The nexus of religious populism and digital authoritarianism in Pakistan

The nexus of religious populism and digital authoritarianism in Pakistan

Source: https://www.citizenlab.co/

Abstract

Pakistan’s democracy has a turbulent political history. In the seven decades since its creation, the country has faced four military-led dictatorships and another two decades under indirect military rule. Given this political trend, authoritarianism is not a novel phenomenon in the country. Digital authoritarianism, however, is a relatively new domain of oppression. This paper looks at how a political party in power and the “establishment” (military elite and its civilian collaborators) have been increasingly controlling digital mediums as well as weaponizing cyberspace. This dual control and usage allow for growing digital authoritarianism.

Using the case study of Islamist civilizational populist Imran Khan’s government (2018-2022) and its collaboration with the military establishment in enforcing digital authoritarianism, this article provides a four levels of assessment of internet governance in Pakistan: 1. whole network level, 2. sub-network level, 3. proxy level, and 4. user level. In addition, the role of Khan’s political party’s Islamist civilizational populist outlook in contributing to authoritarianism is also discussed. A lot of censorship happens around the ideas of protecting Islam and Pakistan’s Muslim identity. Thus, Pakistan’s digital space is oppressive where ideas of religion, ontological insecurity, and nationalism are weaponized to legitimize the state’s growing authoritarianism.  

Read the article at the European Center for Populism Studies

Hindutva civilizational populist BJP’s enforcement of digital authoritarianism in India

 

Source: https://www.thefinancialexpress.com.bd/

Abstract:

The largest democracy in the world is now moving towards authoritarianism under the Hindutva civilizational populist prime minister Narendra Modi-led Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)’s rule. This article focuses on digital rights in India that have seen a sharp decline in recent years. It explores the transformation of the internet and social media, from a relatively open and liberal space to a restricted one. This survey of India’s digital landscape finds that the rise of civilizational populist Modi and his eight years long rule have led to an upsurge in digital surveillance and control and has fostered an environment of online harassment and bullying for those who are critical of the BJP’s views and politics. The article uses a four-level framework (Full Network, Sub-Network, Proxies, and Network Nodes) to explore digital authoritarianism by the BJP government. At each of these levels, the Hindutva populist government has closed avenues of open discussion and exchange of views by enforcing new rules and regulations.

Read the article at the European Center of Populism Studies

A Quest for Identity: The Case of Religious Populism in Pakistan

Pakistani Identity

 Source: BBC

Abstract:

Since its founding, both civil and military Pakistani governments have used religious populism to consolidate support and legitimize their actions. This has paved the way for religious populism to become a part of the nation’s cultural imagination and identity. During the country’s “infant” or “fragile” democratic phase, religious populism was repeatedly used to consolidate support. Religious parties and groups hold great political sway in the county. Through the use of religious populism, these factions have been allowed to nurture their own “people” who are partisan towards “others.” The weak level of governance, political turmoil, and distrust in institutional capabilities has pushed the public into the arms of religious populists. 

The article can be read at European Center for Populism Studies

Military and Populism: A Global Tour with a Special Emphasis on the Case of Pakistan

 Pakistan army chief General Qamar Bajwa and Prime Minister Imran Khan in Miranshah

Source: Khyber TV

Abstract

Although populism has become a focus of research in the last decade, there hasn’t been much academic work on how militaries around the world have reacted/acted to the rise of populist leaders. There is some timeworn research on the relationship of militaries in Latin America with various left-wing populist governments and leaders from the 1930s to 1970s. Given that populism was largely understood in the context of left-wing politics, with the rise of right-wing populism, the literature on the military and populism needs to be advanced by studying the relationship between right-wing populism and the military. This article aims to address this gap by looking at the right-wing populism case study of Pakistan, where the military has actively participated in the rise of a religious populist leader. To situate the case study within the larger literature of the military and populism, the dynamics and history of military associations with populism and populist leaders are revisited in the article’s first part.

The article can be read at European Center for Populism Studies

Civilizationist Populism in South Asia: Turning India Saffron

Bajrang Dal Rally

Source: The Hindu

Abstract:

 The 21st century has witnessed a significant shift in how the concept of nationalism is understood. A political marriage between identity politics and populism has resulted in “civilizationism,” a new form of nationalism that entails an emotionally charged division of society into “the people” versus “the Other.” All too often, the divisive discourses and policies associated with civilizationalist populism produce intercommunal conflict and violence. 

This paper draws on a salient case study, India’s Hindutva movement, to analyze how mainstream populist political parties and grassroots organizations can leverage civilizationist populism in campaigns to mobilize political constituencies. In surveying the various groups within the Hindutva movement and conducting a discourse analysis of their leaders’ statements, the paper shows the central role of sacralized nostalgia, history, and culture in Hindutva populist civilizationism. By analyzing the contours and socio-political implications of civilizationist populism through this case study, the paper contributes to the theoretical understanding of the concept more generally.

Read the paper at European Center for Populism Studies website

As Imran Khan fails, he turns to religious nationalism to save him

Imran Khan came to power as a populist right-wing politician. His key support came from the powerful Pakistani military, which arranged favorable judicial verdicts against ex-Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and other leaders of (Sharif's party) Pakistan Muslim League (N), a sycophantic media, a hostile atmosphere for PMLN second-tier leadership forcing them to change loyalties, and rigging on the election day.

The military also helped discredit the religious credentials of the right-of-center PMLN leadership by painting them as pro-Ahmadi or pro-Qadiani. A new extremist organization, the Tehreek-e-Labaik Pakistan (TLP), was supported by the military to arrange protests all over the country and to force the country to come to a standstill. The military refused to come to the aid of the civilian government which it was constitutionally bound to. Furthermore, once Sharif's government bowed before the extremists, an army general was photographed paying money to the TLP protesters publicly. 

All this was, however, before the 2018 elections. As time passed by and the economy and governance deteriorated sharply, the confidence of even Imran Khan's supporters in his competence went downhill. Blaming the opposition and using the COVID-19 pandemic to hide misgovernance worked for a period but when corruption and mismanagement soared and the military also reduced its support, instrumentalizing Islam was the only possible way to retain popularity.

During the last three years, Imran Khan has reversed the trend of decreasing religious nationalism in Pakistan that was almost two decades old. As explained in my book, State, Nationalism, and Islamization, religious nationalism increased during the 30- year period from the early1970s to the late 1990s. With the start of the new century, there was a change, and the Pakistani state reduced (not end) its support for religious nationalism and extremism. 

Following are some of the key actions taken by the Imran Khan government/party to instrumentalize Islam after he came to power in 2018:

1. Riyasat-e-Madina rhetoric: From his maiden speech after becoming the Prime Minister, Imran has vowed to make Pakistan a newer version of the Madina state. In his maiden speech, he said that his 22-year struggle was aimed at turning Pakistan into a state like the Madina state, led by Hazrat Muhammad (Peace Be Upon Him). He said that the West has adopted riyasat-e-Madina's principles of the welfare state, accountability, simplicity, justice, spending on education, etc., while Pakistan had not. Importantly, during the last three years, he has not worked consistently on any of the above objectives. Pakistan is more corrupt today than it was in 2018 while the accountability regime and courts have only targeted his political opposition.

2. Even during the height of COVID 19 pandemic, Imran Khan was not ready to anger religious extremists and temporarily stop congregation prayers. He risked outbreak of virus and deaths of hundreds of thousands Pakistanis just to appease extremists. Most religious conservatives were ready for the temporary end of congregation prayers as almost all of 50 Muslim-majority countries had done so but Imran was not reasdy to anger extremists who were a minority.

Source: Republicworld.com

3. Imran's government intends to implement the Single National Curriculum which increases the amount of religious content in the primary and secondary school curriculum, including making Arabic mandatory. This will also pave way for the hiring of thousands of madrassa-educated men by the government, influencing not only the teaching of Islamiat and Arabic but also of other subjects and the overall milieu.

4. Imran Khan has twice bowed before the TLP extremists and accepted their demands even when the military was supporting him. He accepted such ridiculous demands as declaring the French ambassador persona non grata. The most recent agreement between the TLP and the government has been kept in secret which shows that it also has some ridiculous and illegal demands. He has also said that the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan, which has been implicated in the murder of thousands of innocent Pakistanis, would be pardoned.

5. Imran Khan has repeatedly blamed women clothes for increase in crimes agianst women and then repeatedly claimed that he didn't mean what he said or people didn't understand what he was saying. These statements curry favor with the conservatives who also argue that crimes agianst women are largly due to women's independence, clothes, and activities outside their homes.

5. Rehmatul Lil Alameen Scholarship Program: Prime Minister Imran Khan also launched the Rehmatul Lil Alameen Scholarship Program 2021 which would help finance undergraduate education of underprivileged and deserving students across the country.

6. National Rahmatul-Lil-Alameen Authority was launched by the PM in 2021. This authority aims to promote research on Seeratun Nabi (Peace Be Upon Him) and guide youth on multiple aspects of the Holy Prophet’s (PBUH) life. According to PM Khan, it will monitor media for any blasphemous content and school curriculum for promoting the true image of Islam.

7. The Punjab Government, also led by the PTI, decided in 2021 to make Naazrah Quran education compulsory for classes 1-5 for schools across the province,  This was in addition to the Compulsory Teaching of the Holy Quran Act, 2018.

8. The PTI Punjab Chief Minister Usman Buzdar has also ordered that the recitation of Darood-e-Ibrahimi (verses in praise for Holy Prophet (PBUH)) before the national anthem and after the recitation of the Holy Quran must be ensured at the public school assemblies. 

9. Imran Khan has raised issue of Islamophobia at various fora, including the UN General Assembly. He has also written letters to major social media companies as well as leaders of 50 Muslim majority states to highlight the issue and to call for its end. However, crucially, he has been very silent about what is happening to Uighar Muslims in China or Sri Lankan Muslims, showing his hypocrisy and duplicity.

Hinduism, Hindutva and Hindu Populism in India: An Analysis of Party Manifestos of Indian Rightwing Parties

Abstract:

Since the rise of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), a lot has been written on Hindu nationalism. Prime Minister Modi’s ascendency has similarly resulted in a plethora of books and articles on Hindu populism. However, most of the literature does not distinguish between the two. Hindu nationalism and Hindu populism overlap, particularly in Modi’s India and Modi’s BJP, but they are not the same. In this article, after a discussion on Hinduism’s affinity to populism, an attempt has been made to distinguish between Hindu nationalism and Hindu populism based on an analysis of Hindutva parties’ election manifestos. Since independence, three Hindutva parties have made a name for themselves at the national level: Hindu Mahasabha, Bharatiya Jana Sangh (BJS), and BJP. Based on their importance and success at the national level, one manifesto of Hindu Mahasabha, two manifestos of BJS and four manifestos of the BJP were analyzed based on criteria chosen after the literature review. The results show that while Hindu nationalism was strong and visible in early Hindutva parties (Hindu Mahasabha and BJS), Hindu populism was weak and sporadic. Interestingly, for the BJP, there is a rise and then drop in Hindu nationalism while Hindu populism has consistently increased. 

Article:

1. Introduction

Prime Minister Modi’s approach and strategy to deal with the COVID-19 pandemic has been universally acknowledged as a disaster. The second wave exposed the deficiencies of his leadership style and his overall grasp of problems facing his 1.3 billion people. Many experts are blaming it on his populist politics and pointing as evidence to other populist leaders, such as Presidents Trump and Bolsonaro, who also failed to manage the pandemic (Collinson 2021; Friedman 2021; Santoshini et al. 2021). Others have criticized his Hindutva ideology, disregard for science and constitutionally ordained secularism and the othering of minorities that divided the nation instead of uniting it against the pandemic (Guha 2021; Viswanath 2021). Hindutva and Hindu populism have been part of Modi’s success story from the start. He is a man from a very humble background who dethroned the famed Nehru-Gandhi dynasty and their party, the Indian Nation Congress, which was the dominant political party in India for more than fifty years. While Modi is not the first Hindu nationalist Indian prime minister, he is certainly the first one who has used both Hindu nationalism and populism. Although there has been a plethora of scholarship on Hindu nationalism, Hindu populism is mostly studied as an auxiliary component of Hindu nationalism or of the broader rightwing1 populist movement that has taken the world by storm during the last decade. There is a need to trace Hindu populism’s history in India and to distinguish it from Hindu nationalism.

2. Religion and Populism

Populism is a concept that is difficult to define and highly contested. Populism can be leftwing or rightwing and it can instrumentalize the majority religion and exacerbate religious conflicts in the society or it can stay away from religion. It can be national or civilizational (Brubaker 2017). Scholars have defined it based on ideology, rhetoric or policies but no definition can accommodate the protean concept and efforts to conceptualize this intriguing idea are continuing (Yilmaz and Morieson 2021; Mackert 2019; Plagemann and Destradi 2019). For this article, populism refers to a kind of politics that divides the population into two parts, a small, corrupt ruling elite and an oppressed, exploited pure majority. Sometimes, besides this vertical dimension, there is also a horizontal dimension where the righteous majority is threatened by perfidious insiders and outsiders that are in cahoots with the corrupt elite. A temporal dimension is often also part of the populist politics where populist leaders disown and repudiate the present while singing about the glories of an imagined past and an impending future if the populist leader is allowed to lead.

Before the 1970s, for almost a hundred years, secularization theory was the dominant sociological paradigm. The major assumption of the theory was that religion would gradually decline as human societies progress. Its role in the public sphere would probably completely disappear while its role in the private sphere would be limited. The idea seemed to make sense as the increased knowledge about nature, scientific and technological progress, pluralization of religious field, functional differentiation, enlightenment, theory of evolution, more archaeological data falsifying religious myths, sexual revolution, etc., made a modern person less amenable to accept certainties of divine edicts. The functions that religion used to perform in the ancient and medieval world were performed by secular concepts in the modern world. The secularization of Western Europe, since the 17th century, seemed to be the model that other regions were destined to follow as they moved up the ladder of human progress.

The 1970s, however, reasserted or re-established the role of religion not only in the private sphere but also in the public sphere. The Iranian Revolution, the emergence of the moral majority movement in US politics and rise of religious parties and fundamentalist movements in many developing countries were few of the many indications of the change. The re-emergence of religion that was supposed to be consigned to the dustbin of history as a key explanatory factor in domestic, regional and international politics was surprising for many scholars (Grzymala-Busse 2012). The 1980s and 1990s came up with further evidence of the impact of religion on politics. The religious fervor and avidity of Pope John Paul II, President Reagan and Islamist mujahideen in the fall of Communism and the Soviet “evil” empire was critical. These developments perhaps forced Samuel Huntington to come up with his controversial theory of “Clash of Civilizations”, where civilizations are primarily defined on the basis of religion (Huntington 1993). The start of the 21st century totally debunked secularization theory or thesis as 9/11 attacks made religion one of the most significant factors in international politics, although there are still some scholars that believe in a much-diluted form of the secularization theory...

6. Two Distinctions: Hindu Nationalism (Hindutva) vs. Hindu Populism and Populist Political Leaders vs. Populist Parties

Hindu nationalism started to become popular in the late 19th century. It came out of the Hindu revivalist movements which tried to “modernize,” unite and Semitize Hinduism. For these Hindu revivalist movements, the British were a source of both envy and threat. Brahmo Samaj and Arya Samaj are two of the most famous revivalist movements. These movements and developments created a Hindu consciousness which later became the basis of Hindu nationalism. The first ideologue of Hindu nationalism was V. D. Savarkar who wrote the book Hindutva: Who is a Hindu? in the early 1920s and associated Hindutva with not only religion but also with land, culture and language (Hindu, Hindi, Hindustan). He argued Hindu is the one who considers India as the land of his forefathers (pitribhumi) as well as his holy land (punyabhumi). Savarkar was a nationalist but there is debate whether his politics in the Hindu Mahasabha party can be called populist or not. Savarkar was certainly rousing a large majority of people against the corrupt elite, but his prime target changed depending on the time, from British, the Congress, to Muslims. Moreover, as far as strategy and style were concerned, he was not a populist leader, trying to lead an unorganized mass against the enemy using dirty rhetoric and bad manners (Visana 2020; Tharoor 2018, pp. 40–50). Similarly, his party Hindu Mahasabha cannot be called a populist party as it was not anti-elite. It was much more pro-British than Congress and relied for support on Hindu aristocracy, gentry and business elite, and had urban, high caste roots, similar to the pre-Gandhian Congress (Bapu 2013, pp. 26–43). So, Hindu Mahasabha was Hindu nationalist but not Hindu populist. This difference between rightwing nationalism and rightwing populism is important to keep in mind.

Although numerous rightwing populist parties are nationalist and a few nationalist parties have become populist, this does not mean that nationalist and populism are the same or always exist together. Rightwing nationalism has been growing since the 1970s. Israel had thirty years of leftwing governments before it had its first rightwing nationalist government in the late 1970s. However, since then, Israel has steadily moved rightward and this rightwing shift has helped make Benjamin Netanyahu the longest serving prime minister of Israel, without being populist. There were less remarkable rightwing shifts in both the US and British politics in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Populism in the US and Europe is a comparatively new phenomenon and with the rise of rightwing populism, there is also a less consequential rise in leftwing populism. Former President Trump was a rightwing nationalist populist but he was not the first rightwing nationalist president, and the Republican Party had long espoused rightwing nationalism. Almost every rightwing populist is a nationalist, but every rightwing nationalist is not a populist.

Keeping in view the above, while discussing the rise of Narendra Modi there is a tendency to extend Modi populism to the BJP early days in the 1980s or even to Hindu nationalists before India independence. As discussed above, Hindu nationalism has existed since the start of the 20th century. Hindu sabhas were formed and later many joined to form the first Hindutva or Hindu nationalist party. Now, one can argue that Hindu Mahasabha was also populist but just because Modi was populist, all Hindu nationalist parties cannot be painted populist. If one has to demonstrate the link between Hinduism and populism since the early 20th century, then one has to define populism, select a measuring scale and show the existence of populism. Modi populism is even insufficient to declare the BJP populist before Modi’s rise. In fact, some scholars have argued that the BJP before Modi was not populist. The anti-elitism was missing before 2013. Plagemann and Destradi (2019) argue that Hindutva, although itself fuzzy, is the core and “thick” part of the BJP ideology and has defined the BJP during its whole life. In contrast, (Modi’s) populism is the “thin” ideology and is a recent addition to BJP’s repertoire. It may or may not survive Modi. This raises many questions. Was the BJP populist in 1984 or 1994 or even in 2004 under Vajpayee and Advani? There are no rigorous studies to decide one way or the other...

The rest of the article can be read here.