Iran and Israel: Changing Places?

Being two states based on religious nationalism and also critical for world peace and economy, Israel and Iran have been focus of this blog. So, it is fascinating to read a comparison of these two states. 

Two academics, one Iranian and the other Israeli, from the prestigious Stanford University have penned a wonderful op-ed in New York Times Sunday Review (See Are Iran and Israel trading places?). They argue that Iran and Israel are trading places in terms of religious nationalism, democracy, human rights and international acceptance. Iran is now considered undemocratic, authoritarian, radically religious nationalist and international pariah while Israel is considered democratic, liberal and is internationally accepted. Soon, however, Iran can become today's Israel and Israel today's Iran, if Israelis and Iranians do not change their current trajectories. 

Message of the authors is clear. While Israelis should change their trajectory, Iranians should stick to it.

After first listing the similarities between Iran and Israel (old civilizations; primarily non-Arab states in a mostly Arab region; and bastions of secular nationalism in the 1950s), Milani and Waismel-Manorapril contend that a critical cultural and demographic shift is happening and Israelis and Iranians are changing both inside their countries and outside. 

Iranian intellectuals, previously supporting religious authoritarianism, are now voicing their dissent against the regime. The argument that democracy and human rights are against Islam has been rejected. The patriarchal society established by the ruling elite, disproportionately old and male, has been challenged by Iranian women, who make up almost two-third of country’s science and engineering graduates. Gender apartheid has failed and Iranian women are asserting themselves. Birthrate in Iran is falling. Most of the Iranians are under thirty and believe in individual liberty. The rise of Mr. Rouhani and the current pragmatism is the consequence of these major changes. So, expect more pragmatism, democracy and better relations with the West. These trends inside Iran are supported by Iranian diaspora that is strong, liberal and increasingly successful.

Milani and Waismel-Manorapril then contrast this situation with Israel. While Iranian elite are moving toward West/US, Israeli elite are increasingly antagonistic as seen by their recent statements. These changes are again based on an underlying cultural and demographic shift. Orthodox Jews are gradually controlling the state that was once more liberal. Demographically, they have grown much faster as their average birthrate of 6.5 children per family is much more than the 2.6 children per family for the rest of Israelis. This change has obvious political consequences. Orthodox Jewish parties hold about around one-fourth of Knesset seats. They want to make Israel less democratic and more Jewish, with not many rights for its Arab population. Most of them are also against any agreement with the Palestinians and support settlements. Their support has been critical for continued expansion of settlements and rejection of any real peace deal. Internationally, these Israeli policies have led to increasingly strong support for the boycotts, divestment and sanctions (BDS) campaign against Israeli companies and institutions, an existential threat to Israel. Jewish diaspora is also changing and is becoming less religious and less uncritically pro-Israel. European and American Jews are mostly liberal and have difficulty accepting Israel's attitude toward Palestinians and its refusal to end occupation.

While I agree with much of Milani and Waismel-Manorapril's argument, there are few observations I want to make:

• Both Israel and Iran were not bastion of secularism in 1950s. Muhammad Reza Shah was for modernization but if secularism means separation of religion from politics, Shah clearly didn't want secularism. He used to pray at religious shrines; tell stories about how he had dreams in which he met Shia Imams; used to seek supplications from Tehran's prayer leader before going to foreign visits; and had no problems with the ascendancy of Shia sect. While his father (Reza Shah)'s regime can be called a 'bastion of secularism', his cannot. 
• Israel was even less of a bastion of secularism. Although, it was ruled by secular Jews, Judaism had a special place in Israel from the start. Israel's national anthem, language and flag and more particularly establishment of Chief Rabbinate clearly showed a tendency against secularism. Interestingly, it was in the 1950s that religious courts established their control over matters of marriage and divorce in Israel. So, while both countries have become more religious, they were not secular in 1950s.
• It is true that Iranians want a more liberal and open society but do they want a Western society? There is a difference and it should be recognized. Iranians maybe against their ruling clerics but they are also strongly nationalistic and this nationalism is largely based on West's injustice and its efforts to control Iran since 1850s. Therefore, expect better Iranian relations with the West but if Iranian felt they are being unjustly humiliated (again), then all bets are off. The recent refusal of the US government that it would not give visa to Iran's designated ambassador to the UN is one example how things can go the 'other' way.