Religious nationalism: A new development in the Middle East

Nationalism is a concept linked with modernity and so are its numerous variants, including religious nationalism. Although Islam has been the dominant religion in the Middle East for the last 1500 years, religious nationalism is a recent phenomenon. Like European feudal states and empires, Muslim feudal states and empires of the pre-modern era did not propagate or even espouse religious nationalism.

Brian A. Catlos, the religious studies professor at the University of Colorado at Boulder, has written an excellent column in the Washington Post on religious nationalism in the Middle East. Following are some excerpts, but do read the Religious Nationalism finds a footing in the Middle East

With many reports of this violence come adjectives such as “barbarous” and “medieval,” along with the intimation that this sort of intolerance is particularly characteristic of Islam and antithetical to the enlightened and rational secularism of the West.

But brutal as this sectarian violence may be, the fact that there are so many religious minorities in the Middle East stands testament to the reality that, despite long-standing antagonisms, myriad ethnic groups and religious denominations have not only survived but even thrived in this region through some 1,500 years of Islamic domination. The richness of the culture, where many of the ancient sects and arcane languages — often surviving only in small, highly localized communities — predate Christianity, Islam and even modern Judaism, has no parallel in Europe. The Yazidi religion, for example, goes back to Mesopotamia; Aramaic, the language of Jesus, continues to be spoken in a clutch of villages near Damascus...

This reflects an entirely different model of political compromise than that which has developed in the West, and it may seem regressive to us. But it is an arrangement that developed organically and has functioned for about 14 centuries.

The breakdown of religious tolerance and plurality in today’s Middle East is not, then, a manifestation of some particularly Islamic barbarism or evidence of a return to the Middle Ages. Nor is it religious in motivation, although it may be in expression. It is a symptom of what we call modernization, and its political framework: nationalism...

Is Iran's Supreme Leader subject to oversight? Constitutionally yes, but...

Iran's constitution gives wide powers to the Supreme Leader. The preamble of the constitution states that in the physical absence of Hidden Imam, the nation would be guided by a person, recognized by the people as leader 'under all conditions, so that there shall be security against deviation by various organizations'.

Article 57 states, 'The powers of government in the Islamic Republic are vested in the legislature, the judiciary, and the executive powers, functioning under the supervision of the absolute vilayat al-'amr and the leadership of the Ummah, in accordance with the forthcoming articles of this Constitution. 

Article 110 enumerates the vast powers of the Supreme Leader:

Following are the duties and powers of the Leadership:

• Delineation of the general policies of the Islamic Republic of Iran after consultation with the Nation's Exigency Council.
• Supervision over the proper execution of the general policies of the system.
• Issuing decrees for national referenda.
• Assuming supreme command of the armed forces.
• Declaration of war and peace, and the mobilization of the armed forces.
• Appointment, dismissal, and acceptance of the resignation of:

a. The fuqaha' on the Guardian Council.
b. The supreme judicial authority of the country.
c. The head of the radio and television network of the Islamic Republic of Iran.
d. The chief of the joint staff.
e. The chief commander of the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps.
f. The supreme commanders of the armed forces.

• Resolving differences between the three wings of the armed forces and regulation of their relations.
• Resolving the problems, which cannot be solved by conventional methods, through the Nation's Exigency Council.
• Signing the decree formalizing the election of the President of the Republic by the people. The suitability of candidates for the Presidency of the Republic, with respect to the qualifications specified in the Constitution, must be confirmed before elections take place by the Guardian Council; and, in the case of the first term [of the Presidency], by the Leadership.
• Dismissal of the' President of the Republic, with due regard for the interests of the country, after the Supreme Court holds him guilty of the violation of his constitutional duties, or after a vote of the Islamic Consultative Assembly testifying to his incompetence on the basis of Article 89 of the Constitution.
• Pardoning or reducing the sentences of convicts, within the framework of Islamic criteria, on a recommendation [to that effect] from the Head of judicial power.

The Leader may delegate part of his duties and powers to another person. 

So with such imperial powers, is supreme leader subject to insight? 

The constitution says yes and gives this power to the Assembly of Experts (Article 111). The current supreme leader also agrees but argues that oversight should be broad and if the supreme leader fulfills that basic conditions of leadership, all of his actions and that of his subordinates should be beyond criticism. Now, what are these broad conditions? According to the constitution (Article 109), there are three conditions:

1. Scholarship, as required for performing the functions of mufti in different fields of fiqh.
2. Justice and piety, as required for the leadership of the Islamic Ummah. 
3. Right political and social perspicacity, prudence, courage, administrative facilities and adequate capability for leadership.

Others have argued that because he is the guardian/Supreme Leader of all, nobody has the capacity/ability to judge/oversight him.

Shahir explains the dynamics of this important issue in his article in Al-Monitor (See http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2014/12/iran-ayatollah-ali-khamenei-supreme-leader-oversight.html) 

Religious Nationalism Course

I taught a course on  'Religious nationalism' at George Mason University, managed by Encore Learning. Here are the slides of the lectures.

Religious Nationalism: Introduction

Pakistan: Religious (Muslim) Nationalism

Iran: Religious (Muslim/Shia) Nationalism

Israel: Religious (Jewish) Nationalism

Saudi Arabia: Religious (Muslim/Wahhabi) Nationalism

Separatist movements - the peaceful route to independence?

Scotland, in the end, decided not to be independent. However, it did encourage other separatist movements, many of which supported Scottish referendum. There is evidence that Catalonians from Spain helped the ‘Yes’ vote campaign and many Kashmiris in Scotland and England supported Mr. Salmond’s Scottish National Party, not for any love for an independent Scotland but for its positive implications for Kashmir region. Despite the negative results, referendum has shown that there is no need for fighting or killing for independence in the 21st century. As Jonah Blank, senior political scientist at the RAND Corporation, writes in the Foreign Policy after the Scottish referendum (See From Glasgow to Kashmir) :

Almost every modern nation has some sort of local separatist movement, and the international community views nearly all of them either with indifference or contempt. Merely to be considered a quasi-legitimate candidate for independence, a group generally has to suffer generations of brutality bordering on genocide. Even then, the odds aren't great. Just ask the Kurds.

The vote in Scotland shows what modern-day secessionism should look like. What if an ethnic group didn't have to justify its bid for a separate state through a saga of historical oppression, or seek to achieve it through a violent insurgency? What if the standard for independence were nothing more than the statement: "We want out." London agreed to take aye for an answer.

Rest of the blog can be read http://www.calgarycgc.org/blog/separatist-movements-the-peaceful-route-to-independence

Bhutan: A religious nationalist state??

Bhutan is a small kingdom in Himalayas, between India and China. Not many people know it exist and for a long time, Bhutanese elite were happy for being hidden/separate from the world. Darius Lee discusses Bhutan's constitution and calls it a constitutional theocracy (See Here There be Dragons! Buddhist Constitutionalism in the Hidden Land of Bhutan). For us, it is interesting because it is another example of how national identity and religious identity gets mixed up, giving rise to religious nationalism.

Lee argues that written constitutions are meant to stop power concentration but some countries, which he calls constitutional theocracies, have mixed religion and constitutionalism and damaged the very purpose of constitutions.

The goal of constitutionalism is limited government, which is opposed to any form of absolutism, whether religious, cultural or secular. In an age of human rights, untrammeled government power is circumscribed through constitutionally entrenched fundamental rights, including religious freedom. 

But constitutional theocracies turn it upside down, Lee argues, and use constitutions to legalize curtailment of religious and other freedoms. These constitutional theocracies are different from common theocracies.

Unlike a ‘pure’ theocracy, power in a constitutional theocracy is not drawn directly from divine text or a governing priesthood but lies in political figures operating within the bounds of a written constitution. Constitutional theocracies adhere to the core elements of modern constitutionalism, such as constitutional supremacy but enshrine religion as a source of public law.

The key differences between a secular state and a constitutional theocracy in terms of state structure, as identified by Lee, are given below:

          Secular state                                Constitutional theocracy

    Separation of religion and state                                                State recognition of a particular religion as privileged

Benevolent neutrality; accommodates religion                                 Not neutral, favors one religion over others

   Religion is not a source of public law                                                      Religion is a source of public law

In terms of religious freedom, the key differences are as follows:

           Secular state                                  Constitutional theocracy    
State holds no monopoly over religious belief                                                 Religion is tied with national identity

    Does nothing to control religious doctrine                                     Legal sanction for propagation of unorthodox beliefs

Accommodates practices of religious minorities                                          Limited protection for religious minorities

Lee declares that Bhutan is a constitutional theocracy, like Iran, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, although its 2008 constitution commits to separation of religion and politics and does not declare Buddhism as state religion. In comparison with other Buddhist-majority states, Bhutan falls between Cambodia and Sri Lanka, Thailand, Myanmar and Laos.  

Although article 3(3) of Bhutan constitution prima facie supports separation of religion and politic, its justification shows that this separation is rooted in Buddhism. Article 3(3) reads:

It shall be the responsibility of religious institutions and personalities to promote the spiritual heritage of the country while also ensuring that religion remains separate from politics in Bhutan. Religious institutions and personalities shall remain above politics.

The two reasons given for its inclusion are not related to human rights or freedoms but to Buddhism. This article was included in the constitution first, because Lord Buddha separated religion and politics and secondly, because under the first king of Bhutan, religious and political affairs were separate. 

Other reasons for declaring Bhutan a constitutional theocracy are given below:

1. Preamble of constitution pays homage to the three gems of Buddhism. 
2. King must be Buddhist, although he is declared protector of all religions (Article 3(2)). 
3. Article 3(6) establishes the Dratshang Lhentshog (Commission for the Monastic Affairs) and Buddhist religious bodies are funded by the state. 
4. Some part of the ecclesiastical structure of the Dratshang Lhentshog and the qualifications for religious office are given in the Bhutan Constitution, reflecting the privileged position of Buddhism.
5. In Bhutan, Buddhism is considered a major part of Bhutanese culture and the state considers it its responsibility to defend it. For example, article 4(1) asks the state to ‘preserve, protect and promote the cultural heritage of the country, including… religion’.
6. Article 9(20) of the Constitution asks the state to ‘create conditions that will enable the true and sustainable development of a good and compassionate society rooted in Buddhist ethos and universal human values.’ 

Using examples from penal code and other laws, Lee further demonstrates the close link between state and majority religion, negating the notion that Bhutanese state is neutral in matters of religion or that religious minorities are not discriminated.  

While Lee's arguments about Bhutan not being a secular state are strong, his definition of constitutional theocracies needs more elaboration because if we define constitutional theocracies only on the basis of how much privilege the constitutional clauses grant to majority religion in these countries then many other (quite liberal and secular) countries have to be called constitutional theocracies which they are not. For example, as Lee acknowledges, many West European democracies have established churches. Their constitutions privilege majority religion. Can we call them constitutional theocracies, like Iran? I think Lee would not agree.

On the other hand, if we  give importance to not only constitutions but all the other factors (like Lee does in case of Bhutan) in defining constitutional theocracies then is it right to call them constitutional theocracies? 

Are governments supporting or controlling religion?

How do we know governments are controlling or supporting religion? Same laws and actions can be used for controlling religion as for supporting religion. For example, a government can give money to religious schools to impose curriculum of its choice (controlling religion) or to promote the majority religion (supporting religion). Similarly, a government can take control of religious endowments to make them more efficient and to use their funds for repair/maintenance of religious sites (supporting religion) or to dry the main source of funding for independent clerics, thus allow its (paid) clerics to dominate the religious discourse (controlling religion). Jonathan Fox, one of the leading scholars working on the state-religion relationships, argues that it is difficult to be definite about it as it is almost impossible to be certain of a government leader's motivations for a particular (in)action (See his talk on Political secularism, religion and the state).

In some cases, however, the primary motivator is not ambiguous. Because of their Marxist-Leninist ideology, anti-religious rhetoric of the leadership and repression of all religions in public sphere, one can safely assume that the Communist governments try to control religion. Consider the Soviet Union, for example. Lenin wrote against religion and called it a spiritual booze as well as opium (like Marx), probably because, in the early 20th century Russia, booze was much more popular than opium. (See Socialism and Religion: Lenin)

Religion is one of the forms of spiritual oppression which everywhere weighs down heavily upon the masses of the people, over burdened by their perpetual work for others, by want and isolation. Impotence of the exploited classes in their struggle against the exploiters just as inevitably gives rise to the belief in a better life after death as impotence of the savage in his battle with nature gives rise to belief in gods, devils, miracles, and the like. Those who toil and live in want all their lives are taught by religion to be submissive and patient while here on earth, and to take comfort in the hope of a heavenly reward. But those who live by the labour of others are taught by religion to practice charity while on earth, thus offering them a very cheap way of justifying their entire existence as exploiters and selling them at a moderate price tickets to well-being in heaven. Religion is opium for the people. Religion is a sort of spiritual booze,   in which the slaves of capital drown their human image, their demand for a life more or less worthy of man.

Moreover, there were anti-religious campaigns in the Soviet Union. These campaigns included damaging churches, murdering of priests and other acts of violence and suppression; these actions cannot be construed as supporting religion in any way  (See Russian orthodox church). 

By 1918 the government had nationalized all church property, including buildings. In the first five years of the Soviet Union (1922-26), twenty-eight Russian Orthodox bishops and more than 1,200 priests were executed, and many others were persecuted. Most seminaries were closed, and publication of most religious material was prohibited. The next quarter-century saw surges and declines in arrests, enforcement of laws against religious assembly and activities, and harassment of clergy. Antireligious campaigns were directed at all faiths; beginning in the 1920s, Buddhist and Shamanist places of worship in Buryatia, in the Baikal region, were destroyed, and their lamas and priests were arrested (a practice that continued until the 1970s). The League of the Militant Godless, established in 1925, directed a nationwide campaign against the Orthodox Church and all other organized religions. The extreme position of that organization eventually led even the Soviet government to disavow direct connection with its practices. In 1940 an estimated 30,000 religious communities of all denominations survived in all the Soviet Union, but only about 500 Russian Orthodox parishes were open at that time, compared with the estimated 54,000 that had existed before World War I.

Similarly, in case of many assertive or aggressive secular states with a strong anti-clericalism bent, like France and Turkey in the early 20th century, it is clear that the motivation is that of control, not the promotion of religion. Following is an excerpt of Ataturk's speech from the early days of the Turkish Republic:

Gentlemen and Great Nation! Know it well that the Turkish Republic cannot be a country of sheikhs, dervishes, disciples and lunatics. The correct road is the road of civilization.

And a paragraph about the de-Christianization campaign of early days of revolutionary France (See Religion, Society and Politics in France since 1789, page 1):

During the course of the year II much of France was subjected to a campaign of dechristianization, the aim of which was the eradication of Catholic religious practice, and Catholicism itself. The campaign, which was at its most intense in the winter and spring of 1793-94, but which began as early as the summer of 1793 in some regions, and continued after the fall of Robespierre in August 1794 in a few areas, comprised a number of different activities. These ranged from the removal of plate, statues and other fittings from the places of worship, the destruction of crosses, bells, shrines and other ‘external signs of worship’, the closure of churches, the enforced abdication and occasionally, the marriage of constitutional priests, the substitution of a Revolutionary calendar for the Gregorian one, the alteration of personal and place names which had any ecclesiastical connotations to more suitably Revolutionary ones, through to the promotion of new cults, notably those of Reason and one Supreme Being.

Perhaps one clue to solve this puzzle is the attitude and behavior of governing elite. If they show respect to religious symbols and try to demonstrate that they are not against religion, then they are supporting religion. The operative word here is 'demonstrate.' The elite in almost all countries will claim that they are not against religion; they are only against a particular 'subversive' version of it. However, if their behavior shows they are against religion, then most probably they are controlling religion, not supporting it.  

Bangladesh's secular nationalism asserts itself

From 1947 to 1971, Pakistan had two wings, East Pakistan and West Pakistan, separated by Indian peninsula. While West Pakistan (the present Pakistan) was multi-ethnic and multi-linguistic, East Pakistan was ethnically and linguistically homogeneous. Almost all of the people living in East Pakistan were ethnically Bengalis, speaking Bengali language. East Pakistan separated from West Pakistan in 1971 and became Bangladesh after a bloody civil war and an Indian invasion. This separation was based on a rejection of Pakistani religious nationalism and adoption of an ethnolinguistic nationalism, based on the love of Bengali language and Bengali ethnicity. Most Bengalis of the erstwhile East Pakistan felt that Pakistani religious nationalism was a hoax that claimed West Pakistanis and East Pakistanis were not only equal but Muslim brothers/sisters but refused to give Bengalis equal status and their due share in power. Religious parties' near unanimous opposition to Bangladesh's independence movement and the support they provided to Pakistan army during the civil war increased Bangladeshi misgivings to religion's role in politics. Hence, Bangladesh, unlike (pre-1971 or post-1971) Pakistan, chose to be a secular republic. 

The first constitution of Bangladesh proclaimed secularism as one of the four basic principles of the new republic (other three being Bangladeshi nationalism, socialism, and democracy). The new republic also avoided putting a crescent and a star on its flag, revealing the minor role Islam played in Bengali nationalism. Even the green color on the flag is not linked to Islam (as it is in many Muslim-majority nations' flags, like Pakistani, Moroccan, Saudi Arabian flags etc.). Green color symbolizes the lush green land of Bangladesh. Furthermore, Bangladesh's national anthem,  Amar Sonar Bangla (My Golden Bengal). is also a tribute to Bengal and has anti-religion connotations. It was written by Rabindranath Tagore in 1905 against Partition of Bengal on religious lines in 1905. Add to it many speeches/statements of Bangladesh's founder Sheikh Mujib-ur-Rehman and it is beyond doubt that Bangladesh's nationalism was ethnolinguistic and secular.

Despite all the above-mentioned evidence of secular nationalism, Bangladesh quickly reversed its course and dropped secularism. In 1977, fifth constitutional amendment introduced by military ruler Zia-ur-Rehman removed secularism as one of the basic principles and replaced it with the following words "Absolute trust and faith in the Almighty Allah shall be the basis of all actions". In 1988, another military ruler Hussain Muhammad Ershad made Islam the state religion of Bangladesh. For the next fifteen year, religious parties role and overall religious discourse increased and it appeared Bangladesh is still part of Pakistan, with military and religious parties controlling politics and manipulating religious discourse. Awami League, the founding party of Bangladesh, despite its strong attachment to the principle of secularism, also had to accept the reality of the situation as any support for secularism was portrayed as pro-Indian and anti-Islam by its rival, Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP).  

While secularism seemed defeated and religious nationalism on the rise, there was one problem; religious nationalism had difficulty legitimizing Bangladesh's separation from Pakistan. It was only on the basis of ethnolinguistic nationalism that a separate country Bangladesh can be explained to the new generation. New generations were thus socialized in a much different environment (more secular) than those ruling elite that grew up in Pakistan.   

Things began to change with the arrival of the twenty-first century. It appears a new generation socialized in the secular nationalism of Bangladesh came of age and started occupying positions of power. Their sentiments were cashed by Awami League, the party of the Sheikh Mujib-ur-Rehman, now led by his daughter, Sheikh Hasina Wajid. Courts, media, and intellectuals also helped and promoted the secularism/restoration of 1972 constitution movement. In 2005, the high court declared fifth constitutional amendment illegal and secularism was reintroduced as one of the basic principles of the republic. Sheikh Hasina then decided to take on religious parties. She established tribunals to punish those who were involved in crimes against Bangladeshis during the war of liberation. It was a politically astute move as it not only mobilized her own voters and many others but also damaged Jamaat-e-Islami (a religious party whose leadership supported Pakistan Army in 1971 and now usually supported her rival BNP). Although, there was an outcry against the partiality of these tribunals, a large majority of Bangladeshis supported these trials and punishments awarded by these tribunals. The trails revived the dubious role played by many religious leaders, implicating political Islam and increasing the support for secularism.

Although, Islam is still the state religion (so 1972 constitution is not fully restored), secularism is definitely on the march and religious nationalism in retreat. A recent evidence of this came when pro-religion rightist BNP also came out against the political role of religion. Tarique Rehman, the current senior vice chairman and the future leader of BNP, said (See Tarique against Religion-based Politics):

We’ve learned from experience that politics of that kind doesn’t work, it didn’t during Pakistan era... There are many among us who have tried to create political essence and outline based on religion. But invariably they have failed.