articulated in the 1930s textbooks and ruling party (CHP) documents. The third and the most exclusive category was based on ethnicity or a combination of religion and ethnicity.

Cagaptay also explain these categories as three concentric circles.

The above circles, however, hide many complexities. While Islam was an important marker of Turkish nationalism, it was a highly controlled Islam. Turkish government privileged only nominal Islam over other religions. Similarly, while Turkish ethnicity was prized, Turkish language was also important and non-Turks were told to learn Turkish language, if they want to be part of the inner-most circle. So, the inner-most circle can also be described as ethno-linguistic. 

All non-Muslims living in Turkey were also not equal. All kinds of Christians were considered beyond assimilation so they were in the exterior part of the outer-most circle. Armenians were considered the most anti-state so they maybe considered at the edge of outer-most circle. Jews were, however, considered loyal and not beyond assimilation. They were asked to learn Turkish (and adopt Turkish names) so that they can join the inner circles. There were also differences between non-Muslim Turks. Arabs, because of their 'treachery' during World War I, and Kurds, because they resisted assimilation, were ranked lower in termed of Turkishness as compared to Bosnians, Albanians. Bulgar Muslims, Tartars etc.  

The probable vision of future in the minds of Kemalists might be

 

Is Pakistan constitution Islamic?

In his article Pakistan's Constitution Conundrum, Muhammad Asim argues that Pakistan's constitution is not Islamic. He argues that having Islam as state religion or presence of Federal Shariat Court, which can declare any law unislamic, does not make Pakistan's constitution Islamic. According to him, the process of developing laws through a democratic system is completely different from 'extracting laws from Islamic texts in the process of jurisprudence'.

He presents his case as follows:

'In a democratic process, elected lawmakers come together to develop laws as they see fit. There are no constraints as to what they can legislate for, with only a majority of some sort required to pass any particular law. There is no requirement for the legislators to have previous legal experience, nor that they be experts on the subject matter at hand, though technical advice can be sought if required.

In Islam, many matters are clearly defined as being legal or illegal, such as the consumption of alcohol, adultery and interest-based transactions. In areas where definitive rulings do not exist or new realities are encountered, a legal expert is required to extract a ruling from Islamic texts. If the legal expert does not possess technical expertise in understanding a particular subject matter, then he or she is allowed to call upon the help of specialists to apprise them of the reality - for example, a doctor to explain the technical aspects of human-cloning. This process is known as Ijtihad.

In a situation where a numerous legal experts have extracted an array of opinions on the same matter, based upon either a variation of their understanding of the technical reality or use of different principles in accessing non-definitive Islamic texts, it is then up to the ruler of the state to adopt one opinion for it to become the sole reference point in law.

A problem therefore is apparent in the Pakistani law-making process: legislative chambers that are filled with individuals unqualified to extract laws from Islamic sources from a jurisprudential perspective are enacting laws for the country to follow simply according their own limited knowledge and experience rather than turning to divinely revealed guidance.'

Asim further argues that 'the powers of the executive are ill-defined between the president and the prime minister, while according to Islam these should be vested in a single ruler and thus enable him to adopt laws extracted according to Islamic texts. This is crucial, as under the current democratic system even if both legislative chambers of the National Assembly and Senate were filled with qualified jurists, the mechanism to enact an extracted legal opinion into law would be missing, leading to confusion and potential conflict.'

Asim's arguments can be analyzed in at least two ways, as a critique of the democratic system or as an explanation of Islamic system. Since Asim's focus is on the later, I ignore the critique on democratic system and center my analysis on his explanation of Islamic system. I argue that Asim has presented a very simplified version of Islamic law/constitution that needs to be problematized. Lets analyze Asim's arguments one by one.

1. In Islam, many matters are clearly defined as being legal or illegal, such as the consumption of alcohol, adultery and interest-based transactions.Contrary to what Asim is implying, Islam not only defines very few matters as legal/illegal but even those matters that are clearly 'defined', cannot be implemented solely on the basis of Quran and Sunnah of the Prophet (PBH). Lets look at the examples Asim himself has given. Quran has made consumption of alcohol illegal but there is disagreement on what is the minimum amount for a person to be charged. Similarly, although riba (usually translated as interest) is illegal, there is disagreement on how similar riba is to today's interest. So, even those rulings of Quran which Asim argues as definite, are open to disagreements and need human agency/agreement before they are implemented. My view and the view of many Muslim jurists is that Quran and Sunnah primarily give principles and leave actual rules/laws for the Muslims to decide.
2. In areas where definitive rulings do not exist or new realities are encountered, a legal expert is required to extract a ruling from Islamic texts. If the legal expert does not possess technical expertise in understanding a particular subject matter, then he or she is allowed to call upon the help of specialists to apprise them of the reality - for example, a doctor to explain the technical aspects of human-cloning. This process is known as Ijtihad. In a situation where a numerous legal experts have extracted an array of opinions on the same matter, based upon either a variation of their understanding of the technical reality or use of different principles in accessing non-definitive Islamic texts, it is then up to the ruler of the state to adopt one opinion for it to become the sole reference point in law.  I agree with Asim and I think Asim will agree with me that more often than not, on every issue there are more than one opinion of Muslim jurists. Therefore, someone has to decide and it is usually the ruler of the state. The question now becomes who is the ruler of the state. Does Islam prescribe a specific type of ruler or a specific system for choosing a ruler?
3. A problem therefore is apparent in the Pakistani law-making process: legislative chambers that are filled with individuals unqualified to extract laws from Islamic sources from a jurisprudential perspective are enacting laws for the country to follow simply according their own limited knowledge and experience rather than turning to divinely revealed guidance. Here Asim contradicts himself. He argued above that rulers can borrow legal/Islamic expertise and then can decide among different opinions available. Now, he argues that as legislators are unqualified to extract laws from Islamic sources, they are not qualified to serve as rulers. Why Pakistani legislators need to extract laws from Islamic sources themselves when they can take the advice of Muslim jurists (as Asim allows to other rulers)? 
4. If the purpose of the argument above is to show that Pakistani legislators do not take this advice (even when available) and instead make laws on the basis of their own whims then, it can be argued that Pakistani constitution is not inherently unislamic only the legislators (or the people who elect them again and again) are.
5. This leads us back to the questions asked at the end of point 2 above. Has Islam prescribed a political system (so that we can get rulers/legislators)? Unfortunately or fortunately, Islam has not favored any specific political system. So, not only Islam has left small matters of alcohol consumption for the Muslims to decide on, but it has also left bigger matters of deciding about the political system to the Muslims. Again, we can go back to Muslim jurists (to extract a ruling about Islamic political system) but unfortunately, they are also divided. Some say a monarchy is an Islamic system, others argue that a democratic system is an Islamic system.  
6. The powers of the executive are ill-defined between the president and the prime minister, while according to Islam these should be vested in a single ruler and thus enable him to adopt laws extracted according to Islamic texts. This is crucial, as under the current democratic system even if both legislative chambers of the National Assembly and Senate were filled with qualified jurists, the mechanism to enact an extracted legal opinion into law would be missing, leading to confusion and potential conflict. This argument of Asim is especially strange. Where in Quran or Sunnah it is written/given that there should be a single ruler? Infact, the powers of executive are much more clearly defined now then it was in the times of Righteous Caliphs, model of Islamic rule according to a large majority of Muslims. It can be argued that the present system of President/Prime Minister and Parliament is quite similar to caliph and senior Sihaba in the times of Righteous Caliphate. 

I hope I have made clear that Pakistan's constitution is not unislamic. If we accept Asim's arguments, then Iran and Saudi Arabia are both Islamic constitutions. Both these constitutions (or Basic Law in case of Saudi Arabia) were approved by Islamic jurists. However, both these countries' jurists consider the other system as unislamic. So, which Islamic jurists are we to believe? Or are we to believe the Saudi rulers whose Islamic credentials are next to none, probably even lower than Pakistani legislators? 

If it only based on Muslim jurists' opinion, rulers in Muslim -majority countries can easily find jurists to approve their constitutions. Pakistani government has also got a fatwa that constitution is Islamic Religious-decree: 'Constitution completely in line with Sharia'

Three Groups in Religious Nationalist States

Carlo Strenger wrote an interesting article about Israel in which he talked about Israeli society having no center (Israel today: A society without a center).  He argues that there are three groups in Israel, each powerful and trying to attract Israelis to its vision. However, there are not many overlaps among these groups and as they fight, it is clear that there is no common denominator of the Israeli society. Moreover, the differences between them are based on sacred values so no one is ready to compromise. The three groups, he identifies, are liberal Zionists, ultra-Orthodox and romantic nationalism.   

Liberal Zionists believe that Jews have a right to a state of their own but they also believe that now that this state has been established it should be a liberal democracy, with no discrimination based on gender, religion or ethnicity. For ultra-Orthodox or Haredim, religion is the most important thing and while a Jewish state helps, it is not necessary or central to their ideals. Romantic nationalists, as defined by Strenger, are those that link the religion with the land. Holy land was and always will be for the Jewish people and if somebody's rights are trampled because of this special link, then so be it.    

Strenger writes,

'The bitterness and the violent rhetoric of Israel’s political culture are largely due to this clash of three sacred values, with sometimes extreme consequences. The settler movement has already shown that it is capable of extreme violence when the two-state solution is about to be implemented. Haredim have proven that they are willing to go to prison to avoid what they see as fatal infringements on their way of life.'

Looking at other states that are based on religious nationalism, we can find these three groups in all of them. To make their titles more broad and applicable to other states, we can call the three groups: liberals, other-worldly religious and holyland religious.

Liberals do not contest the formation of state on the basis of religion but now want a liberal democracy. Their eventual aim maybe to move closer to a civic nationalism.

Other-worldly religious are more interested in their place in the next world than this world. They are trying to be part of a heavenly kingdom and not very interested in making a kingdom here. For them, if state helps in observing/practicing their religion than it is good but as power and focus on this world invariably corrupts so they always keep a distance from state affairs.

    

Holyland-religious group is focused on holyland. Land is holy because of religion but it is almost as important. This group believes that a specific land is for a specific religion or its adherents. So, in this land, a particular religion should reign supreme. For them, minorities will always remain second-class citizens.

Many of the religious nationalists states are ruled by this last group as it employs power of both religion and nationalism while other groups use only one. Holyland-religious is also more ready to use violence as compared to other two groups to achieve its objectives.   

Who counts as a Jew?

On February 20th, Pew's report 'A Portrait of Jewish Americans' was discussed. Here (Who Counts as a Jew?) Rachel Gross discusses how Pew researcher dealt with the tricky question, who counts as a Jew. As Rachel argues there is a long history of cultural Jews. So the study not only counted 'Jews by religion' but also 'Jews of no religion', the former being 78% of the total Jews. 

Gross supports Pew's definition and argues,

'The concept of religion is a modern Protestant creation, and modern Judaism has never fit comfortably into the category, despite the best efforts of Jewish thinkers and communal leaders. In the United States, Jews have embraced American conceptions of religion as an individual matter of belief and choice rather than one mandated by ethnicity and community, giving rise to dynamic, changing community structures and rituals.'

'But beyond the door of the synagogue or Jewish communal center, American Jews’ spiritual lives are rich, complex, and hard to pin down. Divisions between Judaism (the religion) and Jewishness (the culture) are no longer useful, if they ever were. Simplistic “religious” and “secular” Jews no longer accurately describe the diversity of American Jewish practice, if they ever did. As the Pew researchers highlight at the beginning of their report, “Jews by religion” and “Jews of no religion” are both overwhelmingly proud to be Jewish and have a strong sense of belonging to the Jewish people.'

This reminds me of reading about Hinduism and the difficulty in answering the question, who counts as a Hindu.  Hinduism, according to many scholars, was more a culture than religion until atleast the eighteenth century. It was the British colonial administration that first united all Hindus (on paper and under law) as believers in a distinct religion when it decided to make Hinduism the residual religion of all Indians. Hindu nationalists have now the unenviable task of not rejecting any major groups from the definition of Hindu but also drawing more clear boundaries so that who is a Hindu is more distinguishable. 

Going to Jail for studying Torah

As discussed in this blog on 11th February 2014 (See 'Is studying religion a service to the state?'), partial exemption of ultra-Orthodox/ Haredi students from military draft has become a major issue in Israel. In national elections last year, parties supporting ending or at least reducing this exemption for Haredi made big gains and the ruling coalition was formed only when PM Netanyahu agreed to change the law. But afraid of the religious community, Bibi was not ready to do much until his hand was forced by a Supreme Court ruling that made the compromise Tal law unconstitutional. 

In March 2014, a new law was proposed by the Israeli government. It was a compromise:

The new legislation sets annual quotas for drafting yeshiva students for military or national service, and mandates criminal penalties against draft evaders. However, the law doesn’t entail complete Haredi conscription, instead calling for a gradual annual increase in the number of ultra-Orthodox 18-year-olds drafted, and still allowing for small numbers of exemptions until 2017. (See Israel passes ultra-Orthodox draft law)

The ultra-Orthodox Jews were not happy. They thought that the law was discriminatory as it targeted only them and not other groups who were also exempted from military service (such as Arab-Israelis who were not required to serve). But mainly they were angry that in a Jewish state, Torah study was not being due importance and they would be sent to jail for studying Torah. They even threatened to quit Israel and emigrate to the US etc. to save their religion.

“If this is the Jewish state, it is one that must have Torah at the center,” said Rabbi Mordechai Bloy, an educator of Haredi youth in Bnei Brak, a mostly Orthodox town near Tel Aviv, as he made his way to Jerusalem. “A Torah scholar must not be treated like a drug dealer.”Protesters’ posters carried slogans like “We will all go to jail” and biblical verses like “Save me, I pray, from the hand of my brother,” a plea made by Jacob, who feared that his brother, Esau, might kill him.

The ultra-Orthodox Jews were on the streets to protest the draft law. Around 300,000 of them protested in Jerusalem.

Defenders of the draft law argued that ultra-Orthodox Jews constitute 10% of the Israeli population and their share is increasing as they favor large families, so continued exemption will lead to a total collapse of the military draft system. Even some right wing parties were supporting the bill. Naftali Bennet of Jewish Home party contended that with 30% first grader coming from Haredi (ultra-Orthodox) homes, Israel could not survive unless ultra-Orthodox share the burden (see Ultra-Orthodox Jews Clog Jerusalem Streets to Protest a Draft Bill). 

Source: Israel passes ultra-Orthodox draft law

The issue as one newspaper pointed out is Israel's religious nationalism.

'In a nutshell, the equal burden law represents the deep schism that divides those who see Israel as the national secular Jewish state and those who see Israel as a place where Jews must live, first and foremost, in obedience to God and His Torah. The first are hinging the wellbeing of Israel on democracy and a strong army. The later hinges it on faith in God.' See Orthodox Jews Threaten to Quit Israel Over IDF Draft

The issue is whether Israel was made for Jews or for Judaism?

In the end, the draft law was passed with 67 voting in favor and only one voting against it in the Knesset. The opposition boycotted the vote.

Zionism, Judaism and Nationalism

Two very interesting articles that discuss the intersection of three philosophies. The New York Times article by Mark Oppenheimer (A Conflict of Faith: Devoted to Jewish Observance but at Odds With Israel) explains why six very learned and observant Jews oppose Israel's policies/Zionism.

Professor Manekin (Philosophy professor at the University of Maryland), Professor Stefan Krieger(Law professor at Hofstra University), Rabbi Alissa Wise (Works for Jewish Voice of Peace), Daniel Boyarin (Professor of Talmudic Culture at University of California-Berkeley), Noam Pianko (Associate Professor of Jewish History at University of Washington) and Corey Robin (Professor of Political Science at Brooklyn College) are all observant Jews. Talmudic precepts are important to them and they are well-versed in Jewish history and culture. These qualities makes them a minority in the American Jewry but they are also part of an exceeding rare group of religiously-observant Jews not supporting Israel.

These six scholars give a number of reasons for not supporting Israel, including Israeli unjust policies toward Palestinians, Zionism’s incompatibility with Jewish beliefs and moral issues with the idea of worshiping a heavily militarized state and with the belief of one land/state for one specific people.   

Few quotes:

"I think nationalism and religion together are toxic," said Stefan Krieger

"The very concept of a state defined as being for one people was deeply problematic and inevitably going to lead to moral and political disaster. Which I think it has", said Professor Boyarin.

"People look at 'non-statist Zionism' as the type that lost. But I found a lot of what they were saying resonated today, and a lot of their predictions about endless war had come to pass, " said Professor Manekin. 

 "There are lots of ways to be Jewish," Professor Robin said, "but worshiping a heavily militarized state seems like a bit of a comedown from our past."

Liel Leibovitz puts forward the counter argument in his article Why Religious Judaism is tied to Nationalism: What subjects of a recent New York Times column get fundamentally wrong   

"The answer is a core tenet of Judaism, namely the realization that earthly power is indispensable. As Michael Walzer elegantly noted in his (book) Exodus and Revolution, nothing inherent sets Canaan apart from Egypt and its houses of bondage; the Promised Land’s promise lies not in some external bit of magic but in the ability of the Jews to apply their sovereignty and turn their nation state into a concrete example of a just and merciful kingdom. In other words, Judaism suggests that if you’re going to live up to your calling and set a moral example, you do it not by shuffling off this mortal coil and declaring yourself too pure for the imperfect and compromise-ridden business of government, but by jumping right in and serving as an example of how a real nation addresses real problems right here in the real world."

These two articles bring into focus the main issues of religious nationalism. Does religion need state power to show its relevance? Does religion want to establish a just and merciful society or a just and merciful kingdom or one is a mean to reach the other? A just and merciful kingdom governed by divine laws should attract more adherents but religious states have usually resulted in persecution of religious minorities, so potential adherents have been lost forever than gained. How do we reconcile it with the idea of religious state being a 'moral example'?