Religious Conversion Laws and Religious Nationalism

Religious conversion laws are generally anti-religious conversion as they try to make the process of religious conversions difficult. These laws can be an indicator of growing religious nationalism. Religious nationalist countries usually have these laws as conversion from majority religion is considered tantamount to disloyalty to the state. As religion is conflated with the state, a change in religion (usually from state-preferred religion to another religion) is considered not only a rejection of previous religion but also a rejection of the state. 

Today, religious conversion was in the news because Myanmar/ Burmese authorities published the draft of a bill that would make it difficult to convert from one religion to another. The draft was published to get the opinion of the public. The proposed law is the result of efforts by Buddhist groups to stop/slow/restrict religious conversion. Although the draft law does not mention any specific religion, it is clear the effort is to stop conversion from the majority religion (Buddhism), rather than to it. News report gives the following details ( See  Myanmar Publishes Draft of Religious Conversion Bill):

Myanmar’s government on Tuesday published a draft bill on religious conversion, calling for public opinion on rules proposed by nationalist Buddhist monks which would require those who want to change faiths to first obtain permission from local authorities. Under the proposed law, anyone who wants to change their faith is required to apply to local registration teams—consisting of religious affairs, immigration, women’s affairs, education, and administration officials—for permission.

If passed, those found to be guilty of violating a list of prohibitions—which includes obstructing someone from converting—would be subject to a maximum penalty of two years imprisonment and a fine of 200,000 kyats (U.S. $200). Anyone found guilty of proselytizing could face up to a year in prison, though there is no mention of whether any action would be taken against someone who did not obtain permission to convert.

Organization of Protection of Race, Religion and Belief, a Buddhist group, pressurized the government to propose these laws after a public campaign that collected 1.3 million signatures last year. Myanmar is drifting toward religious nationalism as discussed in this blog before (See Buddhist Fundamentalism: Is it possible?).

Many Muslim religious nationalist states have religious conversion laws or restrict conversion from Islam through courts. In Saudi Arabia, for example,  religious conversion from Islam is termed as apostasy, a crime that carries the death sentence. Similarly, Iran criminalizes apostasy. In Pakistan, apostasy is not a crime despite religious parties efforts but apostates can be charged under the blasphemy law that carries the death penalty. 

Many countries that are drifting toward religious nationalism, like Myanmar, have been consistently pressurized by their majority religious groups to pass religious conversion laws. In some federations, like Malaysia and India, although there are no specific national laws on religious conversion, there are laws at the state/provincial level that restrict religious conversion.

The recent landslide victory of BJP, a Hindu nationalist party, have revived aspirations or fears of a national (anti) religious conversion law. BJP has supported religious conversion laws at the state level (See Narendra Modi (BJP) election win good for Indian economy, but scary for Christian minority) and BJP leaders have vowed to bring such law, if they win elections in 2014 (See ‘BJP will bring law against religious conversions if voted to power’).


Anti-conversion laws in Indian states

Source: Conversion of religion: India (legal aspects) 

Religious conversions are bound to increase as people have more opportunities to know about other religions so pressure from majority religious groups in states based on religious nationalism would also increase to restrict/ban religious conversions (from the majority religion, not to the majority religion). 

    

 Update: Myanmar Parliament passed the anti-conversion law in August 2015.

VHP sees Modi government implementing Hindutva

VHP leader see Modi (See VHP confident on Ram Temple) implementing Hindutva agenda. Modi is compared to the Hindu raja Prithviraj Chauhan that ruled Delhi in the 12th century and asked to return to the Hindutva. Prithviraj was defeated by Shahad-ud-din Ghauri and that led to Muslim rule in Indian subcontinent.

The three main demand of VHP are

1. Building of Ram mandir (where once Babri mosque stood)
2. Common civil code
3. Ban on cow slaughter.

I do not see these things happening but there will be some movement in the direction of Hindutva. Ram mandir and common civil code are particularly difficult to achieve. However, indirect restrictions on cow slaughter maybe imposed.
  

Modi's victory: Do we need public religion today?

There will not be many people who would deny the important role of religion in human lives. However, a public role of religion is controversial. As religion comes out of the shadows and is embraced not only publically but also enthusiastically, the debate has increasing relevance. The most recent triumph of public religion came on May 16 when Hindu nationalist party BJP won a landslide election victory in India (See Landslide for Modi).

 

An overtly religious party winning in secular India is new. Though BJP had won in late 1990s too, in at least two ways this win was different. First, in late 1990s, BJP was led by the intellectual, poet, 'soft' team player Vajpayee who is world away from the current leader Narendra Modi (NaMo) who is brash, street-wise and domineering (See The fact remains, Narendra Modi can never be a Atal Bihari Vajpayee). While Vajpayee's religion was closer to Gandhian model, Modi has been accused of being anti-Muslim and (although not proved) is widely implicated in 2002 riots when around two thousand people were killed (mostly Muslims) under his watch. Secondly, in late 1990s, BJP government was dependent on other parties as it didn't have simple majority in Lok Sabha. In 2014 election, however, BJP won a landslide victory and is not dependent on anyone. So, it can implement its agenda of Hindutva, if it wants (See Will Modi be India’s Putin?)     

 

So, religion is not going anywhere. Ok, but can we justify or understand religion's powerful existence in this modern age? Habermas, possibly the most celebrated intellectual/philosopher of our current age provides some answers. His detailed views are available in his many books and lectures. Here is a small tasting discussion by Michele Dillon on his views of post-secular society and religion (See Enter the Post Secular).

Among other points, Habermas noted that the Enlightenment project of modernization had gone somewhat awry, has become derailed. In particular, as he had previously elaborated, he noted that globalizing economic markets defy the control of consensual rational judgments, and he lamented not only the extent of global socioeconomic inequality but the mass political indifference toward it. This indifference is part of a longer depoliticization process resulting from modernization and increased affluence and consumerism, highlighted by Habermas decades earlier. For Habermas, the threat posed by current globalizing forces to potentially “degrade the capacity for democratic self-steering,” both within and across nations, makes the need for public communicative reasoning all the more necessary. He thus looks to discover new (i.e., underappreciated) political cultural resources for the democratic revitalization project. Hence, “a contrite modernity,” one characterized by several social pathologies that need fixing, may benefit, Habermas argued, from religious-derived norms and ethical intuitions. He conceded that these religious resources can help human society deal with “a miscarried life, social pathologies, the failures of individual life projects, and the deformation of misarranged existential relationships.”

Many sociologists have elaborated on the perils of globalization and the increased polarization between classes and regions as the profit logic of capitalist markets inexorably trumps normative considerations. Yet only Habermas looks to the religious domain rather than pushing for attentiveness to a rearticulated political ideology of, for example, global social democracy, as a way of reorienting societal thinking about modern socioeconomic pathologies. In his view, “The translation of the likeness of the human to the image of the divine into the equal and absolutely respected dignity of all human beings” offers a way of using religious values to reorient society’s values toward principles of economic and social justice. Clearly, Habermas’s new affirmation of the relevance that religious ideas and ethics have for contemporary political debate marks a major transformation in his thinking. I very much welcome this more inclusive view of religion as a potentially emancipatory political and cultural resource, a resource that can open up and enhance rather than retard public discourse, and energize the creation of more deliberative and more participative social institutions.

A Habermas's article on the solution of the 'problem' of religion in public sphere can be read here ( See Religion in the Public Sphere). 

 

  

Is General Sisi leading a coalition of civic nationalists?

Crown Center of Brandies University has posted an interesting brief on the US-Egypt relations ( See "Resetting" U.S.-Egypt Relations). The authors talk about the competing narratives of the US and Egyptian policymakers about the events since July 2013 and the gap and lack of understanding about the other side. The US policymakers see the last few months as the return of military authoritarianism and the abandonment of democracy. Although the mistakes of President Morsi are acknowledged by the US and the US government has refused to label the military takeover as a coup, nevertheless, it is hesitant to engage fully with the current Egyptian regime because it is clearly undemocratic. Banning of protests and mass killing of protesters has further alienated the US policymakers.

Egyptians, however, see the events of last ten month in a completely different light. They feel that July 2013 was a revolution against authoritarianism (comparable to January/February 2011 revolution) and saved Egypt from becoming a theocratic state. Muslim Brotherhood is considered a front for terrorists and its actions since July 2013 have left no doubt in Egyptian policymaker's minds that Brotherhood is against Egyptian national interest. Many Egyptians feel angry at the suspension of the US aid and consider that US/Obama administration bent on bringing Morsi back, completely ignoring Egyptian public opinion.

Source: Egypt's General al-Sisi: The man behind the image

What is interesting from our perspective is authors, Abdel Monem Said Aly and Prof. Shai Feldman, call the group, opposed to Muslim Brotherhood and leading Egypt now (defining the competing narrative), as 'Egypt's civic nationalists' or madaniyya and define them as follows:    

Egyptian civic nationalists accept Islam as the religion of the state, as stipulated in all Egyptian constitutions since 1923, but insist that all laws be enacted by the peoples’ elected representatives in Parliament, and that disputes be adjudicated by the judiciary—that is, by civilian courts. Accordingly, they objected strongly to Article 4 of the constitution proposed by the Muslim Brotherhood in 2012, providing that laws enacted would be subjected to review by al-Azhar University, which would be entrusted with verifying that they were consistent with Sharia law. They also objected to Article 219, which limited interpretation of Sharia law to a narrow school of Sunni thought, insisting instead that this task be left to the High Constitutional Court.

There are several problems with this labeling. First, the Salafist Al-Noor Party and al-Azhar University administration were part of the coalition that General Sisi used to topple President Morsi. These groups can hardly be defined as civic nationalists. Both of them argued for more role of religion in the constitution and were supporters of the Article 4. Second, although a large part of the group that supported July 2013 coup/revolution was civil nationalists, many were not. Egyptians criticized Morsi and Brotherhood not only because of their religious orientation but also due to the lack of governance and rising poverty, inequality and inefficiency. The dire economic conditions in Egypt played a prominent role in persuading Egyptians to join protests against Morsi (See Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi’s Biggest Challenge? The Economy, Stupid). To argue, without evidence, that all or most of the Egyptians joining the protests were angry because of Morsi/Brotherhood's religious nationalism is not correct. Moreover, since July 2013, it is clear that it is the Egyptian military that is controlling the state and civic nationalists are being used. Whenever civil society/nationalists tried to reign in the military or increase their freedoms, they were brutally suppressed (See Egypt another step backward on civil-society and Egypt’s Death Sentences, Ban of ‘April 6' Criminalize Political Opposition).  Therefore, the argument that Obama administration is not understanding civil nationalists' narrative is again not correct. Obama administration is willing to work with civil nationalists and has tried to accommodate them but military junta's undemocratic and brutal campaign against all types of opposition (including civic nationalists) cannot be ignored.

In conclusion, the brief tries to explain a very complex situation in terms of Islamists and civic nationalists. This simplifying attempt can be termed as simplistic at best and deceiving at worst. It extends the 'clash of civilizations' narrative, despite clear evidence to the contrary.      

Netanyahu: Need of a Jewish State

It seems I prematurely jettisoned the idea of a Jewish state (See End of prospects of a Jewish state?). Prime Minister Netanyahu, on Israel's independence day, announced that he is preceding to make the Jewish state a reality by amending Basic Law of Israel (that serves as Israel's Constitution) to highlight the Jewish character of Israel. He argued:

Israel gives full equal rights to all its citizens, but it is the nation-state of one people – the Jewish people – and no other. To fortify Israel's standing as the nation-state of the Jewish people, I intend to spearhead the legislation of a Basic Law that will enshrine this status.

Israel is a Jewish and democratic state. Our Basic Laws give full expression to the democratic aspect of the state. We do this by giving full equal rights to each and every citizen. The Basic Laws do this by means of two main laws – the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, and the Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation. It will define the national right of the Jewish people to the state of Israel, without infringing on the individual rights of any citizen of Israel. It will fortify the standing of the Law of Return as a Basic Law, it will anchor in the Basic Laws the standing of the national symbols – the flag, the national anthem, the language and other components of our national being...These components are under relentless and increasing attack from abroad, and even at home.

Of course, there are those who don't want Israel to be defined as the nation-state of the Jewish people...They want to see a Palestinian nation-state arise alongside us, and for Israel to gradually become a bi-national, Arab-Jewish state, within its narrow borders. But I say one simple thing: You can't hold the national stick by both ends. You can't say that you want to separate from the Palestinians in order to avoid a bi-national state, an argument that has a certain logic to it, and meanwhile sanctify a bi-national, Jewish-Arab state in Israel's permanent borders. (See Netanyahu: Israel is home to one people - Jewish)

Changing of Basic Law and giving preferential treatment to Jewish over democratic character of Israel would, of course, establish an overtly Jewish state. Let's look at the arguments. Is Israel's flag, anthem and language increasingly under attack? No. Is Israel itself increasingly under attack for being a Jewish state? Not so. The world's focus on Israel is because of Israel-Palestine conflict. Yes, there are concerns about the treatment of Arab minority but treating minorities badly is common in the Middle East and around the world so that is not the issue. Even being a religious nationalist state is not an issue because the Middle East has many such states. Netanyahu would like us to believe that it is anti-Semitism but it is not true. Increasingly Jewish people themselves are realizing, this is just a way to legitimize occupation of Palestinian lands.

1947 Zionist poster

Source: Zionist Postcards

The second argument is again problematic. Those, who promote a separate Palestinian state, also accept Israel's right to exist. They want both states to give rights to their minorities. Those, who favor the two-state solution, do not demand or accept an Islamic state in Palestine while denying Jews to establish a Jewish state in Israel. What many people are arguing for is two states for two communities, not two faiths. But the world can also live with two states for two faiths (i.e. states based on religious nationalism), if they are separate. What world, I think, is wary of is the conflict and Israel has tended not to resolve the conflict for at least the last twenty years. And this is jeopardizing Israel's Jewish character itself.  

BJP's religion is about order

Amit Chaudhuri, a novelist and ­professor of contemporary literature at the University of East Anglia, looks at BJP's Hindu nationalism in an interesting way (See India's new Hinduism is about order). Rather than focusing on Modi, he asks the readers to see how Hinduism has changed and is currently being used in India. Religion, 'the sacred is not meant to cause wonder, but to impose order and obedience and curb visceral urges.' He gives evidence to prove his point.

Let me provide an example. “Prophylactic Hindu tiles”, as I’ll call them, have been proliferating in India for the past two decades. You see them on walls, the sides of urinals, and staircases. They have on them a Hindu deity Shiva, Parvati, Ganesh painted in the European style that is a cliche of kitsch Hindu iconography. Their function is to discourage urinating and spitting on public surfaces, both compulsive national masculine pastimes. The argument they embody never actually inscribed in either ancient scripture or even a municipal text is that no one would dare urinate or spit betel juice on a deity. I can think of no more tasteless use of the sacred, but the bizarre interpretation of religion in contemporary India means that hardly anybody thinks the tiles an outrage.

Hinduism was always open and syncretic. What European had started is now bearing fruit. Hinduism has been changing into a modern semitic religion, with specific gods, precepts and practices. According to Chaudari, BJP has done two things to speed up this process. 

The BJP’s contribution to the reshaping of Hinduism has been twofold. First, by turning metaphorical moments such as the birth of Rama into historic events to be fought over, it has made Hinduism a literal-minded, Europeanised, Semitic-style faith. By taking away from Hinduism its complexity and contradictoriness, both the BJP and the free-market “new India” in which it has flourished have produced a generation that knows little about Hinduism.

Second, the political, instrumental use of Hinduism to defend and assert identity while assailing other identities, and a general ignorance of religious experience on the part of the most active religionists, means that not only do we live in an age when to be Hindu is to constantly take offence, but the line separating obeisance from offence, the holy from the disgusting, religious pride from poor taste, is blurred. Indians are being schooled to defend the sacred, but have absolutely no idea how to recognise it.

But why the markets love BJP/Modi? Markets love them because Hindutva promises to bring order to this humongous country. Modi's developmental model is all about completing projects and not worrying about niceties. Maybe a poor and minorities are expendable, if it later results in stability and growth for the next twelve years. Maybe the argument is that if India has to compete with China, it has to be like China where human rights are not important. Read about Gujarat model and big business love for Modi here (See Narendra Modi a 'king among kings', says Anil Ambani at Vibrant Gujarat summit),   

Buddhist Violence: Is it possible?

In a recent family gathering at my home, a friend talked about the peaceful message of Buddhism as compared to the monotheist religions. I acknowledged that Buddhism has a very peaceful message and it does not insist on being the 'only' right path as religions like Christianity and Islam do. However, I argued that religions are multivocal and can be used for all kinds of purposes. Almost all religions promote peace and reject violence even against non-believers but there are also religious teachings and histories that can be used to incite killings, even of fellow believers. Buddhism is no different. It can be and has been used for inciting violence. I have discussed this issue at length in a blog (See Buddhist Nationalism in Sri Lanka and Burma).

An article in Huffington Post in May 2014 discusses the same issue and links it to three countries, Sri Lanka, Burma and Thailand (See Asian Buddhism's Growing Fundamentalist Streak Signals Growth Of Religious Nationalism In Several Countries). Authors Anuradha Sharma and Vishal Arora refer to what was discussed at my home; the contrast between what Buddhism teaches and how it is usually perceived and what is happening in majority Buddhist countries, where it is used as a tool of the state. Authors first cited some examples of Buddhist violence:

In Sri Lanka, where about 70 percent of the population is Theravada Buddhist, a group of monks formed the Bodu Bala Sena or the Buddhist Power Force in 2012 to “protect” the country’s Buddhist culture. The force, nicknamed BBS, carried out at least 241 attacks against Muslims and 61 attacks against Christians in 2013, according to the Sri Lanka Muslim Congress.

In Myanmar, at least 300 Rohingya Muslims, whose ancestors were migrants from Bangladesh, have been killed and up to 300,000 displaced, according to Genocide Watch. Ashin Wirathu, a monk who describes himself as the Burmese “bin Laden,” is encouraging the violence by viewing the Rohingya presence as a Muslim “invasion.”

And in Buddhist-majority Thailand, at least 5,000 people have died in Muslim-Buddhist violence in the country’s South. The country’s Knowing Buddha Foundation is not a violent group, but it advocates for a blashemy law to punish anyone who offends the faith. It wants Buddhism declared the state religion and portrays popular culture as a threat to believers.

Later, authors contrast the views of  Maung Zarni, an exiled Burmese who is a visiting fellow at London School of Economics and who writes regularly on the violence in Burma/Myanmar and Sri Lanka, with the views of Wirathu and other Buddhists, who advocate militancy.

Zarni argues:

No Buddhist can be nationalistic...There is no country for Buddhists. I mean, no such thing as ‘me,’ ‘my’ community, ‘my’ country, ‘my’ race or even ‘my’ faith...For sure, Thailand has its own brand of ‘Buddhist’ racism towards non-Buddhists...But, I am not sure the Thai society will go the way of those two genocidal Theravada Buddhist societies (Sri Lanka and Myanmar) — where racism of genocidal nature has enveloped the mainstream ‘Buddhist’ society.

Zarni warns that there are links among the fundamentalist 'anti-Dharma Buddhist networks' in Burma, Sri Lanka, and Thailand that are 'toxic, cancerous and deeply harmful to all humans anywhere.' Zarni is also concerned about the demand for an anti-blasphemy law in Thailand and considers it a distortion of Buddhism, a religion that is against allowing any 'organization that policies or regulates the faithful’s behavior or inner thoughts.

But Buddhist fundamentalists supported by the state argue that Buddhism needs protection and point toward the past when Buddhists were persecuted and their institutions destroyed. They demand laws and argue that state should promote knowledge of Buddhism to protect Buddhist culture which is again under threat. And they are proud to be called 'radical' by the West.

Sounds familiar, right?

Michael Jerryson, the co-author of the book Buddhist Warfare, with Mark Juergensmeyer, also had difficulty acknowledging that Buddhists could be violent. He called it a "bittersweet experience" that started with researching about peaceful Buddhism but culminated in writing about the "dark side" of Buddhism.

Jerryson, in an article, talked about military monks and why people have trouble accepting monks with guns:

One day after teaching an English class for Buddhist novices at a monastery a young monk came over and pulled back the folds of his robe to reveal a Smith & Wesson. I later learned that he was a military monk—one of many covert, fully ordained soldiers placed in monasteries throughout Thailand. To these monks, peacemaking requires militancy.

Since my initial realization in 2004 [about Buddhist violence], I began to look critically at my earlier perspective on Buddhism—one that shielded an extensive and historical dimension to Buddhist traditions: violence. Armed Buddhist monks in Thailand are not an exception to the rule; they are contemporary examples of a long historical precedence. For centuries monks have been at the helm, or armed in the ranks, of wars. How could this be the case? But more importantly, why did I (and many others) hold the belief that Buddhism=Peace (and that other religions, such as Islam, are more prone to violence)?

It was then that I realized that I was a consumer of a very successful form of propaganda. Since the early 1900s, Buddhist monastic intellectuals such as Walpola Rahula, D. T. Suzuki, and Tenzin Gyatso, the Fourteenth Dalai Lama, have labored to raise Western awareness of their cultures and traditions. In doing so, they presented specific aspects of their Buddhist traditions while leaving out others. These Buddhist monks were not alone in this portrayal of Buddhism. As Donald S. Lopez Jr. and others have poignantly shown, academics quickly followed suit, so that by the 1960s U.S popular culture no longer depicted Buddhist traditions as primitive, but as mystical.

Although the book only arrived at bookstores last month, it apparently touched some nerves in the academic community before its release. Some have objected to the cover, which they feel is not an appropriate subject for Buddhism. Ironically, that is the very reason this collection of essays is so important: to address the apparent and widespread inability to acknowledge the violent side to religious traditions. It is this inability that robs its adherents of their humanity.

In a way, I wish I could return to that dream of Buddhist traditions as a purely peaceful, benevolent religion that lacks mortal failures and shortcomings. But I cannot. It is, ultimately, a selfish dream and it hurts other people in the process.

Buddhism, like other religions, is multivocal and can be used, like other religions, to commit atrocities. What is happening to Rohingyas in Myanmar is inconceivable for many but it is not rare or unusual.