More on the tussle between and merging of Islamic and Persian identity in Iran

The tussle between the Islamic/Shiite identity and the Persian ethnolinguistic identity is continuing. Since the 19th century or even before, Iranians are debating which of their two identities is real and authentic and which one is affected and false or which one is dominant and which one is recessive. The Iranian state also sways, sometimes moving in one direction and then in the opposite direction. During the time of Pahlavi dynasty (1925-79), the Persian identity remained the ascendant and principal identity but since the Islamic Revolution, the Islamic identity became the paramount identity while Persian identity became recessive and invisible.

However, during the last decade, it appears the pendulum has changed direction again. The Persian identity is rising and there has been an attempt by the elite to appropriate it, without rejecting the Islamic identity. Former President Ahmadinejad was the first one from the top elite of the Islamic regime to also acknowledge/lay claim on the Persian identity (See blog post Afraid of Ahmadinejad). He loaned the famed Cyrus Cylinder from the British Museum in 2014 and exhibited it in Iran,  taking pride in ancient Persian history, while not discarding his Islamic identity (He claimed, without much evidence, that Cyrus was mentioned in the Holy Quran). Last year, there was more evidence that the people and political elite are embracing the Persian identity and do not consider it contradictory to their Islamic identity. In October 2016, thousands of Iranians visited Cyrus's tomb and President Rouhani joined the celebrations via Instagram, “Persepolis is one of the invaluable and unique remains of the ancient history of this land, which demonstrates the antiquity of the civilization, the ingenuity, the wisdom, and the management skills of the great people of Iran, as well as their monotheism.” (See blog post Is Persian Identity rising again in Iran?). The last part of the message establishes a link between Cyrus and Islam (i.e. monotheism) and makes sure that Rouhani is not accused of rejecting Islam. This embracing of both identities is new for the elite but many Iranians have no problem doing it. As explained in a previous blog post, in the Iranian society, many groups embrace both religious and ethnolinguistic identities:

However, it would be a mistake to consider both groups as mutually exclusive and some scholars, even partisans, do not completely reject the arguments of their rivals. Except for the opinionated, the difference between the two groups is whether the emphasis is placed on religion or ethnolinguistic characteristics as the primary constituent to the Iranian identity.

For example, many Persian nationalists claim that Islam in its true form is only practiced (i.e. Shia/Twelver sect Islam) in Iran and Islam was saved from Arabs and others only by Iranians. So, they view Islam as part of Iranian identity but do not accept that Islam gave Iranians a new identity. Instead, they claim that it was Iranians, a group at a much higher level of civilization than Arabs, that saved Islam by adopting it, otherwise, Islam's achievements would have been few and it would have been far less successful. 

Similarly, Islamic nationalists accept that Iranian Islam (Twelver sect) is superior and give homage to ethnolinguistic identity perspective by arguing that Iranians have a special affinity with the true religion, Islam, as they are special, seekers of what is true and right. For them, the Aryan/Iranian/Shiite Islam was and is the real Islam while the Semitic/Arab/Sunni Islam is the adulterated false version, despite Prophet Muhammad being an Arab. (See blog post Iranian 'Persian-National' Identity)

Source: Shrine of Sahabi Salman Al Farsi (The Persian)

Amir Taheri's article informs us how efforts to bring Iran and Islam closer has led to the renovation of the tomb of Salman Farsi (Salman, the Persian), who was a Persian and one of the earliest non-Arab converts of Islam and a confidant of Prophet Muhammad (PBUH). He also talks about the recent popularity of non-Islamic names in Iran:

The current new fascination that many in Iran feel for Salman is part of the movement for “Iranian Islam” which has been gaining ground in the past few years. Iranian history in the past 15 centuries has often see-sawed between religion and nationalism. The rise of one has often been accompanied with the decline of the other and vice versa.

“Partly because of dissatisfaction with the role of (Shi’ite) clerics in politics, Iran is experiencing a growing anti-religious trend,” says Mehrangiz Bayat, a Tehran researcher.
That analysis is backed by some prominent clerics. For example, Grand Ayatollah Shubeir Zanjani, one of the top clerics in Qom, warned last week that involvement in politics had contributed to the decline of the authority and popularity of the Shi’ite clergy in Iran.

Ultra-nationalists, including pan-Iranists who dream of reviving the Sassanid Empire in one form or another, have seized the popular disaffection with the ruling clergy as template for attacking Islam as “an alien Arab religion imposed on Aryan Iranians by the sword.” They ignore the fact that the mass of Iranians converted to Islam long after the 80-year-old Arab occupation of parts of Iran had ended. The concept of the “Iranian” or ”Aryan Islam” has been launched to counter the claim of “alien Islam”....

According to reports, which cannot be independently verified, the “brain” behind the idea of an “Aryan Islam” is an obscure cleric named Hassan Yaaqubi who, although he has never been seen or heard in public, is supposed to have authored more than 40 books.
Other clerics have tried to promote the idea of an “Aryan Islam” by claiming that Hussein Ibn Ali, son of Ali Ibn Abitaleb and Fatimah, married Bibi Shahrbanu a daughter of the last Sassanian King Yazdegerd, initiating a fusion of Islam and Iran. “All descendants of Hussein have Iranian blood in their veins,” says Ayatollah Sobhani. “This means an unbreakable human bond exists between Islam and Iran.”

Iranian nationalists, however, reject that idea and claim that Bibi Shahrbanu, whose shrine near Tehran attracts millions of pilgrims every year had been taken a captive and never converted to Islam.

Another cleric, Ayatollah Husseini Qazwini, claims that Iran’s Islam bond was strengthened by the Twelfth Imam, known as the Hidden Mahdi al-Montazar, emerged from his Long Absence in secret and married a girl from Tehran, ensuring the continuation of the “sacred line of Ali” with generation after generation of people with “Iranian blood in their veins.”

However, the traditional Iranian conflict between nationalism and religion seems set to intensify. According to government sources, more and more Iranians now use non-Islamic names for their new-born children. That has led to a decision by the Central Registration Office at the Ministry of Interior last Thursday to toughen rules for using “non-Islamic” names.

Spokesman for the registration office Seyf-Allah Abutorabi told a press conference that the ministry would also help those who wish to replace their non-Islamic names to do so with a minimum of bureaucratic hassle. (See Iranians Debate the Reality of ‘Aryan Islam’)

Poland and the Catholic Church

Catholicism is generally considered the most vital ingredient of Polish identity. It is argued that during the last five centuries, the Polish state fought battles against the Russians (Orthodox Christians from the East), Ottomans (Muslims from the South) and Germans and Swedes (Protestants from the North and West), so defending Poland or defending the Catholic Church became one and the same and Catholicism formed the basis of Polish nationalism. Poland was partitioned between its neighbours in 1785 and did not exist as a state till 1918. During the nineteenth century, with the state gone, Church gained more importance. Catholic priests played a key role in Polish insurrections against occupiers. However, contrary to what is portrayed, Church was not the only expression of Polish resistance and, during the occupation, while priests supported the insurrections, the Holy See asked Poles to accept the Russian Tsar as their divinely anointed emperor. In 1945, its liberty was again compromised when it became a Communist state. During the post-1945 dark period, the Catholic Church was at the forefront, strengthening the myth that the Catholic Church was essential to Poland. Cardinal Stefan Wyszyński, Archbishop of Warsaw (1948-81), was the undisputed leader of the resistance against Nazis and Communists for decades and the fall the Communist regime (1945-89) was aided by the selection of another Polish Cardinal Karol Wojtyła as Pope John Paul II in 1978. The Catholic leadership, unsurprisingly, promoted the religious nationalism. Cardinal Stefan Wyszyński once said that "nowhere else is the union between Church and nation as strong as in Poland." Pope John Paul II declared, "Without Christ, it is impossible to understand the history of Poland." The charismatic "Polish Pope" made the Church very popular and the linkage between Poles and their faith is still strong: 99% of the Polish children are baptised, 93% of weddings are also solemnized in Church and between 90% and 98% of the Poles will affirm their belief in the Catholicism. The national myth and the present demography helps make most Poles believe that Poland was always homogeneously Catholics, with few 'foreigners'. However, in reality, Polish state has always been ethnically and religiously heterogeneous. In the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, Poland (or Poland-Lithuania) was a diverse nation, with Jewish, Orthodox, and Protestant communities. Ethnic Poles lived with Ukrainians, Belarusian, Prussians, Lithuanians, Jews and Livionians. It was only after the Counterreformation movement that Catholics established their hegemony and not only physically banish some non-Catholics from the Polish state but also expelled them from the state's historical narrative (See Faith and Fatherland: Catholicism, Modernity, and Poland). During the interwar years, when the Catholic Church again became dominant, it again tried to establish its hegemony and tried to restrict the religious freedoms of minorities.

Largest Catholic Church in Poland: Basilica of Our Lady of Licheń
Source: Christian Tourism

The present-day Poland is very homogeneous. Ninety eight percent of the population belong to Polish ethnicity and around ninety percent are Catholics. However, this homogeneity is a recent phenomenon. Even before the Second World War, Catholics only had a two-thirds majority in Poland.  In 1921, newly revived Poland, "Rome's most faithful daughter," had 62.5% Roman (Latin) Catholic, 11.8% Eastern Rite Catholic, 11% Greek Orthodox, 10.8% Jewish, and 3.7% Protestants citizens. The war, change of borders, and voluntary migrations and forced deportations bequeathed Poland its religious and ethnic homogeneity. Ukrainians and Belarusians became part of Soviet Union and Germans were either killed in the War or fled or were expelled later on. Jewish minority was either destroyed in the Holocaust or fled. The homogeneity of Poland was further aided by the migration of Poles from Kresy ((Eastern) Borderlands), an area that was part of pre-WWII Poland but was annexed to the Soviet Union after 1945. 

In the 1990s, after democratization and defeat of communism, Catholic Church's influence increased. For instance, abortion, which was legal since 1956, was made illegal, except for few exemptions, in 1993. The Polish law on abortion is one of the most restrictive in Europe. The Church vigorously campaigned for the bill. Even the Pope came from Rome to campaign for the bill. There was such emotional support for the bill that its opponents felt threatened but the religious right was even then not happy with the law: 

Lawmakers approved the measure in January after heavy lobbying by the Roman Catholic Church and in a climate of such emotion and intimidation that virtually all state hospitals had already stopped performing abortions. Gynecologists who perform the procedure say they are targets of threats and attacks by militant anti-abortion campaigners...

Bishop Tadeusz Pieronek, the associate general secretary of the Polish Bishops' Conference, said that the church was unhappy with the law as passed because "the principle 'Thou shalt not kill' does not allow any exceptions."

Halina Nowina-Konopka, a member of Parliament from the Christian National Party, said the law did not go far enough.

"It just regulates when you can kill and when you can't," she said. "It devalues human life in that it makes one life worth less than another. It's like ancient Sparta where they threw individuals who were less fit off the cliffs." ( See Tough Abortion Law Provokes Dismay in Poland)

Not only this law is still on the books, but there also have been attempts to ban abortion completely.

In 1993, the Polish state signed a concordat with the Church. This agreement was declared as a model for other post-communist countries by the Pope. The important thing to note was that the concordat was agreed and signed before the new constitution. Therefore, the Polish Constitution (1997) had to conform to the concordat, not the other way round. In fact, several drafts of the constitution had to be adjusted to conform it to the concordat. The concordat has been criticized for various reasons. Once signed, the concordat ended any possibility of constitutional separation of church and state. It also ended the equality of all religions before the state. The Catholic Church acquired a special position within the state because of its special relationship. Under concordat, the state promised to provide Catholic religious education in state schools if requested. The Church also made state declare seven religious days as public holidays. The state also accepted the role of Catholic military chaplains, administered by the (Catholic) military bishopric, in the Polish military forces. The controversial rightwing Radio Marya was also protected under the concordat (See Polish concordat (1993): Text and criticism)

The 1997 Constitution also shows several elements of religious nationalism. The preamble mentions God twice and the following sentence emphasizing Christian heritage of Poland:

Beholden to our ancestors for their labours, their struggle for independence achieved at great sacrifice, for our culture rooted in the Christian heritage of the Nation and in universal human values, 

The following articles go against the principle of the secularity of state:

Article 25(4): The relations between the Republic of Poland and the Roman Catholic Church shall be determined by the international treaty concluded with the Holy See, and by statute. 

Article 53(3): Parents shall have the right to ensure their children a moral and religious upbringing and teaching in accordance with their convictions. The provisions of Article 48, para. 1 shall apply as appropriate.

Article 53(4): The religion of a church or other legally recognized religious organization may be taught in schools, but other peoples' freedom of religion and conscience
shall not be infringed thereby. 

Article 104(2): Deputies, before the commencement of the performance of the mandate, shall take the following oath in the presence of the Sejm:
"I do solemnly swear to perform my duties to the Nation diligently and conscientiously, to safeguard the sovereignty and interests of the State, to do all within my power for the prosperity of the Homeland and the  well-being of its citizens, and to observe the Constitution and other laws of the Republic of Poland."
The oath may also be taken with the additional sentence "So help me, God."

Article 130: The President of the Republic shall assume office upon taking the following oath in the presence of the National Assembly:
"Assuming, by the will of the Nation, the office of President of the Republic of Poland, I do solemnly swear to be faithful to the provisions of the Constitution; I pledge that I shall steadfastly safeguard the dignity of the Nation, the independence and security of the State, and also that the good of the Homeland and the prosperity of its citizens shall forever remain my supreme obligation."
The oath may also be taken with the additional sentence "So help me, God." 

Article 151: The Prime Minister, Deputy Prime Ministers and ministers shall take the following oath in the presence of the President of the Republic:
"Assuming this office of Prime Minister (Deputy Prime Minister, minister) I do solemnly swear to be faithful to the provisions of the Constitution and other laws of the Republic of Poland, and that the good of the Homeland and the prosperity of its citizens shall forever remain my supreme obligation."
The oath may also be taken with the additional sentence "So help me, God." (See The Constitution of the Republic of Poland of 2nd April 1997)

Secularization of Quebec Nationalism

Before the 1960s, Quebec's nationalism was a cocktail of ethnolinguistic and religious sentiments. It was difficult to define Quebec's nationalism without explaining the differences between Catholicism and Protestantism and without reminding the reader about the Catholic struggle for equal rights in Protestant-majority Canada and previously in the British Empire that was based on Anglican nationalism. Roman Catholic Church was the main part and defender of Quebec's culture. However, during the 1960s, many long-term developments and events lead to the "Quiet Revolution" that considerably weakened the link between Catholicism and Quebec nationalism. The religious nationalism declined and became more implicit after the end of Maurice Duplessis era (Quebec's Premier 1936-39 and 1944-59).

Source: Francophone Nationalism in Québec


David Seljak in his article "Why the Quiet Revolution was “Quiet”: The Catholic Church’s Reaction to the Secularization of Nationalism in Quebec after 1960" explains the secularization of the Quebec identity. However, it is important to note that the secularization was not complete:

One of the most important issues was the Church’s acceptance of the secularization of French-Canadian nationalism. If the Quebec state had the power to make the reforms of the 1960s “revolutionary,” then the Church had the power to make the revolution “quiet” – or not. Its reconciliation to the new nationalism has helped to determine the shape of Quebec culture and society after 1960.

While the British North America Act implicitly gave the Catholic Church a semi-established status in the province of Quebec, the two most important motors of modernization, democratic political structures and capitalist economic institutions, remained outside of its control. Consequently, despite its important role in Quebec society, the Church was most often in the position of reacting to social change. From 1900 to 1930, the Church responded to industrialization and modernization with what Guindon has called an “administrative revolution,” an unprecedented campaign tocreate new institutions and bureaucracies to meet the needs of French Catholics in every realm of modern urban life. Besides multiplying its institutions which provided education, health care, and social services, the Church promoted the growth of Catholic labour unions, farmers’ cooperatives, credit unions, pious leagues, newspapers, radio and television shows, films, and Catholic Action groups for workers, students, women, farmers, and nationalists. This project was encouraged by Pope Pius XI, who founded the Catholic Action movement to encourage Catholics to form “intermediary bodies” or voluntary associations to mediate between individuals and the state apparatus. Conservative Catholics dreamed that these bodies would eventually reclaim all those functions in society that had been wrenched from the Church’s control.

While other peoples met the challenges of industrialization and modernization with programs of what sociologist Karl Deutsch has called “nation-building,” French-Canadian nationalists embarked on an aggressive programme of “church-building” with the goal of creating an “Églisenation” (nation-Church) rather than a nation-state. While they encouraged state intervention in specific projects (such as the colonisation of the hinterlands of Quebec), French Canadian nationalists usually preferred to resolve conflicts by creating religiously inspired social structures rather than appealing to state power. For example, in the Church’s corporatist response to the Depression, the actions of the state were limited to those realms where the first agents of society (the family and the Church) were as yet incapable of fulfilling their responsibilities. Typically, French-Canadian nationalism was marked by a certain anti-étatisme and apolitisme. Because it was rooted in a profoundly conservative, clerical, Catholic triumphalism, this nationalism could be xenophobic, intolerant, and repressive, as evidenced by its crusades against Jews, socialists, and Jehovah’s Witnesses in the name of religious and national solidarity. Despite the anti-modern discourse that its authors employed, this bureaucratic revolution ironically promoted the modernization of French Quebec society including that of the Church itself and French-Canadian nationalism. This modernization was certainly problematic. Critics drew attention to the gulf between the modern, multicultural, urban, industrial reality of Quebec society and a conservative Catholic ideology centred on rural values, ethnic solidarity, religion, and a rejection of politics and the state. These critics, including those who participated in the Catholic Action movements, grew suspicious of the traditional nationalism and some even rejected nationalism altogether.

The rapid changes of the 1960s, known as the Quiet Revolution, grew directly out of the type of society that was formed in Quebec after 1867. After World War II, a “new middle class” of university-trained bureaucrats increasingly occupied important positions in the immense bureaucracy that the Church had created. While educated in Catholic culture and values, members of this clerically dominated bureaucracy were simultaneously socialized into modern, rational and democratic values. Thus, they were uncomfortable with the conservative, undemocratic practices of the Duplessis regime and with the complicity of the Church in those practices. They demanded the rationalization of the bureaucracy that oversaw education, health care, and social services. They also demanded its democratization and protested against its “clericalism,” understood as the best positions being reserved for Church officials. Consequently, the new nationalism was defined as much against the Catholic Church as the Anglophone business elite.

The ascent to power of these elites was assured when the Parti libéral du Québec (PLQ) took power in June of 1960. Inspired by a secular and modernizing nationalism, the Lesage government introduced a number of measures that radically redefined the role of the state. It took over the functions of the Church in education, healthcare, and social services. Through the nationalization of hydro-electric utilities and the creation of crown corporations, the PLQ sought both to expand the influence of the government in the economy and to increase the presence of French Canadians in the upper levels of that economy. The state bureaucracy increased at a tremendous rate, growing by 42.6 percent between 1960 and 1965. While the changes adopted by the Lesage government mostly satisfied the interests of the new middle class and francophone business people, some sought to promote a more democratic, humane, and participatory society. The Liberal government introduced more progressive labour legislation and important social welfare reforms. Supporters of the government’s reforms attacked both traditional religious nationalism and laissez-faire liberalism. In doing so they created a new political nationalism that was adamantly secular, state-centred, and optimistically oriented to Keynesian liberalism or even social democracy. 

While accepting these reforms, Catholics attempted to find ways of adapting Church structures and Catholic thinking to the new context. Given the history and theology of the Catholic hierarchy in the 1950s, this reaction was by no means the obvious route to take. Even in the early 1960s, the bishops condemned the attack on traditional French Canadian nationalism in the very popular book, Les insolences de Frère Untel. Even though, led by Cardinal Paul-Émile Léger, they had accepted the urbanization of Quebec society and reluctantly had given up the strategies of colonization and corporatism, the bishops’ traditional paternalistic attitude, obedience to Rome, moralizing spirit, and confusion between Catholicism and conservative ideology had remained intact. Yet by 1970, the bishops had largely reconciled themselves to the autonomy of the state, the liberty of individual consciences in political questions, and the legitimacy of the new nationalism. The early opposition and later reconciliation of the bishops was paralleled in many sectors in the Church.

This reconciliation would have been impossible without the coincidence of the Quiet Revolution with the Second Vatican Council. In Quebec, the Church’s redefinition of its relationship to modernity had three immediate consequences. First, it took the wind out of the sails of the conservative rejection of the new society. It made the project of the traditional nationalists impossible – since the Church hierarchy now refused its designated role as spiritual and cultural leaders of the attack on modernity. Second, it allowed Catholics – and even clergy and bishops – to support some projects of the Quiet Revolution in spite of their “laicizing” agenda. Finally, it inspired a new concern for development and social justice among Quebec Catholics. The Council affirmed the new direction of Catholic social teaching laid out by Pope John XXIII. Catholics sought to remain relevant to Quebec society and to participate, as Christians, in the important struggles of their society.

This new social teaching, along with the reflections of the Catholic Church in Latin America, would lead to the emergence of a faith and justice movement in the 1970s. Influenced by this teaching, the Church in Quebec could develop a sustained ethical critique of the new society and the new nationalism while affirming their liberating aspects. Taken together these three developments meant that Quebec society avoided the painful cultural schism between Catholics and modernizers (both liberal and radical)that has marked other Catholic societies

First of these two events was the 

Can a Zoroastrian be a representative of Muslims in Iran?

Majlis, the Iranian Parliament, has five separate reserved seats for religious minorities out of a total of 270 seats. Iranian Christians have three of these reserved seats, while Zoroastrians and Jews have one each.  Sunni Muslims are not considered a religious minority and they can run for all seats of the Majlis. Non-Muslims cannot run for the general seats in the Majlis as they do not believe in the ideology (Islam or Shiite Islam) of the Iranian state. High officials of the state have to be Muslim.

Source: Radio Farda

However, non-Muslims have participated in elections at the local level and been elected to the general seats (i.e. seats not reserved for minorities). One such election is now causing controversy in Iran as the conservative judiciary and moderate politicians fight to prevail. An excerpt from an article on the controversy is given below:

The election of Sepanta Niknam, a Zoroastrian, as a city council member in the central Iranian town of Yazd has become the topic of hot debate on the country’s political stage. While the Guardian Council says religious minorities cannot be representatives of Muslim-majority constituencies, the administration of President Hassan Rouhani and the parliament think otherwise.

It should be noted that Niknam has already served one full term as city councilor in Yazd from 2013-2017. However, following his re-election in the May 19 municipal polls, a defeated conservative candidate filed a complaint on the grounds of Niknam's religion, arguing that it was against Iran's constitution for a member of a religious minority to make decisions on behalf of the whole population of a Muslim-majority city. The complaint prompted the Court of Administrative Justice to issue an order suspending Niknam’s membership to the city council, basing its decision on an earlier letter by Ayatollah Ahmad Jannati, the ultra-conservative head of the Guardian Council, which is the clerical body that vets candidates for elections.

So where did the story begin? On April 15, about one month before Iran’s local and presidential elections, Jannati issued a directive demanding that non-Muslims be disqualified from running in the then-upcoming city and village council elections in localities where most of the population are Muslims. His order was met with different reactions from Iran’s political groups, with many voicing opposition to such a measure.
However, since city council elections — contrary to presidential and parliamentary polls — are not supervised by the Guardian Council and a parliamentary delegation oversees the vetting of the candidates for these elections, Jannati’s directive was never implemented. Thus, many religious minorities participated in the May 19 municipal vote and won, including Niknam.

A few months later, on Oct. 9, Yazd City Council Chairman Gholamali Sefid said he had been ordered by the governor of Yazd to suspend Niknam’s membership to the city council in accordance with a ruling by the Court of Administrative Justice. However, Sefid announced his refusal to implement the order two days later, on Oct. 11, and insisted that he would resign from his post if the suspension was not revoked.
Reformists strongly criticized the Guardian Council decision, calling it illegal. Many political figures asked that parliament step in and revoke Jannati’s order. Even parliamentary speaker Ali Larijani, himself a Principlist, opposed the decision.

In a meeting with Yazd city councilors on Oct. 18, Larijani said, “I said from the start that we do not approve of this method. In my talks with Ayatollah [Ahmad] Jannati, the honorable secretary of the Guardian Council, I emphasized that local councils should be handled according to the law. … The Court of Administrative Justice getting involved in the matter has not been a timely move either, and I mentioned this point to the judiciary as well.” Larijani added, “If this matter is not resolved, we have no choice other than to refer it to the Expediency Council for a final resolution.”

Also on Oct. 18, Guardian Council spokesman Abbas-Ali Kadkhodaei said that Jannati’s ruling was unchangeable and its implementation mandatory: “Anytime one of the Guardian Council jurists sees a measure that is against Islamic law [Sharia], he can step in and say so. Those who object to this have no knowledge of the laws and want to look at the issue from an expediency perspective.”

This was not the end of the story. On Oct. 24, hard-line cleric Ayatollah Mohammad Yazdi, Iran’s former judiciary chief (1989-99) and a current member of the Guardian Council, announced that “the jurists in the [Guardian] Council have unanimously voted for the suspension of Sepanta Niknam, the Zoroastrian member of the Yazd City Council. This is a decision that is lawful, in accordance with Islamic laws, definite and nonretractable. No one can revoke this law.” He then warned that any attempts to overturn this ruling would be “a fight against the principle of the Islamic Republic of Iran, which the establishment surely would not tolerate.”

According to the constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran, followers of Judaism, Christianity and Zoroastrianism are each allowed to have a representative in parliament. But what does the Iranian Constitution say about city councils? Based on Article 91 of the constitution, the Guardian Council is responsible for examining the compatibility of the legislation passed by the Islamic Consultative Assembly (parliament) with Islam. However, Article 94 of the constitution sets a time frame for how long the Guardian Council has the liberty to comment on a piece of legislation. Based on this article, “All legislation passed by the Islamic Consultative Assembly must be sent to the Guardian Council. The Guardian Council must review it within a maximum of 10 days from its receipt with a view to ensuring its compatibility with the criteria of Islam and the constitution. If it finds the legislation incompatible, it will return it to the assembly for review. Otherwise, the legislation will be deemed enforceable.” This is while city council elections were held on May 19, 2017, with results being announced a few days after.

With rising controversy, the Rouhani administration was soon pulled into the issue as well. On Oct. 25, Shahindokht Molaverdi, the president’s special aide on citizens’ rights, said, “There is no legal prohibition against Sepanta Niknam’s membership of the Yazd City Council — neither from a citizen’s rights point of view nor in regard to any other law.”

Rest of the article can be read here. 

A victory for indigenous faiths in Indonesia

Indonesia's official ideology is Pancasila, which includes belief in one God but otherwise, it is quite secular. Indonesia officially recognizes only six religions: Islam, Protestantism, Catholicism, Buddhism, Confucianism and Hinduism. Believers of other religions faced discrimination, particularly after the introduction of new legislation in 2006. The Indonesian Constitutional Court has rejected the new legislation.

Source: Religion in Indonesia

An excerpt from a news article explaining the change is given below:

Indonesia’s top court has overturned a law that denied recognition and legal rights to followers of indigenous faiths, in a surprise advance for religious freedom in the world’s most populous Muslim nation.

The Constitutional Court, in a unanimous ruling Tuesday (Nov. 7) from its nine-judge panel, said articles in the Civil Administration Law were discriminatory and violated the principle of equality before the law.

“These articles are not legally binding as they contradict the 1945 constitution,” presiding Judge Arief Hidayat told the court.

The ruling is an unexpected victory for moderates at a time when religious conservatives have demonstrated growing political influence and undermined the country’s reputation for tolerance.

The discriminatory articles, in place since 2006, effectively required followers of faiths not among the six recognized by the government to list one of the official religions on their national identity card or be denied basic rights such as marriage registration and land titles.

They also had the option of leaving the religion category blank but that would risk being accused of being an atheist, an offense under Indonesia’s blasphemy law, said Andreas Harsono, Indonesia researcher for Human Rights Watch.

Full article can be read here 

A change in the blog

I have been writing this blog since 2014. The usual style until now is that I focus on some events, news or articles related to religious nationalism, explain them and give my views. However, lately I have been feeling that while I should keep giving my own views/comments, I should not deprive the readers of this blog of the many interesting news, events and articles about religious nationalism that are important but about which I do not have time to comment or explain. So, from today onwards, I will post news and articles about religious nationalism on this blog without my own commentary.

Women can drive in Saudi Arabia but is it really a big change?

Saudi Arabia is not the place from where one can expect good news for women. It is the most restrictive country for women in the world. It's not for nothing that it has been called the most masculine state and anti-woman kingdom. Though many blame Islam for women plight in Saudi Arabia, there are around fifty other Muslim-majority countries in the world and none of these countries control and regulate women lives as much as the Saudi state.Those blaming Islam for the Saudi state's misogyny, however, have one powerful supporter inside the kingdom, the Saudi state, which justifies its invidious discrimination of women on the basis of Islam, Sharia and tradition.

So, knowing Saudi state's general puritanism and its stance on gender equality, it was a surprise to read a series of news that advance the empowerment of Saudi women. Following are the positive news received over the last two months:

• King Salman issued a historic decree removing the ban on issuance of driving licenses to women. Women will be able to drive by June 2018 (See King Salman’s decree allows women to drive in Saudi Arabia):
• Iman Bint Abdullah was appointed as Assistant Mayor of the Al-Khobar municipality, with special responsibility for information technology. She is the first Saudi woman to hold such a senior position (See First Saudi woman appointed as assistant mayor);
• Fatimah Baeshen was appointed as the first female spokesperson for the Saudi Embassy in Washington DC (See First spokeswoman appointed at Saudi embassy in Washington);
• As part of the independence day celebrations, Saudi women were allowed to enter the King Fahd International Stadium (Riyadh) for the first time to attend a pageant operetta. They were also allowed to attend a concert in Jeddah (See National celebrations open Saudi sports stadium to women for [the] first time);
• Saudi Ministry of Education issued a decree that will allow girls to participate in physical education classes for the first time. The government also agreed, again for the first time, to issue female gym licences. Female gyms previously operated as salons and faced threats of closure (See Saudi Arabia will finally allow girls to take PE — that's a big deal).

Besides openings for Saudi women, the Saudi government also proclaimed at least one future relaxation for foreign women. In August, it was announced that a new 50 island Red Sea luxury resort would be built and this resort would be “governed by laws on par with international standards.” The government did not explicitly say it but the meaning of "international standards" was mostly interpreted as freedom for women to wear whatever they like, including bikinis, at the resort (See Saudi Arabia to open luxury beach resort where women can wear bikinis).

So, why this change and why so fast? This was the kingdom which believed in evolution, not revolution. This was the kingdom where tradition and Wahhabi style Islam reigned supreme unfettered by modernity. Most analysts have pointed out that the force behind these changes is the new Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman. Since his father ascended to the throne in January 2015, he has gradually acquired more and more power. In the first cabinet of his father, Prince Mohammed was appointed Minister of Defense and he was also the head of the Royal Court. Also in January, he was named the chair of the newly established Council for Economic and Development Affairs. In April 2015, he was appointed Deputy Crown Prince and Second Deputy Prime Minister, just two heartbeats away from the throne. So after April 2015, he was controlling both economic and defence policies of the kingdom (For his pivotal role in the Yemen war see Saudi Arabian Nationalism, Religion and Yemen War, an earlier blog post).

A year later, "Mr. Everything," a name given to Prince Mohammed because of his all-pervasive influence (See Why Saudi's Mohammed bin Salman is 'Mr Everything'), presented Vision 2030, a roadmap for the Saudi economy and society for the next 15 years. In his final promotion, Prince Mohammed bin Salman was made Crown Prince and Deputy Prime Minister by his father in June 2017. 

There are several reasons why openings for the Saudi women are being linked to Prince Mohammed. First, he has said many times that he favors women joining the workforce. In 2016, when he was asked, "Do you think having a greater proportion of women in the workforce would be good for Saudi Arabia?" He replied, "No doubt. A large portion of my productive factors are unutilised. And I have population growth reaching very scary figures. Women’s work will help in both of these issues." Second, he is the main force behind the Vision 2030 which declares:

Saudi women are yet another great asset. With over 50 percent of our university graduates being female, we will continue to develop their talents, invest in their productive capabilities and enable them to strengthen their future and contribute to the development of our society and economy.

Third, the timing of the reforms is too difficult to ignore. In late June, Prince Mohammed vanquishes his last major rival (cousin and former Crown Prince Mohammed bin Naif) and becomes Crown Prince and in the next two months, a series of reforms happen. Finally, because of his failure to deliver a victory in the Yemen War, he wants a big win to consolidate his power and these changes can give him that, if he can manage the conservative Wahhabi religious establishment. 

Source: Saudi Arabia to allow women to obtain driving licences

The question is whether these changes are going to be a game changer for Saudi women or not. The major change is, of course, permission to drive. Many analysts have pointed out that while important, this change still does not give freedom to drive to Saudi women. After June 2018, Saudi women will still need to have consent from their male guardians:

The key change is that there is no longer any legal prohibition for women to drive. And nor, according to the statements of the formerly reluctant clerics, is there a basis for a ban in sharia law, which governs most aspects of Saudi society. The onus of decisions about whether women can sit behind the wheel has been shifted from the state to families.

Under repressive guardianship laws, male relatives have veto over whether wives or daughters can leave the home unaccompanied. While a woman can be granted a licence and is allowed to drive, a male family member can still stop her from doing so. (See Saudi Arabia: Prince Mohammed plays his biggest card yet)

Madawi Al-Rashid, a Suadi Arabian scholar, has argued not much is going to change. According to her, it is a "public relations stunt" and women are still going to be oppressed in Saudi Arabia and the changes have been solely done to mollify Western critics and get their support:

The Saudi state is one of the most male-dominated in the world. Now it is compelled to look as if it is treating women better to win over critics in the west. As a result, it has embarked on a series of cosmetic reforms...History is littered with dictators who have promoted women, from Turkey’s Atatürk, the Iranian Shah, Habib Bourguiba of Tunisia, and Hosni Mubarak in Egypt. Appearing to support women has won dictators applause, especially in the west, where women’s rights have become an axis against which to measure nations and evaluate regimes.

Today’s authoritarian regimes will win extra praise when they appear to be liberating Muslim women from the oppression of Islam. Saudi Arabia is no exception. Here, Muslim women are depicted either as survivors of their patriarchal religion or as heroes who are challenging such a dominant and primitive culture. Like their counterparts in Afghanistan, Egypt, Pakistan and elsewhere, Saudi women had been framed in this binary image. Dictators conveniently depict themselves as liberators of these downtrodden women while society is shown to be the oppressor. In particular, in recent times, Islam and sharia law are portrayed as the cause of women’s suffering.

Such a narrative is appealing to both Arab dictators and certain constituencies in the west. But allowing women to obtain a driving licence is little more than a public relations stunt designed to cement this notion of the Saudi regime as the liberator of women. (See Women are still not in the driving seat in Saudi Arabia)

Al-Rashid is correct in her assessment that Saudi women lives will not transform because of these few changes. However, she also argues that Saudi Royals are following Ataturk, Muhammad Reza Shah and Bourguiba and like them trying to please the West. If she is correct, this is a big change. It may not be a big change for the Saudi women but it is a metamorphosis for the Royals. Saudi Arabia is based on religious nationalism and Ataturk, Muhammad Reza Shah and Bourguiba were enemies of religious nationalism in their countries. These leaders derived their power by standing against the religious conservatives and Shariah while Saudi Royals justify their rule on the basis of Shariah. So, I would argue that the hold of religious nationalism on Saudi Arabia has loosened a bit because of these changes. If Prince Mohammad keeps on (slowly) moving away from religious nationalism, Saudi Arabia will feel the changes in other areas too. One should be thankful for the small mercies.