Crown Center of Brandies University has posted an interesting brief on the US-Egypt relations ( See "Resetting" U.S.-Egypt Relations). The authors talk about the competing narratives of the US and Egyptian policymakers about the events since July 2013 and the gap and lack of understanding about the other side. The US policymakers see the last few months as the return of military authoritarianism and the abandonment of democracy. Although the mistakes of President Morsi are acknowledged by the US and the US government has refused to label the military takeover as a coup, nevertheless, it is hesitant to engage fully with the current Egyptian regime because it is clearly undemocratic. Banning of protests and mass killing of protesters has further alienated the US policymakers.
Egyptians, however, see the events of last ten month in a completely different light. They feel that July 2013 was a revolution against authoritarianism (comparable to January/February 2011 revolution) and saved Egypt from becoming a theocratic state. Muslim Brotherhood is considered a front for terrorists and its actions since July 2013 have left no doubt in Egyptian policymaker's minds that Brotherhood is against Egyptian national interest. Many Egyptians feel angry at the suspension of the US aid and consider that US/Obama administration bent on bringing Morsi back, completely ignoring Egyptian public opinion.
Source: Egypt's General al-Sisi: The man behind the image
What is interesting from our perspective is authors, Abdel Monem Said Aly and Prof. Shai Feldman, call the group, opposed to Muslim Brotherhood and leading Egypt now (defining the competing narrative), as 'Egypt's civic nationalists' or madaniyya and define them as follows:
Egyptian civic nationalists accept Islam as the religion of the state, as stipulated in all Egyptian constitutions since 1923, but insist that all laws be enacted by the peoples’ elected representatives in Parliament, and that disputes be adjudicated by the judiciary—that is, by civilian courts. Accordingly, they objected strongly to Article 4 of the constitution proposed by the Muslim Brotherhood in 2012, providing that laws enacted would be subjected to review by al-Azhar University, which would be entrusted with verifying that they were consistent with Sharia law. They also objected to Article 219, which limited interpretation of Sharia law to a narrow school of Sunni thought, insisting instead that this task be left to the High Constitutional Court.
There are several problems with this labeling. First, the Salafist Al-Noor Party and al-Azhar University administration were part of the coalition that General Sisi used to topple President Morsi. These groups can hardly be defined as civic nationalists. Both of them argued for more role of religion in the constitution and were supporters of the Article 4. Second, although a large part of the group that supported July 2013 coup/revolution was civil nationalists, many were not. Egyptians criticized Morsi and Brotherhood not only because of their religious orientation but also due to the lack of governance and rising poverty, inequality and inefficiency. The dire economic conditions in Egypt played a prominent role in persuading Egyptians to join protests against Morsi (See Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi’s Biggest Challenge? The Economy, Stupid). To argue, without evidence, that all or most of the Egyptians joining the protests were angry because of Morsi/Brotherhood's religious nationalism is not correct. Moreover, since July 2013, it is clear that it is the Egyptian military that is controlling the state and civic nationalists are being used. Whenever civil society/nationalists tried to reign in the military or increase their freedoms, they were brutally suppressed (See Egypt another step backward on civil-society and Egypt’s Death Sentences, Ban of ‘April 6' Criminalize Political Opposition). Therefore, the argument that Obama administration is not understanding civil nationalists' narrative is again not correct. Obama administration is willing to work with civil nationalists and has tried to accommodate them but military junta's undemocratic and brutal campaign against all types of opposition (including civic nationalists) cannot be ignored.
In conclusion, the brief tries to explain a very complex situation in terms of Islamists and civic nationalists. This simplifying attempt can be termed as simplistic at best and deceiving at worst. It extends the 'clash of civilizations' narrative, despite clear evidence to the contrary.
No comments:
Post a Comment