Official Ulema: Can they provide legitimacy?

Abdullah Saeed in his chapter titled 'The official ulema and religious legitimacy of the modern state' in Islam and Political Legitimacy (Edited by Shahram Akbarzadeh and Abdullah Saeed) argues that official ulema can provide little legitimacy to the modern state. 

Defining alim (plural ulema) as anyone formerly trained in Islamic religious disciplines, Saeed divides ulema into two categories based on their relationship with the state. The official ulema are economically dependent on state and are usually part of a bureaucratic structure. The unofficial ulema are largely independent of state and depend on income from sources other than state coffers.

Development of institution of ulema

Before delving into the issue of legitimacy of the modern state, Saeed has traced the history of ulema-state relationship in Muslim history. He argues that at the time Prophet Muhammad there was no real distinction between his political and religious authority but this should not mean, religious authority always dominated the political authority. The gradual application of different laws and specific timing of their promulgation clearly showed political and social considerations. After the death of Prophet, the Rashidun (rightly-guided) Caliphate ruled Muslims (632-661 AD). During this period, the unity of religious and political authority continued but due to the absence of revelation (and the direct divine attribution and sanction that comes with it), caliphs orders could be debated and challenged. However, there was still no particular clerical class.   

Umayyad dynasty (661-750 AD) established the first Muslim monarchy. As its rule was devoid of any Islamic sanction, its legitimacy was circumspect from the start. Religious and temporal affairs were now separate but there were still no ulema. According to Saeed, it was only in the early Abbasid period (750-1258) that a clear distinct class of ulema can be detected. The factors that led to this development were development of Islamic disciplines and need of specialists; Abbasid's use of notion of divine rule; ulema's legitimacy of political authority to avoid chaos/fitna; some attempts by caliphs to impose a particular theology using political power; need of legal framework for expanding empire and qadis; and caliph loss of political authority to sultans.

Ulema in modern period: role, status, and legitimacy
Saeed contends that in pre-modern period ulema enjoyed a privileged status:

As scholars, judges and muftis they developed law. As judges (qadis) they administered justice and as administrators of awkaf (endowments) they often had substantial economic independence. The ulema also controlled the training of students, basing this on a model in which religious disciplines were given priority. The influence of religion in all aspects of life in the society thus confirmed the social role of ulema.

But the modern period, with its trend toward secularization, transformed the state and ulema's position in society. First, colonial authorities and then modern nation-states took over most of the functions previously performed by the ulema. Some of the measures taken by the modern state that minimized the role of ulema were the marginalization of Islamic law; regulation of the training of ulema; bureaucratization of ulema; state control of mosques; establishment of a public education system and regulation of religious education in schools; and state management of the awkaf.

State legitimacy
Saeed argues that ulema have historically been used by the state to gain legitimacy. Often (official) ulema would issue a fatwa of heresy against political opponents of those in power so that these opponents could be imprisoned/killed. But the current attempts of modern state to gain legitimacy through official ulema have not resulted in much success due to the lack of piety/knowledge and economic dependence of ulema and sharp criticism they suffered from Islamists (prominent among them are Mawdudi, Hasan al-Banna, and Syed Qutb) who regarded them corrupt and lacking the knowledge of 'real' 'true' Islam. With their own legitimacy eroded, Saeed contends, it is a myth that they could provide legitimacy to the state.

Chairman, Council of Islamic Ideology (Pakistan) meeting with the President of the Presidency of Religious Affairs (Turkey), 2012

Source: Council of Islamic Ideology of Pakistan visit to Turkey

Critical review
Saeed's arguments are focused and clearly lay down the reasons why official ulema cannot provide legitimacy to the modern state. However, two developments, hinted by Saeed but not fully explored, still point toward the substantial utility of the official ulema in increasing the legitimacy of a modern Muslim state. First, with the control of public education, the state with the help of official ulema can socialize the populace into its own version of Islam. This process takes time but it is possible. This happened, for example, in Turkey. Second, the state needs to defend its policies in an Islamic discourse and official ulema can provide that.  The alternative would be to defend state policies on the basis of some other ideology which is possible but has not been much successful in many Muslim states.

Another issue that needs to be discussed is how Muslims define legitimacy. Have the criteria changed over the last fourteen centuries or remained the same? Modern states, whether Muslim-majority or not, need to perform many new tasks to be considered legitimate. These tasks were previously not considered part of Islamic legitimacy of the state but now they are. Islamists have successfully increased the requirements of Islamic legitimacy of the state in line with the modern times and most Muslim states have failed to live up to this new modern-Islamic criteria. As modern Muslim states accept these criteria and then fail to keep up with it, official ulema have a very difficult task.          

How 'Holy' Wars End?

'Holy' wars are grabbing our attention again. Whether it is ISIS in Iraq/Syria, kidnapping of teens in Palestine or Pakistan's military action against Taliban, religious issues loom large and more often than not are the major point of contention between the warring parties. There is also a danger of a future Shia-Sunni conflict that can engulf more than a dozen countries from Saudi Arabia to Pakistan.

Conventional wisdom (and there is some research to back this up) claims that religious conflicts are more intractable because of the non-negotiability of religious beliefs. It is argued that combatants, because of their other-worldly ends, continue to fight even after all reasonable analysis would demonstrate the impossibility of victory. Eyeing defeat or a long and costly stalemate, a pragmatic strategy would be to cut the losses and grab what is (maximally) achievable through negotiations. However, in case of religious conflicts, due to the indivisibility and sacredness of the core beliefs, negotiations for peace have no chance and fighting continues.    

Source: Does Religion Cause War?

Isak Svensson & Emily Harding contend that peace is achievable in religious conflicts as combatants do not have to necessarily compromise on their core beliefs (How Holy Wars End: Exploring the Termination Patterns of Conflicts With Religious Dimensions in Asia, Terrorism and Political Violence). Their main argument is as follows:

We argue that there is a possibility for conflict resolution that does not require concessions on core beliefs and aspirations. Religious aspirations, we contend, are primarily associated with conflicting parties’ ultimate goals, and less concerned with the particular means of achieving such goals. They are also not the sole aspirations of parties: conflicting actors can have territorial, structural, economic or other ambitions as well. This opens up space for two conflict resolution mechanisms that can be applied in religious armed conflicts. First, drawing on the distinction between means and ends in regard to religious demands, there is a theoretical possibility for enabling political procedures to replace the fighting. Second, by disentangling religious demands from other non-religious demands, horse-trading procedures can be utilized in order to reach agreement without requiring concessions on the religious dimensions.

As evidence of their contention, authors chose six different conflicts in Asia that have ended and argue that most of these conflicts have been resolved through negotiations based on means-end differentiation, in case of core beliefs, or horse-trading on non-religious issues. The following table (from Svensson & Harding) presents the basic outline of the conflicts.

Selection of cases of terminated religious armed conflicts

  Country               Incompatibility                   Rebel-side                    Religious dimension
Philippines         Territory: Mindanao                MNLF                    Islamic State in Mindanao
Indonesia             Territory: Aceh                        GAM                       Islamic State in Aceh
Uzbekistan           Government                          IMU; JIG                            Islamic State
India                  Territory: Punjab                 Sikh Insurgents                Sikh State in Punjab
Nepal                  Government                           CPN-M                            Secular State
Tajikistan             Government                           UTO                                 Islamic State

Svensson & Harding analysis demonstrates that peace was achieved mostly through negotiations.

Outcomes of conflicts with religious dimensions

 Conflict termination               Religious           Horse         Political      Government/
        patterns                      goals achieved?     trading         process       Rebel victory 
Indonesia, GAM                           X                                         X
Philippines, MNLF( 2)                 X                    X                  X
India, Sikhs                                                                                                     X
Nepal, CPN-M                             X                                         X
Tajikistan, UTO                                                                       X
Uzbekistan, IMU                                                                                            X
Uzbekistan, JIG                                                                                              X

The article is very thought-provoking but there are few issues that need more elaboration. First, while conventional wisdom argues that religious conflicts are more difficult to resolve and authors have tried to prove it wrong empirically, this idea that religious conflicts are different than other conflicts has increasingly been contested. Scholars have argued that it is very difficult to declare a conflict as a religious conflict. Svensson & Harding define religious conflict in the following way:

A conflict has a religious incompatibility when one of the conflict parties makes in their stated goals a specifically religious demand that involves the nature of the state. Such demands can have to do with concern, for example, about the religious characteristics of the state. The demands could have to do with concern that the state, or part of the state, should give certain preferences to one particular religion...

While the definition seems reasonable, it is difficult to define the above conflicts as purely religious conflicts. In each of these conflicts, religious demands were intertwined with demands for democratic, political or civil rights. Authors have to clarify why they consider these conflicts as religious conflicts and other conflicts (such as East Timor) as non-religious conflict. 

Second, if Svensson & Harding's aim is to show that peace can be achieved through negotiations in religious conflicts (as is the case of other conflicts) than outright victories of government/opposition should not be presented as evidence. In case of victories, winning party imposes whatever it likes. The indivisibility or sacredness of losing party's beliefs matter little. Some concession may be made but they are wholly at the discretion of the winning side. 

Finally, authors have to explain why Nepal is not considered a 'rebel victory' in their analysis. The government, led by King Gyanendra, bowed out after Maoists controlled almost eighty percent of Nepalese territory and blockaded Kathmandu, the capital. It was not other opposition parties' pressure that forced monarchy out, it was the Maoists. 

Arab Nationalism: The end?

Adeed Dawisha's article remember's Arab nationalism (See Requiem for Arab Nationalism), once a powerful force, aiming to revive the glory of Arab nation.

He talks about Nasser, the undisputed leader of Arab nationalism, and the effect of 1967 defeat.

It took some time for the light to go out on Arab nationalism, but its power generator went down in June 1967. After the Six-Day War, the slide of Arab nationalism toward political marginality became irreversible. And what finished it was the fact that Egypt, under Gamal Abdel Nasser, lost the war. Egypt's devastating defeat was Arab nationalism's mortal loss, for the fate of Arab nationalism during the struggles, triumphs, and reversals of the 1950s and 1960s was inexorably linked to Egypt and its charismatic president.

Had Syria or Jordan, or even both, lost the war, it would not have been the unmitigated disaster for Arab nationalism that it proved to be. But Arab nationalism could not survive the abject humiliation inflicted on its acknowledged prophet, who, through his shrill and overzealous propaganda machine, had promised a fabled triumph in al-Ma'raka al-Masiriya, the battle of destiny.

Arab countries and their flags 

Source: Islam and Arab Nationalism الإسلام و العربية الجنسية in the 21st century

The main competitor of Arab nationalism was, of course, individual country/territorial nationalisms. Arab nationalism was all about unity and indivisibility of the proud Arab nation but gradually borders between Arabs became important. 

Part of the reason for this "sanctification" of borders was that Arab political and economic elites developed a vested interest in the survival of each particular state. Not surprisingly, these elites were loath to put themselves at risk for the sake of Arab unity.So they argued that Arab nationalism was really just a license for some elites to browbeat others. The advocates of territorial nationalism also relied on geo-political and cultural arguments in making their case. They insisted that Arab nationalists had failed to understand that while various Arab states might accept an overarching Arab identity, geographic and even cultural differences were real enough to preclude an organic unity. And they were right: the decline of Arab nationalism from 1961 validated their argument.

But territorial nationalisms were not the only enemy. Many sub-state and supra-state identities also damaged the Arab nationalist's cause. Tribal loyalties, argues Adeed, were powerful in many Arab countries and didn't disappear as Arab nationalism and territorial nationalisms fought for the primary loyalty of the Arabs.

In some states, tribal affiliations formed the backbone of popular support that shielded local leaderships from the advancing tide of revolutionary Arab nationalism. Such was the case in Saudi Arabia, where the tribal-based demographic structure contributed to the stability of the political order.Successive Saudi monarchs, in the process of shifting the loyalty of the Bedouin from tribe to state, made sure to act and be perceived as tribal overlords.

Bedouin military personnel were also responsible for the survival of Jordan's young King Hussein, in the face of seemingly impossible odds. Jordan's "Arab Legion" was initially formed to combat Bedouin anarchy in the new country. In a stroke of genius, the Arab Legion's founder, the British officer John Bagot Glubb, decided to harness the warlike qualities of the Bedouins by recruiting them into the army. Very quickly, the Arab Legion became the Arab world's most disciplined fighting force. But one thing that Glubb did not change was tribal solidarity, which he nurtured every step of the way to make the Arab Legion "the Bedouin prop of the Hashemite polity.

Source: Arab League, Wikipedia

Coming to the focus of this blog, religious identities also didn't allow Arab nationalism to take hold. Sectarian loyalties divided Arabs and in many countries, especially when they were politicized as in Iraq. These loyalties were weakened and laid dormant during the heyday of Arab nationalism and Nasser but they were back with a vengeance in the 1970s.

Iraq's sectarian divisions formed another hurdle in the Arab nationalist march. The country's Shi'ite majority never overcame its suspicion of Arab nationalism as a Sunni project. Shi'ite grievances against the Sunnis were primarily political, pertaining to Sunni dominance over Iraq's political order. The Shi'ites would point to the paucity of their numbers among the decision-making elite and in the ranks of the administrative and military institutions.

It is not that the Shi'ites did not believe in Arab nationalism, or that they did not consider themselves to be Arabs. Shi'ite men of letters penned some of the marvels of Arabic literature. Iraqis of all religions and denominations flocked to the Arab nationalist cause under Abdel Nasser's leadership in the 1950s and 1960s. But that did not mean that tribalism and sectarianism were erased. They were too deeply ingrained to disappear; they simply retreated into the recesses of people's consciousness. Once Arab nationalism began to suffer reverses and setbacks, and Abdel Nasser's ability to work his magic came into question, all the particularistic, anti-national tendencies reemerged and even surged to the forefront.

Although Adeed talks about 'radical Islam', as the last competitor of Arab nationalism, how he explains it, this 'radical' Islam is closer to what others have called political Islam or religious nationalism ('Radical' Islam is usually used to describe militant Islam). Political Islam and Arab nationalism share many myths. The glory and grandeur of Arab nation happened after Arabs accepted Islam and Islam is empty without Arab contribution.

In one sense, this competition is surprising. The vast majority of Arabs are Muslims, and the most glorious periods of Arab history occurred during the dazzling medieval Islamic empires. Similarly, all Muslims, moderates or radicals, could not but admit the central role of the Arabs in their religion. After all, Islam was born in the Arabian Peninsula, the Prophet Muhammad was Arab, and God's message was revealed in Arabic. One would think that the two social movements would share a cooperative relationship.

Instead, it was downright hostile. Arab nationalists, from Husri to Abdel Nasser and Michel Aflaq, founder and philosopher of the Baath Party, accepted the special place that Islam occupied within the Arab nationalist movement. But they stressed only those aspects of Islam that were moral and spiritual in nature. They resolutely rejected Islam's political and constitutional implications and insisted on its complete subordination to Arab nationalism. The nationalists vehemently argued that it was not religious but linguistic and historical ties that would knit the Arab nation into a cohesive whole.

Religious nationalists, of course, could not accept religious loyalty being relegated by ethnolinguistic loyalty. They denounced Arab nationalists and claimed Arab nationalism means denying the primacy of Islam/God/Prophet. Adeed, in the following section, only talks about militants but there were many more Arab Muslims who silently disliked Arab nationalism than those who attacked it militarily.

This was sheer blasphemy to the radical Muslim groups, and nationalists became the target of these groups' jihad. The concept of jihad, holy struggle, was central to the lexicon of Islamic militancy. Jihad was to be waged against the perceived enemies of Islam—i.e., all those who would try to infuse Muslim society with alien and blasphemous ideas, imported primarily from the West. To the Muslim radicals, perhaps the greatest offenders were the secular nationalists, who propagated ethnicity at the expense of religion and advocated the separation of Islam from politics.

Adeed then talks about causes of Arab nationalism failure. But let's leave it for some other time. 

Is Britain a Christian country?

I have not thought that I would write about Great Britain on this blog. But British Prime Minister David Cameron wrote an interesting, though controversial, article in Church Times (See My Faith in Church of England), a publication that proudly declares itself as' the world's Anglican newspaper'. In this article, he argued that Christians should be more confident, more ambitious and more evangelical about their faith. Some of the more interesting parts for our purpose are copied below:

Some people feel that in this ever more secular age we shouldn't talk about these things. I completely disagree. I believe we should be more confident about our status as a Christian country, more ambitious about expanding the role of faith-based organisations, and, frankly, more evangelical about a faith that compels us to get out there and make a difference to people's lives.

And

But that doesn't mean the Church of England doesn't matter to me or people like me: it really does. I like its openness, I deeply respect its national role, and I appreciate its liturgy, and the architecture and cultural heritage of its churches. My parents spent countless hours helping to support and maintain the village church that I grew up next to, and my Oxfordshire constituency has churches - including some medieval masterpieces - that take your breath away with their beauty, simplicity, and serenity. They are a vital part of Britain's living history.

Religious nationalism and Britain today seem difficult to imagine together, notwithstanding what happened in the past. British nationalism was once based on religious faith. Many laws were based on Anglican Church or Christian commandments and Church regularly influenced foreign and domestic policies. Not only non-Christians but even non-Anglicans were persecuted and not allowed to follow their faith openly. Non-Anglicans were also barred by law from important posts in the realm. The monarch was the head (supreme governor) of the Anglican Church and took his/her duties as 'defender of the faith' (against other faiths/liberal ideas) very seriously.

Source: Anglican Church Embraces Working Relationship with Church of England

Though British nationalism today has lost its religious basis, British monarch (Queen Elizabeth II) is still head of the Anglican Church and Britain has an official church and state religion. As many as twenty-six bishops and archbishops are members of the British Parliament (House of Lords). These 'Lords Spiritual' not only say prayers but also take part in the proceedings. According to Church of England (as Anglican Church is called in England), these lords perform an important function in the House of Lords (See Bishops in the House of Lords):

Their presence in the Lords is an extension of their general vocation as bishops to preach God's word and to lead people in prayer. Bishops provide an important independent voice and spiritual insight to the work of the Upper House and, while they make no claims to direct representation, they seek to be a voice for all people of faith, not just Christians.     

So, is Britain a Christian country as PM Cameron says? There is no denying the fact that majority of British people are Christians so in that sense, it can be called a Christian country ( See Religion in England and Wales 2011)


In Great Britain, (See We believe in God)

Certainly, Britain is not a Christian country in the sense that Christianity influences affairs of state as for example Islam in Iran or Saudi Arabia? So, what Cameron means? The way Cameron explains his concept of Christian country appears innocuous. Who can disagree with religion's (or Anglican Christianity's) utility as psychological support; motivator to help others and to lead a moral life. Church's role in social welfare, health and education cannot be denied. So, why was his article controversial?

More than fifty prominent Britishers answered this question and let me quote them directly (See David Cameron fosters division by calling Britain a 'Christian country’) 

SIR – We respect the Prime Minister’s right to his religious beliefs and the fact that they necessarily affect his own life as a politician. However, we object to his characterisation of Britain as a “Christian country” and the negative consequences for politics and society that this engenders.

Apart from in the narrow constitutional sense that we continue to have an established Church, Britain is not a “Christian country”. Repeated surveys, polls and studies show that most of us as individuals are not Christian in our beliefs or our religious identities.
At a social level, Britain has been shaped for the better by many pre-Christian, non-Christian, and post-Christian forces. We are a plural society with citizens with a range of perspectives, and we are a largely non-religious society.

Constantly to claim otherwise fosters alienation and division in our society. Although it is right to recognise the contribution made by many Christians to social action, it is wrong to try to exceptionalise their contribution when it is equalled by British people of different beliefs. This needlessly fuels enervating sectarian debates that are by and large absent from the lives of most British people, who do not want religions or religious identities to be actively prioritised by their elected government.

Sending people to heaven by force or a whip

A recent controversy in Iran brought into focus the use of the state to enforce religion, a tactic used by states based on religious nationalism.

According to Al-monitor, six young men and women Iranians were arrested after they posted a video of them dancing to Pharrell Williams’ hit song, Happy (See Rouhani, critics debate 'path to heaven' ). President Rouhani, who doesn't control justice department, was not amused and remarked, 

Do not interfere so much in people’s lives, even out of compassion. … Let people choose their own path to heaven. We cannot send people to heaven by force or a whip. 

Source: Rouhani encourages political freedom in Iran

Conservative clergy establishment that controls justice department and is wary of Rouhani's overtures to the West, blasted him for these remarks and not only questioned his excellent clerical credentials but also accused of moving away from Imam Khomeini's path ( See Rouhani accused of trying to separate religion, administration). Hard-line cleric Ayatollah Mohammad-Taghi Mesbah Yazdi, a member of the Assembly of Experts and director of the Imam Khomeini Education and Research Institute in Qom said, 

That some say the administration does not have a responsibility for the people’s religion, but that the administration’s only responsibility was to remove the sanctions — and not through resistance but through diplomacy — is against Imam [Khomeini]’s path. Did Imam start an uprising because of sanctions and the economy? Did this many martyrs sacrifice their lives for their stomachs and sanctions?

Saudi Arabian and Pakistani states have also tried to send people to heaven using a whip. Under They have tried to legislate and enforce good behavior. Good behavior or good religious behavior, however, can only come from people's own free will. Enforcement usually leads to false piety and hypocrisy. 

In Pakistan, during the last two decades, there has been a manifold increase in people travelling to Saudi Arabia for visits to the holy sites. In a poor country in need of foreign exchange, millions of dollars are spent each year on these travels. Similarly, millions more are spent to arrange festivals relating to Prophet Muhammad (PBUH)'s birthday. Although I do not have statistics, generally it is agreed that more people are praying in mosques than before. But has Pakistanis also witnessed a corresponding increase in piety or spirituality or humility or a decrease in fraud or corruption in the last two decades? Very few Pakistanis can answer this question in affirmative. So, Islamization has only lead to superficial and overt religiosity. As Rouhani said, 'whip' has not moved them any closer to God or heaven.      

India-Israel ties under Modi: Can Jewish and Hindu nationalism fraternity help?

San Diego Jewish World yesterday published an article on the excellent prospects of Indo-Israel relationship after the recent coming to power of the BJP government (See India and Israel strengthen ties. Indian commentators have also agreed with the predictions. See India 2014 Elections: Narendra Modi, Israel's Best Friend In South Asia). Several reasons were given by author Sean Savage as to why the bilateral relations could see an upsurge under Prime Minister Modi.

First, there is a talk of similarities between the two countries: 

Differences in size and culture aside, India and Israel have many modern and historical similarities. Hinduism and Judaism are among the world’s oldest existing religions, and both share ethno-religious components that set them apart from other major faiths. At the same time, both religions have complicated systems of laws, purity codes, and dietary restrictions that define their communities. In modern times, both India and Israel achieved independence from Great Britain during the late 1940s, after long internal struggles and bloody partition plans.

But these similarities didn't initially result in close ties as Nehru and later Congress Party governments thought Israel as a sign of Western imperialism (colonial policy of divide and rule) and supported Palestinian struggle. So, due to Congress Party's 'mentality', India supported Palestinians from the 1940s to 1980s. However, during the last two decades, both countries have not only become close trading partners but also joint collaborators in military research.

Source: India & Israel Partner To Strengthen Startup Ecosystem

The reasons given for the improvement in relations under Modi are mostly related to the religious nationalism of BJP (particularly of Modi) and its affinity with Israel and Bibi's Jewish nationalism. The author argues that Modi gives importance to his religion as Bibi does.

One of Modi’s first public gestures as prime minister was to visit the Ganges River, one of holiest places in Hinduism, where he promised to restore the heavily polluted river to its former glory. Over the years, Netanyahu has taken a similar approach, focusing on securing Israel’s Jewish heritage sites and insisting that Jerusalem remain under Jewish sovereignty.

Due to this attitude, both and Modi are criticized in the West, which may bring them closer.

Modi, meanwhile, has garnered significant attention for his strong Hindu nationalism, resulting in criticism from the West—especially for Hindu-Muslim riots in Gujarat in 2002. Yet his views in that area may also allow him to form an ideological bond with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who is similarly chastised in some Western countries.

It is also mentioned that Israel supported India during its Kargil conflict with Pakistan in 1999 and Israeli companies invested billions of dollars in Gujarat when Modi was Chief Minister there. Modi's foreign policy team is also considered Israel friendly. What is not directly mentioned, although implied, is the fact that the main enemies of both Hindu and Jewish nationalism are Muslims. Internally, Hindu and Jewish nationalism want to deny basic civil rights to their Muslim minorities and externally they have difficult relations with their Muslim neighbors and face terror attacks. These are probably the 'ideological affinities' mentioned in the article.

The new Indian prime minister “might warm up considerably to Benjamin Netanyahu, say, driven by ideological affinities on some issues,” said Jawaharlal Nehru University’s Ningthoujam.

So, does it matter for Indo-Israeli relations that Modi is a Hindu nationalist?

I think yes it matters but probably not much. Where it matters i.e. in security/military affairs, Indo-Israeli relations are already very close as accepted by Ningthoujam in his own article (See India-Israel Defense Cooperation). Incremental improvements aside, the next level of bilateral relations in these sectors can be a defense pact but that is never on the cards because of India's need for Middle Eastern 'Muslim' energy resources. So, the close cooperation will continue and increase but under wraps.  

Economic ties, despite efforts, have not been very close to the potential of improvement is greater there. Can Modi's regime be a game changer? Yes, it is possible and odds-on but does it has something to do with Modi being a Hindu nationalist? Probably not. 

Barrington's Five Variants of post- independence nationalism

Lowell Barrington in his book After Independence: Making and Protecting in Post-colonial and Post-communist States (2006)  differentiates between pre-independence and post-independence nationalism and identifies five possible variants of post-independence nationalism. He argues that all nations have to decide about their territorial (which areas are part of the nation?) and membership (which groups are part of the nation?) boundaries. The five variants show different nationalisms emphasize different boundaries and their relationship with the state. The first two variants focused on territorial boundaries or national 'homeland' while the other three focus on national identity or membership boundaries. 

1. External Territory Claiming Nationalism: Under this variant, nationalism defines nation as existing outside the boundaries of the state. There is a strong belief that an emotionally important part of the homeland remains outside the borders. 
2. Sovereignty Protecting Nationalism: Nationalism here is under threat from minorities as nation is considered smaller than the territory it is holding. Thus, it is the opposite of the first variant.
3. Civic Nation Building nationalism: If ‘who is the nation’ answered in a such a way that all group inside the new state are included -- a relatively civic way -- an overarching national identity is developed. Nationalism becomes a nation-building project.
4. Ethnic Nation Protecting Nationalism: Majority ethnic group (sometimes dominant minority groups) may still feel under threat after independence. Independence is nor perceived to have brought cultural security and so nationalists may reject civic nation-building and continue struggle as ethnic group. In such a state, minorities are discriminated.
5. Co-National Protecting Nationalism: Ethnic nationalism, while discriminating at home, may extend itself to protecting co-ethnics or co-nationals in other states. Nationalists may mobilize people by claiming that co-nationals are being physical threatened or being economically, socially or politically discriminated and so need their help. 

Where does religious nationalism fit in these variants?

Religious nationalism does not fit in any of these variants. However, it is very close to the last type. It discriminates at home against religious minorities while calling for protection of coreligionists in other countries. Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Israel are example of this co-national protecting nationalism. Barrington argues that these types are not mutually exclusive and can be combined. So, we can argue that religious nationalism of Pakistan and Israel are examples of combination of first and last type as both lay claims on external territory. The religious nationalism of Iran and Saudi Arabia, however, could be considered examples of sovereignty protecting nationalism and nation protecting nationalism before their interventions in Syria. In short, religious nationalism can fit in all of the types except civic nation building nationalism.  

Rising Religious Nationalism in Turkey

It has been argued that Turkish nationalism has three different strands: civic nationalism based on Turkish constitution; ethnolinguistic nationalism based on Turkish language and ethnicity; and religious nationalism based on Sunni Islam. Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, the founder of Turkey, mainly meandered between the first two types. He tried to bring all groups living in Turkey together and develop an inclusive nationalism based on his modernist rhetoric. But he also promoted Turkish language and Turkish ethnicity and supported research that tried to promote Turks as the group that brought civilization to other groups in the world. To add to the complexity, despite his aggressive secularism, modernism and persecution of Islamic groups, Ataturk (and his allies) implicitly supported Sunni Islam as one of the markers of Turkish identity. So, it is not difficult to find support for all three strands of Turkish nationalism in the founding fathers' decisions and early day of Turkish Republic.

A book that discusses the three strands of Turkish nationalism

Source: The Top Hat, the Grey Wolf, and the Crescent: Turkish Nationalism and the Turkish Republic

The above discussion should, however, not be construed as proclaiming the equal importance of all three strands. Civic nationalism was dominant in the early 1920s but this period did not last long. Ataturk imagined a socially engineered nation out of the motley of groups present in Turkey. The state told the people how they should speak; how they should dress; how they should pray; how they should write; and even what they should call themselves. People were forced to accept these edicts and not surprisingly many rebelled, especially those who lived on the margins of Turkish society, away from the main Anatolian heartland. Kurds and Alevis took part in these rebellions and bore the brunt of an increasingly repressive response from the Turkish state. Ethnic nationalism became dominant as the state decided to suppress any kind of individuality, whether it was ethnic, linguistic or religious. There was only one nation in Turkey and its characteristics were determined by the state. These characteristics were obviously much closer to what the dominant group (ethnic Turks) had or believed in. So, minority ethnic groups, minority religion and minority sects all lost their constitutional and legal freedoms. This situation continued till the late 1970s and resulted in much polarization, instability, and violence. Left-wing/communist and right-wing nationalist paramilitaries fought each other in all regions of Turkey, with almost twenty fatalities each day.  This made the state or deep state (as the powerful military establishment was called) realize that they cannot control all the societal fissures and resulting violence.

The military took direct control in 1980 through a coup and decided to make changes. To decrease the support of communism and left, it was decided to increase religious education and to accept it part of Turkish identity. However, the public role of religion was still abhorrent and more restrictions were introduced such as the ban on hijab in public universities. Despite these restrictions, this era is remembered as the start of religious nationalism in Turkey. Sunni Islam was always an implicit marker of Turkish national identity but after the 1980s, it started becoming more explicit. This change was called the 'Turkish-Islam Synthesis'. As William Armstrong writes in Hurriyat (See The Rise of Political Islam in Turkey)       

The Turkish-Islamic Synthesis was originally formulated by the right-wing nationalist Intellectual Hearths (Aydınlar Ocakları) in the 1970s, but after the 1980 coup it rose to become the de facto state ideology. In practice, this meant more than just General Kenan Evren reciting Quranic verses during public speeches. It also meant huge budget increases for the Religious Affairs Directorate, rapid building of new mosques and opening of Quran courses, the introduction of mandatory religion classes in state schools (only on Sunni Islam), more tolerance for religious bureaucrats, active encouragement of religious organizations, and a widening of opportunities for graduates of religious imam hatip high schools.

Military hoped to manipulate Islam without letting it go out of its control but the socialization of masses in a religious environment, supported and funded by the state itself, led to changes beyond military's  imagination. Merton's law of unintended consequences came into play and Sunni Islam gradually became a very important part of the Turkish identity. Right-wing and Left-wing parties gradually gave way to the winning of election by an Islamist party in 1996. Although that party was forced out by the military within a year, the power of religious nationalism continued to grow due to increase in Islamic-oriented media, foundations and businesses. Eventually, AK Party, whose leadership had been trained in Islamist parties, came to power.

AK Party (Freedom and Justice Party) win brought the reformed Islamists to power. They claimed to be like Christian conservative parties of the Western Europe and pledged to work with the secular establishment, consisting of the President, judiciary and the military. Although, in their initial years, AKP didn't take an overtly religious step, the very presence of AKP at the helm gave confidence to media, educational institutions and businesses run by the religious Anatolian Turks. Good economic management helped AKP win elections repeated eventually controlling the presidency, judiciary and military.

Religious nationalism implies that national identity is now based on religion. This logically means that religion is now not only a personal matter (between a person and her God or gods) but a matter of law and state. Therefore, who is a (true) member of the state religion becomes a big issue. Tellingly, defining a true Muslim is a big issue in Turkey now. While there is hope that Kurdish issue (which is mainly an ethnolinguistic issue) will be resolved soon, Alevi issue is raising its head. The state defines Islam to include Alevis as deviant Sunni Muslims but Alevis consider themselves as members of different sect/religion. Everybody from Prime Minister to opposition leaders to religious leaders is weighing in (See What does Erdogan mean by 'Alevis without Ali'?)

Moreover, there is fighting between AKP and Gulanists, followers of an influential preacher Fethullah Gulen, one-time allies of the AKP. The witch-hunts and inquisitions mean that religious nationalism is rising (See Turkey’s intra-Islamic witch hunt).      

American Secularism: A historical view of separation of the Church and the State in the US

Introduction

Religions are part of every society’s makeup and even in the most atheistic of societies, one can find more than one religion. The conflict between state and religion, therefore, is always present and states have to come up with a religious policy to deal with this conflict in a consistent way. Given the power religion has over its adherents, it may not be a surprise that most countries regulate religion. Some countries have state religions, while others are hostile toward all religions and can be termed as anti-religious. The US has long been considered an outlier in the developed world in terms of religious attendance. However, not many people know that the US is also an outlier in terms of church-state relationship (Mewes 2002).  

Fox (2008) did a survey of 175 states of the world and concluded that most of the states are not neutral toward religions and are involved in religion regulation. Almost one in four states had official religions and another two-fifths of the countries supported some religions more than others. Around 8% were hostile to all religions and only 3 (less than 2%) supported all religions equally. The US was one of the three states which supported all religions equally. Another measure, more strict than government involvement in religion, was SRAS (Separation of State and Religion). US was only country of the world which neither restricted/regulated the practicing of minority or majority religions, nor passed any religious legislation, proving that the church-state relationship in the US is unique in the world.

The traditional US principle of separation of church and state is based on the First Amendment of the US Constitution and prohibition of the requirements of religious tests for qualification of any office/ trust.

Wall of Separation between Chruch and State

Source: Illinois Family Institute (https://illinoisfamily.org/religious/obama-bulldozes-jeffersons-wall-of-separation/)

There are two religious clauses of the First Amendment. The Establishment Clause states, ‘Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion’. The Free Exercise Clause states, ‘or prohibiting the free exercise thereof’. 

The article 6 of the US Constitution dealt with the requirement of religious tests 

‘… no religious Test shall ever be required as a Qualification to any Office or public Trust under the United States’.

These two clauses and article 6 have been interpreted differently by judges in different eras. Judges have agreed on the minimum application of the Establishment Clause, which is that there would be no established or endorsed church. Beyond this, however, there is no agreement. Similarly, there is controversy about how Free Exercise Clause should be interpreted (Long 2012). 

The US in the Eighteenth Century

To fully understand these injunctions of the US Constitution, one has to study the circumstances in which the Framers of the constitution were operating in late eighteenth century. The following discussion will demonstrate that there was a conflict between an elite, which believed in religious freedom, and masses which did not. In the US Constitution, the elite managed to have their way and religious freedom was guaranteed, without any provisos. However, except for clear restrictions on religious tests in oaths, there was nothing specific about religious freedom in the Constitution which allowed the lower level governments to move towards church-state separation enshrined in the Constitution at their own pace. The necessity for immediate change was further downgraded by the actions of the Supreme Court which did not feel the need to enforce the Bill of Rights. 

Religious diversity

Many of the earliest Europeans who immigrated to the US were religious dissenters. Pilgrims, Puritans, Quakers, Huguenots and many other came to the US after being persecuted in their own countries. Facing persecution in their own countries, unfortunately, didn’t make them accept the importance of religious liberty and many of these groups (e.g. Puritans) tried to persecute others for not following what they believed. 

These efforts, however, gradually lost their force as colonial America became more and more diverse. This diversity in religious practice was not only the result of immigration from different corners of Europe but also changes/divisions in many denominations/sects as grew in the US (Holmes 2006). Another important element in religious diversity of the colonial America was the dominance of different denominations in different colonies. Despite being part of British Empire, major sections of populations in many colonies didn’t follow the Anglican Church. 

Even for someone, who didn’t believe in religious liberty, it was obvious that choosing one religion/sect and making others accept it without fear and fight was impossible (Wright 2010).     

Founding Fathers, Sons of the Enlightenment

European Enlightenment philosophy had enormous influence on the making of the US Constitution. Many of the most important members of the Constitutional Convention and other important personalities of American Revolution were inspired by the Enlightenment thinkers like John Locke, Rousseau, Voltaire, and Montesquieu etc. The ideas of limited government, natural rights, separation of powers and religious liberty were all ideas first popularized by the Enlightenment philosophers. Locke and Montesquieu's writings have been regarded as having the most influence on the US Constitution. Persecution because of one’s religious or other beliefs was an idea close to the Enlightenment thinkers like Voltaire, who himself suffered, and this idea influenced Jefferson, Washington, Madison, and others. 

There is an ongoing controversy on what the Framers truly wanted. Did they want high or low wall of separation? This question assumes that all the Framers thought alike which is implausible. Munoz (2009) has shown though none of the three main founders accepted the strict separation of church and state, Jefferson, Washington, and Madison had each a different view about the relationship between church and state. According to Munoz, ‘There is no single church-state position that can claim the exclusive authority of America’s founding history and that no one Founder’s position can be assumed to reflect the original meanings of the religion clauses’.

Ironically, Thomas Jefferson, who coined the term "wall of separation," allowed the use of federal funds to build churches and to support Christian missionary work.

Religious intolerance

Though circumstances in the colonial America at the time of independence were better than the past and also better than many European countries, it was still a religiously intolerant society. Therefore, it would not be correct to think of religious liberty as a popular concept outside the elite that Founding Father belonged to. Anti-Catholicism was prevalent in newly independent America and there were a large number of laws which restricted the ability of Catholics, Jews, and atheists Americans to live as normal citizens (Davis 2010).    

State Rights

Finally, State Rights was another idea which favored religious liberty, although, at the time of the making of the US Constitution, it didn’t stop states from persecuting or prescribing atheists etc. Due to the diversity of the state’s views on religious liberty and inclination of the Framers to leave most of the powers to the state governments, the original constitution didn’t have much on religious freedom except Article 6 and even after First Amendment was added, it was not enforced for almost a century.  

Church-State Relationship in Practice 

Though the US Constitution didn’t see many changes in terms of its provisions relating to the church-state relationship, the way constitution was applied changed immensely during the two hundred and fifty years of US history. One important thing to be kept in mind is the federal nature of the US government where most of the action happens at the local and state level and the federal government has few tools to affect anything happening at lower levels. Changing church-state relationship at the lower levels was particularly difficult as, on this issue, there was neither agreement in the Congress and nor an appetite to touch this sensitive subject among the legislators. Only Supreme Court had the powers to build the wall of separation that it later did. So, for studying the church-state relationship, rulings of the Court are very important (Jelen 2010).

Looking at the important US Supreme Court decisions relating to religion, one is surprised to see that the first important decision relating to religion was delivered in 1879. Compare it with the 1960s, when seven landmark cases relating to religion were decided by the US Supreme Court. The difference is not because of any constitutional change but because of the changing nature of the American society and the Supreme Court.  

Three periods can be distinguished in the US history in terms of church-state relations.

1776-1868

During this period, the federal government and courts generally maintained separation between church and state in their own sphere of influence. However, federal officers and judges did not apply the separation at the state level.  They considered it a prerogative of the states to decide their relationship with the churches. Therefore, while many states applied the First Amendment whole heartedly, others didn’t and there were no consequences. Maryland raised taxes to support ministers, Massachusetts legislature approved the idea of multiple establishments, and Pennsylvanian officials had to take an oath, declaring their belief in God. Some form of religious establishment continued in many states long after the start of the 19th century (Wright 2010).

It is true that at federal government level, separation of church and state was reiterated in treaty with Tripoli and in the delivery of post on Sundays but federal government influence was minimal in the first half of 19th century and what mattered to people were policies at state and local level where state-religion separation was most often not present. The Supreme Court, the one branch which could have done something about it, was more concerned about state right, rather than individual rights. Justice Marshall opined in Barron v. Baltimore (1933) that the Bill of Rights should not be used for limiting state powers. (Wright 2010)

1869-1939

After the Civil War, 14th Amendment in the US Constitution was passed which among other things made the Bill of Rights applicable to the states of the Union.   

The relevant section of the 14th Amendment of the US Constitution states, ‘..nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law..’

It was only after the passage of 14th Amendment that Supreme Court started applying the Bill of Rights to the states as part of the due process required. This process of ‘incorporation’ of Bill of Rights was, however, a slow process as the Supreme Court was still very sensitive to the local laws. So while Supreme Court gave some decisions applying the Bill of Rights, none of them were related to Establishment Clause or Free Exercise Clause. In fact, the only decision related to religion that Supreme Court gave during this period was related to a federal law. Supreme Court decided in Reynolds v. United States (1879) that Free Exercise Clause allowed universal freedom of belief but not freedom of action which is restricted.   

1940 onwards    

During the 1940s, what has been called ‘the New Deal era’, the Supreme Court broadened its interpretation of the federal government powers. This not only helped the New Deal laws but also had implications for the wall of separation between church and state as both Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause were interpreted more broadly. Justice Hugo Black, an associate Supreme Court judge, was instrumental in bringing this change. The following figure shows the difference between how "wall" was interpreted in the eighteenth century and in the mid-twentieth century.


The two walls of separation

Source: The Gospel Coalition (https://blogs.thegospelcoalition.org/justintaylor/2015/07/16/the-urban-legend-that-thomas-jefferson-believed-in-a-wall-separating-church-and-state/)

The church-state relationship during this era is discussed more broadly in the following section. 

US Government v. Religious Freedom

The need of religious freedom and state often do not conflict. The regular conflict between state and religious freedom is characteristic of only those states which have a state religion and give preference to their state religion over other religions or over atheism or agnosticism. These states usually have laws which make religious conversion difficult (unless it is to the state religion) and put additional liabilities on religious minorities. These states thus restrict an individual’s freedom of belief.

Most of the developed states, like the US, usually do not restrict individual’s freedom of belief and practice. Therefore, state, instead of restricting religious freedom in these countries, protects and promotes religious freedom. The conflicts that arise between religious freedom and such developed states are due to three reasons. First, a state has a responsibility to protect its citizens, especially those who are not in a position to protect themselves. If widely accepted obligation of the state comes into conflict with religious freedom, then religious freedom has to be restricted. Second, a state has to decide when fundamental freedoms of two persons are in conflict. While the fundamentals of the religious freedom are agreed upon, the outer reaches of the religious freedom are hotly contested. Finally, a state may force on its citizen some restrictions, which it considers absolutely necessary for social good. These restrictions are usually very few. 

US experience

Religious freedom in the US was restricted in the 18th and 19th centuries. As discussed above, state restricted the freedom of religious minorities in public sphere. Many states had some form of established religion till late in the 19th century. It was only in the 1830s that Jews were allowed to be elected and vote (Maryland State Archives 2013). Add to it the long history of burning of black churches and restrictions on African-American population of the US, which the Southern states governments, explicitly or implicitly, supported even well into the twentieth century (Brooks 1922, SimmsParis 1998). The issue was, of course, racial hatred but it did make it difficult for African-Americans to participate in their religious practices without fear. So, historically, the US has not done well in terms of protecting the religious freedom of certain sections of its society and despite the apparent legal religious freedom, Christian/Protestant ideas have circumscribed what ‘others’ can do (Sehat 2010). The reason for restriction on religious freedom was, however, not needs of the government but social prejudice.

It is only after the Second World War that major restrictions on religious freedom were based on the need of government. The US government and Supreme Court had to violate one in favor of other in a balancing act. Major areas of disagreement are explained below

Public Schools

A large number of Supreme Court cases relate to public schools where community and individual rights come into conflict on a daily basis. In a large number of cases, Supreme Court has made it clear that any type of religious prayer, instruction and speech goes against religious freedom. Even normal actions, such as giving gifts to one’s class fellows, were denied based on their link with a particular religion.   

Vaccination

The issue of exemption from vaccination based on religious belief is a difficult one. On one side is the religious freedom of a group of people which feel violated and sinned against. On the other side are millions of others which have protected themselves by being vaccinated based on the current medical scholarship but are still vulnerable because of the group which has decided to opt out of this program. In two cases Jacobson v. Massachusetts (1905) and Zucht v. King (1922), Supreme Court decided that the protection of the community is more important than religious freedom of a group (Novak 2005).

Harm to Children

There are many cases in which state restricted the freedom of religion of parents to protect their children from harm. The case of Rebecca Corneau, who was jailed for not revealing the location of her infant baby after one of her previous baby was found starved to death, resulted in a large controversy as it pitted the strange alliance of feminists and religious rights against the state (Wald 2003, Nicilosi 2000).  

Religious Freedom v. other freedoms

A number of cases involving Jehovah Witnesses’ proselytizing practices brought in conflict religious freedom and other freedoms e.g. right of individual privacy or social peace. Although most of these cases were decided on the basis of Free Speech Clause, it brought to a sharp picture the fact that religious practices of some can cause difficulties for many. Another type of cases was related to the workplace. It is hard to unpack Supreme Court decisions and decide whether the court favored religious freedom of an individual or gave preference to ordinary laws/practice. 

Conclusion

The US state has done well in sufficiently accommodating practices of religious minorities. The branch which has most contributed to this atmosphere of religious freedom is the judicial branch. Since the 1940s, Supreme Court and other courts have forced other organs of state to not only stop actions which restrict the rights of a particular religion but also forbidden most religious actions in the public sphere. Critics can point to few decisions which went the opposite way but nobody can deny that the trend is toward more religious freedom. Two recent developments, however, put the future of these gains in doubt. First, 9/11 has started a debate among Americans about whether they have to choose between security and freedom. Many commentators and organizations declare it a false choice but it is difficult to deny that religious practices and freedoms of religious minorities (especially Muslims) are now in sharp focus. The controversy about the building of a mosque near 9/11 site shows emotions can easily be whipped up. Second, the conservative bent of the current Supreme Court (which has been called the most conservative since the 1930s) has shown that if there is a permanent conservative majority in the Supreme Court then many of the liberal gains of the last century could be declared unnecessary or unconstitutional (Chemerinsky 2010). 

Afraid of Ahmadinejad?

On June 4, Al-Monitor correspondent in Tehran reported about a possible return of former Iranian President Ahmadinejad (See Is Ahmadinejad plotting a comeback?).

On June 3, former Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad made his first major speech since leaving office last year. He praised Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, who died 25 years ago on June 4, and said that Iran’s enemies have not yet realized that Iranians would defend the Iranian revolution “until the last breath.” Ahmadinejad, however, did not speak about the one thing that has been a source of speculation: his political return.On May 31, his brother Davoud Ahmadinejad said that the chances of the former president running for the presidency again were “very high.”while Davoud’s comments did not receive the usual Ahmadinejad-type attention, it seems that other forces in Iran are taking his return to politics seriously, and are intent on preventing it.The arrest of two political figures with close ties to Ahmadinejad, as well as the constant criticism directed at the former president by some of his own former ministers, indicates that the possibility of Ahmadinejad returning to the political arena is being taken seriously by the country's right-wing political elite.

Source: Is Ahmadinejad Coming Back In From The Cold?

However, correspondent also reported that Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei continues to give importance to Ahmadinejad.

Although Ahmadinejad's faction was eliminated from politics following the presidential elections, Khamenei appointed Ahmadinejad as a member in the Expediency Discernment Council. Also, last fall, during the mourning ceremony of Ashoura, he was sitting next to the supreme leader. Two months ago, other images were published showing Ahmadinejad and Khamenei next to each other during the second night of the mourning ceremony of "Fatimiyah."

What these images might mean is that, in spite of his disagreements with Ahmadinejad, Khamenei still views him as an influential political figure or that at least Ahmadinejad is not yet completely removed from the list of people close to Khamenei.

Given this tacit support by Khamenei, neither Ahmadinejad nor his supporters seem deterred. Davari said in April, “I assure you that currently we do not have an organized plan for the next elections. However, this might change in the future.” He continued, "If these anti-people policies of the current administration continue, then I think Ahmadinejad will restart his political activities to defend the people's rights."

That right-wing clerics, ministers and Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (Sepah-e-Pasdaran-e Enqelab-e Eslami) are against former president's return is understandable. Though a loyal protege of the Supreme Leader during his first term, Ahmadinejad became increasingly independent in his second term and tried to chart a more nationalistic and less religious course (See Missing Mahmoud?). He even tried to defy the Supreme Leader and contested his authority. The final act of Ahmadinejad's betrayal was trying to get his chief of staff, Esfandiar Rahim Mashaei, elected as President in 2013 presidential elections. Mashaei was intensely disliked by the right wing because of his promotion of Iranian territorial nationalism, among other things (Mashaei was eventually disqualified by the right wing Guardian Council that vets all presidential candidates) (See Who's Afraid of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad?).

The question is why the Supreme Leader is giving importance to Ahmadinejad thereby giving confidence to his supporters and fueling rumors while also ordering (or at least consenting to) the arrest of Ahmadinejad's supporters. Judiciary and police are in control of the Supreme Leader so the arrests could not have happened without his knowledge. Some analysts argue that the Supreme Leader is supporting Ahmadinejad to keep the pressure on the new Rouhani government:

As BBC Persian analyst Hossein Bastani noted, it's highly unlikely that former President Mohammad Khatami would be allowed to sit near the supreme leader in public. Khatami, a reformist, was never considered to be close to Khamenei, who publicly expressed support for Ahmadinejad's anti-Western stances. 

Bastani believes that Khamenei could use Ahmadinejad to put pressure on Iran's new government team, which has been accused by hard-liners of giving in to the West and the United States.(See Is Ahmadinejad Coming Back In From The Cold?)

However, there are many other ways to keep the Rouhani government on the "straight path." The reason Khamenei is courting Ahmadinejad perhaps lies in what Ahmadinejad represents. He has impressive nationalist credentials and is also religiously devout. The question is why Iranians need the rule of the clergy (velayat-e-faqih doctrine) when they can elect people like Ahmadinejad? The whole argument that only clergy can save Iran and Islam from external threats becomes doubtful. Ahmadinejad has not helped his case by claiming to be in communication with the Hidden Imam (thus debunking clergy legitimacy because they claim to rule in the name of the Hidden Imam) and also promoting pre-Islamic Iran (thus trying to harness the votes of those who believe in territorial/Persian nationalism). 

So, the Supreme Leader is perhaps trying to impress on the former president that he can enjoy a leisurely secure retirement during which he would be feted at the state functions and given due respect (even perhaps consulted) or he can think of running again and make his and his friend's lives difficult. The choice is yours. Ahmadinejad!