Is Iran's Supreme Leader subject to oversight? Constitutionally yes, but...

Iran's constitution gives wide powers to the Supreme Leader. The preamble of the constitution states that in the physical absence of Hidden Imam, the nation would be guided by a person, recognized by the people as leader 'under all conditions, so that there shall be security against deviation by various organizations'.

Article 57 states, 'The powers of government in the Islamic Republic are vested in the legislature, the judiciary, and the executive powers, functioning under the supervision of the absolute vilayat al-'amr and the leadership of the Ummah, in accordance with the forthcoming articles of this Constitution. 

Article 110 enumerates the vast powers of the Supreme Leader:

Following are the duties and powers of the Leadership:

• Delineation of the general policies of the Islamic Republic of Iran after consultation with the Nation's Exigency Council.
• Supervision over the proper execution of the general policies of the system.
• Issuing decrees for national referenda.
• Assuming supreme command of the armed forces.
• Declaration of war and peace, and the mobilization of the armed forces.
• Appointment, dismissal, and acceptance of the resignation of:

a. The fuqaha' on the Guardian Council.
b. The supreme judicial authority of the country.
c. The head of the radio and television network of the Islamic Republic of Iran.
d. The chief of the joint staff.
e. The chief commander of the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps.
f. The supreme commanders of the armed forces.

• Resolving differences between the three wings of the armed forces and regulation of their relations.
• Resolving the problems, which cannot be solved by conventional methods, through the Nation's Exigency Council.
• Signing the decree formalizing the election of the President of the Republic by the people. The suitability of candidates for the Presidency of the Republic, with respect to the qualifications specified in the Constitution, must be confirmed before elections take place by the Guardian Council; and, in the case of the first term [of the Presidency], by the Leadership.
• Dismissal of the' President of the Republic, with due regard for the interests of the country, after the Supreme Court holds him guilty of the violation of his constitutional duties, or after a vote of the Islamic Consultative Assembly testifying to his incompetence on the basis of Article 89 of the Constitution.
• Pardoning or reducing the sentences of convicts, within the framework of Islamic criteria, on a recommendation [to that effect] from the Head of judicial power.

The Leader may delegate part of his duties and powers to another person. 

So with such imperial powers, is supreme leader subject to insight? 

The constitution says yes and gives this power to the Assembly of Experts (Article 111). The current supreme leader also agrees but argues that oversight should be broad and if the supreme leader fulfills that basic conditions of leadership, all of his actions and that of his subordinates should be beyond criticism. Now, what are these broad conditions? According to the constitution (Article 109), there are three conditions:

1. Scholarship, as required for performing the functions of mufti in different fields of fiqh.
2. Justice and piety, as required for the leadership of the Islamic Ummah. 
3. Right political and social perspicacity, prudence, courage, administrative facilities and adequate capability for leadership.

Others have argued that because he is the guardian/Supreme Leader of all, nobody has the capacity/ability to judge/oversight him.

Shahir explains the dynamics of this important issue in his article in Al-Monitor (See http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2014/12/iran-ayatollah-ali-khamenei-supreme-leader-oversight.html) 

Religious Nationalism Course

I taught a course on  'Religious nationalism' at George Mason University, managed by Encore Learning. Here are the slides of the lectures.

Religious Nationalism: Introduction

Pakistan: Religious (Muslim) Nationalism

Iran: Religious (Muslim/Shia) Nationalism

Israel: Religious (Jewish) Nationalism

Saudi Arabia: Religious (Muslim/Wahhabi) Nationalism

Separatist movements - the peaceful route to independence?

Scotland, in the end, decided not to be independent. However, it did encourage other separatist movements, many of which supported Scottish referendum. There is evidence that Catalonians from Spain helped the ‘Yes’ vote campaign and many Kashmiris in Scotland and England supported Mr. Salmond’s Scottish National Party, not for any love for an independent Scotland but for its positive implications for Kashmir region. Despite the negative results, referendum has shown that there is no need for fighting or killing for independence in the 21st century. As Jonah Blank, senior political scientist at the RAND Corporation, writes in the Foreign Policy after the Scottish referendum (See From Glasgow to Kashmir) :

Almost every modern nation has some sort of local separatist movement, and the international community views nearly all of them either with indifference or contempt. Merely to be considered a quasi-legitimate candidate for independence, a group generally has to suffer generations of brutality bordering on genocide. Even then, the odds aren't great. Just ask the Kurds.

The vote in Scotland shows what modern-day secessionism should look like. What if an ethnic group didn't have to justify its bid for a separate state through a saga of historical oppression, or seek to achieve it through a violent insurgency? What if the standard for independence were nothing more than the statement: "We want out." London agreed to take aye for an answer.

Rest of the blog can be read http://www.calgarycgc.org/blog/separatist-movements-the-peaceful-route-to-independence

Bhutan: A religious nationalist state??

Bhutan is a small kingdom in Himalayas, between India and China. Not many people know it exist and for a long time, Bhutanese elite were happy for being hidden/separate from the world. Darius Lee discusses Bhutan's constitution and calls it a constitutional theocracy (See Here There be Dragons! Buddhist Constitutionalism in the Hidden Land of Bhutan). For us, it is interesting because it is another example of how national identity and religious identity gets mixed up, giving rise to religious nationalism.

Lee argues that written constitutions are meant to stop power concentration but some countries, which he calls constitutional theocracies, have mixed religion and constitutionalism and damaged the very purpose of constitutions.

The goal of constitutionalism is limited government, which is opposed to any form of absolutism, whether religious, cultural or secular. In an age of human rights, untrammeled government power is circumscribed through constitutionally entrenched fundamental rights, including religious freedom. 

But constitutional theocracies turn it upside down, Lee argues, and use constitutions to legalize curtailment of religious and other freedoms. These constitutional theocracies are different from common theocracies.

Unlike a ‘pure’ theocracy, power in a constitutional theocracy is not drawn directly from divine text or a governing priesthood but lies in political figures operating within the bounds of a written constitution. Constitutional theocracies adhere to the core elements of modern constitutionalism, such as constitutional supremacy but enshrine religion as a source of public law.

The key differences between a secular state and a constitutional theocracy in terms of state structure, as identified by Lee, are given below:

          Secular state                                Constitutional theocracy

    Separation of religion and state                                                State recognition of a particular religion as privileged

Benevolent neutrality; accommodates religion                                 Not neutral, favors one religion over others

   Religion is not a source of public law                                                      Religion is a source of public law

In terms of religious freedom, the key differences are as follows:

           Secular state                                  Constitutional theocracy    
State holds no monopoly over religious belief                                                 Religion is tied with national identity

    Does nothing to control religious doctrine                                     Legal sanction for propagation of unorthodox beliefs

Accommodates practices of religious minorities                                          Limited protection for religious minorities

Lee declares that Bhutan is a constitutional theocracy, like Iran, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, although its 2008 constitution commits to separation of religion and politics and does not declare Buddhism as state religion. In comparison with other Buddhist-majority states, Bhutan falls between Cambodia and Sri Lanka, Thailand, Myanmar and Laos.  

Although article 3(3) of Bhutan constitution prima facie supports separation of religion and politic, its justification shows that this separation is rooted in Buddhism. Article 3(3) reads:

It shall be the responsibility of religious institutions and personalities to promote the spiritual heritage of the country while also ensuring that religion remains separate from politics in Bhutan. Religious institutions and personalities shall remain above politics.

The two reasons given for its inclusion are not related to human rights or freedoms but to Buddhism. This article was included in the constitution first, because Lord Buddha separated religion and politics and secondly, because under the first king of Bhutan, religious and political affairs were separate. 

Other reasons for declaring Bhutan a constitutional theocracy are given below:

1. Preamble of constitution pays homage to the three gems of Buddhism. 
2. King must be Buddhist, although he is declared protector of all religions (Article 3(2)). 
3. Article 3(6) establishes the Dratshang Lhentshog (Commission for the Monastic Affairs) and Buddhist religious bodies are funded by the state. 
4. Some part of the ecclesiastical structure of the Dratshang Lhentshog and the qualifications for religious office are given in the Bhutan Constitution, reflecting the privileged position of Buddhism.
5. In Bhutan, Buddhism is considered a major part of Bhutanese culture and the state considers it its responsibility to defend it. For example, article 4(1) asks the state to ‘preserve, protect and promote the cultural heritage of the country, including… religion’.
6. Article 9(20) of the Constitution asks the state to ‘create conditions that will enable the true and sustainable development of a good and compassionate society rooted in Buddhist ethos and universal human values.’ 

Using examples from penal code and other laws, Lee further demonstrates the close link between state and majority religion, negating the notion that Bhutanese state is neutral in matters of religion or that religious minorities are not discriminated.  

While Lee's arguments about Bhutan not being a secular state are strong, his definition of constitutional theocracies needs more elaboration because if we define constitutional theocracies only on the basis of how much privilege the constitutional clauses grant to majority religion in these countries then many other (quite liberal and secular) countries have to be called constitutional theocracies which they are not. For example, as Lee acknowledges, many West European democracies have established churches. Their constitutions privilege majority religion. Can we call them constitutional theocracies, like Iran? I think Lee would not agree.

On the other hand, if we  give importance to not only constitutions but all the other factors (like Lee does in case of Bhutan) in defining constitutional theocracies then is it right to call them constitutional theocracies? 

Are governments supporting or controlling religion?

How do we know governments are controlling or supporting religion? Same laws and actions can be used for controlling religion as for supporting religion. For example, a government can give money to religious schools to impose curriculum of its choice (controlling religion) or to promote the majority religion (supporting religion). Similarly, a government can take control of religious endowments to make them more efficient and to use their funds for repair/maintenance of religious sites (supporting religion) or to dry the main source of funding for independent clerics, thus allow its (paid) clerics to dominate the religious discourse (controlling religion). Jonathan Fox, one of the leading scholars working on the state-religion relationships, argues that it is difficult to be definite about it as it is almost impossible to be certain of a government leader's motivations for a particular (in)action (See his talk on Political secularism, religion and the state).

In some cases, however, the primary motivator is not ambiguous. Because of their Marxist-Leninist ideology, anti-religious rhetoric of the leadership and repression of all religions in public sphere, one can safely assume that the Communist governments try to control religion. Consider the Soviet Union, for example. Lenin wrote against religion and called it a spiritual booze as well as opium (like Marx), probably because, in the early 20th century Russia, booze was much more popular than opium. (See Socialism and Religion: Lenin)

Religion is one of the forms of spiritual oppression which everywhere weighs down heavily upon the masses of the people, over burdened by their perpetual work for others, by want and isolation. Impotence of the exploited classes in their struggle against the exploiters just as inevitably gives rise to the belief in a better life after death as impotence of the savage in his battle with nature gives rise to belief in gods, devils, miracles, and the like. Those who toil and live in want all their lives are taught by religion to be submissive and patient while here on earth, and to take comfort in the hope of a heavenly reward. But those who live by the labour of others are taught by religion to practice charity while on earth, thus offering them a very cheap way of justifying their entire existence as exploiters and selling them at a moderate price tickets to well-being in heaven. Religion is opium for the people. Religion is a sort of spiritual booze,   in which the slaves of capital drown their human image, their demand for a life more or less worthy of man.

Moreover, there were anti-religious campaigns in the Soviet Union. These campaigns included damaging churches, murdering of priests and other acts of violence and suppression; these actions cannot be construed as supporting religion in any way  (See Russian orthodox church). 

By 1918 the government had nationalized all church property, including buildings. In the first five years of the Soviet Union (1922-26), twenty-eight Russian Orthodox bishops and more than 1,200 priests were executed, and many others were persecuted. Most seminaries were closed, and publication of most religious material was prohibited. The next quarter-century saw surges and declines in arrests, enforcement of laws against religious assembly and activities, and harassment of clergy. Antireligious campaigns were directed at all faiths; beginning in the 1920s, Buddhist and Shamanist places of worship in Buryatia, in the Baikal region, were destroyed, and their lamas and priests were arrested (a practice that continued until the 1970s). The League of the Militant Godless, established in 1925, directed a nationwide campaign against the Orthodox Church and all other organized religions. The extreme position of that organization eventually led even the Soviet government to disavow direct connection with its practices. In 1940 an estimated 30,000 religious communities of all denominations survived in all the Soviet Union, but only about 500 Russian Orthodox parishes were open at that time, compared with the estimated 54,000 that had existed before World War I.

Similarly, in case of many assertive or aggressive secular states with a strong anti-clericalism bent, like France and Turkey in the early 20th century, it is clear that the motivation is that of control, not the promotion of religion. Following is an excerpt of Ataturk's speech from the early days of the Turkish Republic:

Gentlemen and Great Nation! Know it well that the Turkish Republic cannot be a country of sheikhs, dervishes, disciples and lunatics. The correct road is the road of civilization.

And a paragraph about the de-Christianization campaign of early days of revolutionary France (See Religion, Society and Politics in France since 1789, page 1):

During the course of the year II much of France was subjected to a campaign of dechristianization, the aim of which was the eradication of Catholic religious practice, and Catholicism itself. The campaign, which was at its most intense in the winter and spring of 1793-94, but which began as early as the summer of 1793 in some regions, and continued after the fall of Robespierre in August 1794 in a few areas, comprised a number of different activities. These ranged from the removal of plate, statues and other fittings from the places of worship, the destruction of crosses, bells, shrines and other ‘external signs of worship’, the closure of churches, the enforced abdication and occasionally, the marriage of constitutional priests, the substitution of a Revolutionary calendar for the Gregorian one, the alteration of personal and place names which had any ecclesiastical connotations to more suitably Revolutionary ones, through to the promotion of new cults, notably those of Reason and one Supreme Being.

Perhaps one clue to solve this puzzle is the attitude and behavior of governing elite. If they show respect to religious symbols and try to demonstrate that they are not against religion, then they are supporting religion. The operative word here is 'demonstrate.' The elite in almost all countries will claim that they are not against religion; they are only against a particular 'subversive' version of it. However, if their behavior shows they are against religion, then most probably they are controlling religion, not supporting it.  

Bangladesh's secular nationalism asserts itself

From 1947 to 1971, Pakistan had two wings, East Pakistan and West Pakistan, separated by Indian peninsula. While West Pakistan (the present Pakistan) was multi-ethnic and multi-linguistic, East Pakistan was ethnically and linguistically homogeneous. Almost all of the people living in East Pakistan were ethnically Bengalis, speaking Bengali language. East Pakistan separated from West Pakistan in 1971 and became Bangladesh after a bloody civil war and an Indian invasion. This separation was based on a rejection of Pakistani religious nationalism and adoption of an ethnolinguistic nationalism, based on the love of Bengali language and Bengali ethnicity. Most Bengalis of the erstwhile East Pakistan felt that Pakistani religious nationalism was a hoax that claimed West Pakistanis and East Pakistanis were not only equal but Muslim brothers/sisters but refused to give Bengalis equal status and their due share in power. Religious parties' near unanimous opposition to Bangladesh's independence movement and the support they provided to Pakistan army during the civil war increased Bangladeshi misgivings to religion's role in politics. Hence, Bangladesh, unlike (pre-1971 or post-1971) Pakistan, chose to be a secular republic. 

The first constitution of Bangladesh proclaimed secularism as one of the four basic principles of the new republic (other three being Bangladeshi nationalism, socialism, and democracy). The new republic also avoided putting a crescent and a star on its flag, revealing the minor role Islam played in Bengali nationalism. Even the green color on the flag is not linked to Islam (as it is in many Muslim-majority nations' flags, like Pakistani, Moroccan, Saudi Arabian flags etc.). Green color symbolizes the lush green land of Bangladesh. Furthermore, Bangladesh's national anthem,  Amar Sonar Bangla (My Golden Bengal). is also a tribute to Bengal and has anti-religion connotations. It was written by Rabindranath Tagore in 1905 against Partition of Bengal on religious lines in 1905. Add to it many speeches/statements of Bangladesh's founder Sheikh Mujib-ur-Rehman and it is beyond doubt that Bangladesh's nationalism was ethnolinguistic and secular.

Despite all the above-mentioned evidence of secular nationalism, Bangladesh quickly reversed its course and dropped secularism. In 1977, fifth constitutional amendment introduced by military ruler Zia-ur-Rehman removed secularism as one of the basic principles and replaced it with the following words "Absolute trust and faith in the Almighty Allah shall be the basis of all actions". In 1988, another military ruler Hussain Muhammad Ershad made Islam the state religion of Bangladesh. For the next fifteen year, religious parties role and overall religious discourse increased and it appeared Bangladesh is still part of Pakistan, with military and religious parties controlling politics and manipulating religious discourse. Awami League, the founding party of Bangladesh, despite its strong attachment to the principle of secularism, also had to accept the reality of the situation as any support for secularism was portrayed as pro-Indian and anti-Islam by its rival, Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP).  

While secularism seemed defeated and religious nationalism on the rise, there was one problem; religious nationalism had difficulty legitimizing Bangladesh's separation from Pakistan. It was only on the basis of ethnolinguistic nationalism that a separate country Bangladesh can be explained to the new generation. New generations were thus socialized in a much different environment (more secular) than those ruling elite that grew up in Pakistan.   

Things began to change with the arrival of the twenty-first century. It appears a new generation socialized in the secular nationalism of Bangladesh came of age and started occupying positions of power. Their sentiments were cashed by Awami League, the party of the Sheikh Mujib-ur-Rehman, now led by his daughter, Sheikh Hasina Wajid. Courts, media, and intellectuals also helped and promoted the secularism/restoration of 1972 constitution movement. In 2005, the high court declared fifth constitutional amendment illegal and secularism was reintroduced as one of the basic principles of the republic. Sheikh Hasina then decided to take on religious parties. She established tribunals to punish those who were involved in crimes against Bangladeshis during the war of liberation. It was a politically astute move as it not only mobilized her own voters and many others but also damaged Jamaat-e-Islami (a religious party whose leadership supported Pakistan Army in 1971 and now usually supported her rival BNP). Although, there was an outcry against the partiality of these tribunals, a large majority of Bangladeshis supported these trials and punishments awarded by these tribunals. The trails revived the dubious role played by many religious leaders, implicating political Islam and increasing the support for secularism.

Although, Islam is still the state religion (so 1972 constitution is not fully restored), secularism is definitely on the march and religious nationalism in retreat. A recent evidence of this came when pro-religion rightist BNP also came out against the political role of religion. Tarique Rehman, the current senior vice chairman and the future leader of BNP, said (See Tarique against Religion-based Politics):

We’ve learned from experience that politics of that kind doesn’t work, it didn’t during Pakistan era... There are many among us who have tried to create political essence and outline based on religion. But invariably they have failed.

Illiberal Democracies and the Muslim World

For the first time, directly presidential elections were held in Turkey on 10th August, 2014. As expected, Prime Minister Erdogan won the elections and crossed the fifty percent threshold, making a second round of presidential election unnecessary. The idea of Erdogan ruling for five more years is disconcerting for many inside and outside Turkey. Erdogan, after an initial liberal start, has now become a symbol of elected illiberalism or illiberal democracy. Erdogan is not alone. Since the start of 2013, illiberal democrats have won elections in Algeria, Pakistan, India, Hungary, Egypt and Venezuela.  

The idea of illiberal democracy was first popularized by Fareed Zakaria (See The rise of illiberal democracy). He argued that democracy requires only regular competitive elections and can be liberal or illiberal. Liberal democracy, in addition to regular elections, entails individual liberty and constitutionalism. Without the protection of individual rights and limits on the power of democratic governments (usually through constitutions), there is no liberal democracy.

Source: Illiberal Democracy

Zakaria contended that sequencing of liberalism and democracy was different in the early Western European democracies (and East Asian democracies) and most third wave democracies. In the former, liberalism became entrenched before democracy became a reality but in the later, democracy came earlier. This led to illiberal democracy or infringement of individual and minority rights in many countries. According to Zakaria, 

The tension between constitutional liberalism and democracy centers on the scope of governmental authority. Constitutional liberalism is about the limitation of power, democracy about its accumulation and use. For this reason, many eighteenth- and nineteenth-century liberals saw in democracy a force that could undermine liberty. James Madison explained in The Federalist that "the danger of oppression" in a democracy came from "the majority of the community." Tocqueville warned of the "tyranny of the majority," writing, "The very essence of democratic government consists in the absolute sovereignty of the majority."

Rest of the blog can be read at the Calgary Centre for Global Community website (See Illiberal Democracies) 

Why street protests work in Pakistan?

Daniel Markey recently wrote an article on the success of street protests in Pakistan?' (See Why street protests work in Pakistan?). His main arguments is that democratically elected leaders in Pakistan face such protests not only because they face very difficult challenges and weak political institutionalization but also because of their own tendencies to centralize power.

By rights, however, Sharif (and Zardari before him) should not face such a high deficit of popular legitimacy as the one that loomed over Musharraf's tenure. Whatever the flaws of national elections in 2008 and 2013, they were better than what came before, or at least no worse. It is hard to accept that the motivating energy behind the latest round of protests is truly a consequence of voting irregularities. No, today's opposition leaders Imran Khan and Tahir-ul-Qadri are opportunistically latching on to whatever charges can be leveled against Prime Minister Sharif and company. Vote rigging, like corruption, is a perennially effective club to wield against most Pakistani politicians and their parties. 

Part of Sharif's present vulnerability to popular protests can be explained by his own policy missteps that have dissipated enthusiasm for his rule. His dealings with the army, for instance, have been rife with tensions over the Musharraf case and the timing of negotiations and military operations against the TTP. In addition, although Pakistan's economy is no worse off than it was before Sharif assumed office (and by many measures, it is probably stronger), the common Pakistani has seen little material benefit. To be fair, even the best schemes for new power plants and Chinese-financed infrastructure cannot be realized overnight, but decades of unfulfilled promises by Pakistani politicians have jaded the public. The summertime heat and persistent power outages undercut Sharif's appeal as a can-do businessman, his calling card in the last election. 

 Yet lots of democracies face setbacks; the anti-incumbent theme of "throwing the bums out" is a universal rallying cry. In countries where democratic institutions are firmly entrenched, however, opposition parties work through parliamentary and electoral systems to accomplish those ends. It is primarily in democratic systems where institutions are weak and ineffective that unconventional forms of political participation, like street protests, are the norm. At least, this is the principal finding of an insightful political analysis comparing democratic states across Latin America by the Inter-American Development Bank in 2009.

By this logic, Nawaz Sharif's main failing -- the one that makes him most vulnerable to street protest today -- is his lack of investment in the institutionalization of democratic politics. That deficit is indeed glaring. Sharif's critics are right to chastise his do-nothing parliament and hyper-centralization of political authority in the hands of a tiny group of cronies.

I argued in my comments that what Markey is saying is right but the role of Pakistan's military cannot be ignored. It is one of the main reasons why such protests (with proportionally very small number of people) succeed:

A more pertinent question is why such SMALL street protests work in Pakistan. The current protest marchers in Islamabad  are around fifty thousand. Pakistan's population is more than 180 million. So, the question is why 0.003% of population can topple a government. Governing through parliament is important and there is no doubt that Nawaz Sharif' has centralized power but many other world leaders have a similarly centralized power and faced big protests and still continue to rule. Two prominent examples are Erdogan and Putin. Both these leaders have a centralized style of governance and faced proportionally bigger protests but still continue to rule. 

It is true that in countries where democratic institutionalization is weak, unconventional forms of political participation (e.g.  street protests) are the norm but do they topple governments? A pertinent example in that of Mexico where in 2006, there were large protests against vote rigging, similar to what is happening in Pakistan now. What was the end result? The Mexican government patiently waited and eventually protests ended.
There is also no need to resort to ruthless force as the Mexican example shows. Protesters in Mexico city camped for months. Pakistani government has to just wait and there is every reason to believe that Imran Khan supporters (who have a more valid case for protest) would fizzle out.
So, why Pakistani government is worried? The answer is history of military involvement in politics and the perception in Pakistan that military is not happy with Nawaz Sharif. This perception of military's displeasure emboldens Sharif's opponents and makes many others to hedge their bets or go against Sharif to protect their interests. For example, most of the news channels in Pakistan report news with a clear bias against Sharif government. They hardly question the legitimacy of having 0.003% of people demanding dissolution of national assembly, using undemocratic means.
Perhaps looking at Turkey in 1997 and in 2013 will clarify my contention. In 1997, a democratically elected government was toppled one year after being elected only by a memorandum by the Turkish military. In 2013, a democratically elected but much more centralized (and maybe more corrupt too) are not toppled. The main difference in 1997 and 2103 was the absence of military's political power in 2013.  

No-Nos for a Caliphate

Christian Caryl has written an interesting article on Islamic state or more precisely on how to establish a successful caliphate (See 9 Things to Avoid When Creating Your Own Caliphate). In a letter to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the newly (self) proclaimed caliph of IS, Caryl lists the following nine no-nos.

1. You might want to think twice about wearing a Rolex
2. Don't ban music
3. Think twice about punishing girls for alleged immodesty
4. Don't vandalize ancient cultural relics
5. Try not to include too many foreigners in your army
6. Don't alienate local notables
7. Don't prohibit little pleasures
8. Don't spread disunity among Muslims
9. Don't declare yourself a caliph

Source: Was it a Rolex? Caliph’s watch sparks guesses

This list appears to be quite insightful, with all the nine measures linked to the mistakes made during recent attempts at establishing 'Islamic' states. Looking again, one can see that almost all of these no-nos can be subsumed under two broad themes.

• Respect local culture and traditions
• Do not be too strict with the people

These recommendations appear intuitive. Everybody knows that human beings have a powerful affinity with their culture and most of them find it difficult to live under strict rules. The very first Islamic state, established under Prophet Muhammad (PBH), also appears to be following these recommendations. Arab culture was largely adopted or accommodated in Islam. Moreover, the few things in which Islam went against Arab culture were very gradually introduced so that people do not feel burdened (e.g. prohibition of alcohol). Leniency, not strictness, was the hallmark of the first Islamic state.  

The question is then, why Muslim movements continue to go down the same destructive path of rigidity, sternness, and hostility toward local cultures?

The problem appears to be the way these states are created. These states are generally created by young zealots and fighters, not experienced thinkers, administrators, scholars etc. The later groups are largely absent not only in the most prominent leaders, but also in the second tier leadership as purity is appreciated and experience (with the previous regime) is considered a sign of hypocrisy and lack of true faith. In pre-modern history, zealots founded states could survive a bit longer because states had less control our people lives and people didn't demand much from their rulers. However, these primitive states also had to eventually accept the local culture and govern with compassion, if they had to survive long.

Not surprisingly, the zealous leadership of the recent 'Islamic' states, while comparatively good at conquering territory, find it hard to rule and govern. Killing, looting and destroying are the only skills they have and they continue using them, even when they are not required or disastrous. They long for certainties which are (perceived to be) available during wars but are difficult to keep adhering to when one is governing millions of people over large swaths of territory. Uncertainty is difficult to handle for these leaders and they might feel that God has left them. Iconoclasm is their way to show that they are still faithful to God and seek His support. Banning local traditions and small pleasures in another.    

But, are Caryl's warnings only applicable to successful caliphates or Islamic states? It is obvious no state can survive long, if it didn't pay close attention to these warnings. A very illuminating comparison can be made with the communist states of the twentieth century. While leaders that tried to strictly follow Marxist ideology couldn't survive long, leaders that blended Marxism with local culture survived and endured.

From a religious nationalism perspective, the lesson is that religion is important and people would do a lot to save their souls but local culture cannot be ignored.     

Hamas and Islamic State

Ali Mamouri has written an article on why there is no love lost between Hamas and the so-called Islamic State (of Iraq and al-Sham) (see Why Islamic State has no sympathy for Hamas?). Ali argues that there are some doctrinal reasons why the IS does not support Hamas:

Salafists believe that jihad must be performed under legitimate leadership. This argument is advanced through the “banner and commander” concept, which holds that whoever undertakes jihad must follow a commander who fulfills the criteria of religious and political leadership and has raised the banner of jihad. Given that there is neither a legitimate leader nor a Salafist-approved declaration of jihad in Palestine, fighting there is forbidden.

In addition, for Salafists, if non-Muslims control Islamic countries and apostates exist in the Islamic world, the Islamic world must be cleansed of them before all else. In short, the purification of Islamic society takes priority over combat against non-Islamic societies. On this basis, Salafists see conflict with an allegedly illegitimate Hamas government as a first step toward confrontation with Israel. Should the opportunity for military action present itself in the Palestinian territories, Salafists would fight Hamas and other factions deemed in need of “cleansing” from the land and engage Israel afterward.

This approach has its roots in Islamic history, which Salafists believe confirms the validity of their position. Relevant points of historical reference include the first caliphate of Abu Bakr, which gave priority to fighting apostates over expanding Islamic conquests, which occurred later, during the second caliphate, under Umar bin al-Khattab. Likewise, Saladin fought the Shiites and suppressed them before he engaged the crusaders in the Holy Land.

Salafists today see that their priority as fighting Shiites, “munafiqin” (dissemblers, or false Muslims) and apostates, whom they call the “close enemy.” During the current war in Gaza, a number of IS fighters have burned the Palestinian flag because they consider it a symbol of the decline of the Islamic world, which succumbed to national divisions through the creation of independent political states. In Salafist doctrine, the entire Islamic world must be united under a single state, an Islamic caliphate, which IS declared in late June.

So, there are two reasons:

• According to Islamic doctrine, jihad is only allowed under a legitimate leadership and Hamas is not the legitimate leadership because it fights for democracy and a Palestinian state (while IS fights for God and for an Islamic state)
• The IS has to fight the apostate Muslims first, before fighting the non-Muslims. Purification comes before the conquest. So, fighting Shias in Iraq and Syria comes before fighting Israel.

In a recent statement, the IS tried to deflect the criticism that it is not helping Palestinians in Gaza by reiterating its commitment to liberating Palestine and destroying Israel. It asked Gazans to be patient as the IS is working and is not interested in issuing empty statements like many Arab governments (See Gaza crisis: ISIS vows to help Palestinians fight barbaric Jews).

Source: Hamas Website

The IS spokesman, Nuseiri, also argued that it is following a systematic approach and has a plan (See ISIS Spokesman Explains Why 'Islamic State' Not Supporting Hamas) 

However, he pointed out that ISIS has been taking a systematic approach in its campaign, and outlined six specific stages it said needed to be fulfilled before taking on Israel.
Some of those "stages" - building a firm base for an Islamic state in Iraq, and using it as a springboard to wage war in Syria and Lebanon - have already been achieved. But he said a number of other criteria still needed to be fulfilled before challenging Israel directly.
Among them, Nuseiri said that the US - seen as Israel's greatest ally - needed to be weakened politically and economically via attacks on the American mainland, as well as US interests in Muslim countries. Additionally, the existing "Islamic State" needed to expand its borders to cover all of "Greater Syria" (which would include Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan and possibly Gaza); such a state, he said, would then be in a position for a direct confrontation with Israel.

The IS statement can be taken as few practical considerations (which every successful movement has to take into account) in the expansion of the IS Caliphate and this is how the IS wants others to see it. However, these doctrinal and practical considerations can also be understood as a camouflage for nationalistic concerns. 

Doctrinally, the claim of legitimacy of IS is weaker than that of Hamas. Neither the IS leadership is more pious, nor it has support/baya of most of the pious Muslim leadership. Moreover, jihad needs legitimate leadership when Muslims are attacking. When Muslim lands, homes, and persons are attacked (as in Gaza), all Muslims are allowed/required to defend themselves, with or without legitimate leadership.

Source: Islamic State Threatens to Topple Hamas in Gaza

The argument about 'purifying' and killing apostate Muslims first and non-Muslims later is also weak. When Muslim women and children are being killed in hundreds, it is preposterous (and doctrinally indefensible) to not stop this massacre and focus on killing apostates. The fact of the matter is that IS's main enemies are Shias in both Syria and Iraq so it might also be a way to legitimize its own actions. Moreover, as Salafist groups are challenging Hamas in Gaza, the IS might want Israel to destroy Hamas so that more radical and doctrinally closer Gazan Salafists may take over.

Update: By mid-2015, the divisions between the IS and Hamas were public and the IS issued a threat to Hamas in a video statement as reported by YNet News:

The video statement, issued from an Islamic State stronghold in Syria, was a rare public challenge to Hamas, which has been cracking down on jihadis in Gaza who oppose its truces with Israel and reconciliation with the US-backed rival Palestinian faction Fatah.

"Eight years they control the territory, and have yet to enforce one Islamic teaching," the ISIS speaker said in the video.

"We will uproot the state of the Jews (Israel) and you and Fatah, and all of the secularists are nothing and you will be over-run by our creeping multitudes," said a masked Islamic State member in the message addressed to the "tyrants of Hamas".

"The rule of sharia (Islamic law) will be implemented in Gaza, in spite of you. We swear that what is happening in the Levant today, and in particular the Yarmouk camp, will happen in Gaza," he said, referring to Islamic State advances in Syria, including in a Damascus district founded by Palestinian refugees. (See Islamic State Threatens to Topple Hamas in Gaza)

Head of state must be a member of a certain religion

In a factank article, Pew Research  Center lists the countries that require their heads of states to have a specific religion (See In 30 countries heads of state must belong to a certain religion). It found thirty countries (15% of all countries) that have such a requirement. The list shows that it is mostly the Muslim-majority countries that have religion-related restrictions on the selection of their heads of state. Out of the total thirty countries with restrictions, seventeen (17) are Muslim-majority. For example, Jordan, Tunisia, Malaysia, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Pakistan, and Mauritania have such a restriction. The article informs that only two countries each require their heads of state to be Christian (Lebanon and Andorra) and Buddhist (Bhutan and Thailand). However, this is obviously not true as the article later explains that there are other 19 Christian-majority countries that do the same. So, the true count should have been forty-nine (49) countries with restrictions, twenty-one (21) Christian-majority and nineteen (19) Muslim-majority:

In addition to the 30 countries in this analysis, another 19 nations have religious requirements for ceremonial monarchs who serve as their heads of state. Sixteen of these, including the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada and New Zealand, are members of the Commonwealth of Nations with Queen Elizabeth II – also known as the Defender of the Faith – as their head of state. The other countries in this category are Denmark, Norway and Sweden. 

Most of the world’s countries (85%) allow citizens of any religious affiliation to be head of state. In the United States, the Constitution specifically prohibits any kind of “religious test” as a qualification for holding federal or state public office. At the same time, a number of states still have laws on the books prohibiting nonbelievers from holding office. However, the Supreme Court has ruled that First Amendment’s prohibition on the establishment of religion clearly prohibits states from requiring office-holders to profess a belief in God.

Source: In 30 countries heads of state must belong to a certain religion

Several comments on the Pew's website questioned the validity of the analysis. For example, some commentators considered Pew's coding of Pancasila (nationalist philosophy of Indonesia) as a religion was considered strange. Others commented on the absence of the Vatican state from the analysis. I also found the analysis problematic and posted the following comment:

If the focus of the article is whether the position of head of state is restricted to members of a specific religion, then all countries that have such restrictions should be listed first. The distinction between the ‘ceremonial monarchs’ and other heads of state, if need be, should have been made later. The way article is organized, it gives a distorted picture. 

The headline says, ‘In 30 countries, heads of state must belong to a certain religion’ and these 30 countries are listed and shown on the graph. This gives the impression that other countries do not have such restrictions. It is only later that the author remembers that there are some other countries that also restrict head of state to a certain religion. The obvious question is why these countries are not included in the headline count or the first list? The answer is not clearly given but the implicit suggestion is that these heads of state do not have real power. 

This distinction is false as many countries included in the first list also have heads of state that do not have real power. One pertinent example is that of Malaysia. Malaysia is a constitutional monarchy, just like Australia, Canada, New Zealand etc. The Malaysian king (head of state) does not have real power, like the British monarch. But still Malaysia is not in the same list as Australia, Canada and New Zealand. Similarly, Pakistan’s presidency (though not a monarchy) is also a ceremonial position with no real powers but still Pakistan is in the first list. 

The issue discussed in the article was whether head of state has to be a member of a certain religion. Unfortunately, from the very start, this specificity was lost and other factors like power and type of political system influenced the choices/results of analysis.

Multivocality of Islam and Iranian population policies

Recent news reports point toward a major change in Iran’s population policy in near future. Worried about the falling birth rate and its consequences for country’s future, Iranian policy planners are reversing the population policy once again and hoping that the population will listen to them as it did twice before in the 1980s and 1990s.

Source: Tactics and Strategy at the Strait of Hormuz

While many Muslim ulema (traditionally trained scholars) would claim family planning is not allowed, Quran and Sunnah, the two main sources of Islamic law, are ambiguous on this issue. Family planning has been approved, partially approved and rejected using the same two sources. This multi-vocality of Islam has given the Muslim-majority states more leeway in designing population policies than the Catholic-majority states, though most of the Muslim-majority states have not used this leeway to the fullest extent. Iran is an exception in this regard. Though not giving full reproductive rights, Iran has managed to first convince its population to increase the birth rate and then decrease it to close to replacement levels, all in three decades. Let’s look at Iran’s population policies in a little more detail.

Rest of the blog post can be read at Calgary Centre of Global Community who invited me to write on their blog here.

Modi, Prabowo and the threat to Indian and Indonesian civic nationalism

It is fascinating to compare India and Indonesia, two nations at critical junctures of their history. Narendra Modi, the current Indian Prime Minister and Prabowo Subianto, leading contender in the Indonesian presidential elections, are similar in promoting a strong nationalistic cum religious agenda. Despite lingering doubts about Modi and Prabowo's leadership qualities, they seemed to have captured the minds and hearts of many of their countrymen (and women). Can these strongly (religiously) nationalist leaders succeed in very diverse societies that are based on civic nationalism?

No doubt, India and Indonesia are different. Though both are very populous countries, India is much larger. In terms of nominal GDP, again Indian economy is more than double the size of the Indonesian economy, although Indonesians are richer. Their political systems and history are also different. While India is a stable parliamentary democracy, Indonesia is a military-dominated state, still trying to find its feet as a fragile democracy. Moreover, majority religion of India is Hinduism whereas the majority of Indonesians are Muslims.

However, Indonesia and India also share many characteristics which make their comparison compelling. Both Indonesia and India were successor states of colonial empires. As there was almost no history of a united India or a united Indonesia before colonial times, nationalist elites of both countries had to perform an exhausting balancing act. They had to fight against the colonial state but also try to preserve it. Preservation of the colonial state was difficult as not only the boundaries of the colonial state were new (similar to many other colonial states), but these states also had mind-boggling diversity. To deal with the ethnic/linguistic/religious/caste/tribal diversity, nationalist elites of both India and Indonesia adopted civil nationalism so that all communities can identify with the new state, ignoring the demands of many Hindus in India and many Muslims in Indonesia. This decision was one of the main reasons why both these states have not only managed to stay intact for the last sixty years but also showed impressive progress.        

Source: India, Indonesia Sign Pact To Cooperate On Criminal Matters

Another similarity between Indonesia and India is the recent rise of new elites; elites quite different from the leaders that had governed both these countries since independence. For more than half a century, the civic nationalism imposed by the founding fathers of both states was not under threat. There was some criticism but it lacked broad popular support. The nineteen nineties brought a big change in both countries. The Economic crisis in both countries (India in 1990-91 and Indonesia in 1997-98) jolted people out of their slumber and the spell that founding fathers' ideas had on the nation was broken. Suharto and aged Congress leadership, defenders of the old ideas, lost their grip on the country and were thrown out. New elites were 'outsiders'. Never before they had held power collectively. Their defining characteristics were overt religiosity and aggressive nationalism. This combination posed a threat to the civic and secular nationalism, both nations had adhered to since independence.

While economic crisis was the immediate cause of changes in both countries, two long-term developments helped the cause of the new elite. First, inhabitants of these countries were socialized, using public education system and national print media, into myths of (inherent) national greatness and threats to this 'manifest destiny' from outsiders and insiders. This socialization process was not very different from what happens in other countries but, due to the huge size of these two countries, these myths became more real. Socialized on these myths of national greatness, many ordinary Indians and Indonesians supported the strong nationalistic stance of the new elite. Second, the opening of a large number of private TV channels in both these countries around the start of 21st century gave an enormous fillip to religious nationalism. To win the rating war, TV channels mass-produced programs on two themes which the majority of the public can understand and appreciate i.e. religion and nationalism. These large doses of religion and nationalism fed to the public for the last fifteen years are now showing results. Modi's spectacular win is one such result and Prabowo's success in presidential election might be another.

Though both are using religious nationalism to win support, Modi and Prabowo have very different backgrounds. Modi is a man with whom most poor Indians can relate to. He belongs to a low-caste and poor household and didn't have much education. Starting from the lowest rung of the political ladder, he rose to become the chief minister of Gujarat state of India in 2001 and then Prime Minister of India in 2014. 

Prabowo's background cannot be more different. One can argue, he was born into Indonesian royalty and married a princess. Prabowo's grandfather was one of the founding fathers of Indonesia and his father was a cabinet minister under President Suharto. Prabowo joined military and then married President Suharto's daughter. As a princeling, Prabowo got the most prized assignments and rose in military quickly. In 1998, he was serving as Lieutenant General, commanding the key garrison near Jakarta. After his retirement from the military, Prabowo became a successful businessman. More recently, he led the newly formed Greater Indonesia Movement Party (Gerindra) that came third in 2014 legislative elections and now, according to some polls, he is leading the Indonesia's presidential race.

Modi at a Hindu hardline RSS function, giving the RSS salute

Source: The Hindu hardline RSS who see Modi as their own

However, what unites Modi and Prabowo is their use of religious nationalism and the threat they pose to civic nationalism. They have been criticized for abetting or allowing the massacre of religious minorities. While one can argue Modi really believes in Hindutva and Prabowo's attachment to religious nationalism is more instrumental, but we really do not know. Prabowo has a strong support of the religious right and they obviously would demand more religion-based laws, if Prabowo won the presidential election. Prabowo's supporters, however, point to his brother and the major financier of his campaign (who is a Christian) and argue that Prabowo belief in civic nationalism (Pancasila ideology) is paramount.

Another factor that will affect the rise of religious nationalism under Modi and Prabowo is the economy. Both of them are very pragmatic and know that economy is the make-or-break criterion for their success as leaders. Therefore, it is hoped that they will try to unite the nation and move ahead, rather than dividing the nation along religious lines. However, if the economy falters, it is not difficult to see them using religion to win again. 

Muslim yearning for caliphate and ISIS caliphate

ISIS (The Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham) or ISIL (The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant) has declared itself a Caliphate and named its leader as Caliph of all Muslims. The group spokesman said:

He is the imam and khalifah (Caliph) for the Muslims everywhere.......Accordingly, the "Iraq and Sham" (Levant) in the name of the Islamic State is henceforth removed from all official deliberations and communications, and the official name is the Islamic State from the date of this declaration.......It is incumbent upon all Muslims to pledge allegiance to (him) and support him...The legality of all emirates, groups, states, and organizations, becomes null by the expansion of the khalifah's authority and arrival of its troops to their areas.( See ISIS Declares Islamic 'Caliphate' And Calls On Groups To Pledge Allegiance)

Powerful words indeed. While president of Indonesia or Prime Minister of Pakistan, democratically elected leaders of around 200 million Muslims, would find it difficult to call themselves caliph of around 1.5 billion Muslims, ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, commander of fewer than fifteen thousand fighters, has claimed the coveted title. As Al-Qaida's rejection of ISIS shows, al-Baghdadi is not even an accepted leader of militant,trans-national, anti-West extremist Muslims in Iraq or Syria.  

Huff post quotes John Esposito, one of the most eminent scholars of Islam in the West, defining Caliphate in the following way (See What Is A Caliphate? ISIS Declaration Raises Questions) :

Historically, the caliph was the successor to the prophet, the political leader of the community, and therefore the head of the early transnational Islamic empire. That's important -- the idea of it being a transnational empire, that reflected the ummah, and transcended national boundaries.

Does it matter that al-Baghdadi has declared himself caliph? Some have argued that now more Muslim militants would be attracted to him. Fair point. But others have argued that this might be a disastrous outreach (See Jihadis in Iraq and Syria declare a caliphate? Why that's good).

Yesterday's declaration of a caliphate by the leading jihadi army in Iraq and Syria – and its demand that Muslims swear oaths of fealty to its leader – could prove the most disastrous piece of jihadi overreach since Al Qaeda in Iraq's routine use of torture and beheadings spurred a Sunni Arab backlash in 2006. 

The formerly Al Qaeda-linked jihadis are generally reported as going from strength to strength in Iraq, taking and holding cities like Mosul and Tikrit from the central government. But the success of the uprising in Iraq in the past month has rested heavily on the backs of Sunni Arab tribes and former Baathists with formal military training. And the grandiose announcement – a telegraphed intent to impose a harsh and regressive vision of Islam on as much territory as possible – is unlikely to make them happy.

I personally think this announcement does not matter much. Does al-Baghdadi become more legitimate or get more recruits? Some recruits but not much else. ISIS is a like a fringe of a fringe. Al-Baghdadi is a brutal callous killer and it is difficult to find many Muslims, except for the militants, giving his message any serious thought. As an NPR reporter described, even in his own country Iraq, he is considered a nut job. Most of the Muslim probably do not know who he is and those, who have heard of him, would most likely try to keep as much distance from him as possible. In conclusion, ISIS caliphate has not changed much on the ground or elsewhere. As Juan Cole explains in his brief history of Caliphate, hundreds of fringe groups have been claiming caliphate for probably more than a thousand years (See The Debacle of the Caliphates: Why al-Baghdadi’s Grandiosity doesn’t Matter).

What is a more interesting question is why Caliphate still mesmerizes many Muslims today. Why pine for a medieval government/empire? 

Nowadays, the Caliphate has captured the imagination of many Muslims worldwide mainly because they are concerned about the abject condition of the Muslim Ummah today. Despite a plethora of resources and around fifty independent Muslim-majority states in the world, Muslims are followers/lackeys, not leaders. Decisions about Muslims and Muslim-majority states are made by others in Washington, Moscow or Beijing and Muslim leaders (with a few exceptions) kowtow to these capitals, instead of charting their own independent course for the benefit of their own people.

Many Muslim relate these circumstances to the lack of unity among Muslims and hark back to the times when Muslims were successful and leading the world. It is commonly believed that under the erstwhile caliphate, Muslims were united as one nation, within one political state and that was why they were so successful. There is also the notion that caliphate is blessed by Allah. Many Muslims, therefore, desire a new caliphate so that there would be an Islamic renaissance and Islamic civilization would reach another apogee by the blessings of Allah. The message of Hizb-ul-Tahrir, one of the most prominent organizations trying to establish caliphate (Khilafah) today, shows the allied themes of current humiliation; success in the past; and renaissance under a new caliphate (See Hizb-e-Tahrir: About us)

Hizb ut-Tahrir is determined to work within the Ummah in order to implement Islam and achieve its objective by endeavouring to gain the leadership of the Islamic Ummah so that she could accept it as her leader, to implement Islam upon her and proceed with it in her struggle against the Kuffar and in the work towards the return of the Islamic State as it was before, the leading superpower in the world.....

The rise of Hizb ut-Tahrir was in response to Allah (swt)’s saying: T.M.Q. “And let there arise from amongst you a band that calls to the good and commands what is right and forbids what is evil and those are the ones who will attain felicity.” in order to revive the Islamic Ummah after the severe decline to which she has sunk, to liberate her from the thoughts, systems and rules of Kufr, its systems and from the hegemony and influence of the Kufr states,  and  in order to work towards establishing the Islamic Khilafah State so that the rules by what Allah (swt) has revealed returns to the realm of life.

While not denying that erstwhile caliphate was a big Muslim state and a big Muslim state now would probably be more powerful than numerous small Muslim states, the notion that all Muslims were united under caliphate is historically not true. Muslims were only under one caliphate for a quarter of a century during the time of first three Rasidun Caliphs and then again for some decades under Umayyads. The whole period of one united caliphate is less than one century compared to more than thirteen centuries of many Muslim states/caliphates constituting the Muslim ummah. So thinking that just because there is a caliphate, Muslims are united under it, is false.   

Ottoman Sultan and Caliph Suleiman, the magnificent (1494 - 1566)

Source: Poetic Voices of the Muslim World

Linking the glory of Islam/Muslims with caliphate is also problematic. It can be true, partially true or false depending on how glory is defined. Is it the military success or the social development or the cultural refinement or the control over maximum territory? In terms of military successes, united caliphate of the seventh century is unparalleled in Muslim history. However, the height of (comparative) social development and cultural refinement was achieved by the Muslims in the times of early Abbasids when the caliph ruled majority of Muslims but not all Muslims. There were many independent Muslim emirs/king/rulers, alongside Abbasid caliphate. Comparing Muslim history on the basis of territory under control, probably 16th and 17th centuries can be considered the height of Islamic grandeur, a time of more than dozen Muslim states/empires (not one united caliphate). 

As Dr Muhammad Iqbal (poet par excellence,  Muslim philosopher and one of the founding fathers of Pakistan) wrote supporting the decision of Ataturk to abolish caliphate, for most of its history caliphate has worked more as an empire than as an Islamic state. Therefore, its religious sanction is doubtful, to say the least:  

In its essence Islam is not Imperialism. In the abolition of the Caliphate which since the days of Omayyads had practically become a kind of Empire it is only the spirit of Islam that has worked out through the Ataturk. In order to understand the Turkish Ijtihad in the matter of the Caliphate we cannot but seek the guidance of Ibn-i-Khaldun—the great philosophical historian of Islam, and the father of modern history. I can do no better than quote here a passage from my Reconstruction:

Ibn-i-Khaldun, in his famous Prolegomena, mentions three distinct views of the idea of Universal Caliphate in Islam: (1) That Universal Imamate is a Divine institution and is consequently indispensable. (2) That it is merely a matter of expediency. (3) That there is no need of such an institution. The last view was taken by the Khawarij, the early republicans of Islam. It seems that modern Turkey has shifted from the first to the second view, i.e., to the view of the Muttazilla who regarded Universal Imamate as a matter of expediency only. The Turks argue that in our political thinking we must be guided by our past political experience which points unmistakably to the fact that the idea of Universal Imamate has failed in practice. It was a workable idea when the Empire of Islam was intact. Since the break-up of this Empire independent political units have arisen. The idea has ceased to be operative and cannot work as a living factor in the organization of modern Islam.

  

         

Official Ulema: Can they provide legitimacy?

Abdullah Saeed in his chapter titled 'The official ulema and religious legitimacy of the modern state' in Islam and Political Legitimacy (Edited by Shahram Akbarzadeh and Abdullah Saeed) argues that official ulema can provide little legitimacy to the modern state. 

Defining alim (plural ulema) as anyone formerly trained in Islamic religious disciplines, Saeed divides ulema into two categories based on their relationship with the state. The official ulema are economically dependent on state and are usually part of a bureaucratic structure. The unofficial ulema are largely independent of state and depend on income from sources other than state coffers.

Development of institution of ulema

Before delving into the issue of legitimacy of the modern state, Saeed has traced the history of ulema-state relationship in Muslim history. He argues that at the time Prophet Muhammad there was no real distinction between his political and religious authority but this should not mean, religious authority always dominated the political authority. The gradual application of different laws and specific timing of their promulgation clearly showed political and social considerations. After the death of Prophet, the Rashidun (rightly-guided) Caliphate ruled Muslims (632-661 AD). During this period, the unity of religious and political authority continued but due to the absence of revelation (and the direct divine attribution and sanction that comes with it), caliphs orders could be debated and challenged. However, there was still no particular clerical class.   

Umayyad dynasty (661-750 AD) established the first Muslim monarchy. As its rule was devoid of any Islamic sanction, its legitimacy was circumspect from the start. Religious and temporal affairs were now separate but there were still no ulema. According to Saeed, it was only in the early Abbasid period (750-1258) that a clear distinct class of ulema can be detected. The factors that led to this development were development of Islamic disciplines and need of specialists; Abbasid's use of notion of divine rule; ulema's legitimacy of political authority to avoid chaos/fitna; some attempts by caliphs to impose a particular theology using political power; need of legal framework for expanding empire and qadis; and caliph loss of political authority to sultans.

Ulema in modern period: role, status, and legitimacy
Saeed contends that in pre-modern period ulema enjoyed a privileged status:

As scholars, judges and muftis they developed law. As judges (qadis) they administered justice and as administrators of awkaf (endowments) they often had substantial economic independence. The ulema also controlled the training of students, basing this on a model in which religious disciplines were given priority. The influence of religion in all aspects of life in the society thus confirmed the social role of ulema.

But the modern period, with its trend toward secularization, transformed the state and ulema's position in society. First, colonial authorities and then modern nation-states took over most of the functions previously performed by the ulema. Some of the measures taken by the modern state that minimized the role of ulema were the marginalization of Islamic law; regulation of the training of ulema; bureaucratization of ulema; state control of mosques; establishment of a public education system and regulation of religious education in schools; and state management of the awkaf.

State legitimacy
Saeed argues that ulema have historically been used by the state to gain legitimacy. Often (official) ulema would issue a fatwa of heresy against political opponents of those in power so that these opponents could be imprisoned/killed. But the current attempts of modern state to gain legitimacy through official ulema have not resulted in much success due to the lack of piety/knowledge and economic dependence of ulema and sharp criticism they suffered from Islamists (prominent among them are Mawdudi, Hasan al-Banna, and Syed Qutb) who regarded them corrupt and lacking the knowledge of 'real' 'true' Islam. With their own legitimacy eroded, Saeed contends, it is a myth that they could provide legitimacy to the state.

Chairman, Council of Islamic Ideology (Pakistan) meeting with the President of the Presidency of Religious Affairs (Turkey), 2012

Source: Council of Islamic Ideology of Pakistan visit to Turkey

Critical review
Saeed's arguments are focused and clearly lay down the reasons why official ulema cannot provide legitimacy to the modern state. However, two developments, hinted by Saeed but not fully explored, still point toward the substantial utility of the official ulema in increasing the legitimacy of a modern Muslim state. First, with the control of public education, the state with the help of official ulema can socialize the populace into its own version of Islam. This process takes time but it is possible. This happened, for example, in Turkey. Second, the state needs to defend its policies in an Islamic discourse and official ulema can provide that.  The alternative would be to defend state policies on the basis of some other ideology which is possible but has not been much successful in many Muslim states.

Another issue that needs to be discussed is how Muslims define legitimacy. Have the criteria changed over the last fourteen centuries or remained the same? Modern states, whether Muslim-majority or not, need to perform many new tasks to be considered legitimate. These tasks were previously not considered part of Islamic legitimacy of the state but now they are. Islamists have successfully increased the requirements of Islamic legitimacy of the state in line with the modern times and most Muslim states have failed to live up to this new modern-Islamic criteria. As modern Muslim states accept these criteria and then fail to keep up with it, official ulema have a very difficult task.