Women can drive in Saudi Arabia but is it really a big change?

Saudi Arabia is not the place from where one can expect good news for women. It is the most restrictive country for women in the world. It's not for nothing that it has been called the most masculine state and anti-woman kingdom. Though many blame Islam for women plight in Saudi Arabia, there are around fifty other Muslim-majority countries in the world and none of these countries control and regulate women lives as much as the Saudi state.Those blaming Islam for the Saudi state's misogyny, however, have one powerful supporter inside the kingdom, the Saudi state, which justifies its invidious discrimination of women on the basis of Islam, Sharia and tradition.

So, knowing Saudi state's general puritanism and its stance on gender equality, it was a surprise to read a series of news that advance the empowerment of Saudi women. Following are the positive news received over the last two months:

• King Salman issued a historic decree removing the ban on issuance of driving licenses to women. Women will be able to drive by June 2018 (See King Salman’s decree allows women to drive in Saudi Arabia):
• Iman Bint Abdullah was appointed as Assistant Mayor of the Al-Khobar municipality, with special responsibility for information technology. She is the first Saudi woman to hold such a senior position (See First Saudi woman appointed as assistant mayor);
• Fatimah Baeshen was appointed as the first female spokesperson for the Saudi Embassy in Washington DC (See First spokeswoman appointed at Saudi embassy in Washington);
• As part of the independence day celebrations, Saudi women were allowed to enter the King Fahd International Stadium (Riyadh) for the first time to attend a pageant operetta. They were also allowed to attend a concert in Jeddah (See National celebrations open Saudi sports stadium to women for [the] first time);
• Saudi Ministry of Education issued a decree that will allow girls to participate in physical education classes for the first time. The government also agreed, again for the first time, to issue female gym licences. Female gyms previously operated as salons and faced threats of closure (See Saudi Arabia will finally allow girls to take PE — that's a big deal).

Besides openings for Saudi women, the Saudi government also proclaimed at least one future relaxation for foreign women. In August, it was announced that a new 50 island Red Sea luxury resort would be built and this resort would be “governed by laws on par with international standards.” The government did not explicitly say it but the meaning of "international standards" was mostly interpreted as freedom for women to wear whatever they like, including bikinis, at the resort (See Saudi Arabia to open luxury beach resort where women can wear bikinis).

So, why this change and why so fast? This was the kingdom which believed in evolution, not revolution. This was the kingdom where tradition and Wahhabi style Islam reigned supreme unfettered by modernity. Most analysts have pointed out that the force behind these changes is the new Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman. Since his father ascended to the throne in January 2015, he has gradually acquired more and more power. In the first cabinet of his father, Prince Mohammed was appointed Minister of Defense and he was also the head of the Royal Court. Also in January, he was named the chair of the newly established Council for Economic and Development Affairs. In April 2015, he was appointed Deputy Crown Prince and Second Deputy Prime Minister, just two heartbeats away from the throne. So after April 2015, he was controlling both economic and defence policies of the kingdom (For his pivotal role in the Yemen war see Saudi Arabian Nationalism, Religion and Yemen War, an earlier blog post).

A year later, "Mr. Everything," a name given to Prince Mohammed because of his all-pervasive influence (See Why Saudi's Mohammed bin Salman is 'Mr Everything'), presented Vision 2030, a roadmap for the Saudi economy and society for the next 15 years. In his final promotion, Prince Mohammed bin Salman was made Crown Prince and Deputy Prime Minister by his father in June 2017. 

There are several reasons why openings for the Saudi women are being linked to Prince Mohammed. First, he has said many times that he favors women joining the workforce. In 2016, when he was asked, "Do you think having a greater proportion of women in the workforce would be good for Saudi Arabia?" He replied, "No doubt. A large portion of my productive factors are unutilised. And I have population growth reaching very scary figures. Women’s work will help in both of these issues." Second, he is the main force behind the Vision 2030 which declares:

Saudi women are yet another great asset. With over 50 percent of our university graduates being female, we will continue to develop their talents, invest in their productive capabilities and enable them to strengthen their future and contribute to the development of our society and economy.

Third, the timing of the reforms is too difficult to ignore. In late June, Prince Mohammed vanquishes his last major rival (cousin and former Crown Prince Mohammed bin Naif) and becomes Crown Prince and in the next two months, a series of reforms happen. Finally, because of his failure to deliver a victory in the Yemen War, he wants a big win to consolidate his power and these changes can give him that, if he can manage the conservative Wahhabi religious establishment. 

Source: Saudi Arabia to allow women to obtain driving licences

The question is whether these changes are going to be a game changer for Saudi women or not. The major change is, of course, permission to drive. Many analysts have pointed out that while important, this change still does not give freedom to drive to Saudi women. After June 2018, Saudi women will still need to have consent from their male guardians:

The key change is that there is no longer any legal prohibition for women to drive. And nor, according to the statements of the formerly reluctant clerics, is there a basis for a ban in sharia law, which governs most aspects of Saudi society. The onus of decisions about whether women can sit behind the wheel has been shifted from the state to families.

Under repressive guardianship laws, male relatives have veto over whether wives or daughters can leave the home unaccompanied. While a woman can be granted a licence and is allowed to drive, a male family member can still stop her from doing so. (See Saudi Arabia: Prince Mohammed plays his biggest card yet)

Madawi Al-Rashid, a Suadi Arabian scholar, has argued not much is going to change. According to her, it is a "public relations stunt" and women are still going to be oppressed in Saudi Arabia and the changes have been solely done to mollify Western critics and get their support:

The Saudi state is one of the most male-dominated in the world. Now it is compelled to look as if it is treating women better to win over critics in the west. As a result, it has embarked on a series of cosmetic reforms...History is littered with dictators who have promoted women, from Turkey’s Atatürk, the Iranian Shah, Habib Bourguiba of Tunisia, and Hosni Mubarak in Egypt. Appearing to support women has won dictators applause, especially in the west, where women’s rights have become an axis against which to measure nations and evaluate regimes.

Today’s authoritarian regimes will win extra praise when they appear to be liberating Muslim women from the oppression of Islam. Saudi Arabia is no exception. Here, Muslim women are depicted either as survivors of their patriarchal religion or as heroes who are challenging such a dominant and primitive culture. Like their counterparts in Afghanistan, Egypt, Pakistan and elsewhere, Saudi women had been framed in this binary image. Dictators conveniently depict themselves as liberators of these downtrodden women while society is shown to be the oppressor. In particular, in recent times, Islam and sharia law are portrayed as the cause of women’s suffering.

Such a narrative is appealing to both Arab dictators and certain constituencies in the west. But allowing women to obtain a driving licence is little more than a public relations stunt designed to cement this notion of the Saudi regime as the liberator of women. (See Women are still not in the driving seat in Saudi Arabia)

Al-Rashid is correct in her assessment that Saudi women lives will not transform because of these few changes. However, she also argues that Saudi Royals are following Ataturk, Muhammad Reza Shah and Bourguiba and like them trying to please the West. If she is correct, this is a big change. It may not be a big change for the Saudi women but it is a metamorphosis for the Royals. Saudi Arabia is based on religious nationalism and Ataturk, Muhammad Reza Shah and Bourguiba were enemies of religious nationalism in their countries. These leaders derived their power by standing against the religious conservatives and Shariah while Saudi Royals justify their rule on the basis of Shariah. So, I would argue that the hold of religious nationalism on Saudi Arabia has loosened a bit because of these changes. If Prince Mohammad keeps on (slowly) moving away from religious nationalism, Saudi Arabia will feel the changes in other areas too. One should be thankful for the small mercies.

Colin Kaepernick and Tim Tebow: Two faces of American Christianity & Nationalism

Michael Frost, a popular speaker, and writer from Sydney has written a very interesting article titled Colin Kaepernick vs. Tim Tebow: A tale of two Christians on their knees. He compares two American football quarterbacks. Both are devout and make a public display of their religion. However, they are most famous for kneeling on the ground. Describing Tim Tebow, Michael writes:

Tebow was home-schooled by his Christian parents, and spent his summers in the Philippines, helping with his father's orphanage and missionary work.

During his college football career, the Heisman Trophy winner frequently wore references to Bible verses on his eye black, including the ubiquitous John 3:16 during the 2009 BCS Championship Game.

He has been outspoken about his pro-life stance, and his commitment to abstinence from sex before marriage. He is a prominent member of the Fellowship of Christian Athletes, an organization that insists that leaders sign a Statement of Sexual Purity, stating that sex outside marriage is unacceptable to God. He has preached in churches, prisons, schools, youth groups and a welter of evangelical conferences.

And he is well known for his signature move — dropping to one knee on the field, his head bowed in prayer, his arm resting on his bent knee — known throughout the world as Tebowing.

Then, Michael writes about Colin Kaepernick:

Kaepernick, until recently the quarterback for the San Francisco 49ers, was born to a 19-year-old, single, white woman. His black father had left the picture before Colin was born. His mother was destitute and gave him up for adoption. He was raised by the Kaepernicks, a white couple from Milwaukee. 

His body is festooned with religious tattoos, including depictions of scrolls, a cross, praying hands, angels defeating demons, terms like "To God be the Glory," "Heaven Sent," "God will guide me," Psalm 18:39 and Psalm 27:3.

And Kaepernick's faith isn't just about making him feel happy. It's turned him into an activist and philanthropist. During the offseason Kaepernick launched a GoFundMe page to fly food and water into suffering Somalia. It surpassed its $2 million goal in just four days. In March, the plane loaded with essential supplies landed in Mogadishu.

He had already pledged to donate $1 million, along with the proceeds of his jersey sales from the 2016 season, to charitable work. This year, Meals on Wheels announced it had received $50,000 from Kaepernick...

But we all know why Colin Kaepernick is most famous.

Beginning in 2016, he refused to stand to attention during the playing of the American national anthem. Kaepernick decided to either remain seated or kneel during renditions of the Star Spangled Banner in support of Black Lives Matter and to protest police violence against black people.

While Tim is loved by religious Americans, few have a negative opinion about his kneeling. Colin, however, is hated by many and recently President Trump decided to show what he thinks of Colin's kneeling (See Donald Trump versus the NFL, explained). Why Tim is loved by many, while Colin is hated by many? Colin was voted as the most hated player in the NFL.

Michael has presented this as a division of Christianity or battle between two types of Christianity:

It seems to me that Tim Tebow and Colin Kaepernick represent the two very different forms that American Christianity has come to.
And not just in the United States. In many parts of the world, it feels as though the church is separating into two versions, one that values personal piety, gentleness, respect for cultural mores, and an emphasis on moral issues like abortion and homosexuality, and another that values social justice, community development, racial reconciliation, and political activism.
One version is kneeling in private prayer. The other is kneeling in public protest. One is concerned with private sins like abortion. The other is concerned with public sins like racial discrimination.
One preaches a gospel of personal salvation. The other preaches a gospel of political and social transformation...One is listening to Eric Metaxas and Franklin Graham. The other is listening to William Barber and John Perkins.

Source: Tim Tebow Prefers Colin Kaepernick Would Protest 'The Right Way'

For me, it also tells one about two visions of America. What kind of nation Americans want? One vision is inclusive and wants to include all Americans irrespective of their color or religion. It is ready to accept current racial discrimination and talk about the horrible past. The other vision either denies current and past injustices or simply do not want to talk about them. One vision harks back to white nationalism and good old days when people of color knew their place. The other harks back to the ideals on which America was founded, the ideals written in the declaration of independence. 

As Michael argues both these visions of nations have an element of religion in them. Both these visions take their inspiration from the Bible. However, most of the Americans who claim to be religious appear to support only one of those visions. The religious nationalism that Trump supports or many Republicans support is also based on one of those visions. 

Israel: Marginalization and minoritization continues

As discussed in this blog before, religious nationalist states usually suffer from two predicaments. First, as citizenship is based on religion, religious minorities in the country are de facto second-class citizens i.e. they have fewer rights than those belonging to the state/state-preferred/majority religion. Second, since religion is one of the main sources of laws and regulations, the sectarian differences within the state-preferred religion become political issues and powerful groups within the state-preferred religion try to impose their interpretations on others through the state, giving rise to sectarianism (See Religious Nationalism and Sectarianism). Sectarianism is generally slow at the start as groups outside (i.e. religious minorities) are being tackled but once outside groups are "tamed," the heretics or those who do not subscribe to the mainstream/state-preferred interpretation are targeted. Thus, sectarianism becomes a big issue and minorities are formed within the majority i.e. within the adherents of the state-preferred religion. Over the last seventy years, Pakistanis have seen this process of state marginalization and minoritization happening. Before the separation of Bangladesh, it was primarily the Christians and the Hindus who faced or felt state discrimination but later on, after 1971, in addition to the non-Muslims, groups that called themselves Muslims felt they were being victimized because of their religious beliefs. The Shias, for instance, held their first political demonstration in July 1980 when they marched to Islamabad and laid siege to the federal government offices to protest against the Zakat Ordinance promulgated by the government of General Zia-ul-Haq.

One can see the same processes of marginalization and minoritization currently at play in Israel. Being a religious nationalist state since its formation, Israel is not new to this process. Soon after independence, thousands of Muslim minority members were murdered and forced to flee their homes. No process was adopted to see whether those being killed or made refugees had actually fought against Israeli forces. Then, Law of Return was passed in July 1950 to make Israeli citizenship available to all the Jews in the world while Muslims that had lived in Israel for generations were denied return to their ancestral homes. However, the process of marginalization and minoritization soon progressed from non-Jewish minorities to Jewish minorities. Jews from Arab or Muslim lands, called Mizrahi Jews, faced "scorn and detestation" primarily because they were non-European but also because their religious practices were either considered primitive or not genuinely Jewish. They were considered too influenced by crude and barbaric cultures of the Orient.  Israel's founding father and Prime Minister for first fifteen years, David Ben Gurion (1948-54 and 1955-63)'s quotes below demonstrates the attitude of ruling Ashkenazi (European) Jews towards Mizrahi Jews:

We do not want Israelis to become Arabs. We are bound by duty to fight against the spirit of the Levant that corrupts individuals and society. 

and 

Even the immigrant from North Africa, who looks like a savage, who has never read a book in his life, not even a religious one, and doesn’t even know how to say his prayers, either wittingly or unwittingly has behind him a spiritual heritage of thousands of years…

and

The ancient spirit left the Jews of the East and their role in the Jewish nation receded or disappeared entirely. In the past few hundred of years the Jews of Europe have led the nation, in both quantity and quality. (See The roots of anti-Mizrahi racism in Israel, David Ben-Gurion, Israel’s Segregationist Founder and Post-Zionism and the Sephardi Question for further information about discrimination against Mizrahi Jews in Israel)

Coming back to the present, the Israeli government is furthering the process of marginalization and minoritization of two communities. First, Arab (Muslim) Bedouins are being stripped of their Israeli citizenship. Those who have been citizens for decades are being told to apply for citizenship again:

When Bedouin citizens come to Interior Ministry offices in Be’er Sheva to take care of routine matters such as changing their address, obtaining a birth certificate or registering names, the Population Authority examines their status, as well as that of their parents and grandparents, going back to the early days of the state. In many cases, the clerk tells them that their Israeli citizenship had been granted in error. On the spot, he changes their status from citizen to resident and issues them a new document. People who lose their citizenship are given no explanation and no opportunity to appeal. Instead, the clerk suggests that they submit a request and start the process of obtaining citizenship from scratch, as if they were newcomers to Israel. (See Why Stripping Non-Jews Of Their Israeli Citizenship Threatens Zionism)

Indigenous Arab Bedouins have been discriminated since the establishment of Israel. Their homes and grazing lands were allocated to Jewish settlements and they were forced to settle or to relocate to areas chosen for them by the Israeli authorities. Many of their villages were not recognized as official municipal areas and so were not provided civic amenities and were razed whenever there was need for more Jewish settlements (See European Parliament condemns Israel's policy toward Bedouin population and New Jewish settlements planned 'on top of' Bedouin villages). Cultural appropriation and disappropriation at the hands of Israelis have also been the fate of Bedouins as is the case with the general Palestinian population (See a recent example at Palestinian Bedouin Dress at New York Fashion Week Reveals Stakes of Israeli Cultural Appropriation).

Source: Land grab: Israeli govt backs bill to forcibly relocate up to 40,000 Bedouin villagers

However, the denial of citizenship is a completely new level of discrimination and member of Israeli Parliament Knesset Juma’a Azbarga argues that something sinister (i.e. changing demography) is behind this new policy:

I believe this is part of a process happening beneath the surface...They want to slowly reach a critical mass of citizenship-less people in order to make it easier when they come to transfer us. The name of the game is demography; the Bedouin make up 34 percent of the population in the Negev. In the eyes of the state, that’s a threat.

The state established a network for Bedouin settlement. We are not settlers — we are the natives here. So they put pressure to force the Bedouin to move to areas without infrastructure or sources of income — a forced urbanization and ghettoization of an agrarian society. We have enough land in the Negev for everyone. The Bedouin claim less than six percent of the land as their own, but they want to concentrate us in 1.5 percent of the territory. For the state it is ideology, for us it is a war for survival. (See Is Israel turning its Bedouin citizens into a stateless people?)

Secondly, the Israeli government made a decision in June 2017 which clearly demonstrated (again) that Reform and Conservative Judaism are not considered authentic Jews in Israel. The government suspended the 2016 agreement which would have provided the Reform and Conservative Jews a separate place (a pluralistic prayer pavilion) to pray at the Western Wall (Kotel). Despite the opposition of the ultra-Orthodox rabbis, who currently administer the whole sacred space around the Kotel, the Israeli government decided to treat all branches of Judaism somewhat equally. The agreement was reached after a great effort by both the Israeli government and the Reform and Conservative movements and the Israeli government was proud to take credit for it (for a detailed look at the controversy and the 2016 agreement see Western Wall prayer controversy in Israel). However, due to the pressure of ultra-Orthodox parties, the Israeli government suspended the agreement indefinitely. Rabbi Rick Jacobs, the head of the North American Reform Movement, on hearing the news called it "a very, very dark day" and said, "To hear the government of Israel make a statement today that the rights of non-Orthodox Jews don’t matter is deeply distressing" (See US liberal Jews decry ‘slap in the face’ from Netanyahu on Western Wall prayer).

Members of "Women of the Wall" praying with a Torah scroll near the Western Wall (July 2017)

Source: Reform Conservative movements incensed by Netanyahu attack

In September 2017, Prime Minister Netanyahu added fuel to the fire by declaring that the Reform and Conservative movements were using the Western Wall agreement as a stealthy way to get recognition from the Israeli state. This was vehemently denied by leaders of both Reform and Conservative movements and they accused the Prime Minister of lying and betraying their trust:

Netanyahu reportedly told members of the press in New York Monday night that the Reform and Conservative movements wanted to get recognition “via the backdoor, secretly, under the pretext of a technical clause of joint administration of the Western Wall,” according to Army Radio reporter Ilil Shahar...

Rabbi Gilad Kariv, director of the Reform movement in Israel, said that the prime minister’s comments demonstrated that he had decided to join “the wave of haredi incitement against millions of Reform and Conservative Jews.”

Kariv also noted that Netanyahu had been involved in every detail of the deal, had celebrated the approval of the deal and demanded credit for it as well.

“The Reform movement does not clandestinely demand recognition bur rather openly and publicly,” said Kariv. 

“The prime minister has shown a lack of leadership regarding the Western Wall, and political weakness, and in order to hide this he is choosing to attack the Reform movement,” adding that Netanyahu should find ways of rebuilding trust with Diaspora Jewry “and not to deepen the damage he and his government have done.”

Director of the Masorti [Conservative] movement in Israel Yizhar Hess said Netanyahu was “distorting reality” and pointed out that “it was this government of Israel, the prime minister and his people who proposed to us this model of agreement, including explicit emphasis on the prima facie advantages of the of the agreement regarding the issue of recognition in light of the fact that we would have official representatives on the administrative council for the site.”

“To present this now as our manipulation is a new record in fake news,” Hess added.

Netanyahu said at a briefing in New York with reporters Monday that were the issue merely one of finding an egalitarian prayer space at the Western Wall, then the issue would have been solved. (See Reform Conservative movements incensed by Netanyahu attack)

The discussion shows that, like in other religious nationalist states, the process of marginalization and minoritization is continuing in Israel. 

Guardian Council, 12 Holy Men

The Council of Guardians or Guardian Council of the Constitution (Shoraye Negahban-e Qanun-e Assassi) is the most powerful constitutional body in the current Iranian political system, much more important than the Iranian elected legislature (Majlis: Islamic Consultative Assembly). Guardian Council has been called Iran’s most powerful body (that controls Iranian democratic framework), most influential body, one of the most significant institutions under by the Supreme Leader, and de-facto Upper house of the Iranian legislature (p-41). Why the Guardian Council is so powerful when there are a host of other constitutional bodies, such as Majlis, Expediency Council, Assembly of Experts, etc?

Let's first see how the Guardian Council is constituted.

According to the Iranian Constitution of 1979, the Council has 12 members. Six of these members are Islamic jurists and are selected/nominated by the Supreme Leader. The other six civil jurists are specialists of other branches of law and are elected by the Majlis from among the list of Muslim jurists provided by the Head of Judiciary (Article 91). The term of the Guardian Council is six years (Article 92).

It appears that at least six members of the Guardian Council are (indirectly) elected and, therefore, they would be more concerned about the popular opinion. However, this is a facade as the six "elected" members are also from the list provided by the Head of the Judiciary, who is in turn selected by the Supreme Leader (Article 157). The Majlis cannot independently elect even one member of the Council. Hence, one can safely say that the Supreme Leader has almost complete control on who serves on the Council.

Source: Iran's Guardian Council

Why Guardian Council is considered so powerful?

First, the Iranian Constitution gives the Guardian Council many powers. Some of its most important powers are the following:

• Vetting all the candidates for the President, Majlis and the Assembly of Experts before the elections: This means that one cannot become a member of the Majlis or the Assembly of Experts or become President without the approval of the Guadian Council. Even if all the Iranian voters want to elect a particular person as President, they cannot do it unless the Guardian Council approves. The Guardian Council can and has not allowed many popular candidates to run in the elections. Furthermore, the Guardian Council also supervises any referenda or any other direct recourse to the public opinion  (Article 99);
• Approving every piece of legislation passed by the Majlis: All legislation passed by the elected Majlis needs the approval of the Guardian Council to become law. The Council judges all legislation on basis of its conformity with the official religion (Islam- Twelver Shia sect) and the Constitution. If Council does not approve, a draft law, even if it is passed by all members of the Majlis, will remain a draft law. There is no provision to bypass the Guardian Council. Majlis itself cannot overrule Council's rejection by a two-thirds or three-fourths supermajority. In fact, according to the constitution, the Majlis does not hold any legal status if there is no Guardian Council in existence. If there is disagreement between the Council and the Majlis, the case goes to the Expediency Council, which like the Guardian Council is a body nominated by the Supreme Leader and usually has all the members of the Guardian Council as its members (Article 4, 72, 91, 93 and 96);
• Sole interpreter of the Constitution: Like the Supreme Court in many countries, the Guardian Council has the power to interpret the constitution and its judgment is final (three-fourths majority required). The Council is also part of the constitution-amending process (Article 98 and 177).

Source: Deep-Seated Entanglements, RAND

Second, the Guardian Council consists of only twelve members. Comparing it with the membership of Majlis (290 members), Expediency Council (usually 30+ members) or Assembly of Experts (usually 80+ members), one can fathom how much more power an individual member of the Guardian Council would have, even if powers of all these constitutional bodies were equal. The fact is that the Guardian Council has greater powers than all these bodies and it is smaller then all of them, making it extremely powerful.

Third, the Guardian Council is powerful because its decisions, in most cases, are final. Its decisions regarding interpretation of the constitution cannot be contested. Similarly, its decisions regarding the vetting of candidates or election results are legally conclusive.

Finally, Council is powerful because constitution does not bar re-appointment of its members. Therefore, Guardian Council members can stay on for decades, if they retain the confidence of the Supreme Leader. The current Chairman of the Guardian Council, Ayatollah Ahmad Jannati, has been a member of the Council since its first establishment in 1980 (37 years) and has been its chairman since 1992 (25 years). Ayatollah Mohammad Yazdi, another member, has been part of the Council since 1988 (29 years). Ayatullah Sayed Mahmoud Hashemi Shahroudi, another member, was earlier also part of the Council from 1992 to 1999. Then, he was appointed as the Head of Judiciary (1999-2009) and in that capacity was nominating Guardian Council candidates to the Majlis and then he again became a member of the Council in 2009. 

90 years old Ayatollah Jannati, head of the Guardian Council, with the Supreme Leader

Source: ‘Election Violations’ Used Against Rouhani

From the above analysis, it is clear that the Guardian Council plays a crucial role in the continuous clerical control of the Iranian political system. If Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) protects it militarily, the Guardian Council protects it constitutionally and legally.

Related blog post: Is Iran's Supreme Leader subject to oversight? Constitutionally yes, but...

Nepal: Rare example of decline in religious nationalism

The blog post is based on the masters' thesis of David Rangdrol, Uppsala University (Sweden). The thesis was written in 2007 and is titled, "Religious Nationalism in Nepal: Understanding the Demise of the Hindu Kingdom." Most of my blog posts are about countries where religious nationalism is increasing but this one will be focusing on a country where religious nationalism declined, something rare as Mr. Rangdrol explains: 

Until 2006 Nepal was known as “the only Hindu Kingdom in the world.” The Hindu attribute has its roots in the creation of Nepal in the 18th century; it was written down in the highest law of the land in 1854 and finally enshrined in the constitution from 1962 onwards. But 2006 marked a year of important transitions for Nepal: from civil war to peace, from totalitarianism to democracy, and from religious nationalism to secularism. This last point is particularly interesting given the larger context. The above-mentioned study [of 120 armed conflicts that occurred in Asia between 1946 and 2005] has found that a majority of conflicts (21 out of 31) that had a religious incompatibility at their core involved rebel groups that fought governments against secularism in order to establish religious states. Nepal on the other hand is the unique case in Asia in the past 60 years where a rebel group, the Maoists, has fought a government and included a demand for secularism in its agenda. Though the Maoist People’s War cannot be characterised primarily as an anti-religious war, the demand for a secular state was an important part of it. In any case, the most outstanding event that we will try to explain in this essay is that Nepal has officially shifted from religious nationalism to secularism in May 2006, effectively erasing an important, centennial feature of Nepal – to the dismay of Hindu nationalists.(p-7 of  Mr. Rangrol's unpublished thesis)

The literature used to help answer the research question is: Mark Juergensmeyer, The New Cold War: Religious Nationalism Confronts the Secular State; Nikki R. Keddie, The New Religious Politics: Where, When, and Why Do “Fundamentalisms” Appear?; and Gabriel A. Almond, R. Scott Appleby, Emmanuel Sivan, Strong Religion: The Rise of Fundamentalisms Around the World.

According to Mr. Rangdrol, following were the four main reasons for the decline of religious nationalism in Nepal:

1. There was no failed post-colonial secular nation-building experience:. Most the nations where religious nationalism has arisen in the last three decades were witness to a high expectations period after independence from European powers when a primarily secular leadership took over and led the country. However, this leadership failed to deliver and there was marked disappointment. The ensuing soul-searching by the people (and efforts of the religious elite) made religious nationalism popular. Nepal was never colonized so there was no secular legacy. Nepal was united by Gorkha King Prithvi Narayan Shah in 1769 as a Hindu Kingdom and remained so till 2006. Rangdrol describes how Hinduism was linked to the Nepali Kingdom from the start and how Nepali Kings and Ranas promoted Hinduism and proclaimed Nepal as the real and the only Hindu Kingdom in the world as India, despite being bigger, was ruled by initially by the Mughals and then by the British:

In 1769, Prithivi Narayan Shah, brought small independent states, chiefdoms and principalities of different ethnicities and religions under his control and created modern Nepal. The first Gorkha King declared Nepal asali Hindustan, the “true land of Hindus,” and “garden of four varnas and thirty-six jats.” The kings became widely revered as an incarnation of god Vishnu, one of the main gods of the modern Hindu pantheon. Though scholars disagree on the intensity with which Hinduisation and cultural assimilation was thereafter implemented, it remains clear that Nepal espoused the identity of a Hindu state from its very inception, and that over time non-Hindu indigenous, nature-worshipping, animist or Buddhist people have been gradually ‘Hinduized’ as a result of the conquest of the Hindu Kings and the migration of Parbatiyas (high-caste hill people) to different parts of Nepal.” In 1846, members of a powerful family, the Ranas, relegated the Gorkha monarchy to a secondary role and effectively became the rulers of Nepal, establishing a legacy of dictatorial prime ministers that lasted over a century.

The Ranas chose to build on the Hindu foundations that the Gorkha Kings had laid before them: In 1854, Jangabahadur, the first Rana minister, introduced laws based on Hinduism and divided the country hierarchically, subordinating all other nationalities to the Brahmins and Kshetris (Khas) ruling class. The civil code of 1854 the Muluki Ain (law of the land) cemented the cast system and ensured that the rulers would exercise total control over a static society: “Grounded in the Hindu idea of ritual purity, the Muluki Ain regulated the lives of every citizen from birth to death, making social or political mobility almost impossible.” From then, the process of Hinduisation under the Ranas though not overtly aggressive but rather “gradual and almost imperceptible” had its effects, of which the slow, piecemeal adoption of Hindu traditions and the dominance of the Higher castes. One political function of this was to project a distinct image of Nepal vis-à-vis India which was seen as “defiled” by Mughal Muslim rule and called pejoratively “Muglan” (land of Mughals). Jang Bahadur Rana thus spoke: “We have our own country, a Hindu rajya [state], where laws prescribe the cows shall not be slaughtered; nor women and Brahmins sentenced to capital punishment…In this age of Kali this is the only where Hindus rule.” The Rana rule came to an abrupt end in the 1950s. This tumultuous decade also saw Nepal’s first democratic experiment, which lasted until 1960 when the Gorkha dynasty staged a royal coup and took back the power it has lost to the Ranas a century before. (p-24-25)

Source: Nationalism vs. Patriotism: What will save Nepal?

In 1962, King Mahendra came up with a new constitution under which the king not only reigned but also ruled on top of a panchayat regime. The new constitution enshrined rights of all Nepalis but the position of Hinduism was also secured. Nepal was declared a Hindu kingdom and cow, the national animal, and promoting conversion of religion was prohibited. The king was the source of all power and he had to be a Hindu of Aryan descent:

Article 20: His Majesty-the Source of Power
(1) In this Constitution the words ‘His Majesty’ mean His Majesty the King for the time being reigning, being a descendant of King Prithivi Narayan Shah and adherent of Aryan culture and Hindu religion.
(2) The sovereignty of Nepal is vested in His Majesty and all powers-executive, legislative and judicial emanate from Him. These powers are exercised by His Majesty through the organs established by or under this Constitution and other laws for the time being in force keeping in view the interest and wishes of His Majesty’s subjects according to the highest traditions of the Shah dynasty. (1962 Constitution)

Furthermore, the Panchayat regime safeguarded the continuance of traditional Hindu customs and religion at the lower level.

This system continued till 1990 when large-scale demonstrations forced the king to give up power. In the aftermath, for the first time in Nepal, secularism was discussed as an alternative to religious nationalism. The 1990 constitution replaced the party-less Panchayat system with a democratic multi-party system. There were more rights for minorities and the hold of monarchy and culture and tradition (of which Hinduism was a big part) was reduced. However, Nepal was still a Hindu kingdom and cow the national animal (1990 Constitution).

The 1990 Constitution continued till 2006. The period under the 1990 Constitution was tumultuous. Nepali Maoists started a civil war in 1996 and a royal massacre happened in which Crown Prince Dipendra killed nine members of the royal family (including King and Queen) before killing himself. The new King Gyanendra also showed his assertiveness by dismissing several governments and, in the end, imposing a state of emergency to directly rule Nepal.

It is obvious from the above discussion that Nepal was never secular. It remained a united Hindu kingdom from 1769 till 2006, ruled by a Hindu god-king, who claimed to be an incarnation of one of the principal deities of Hinduism, Vishnu. 

2. Nepal was a fragile and poor country: Literature on religious nationalism indicates that a weak state may lead people and elites to look for answers to what went wrong. As mentioned above, it was the failure of the secular experiment (in terms of economic, social and political development) that has resulted in the rise of religious nationalism in many countries. Nepal had the opposite experience of these countries. It did not experience the failure of the secular experiment; it experienced the disastrous consequences of a religious experiment. As Rangdrol explains, Nepal, social and economic indicators were one of the worse in the world:

Things were not well in the Hindu Kingdom. Nepal has a history of totalitarianism, punctuated by coups, popular revolutions, and democratic experiments that only highlighted the governing elite’s political immaturity and proclivity for corruption. As the authors of People Politics and Ideology: Democracy and Social Change in Nepal explain, legitimacy rests to a great extent on economic development.125 Nepal is one of the poorest nations in Asia. Four out of ten people live with less than one Dollar a day. Nepal ranks 138 and 147 out of 177 in the Human Development and Gross Domestic Product indexes.126 The infrastructure, especially in the capital, cannot support its growing population. Traffic is abysmal and dangerous; sewage overflows daily and spreads deadly disease in the monsoon rain, and the air quality ranks Kathmandu the second most polluted city in Asia.(p-38)

Therefore, people rejected the religious nationalism and opted for something new and different i.e. secular nationalism. 

3. No internal or external enemy that belonged to another religion: Threat from religious groups, different from one's own, is one of the primary reasons for the rise in religious nationalism in many countries. When a group identifies its enemy group on the basis of their religion, religion becomes not only a marker but also the primary reason for the conflict. The enemy group can be internal or external i.e. within the borders or outside it. According to the 2001 Census, Hindus constitute more than 80% of the Nepali population. The biggest religious minority are Buddhists, who are around 8% of the population, and most Hindus consider them a part of Hinduism, not a minority. Muslims and Christians, around 4% and 0.5% respectively, are the only "real" minorities but there was no history of tension between Hindus and Muslims and Christian as described by Rangdol:

Religious nationalist movements are typically exploiting threats of an “other,” which helps them mobilise people to their cause. But that “other” is difficult to locate in Nepal. Nepal was never a colony, neither Christians nor Muslims invaded it, it has experienced no large-scale inter-religious violence nor any other type of traumatic event that can be credibly blamed on this or that religious minority...it is clear that religious demographics show a solid Hindu majority with Buddhists for main minority. It is not customary to talk about Hindu-Buddhist confrontations, and it is very difficult for most Hindus to demonise or speak of a ‘Buddhist threat’ for the simple reason that they take Buddhism as a branch of Hinduism. (p-42)

Maoists, although instrumental in the fall of religious nationalism in Nepal, were also not considered enemy:

If not the secular west, the local secular elite, or religious minorities, who else then could personify an anti-Hindu enemy? The Maoists perhaps? After all, it is them who have asked for a secular state at the point of AK-47s, and they are communists and therefore should be in principle atheists? Although many religious nationalists perceive Maoists as enemies144 – being the brute force behind the fall of the Hindu Kingdom – they have not been widely portrayed directly in terms of an “anti-religious” force.145 In general, Maoists do not fit the anti-religious/atheist communist stereotype. The Maoists seem to have managed a skilled balancing act: on the one hand harvesting the grievances left by decades of pro-Hindu discrimination, and, on the other, being careful enough not to harm Hindu or traditional sentiments. Though the CPN-M official banners display the usual communist avatars146 alongside their leader Prachanda, they have differed from Mao and some of his acolytes in that they have not proactively promoted atheism and anti-religious policies. Although it is reported that there were incidents in the People’s War, especially at the beginning, that involved iconoclastic gestures such as destroying temples or intimidating priests, they were quick to realise the strategic downside of those methods. They have managed to recruit all the marginalised people of the Hindu state system while they have also displayed respect for the Hindu religion and its traditions. (p-43)

Similarly, although Rangdol does not talk about it, there was no external enemy that belonged to another religion. Nepal has no external enemies but Nepalis often feel resentment towards India due to historic land and water disputes, the annexation of Sikkim, both actual and perceived slights by the big neighbor as well as direct intervention by India in Nepali affairs (See Bollywood Meets Nepali Nationalism). The religious "other," therefore, does not even exist outside Nepal, contributing to the decline of religious nationalism in Nepal.

4. Top-down religious nationalist structure: There were no religious nationalist political parties in Nepal during the from the 1950s to 2006. The major reason for this was the presence of Hindu king and declaration of Nepal as a Hindu kingdom. With a four-fifths majority in population and the most powerful man in Nepal on Hinduism side, there was apparently no need for a Hindu nationalist party. Compared to India, there was no history of religious mobilization in Nepal by Hindu nationalists. Therefore, when the king was ousted, religious nationalism went with him:

Part of the reason why there were no Hindu nationalist parties even in the 1990s rests on the historical structure of religious nationalism in Nepal: its top-bottom configuration. Hindu nationalism had been imposed from the top with authoritarian means from the very beginning. The institution of Kingship always secured the Hindu state, and therefore no bottom-up religiopolitical activism was ever needed to maintain religious nationalism...If one compares this trajectory to India the contrast is telling. In India, Hindu nationalism has a century of training by trial and error...In Nepal, with the King in a corner and intensified Maoist pressure, no strong alternative mediums were there to protect the interests of the Hindu state, and none of the political parties saw it as a vital part of their agenda. Hindu political parties did not emerge because there was no demand or need for them; state Hinduness was secure with the King. The 1990 secular debate was an alarming moment Hindu nationalists did not heed, there was no such instinct, no such culture. But not much could be expected in such a short lapse of time because social networks take time to form. (p-48)

Haredi Conscription: Battle between the Knesset and the Supreme Court continues

Two previous blog posts document the fight of the mainly secular Israelis to force Haredi Israelis to serve in the military. In the first blog post ( See Is studying religion a service to the state?), the history of the conflict is traced from the independence of Israel to 2012. In the second blog post (See Going to jail for studying Torah), the passage of the 2014 law, which was a compromise, was discussed.

The March 2014 law made room for multiple but opposing perspectives. Neither secularists nor Haredi liked it. Secularists did not like it because it did not have strict penalties for forcing the Haredi youth to serve in the military. The Haredi were unhappy because it had some weak injunctions for people who refuse to serve:

The new legislation sets annual quotas for drafting yeshiva students for military or national service, and mandates criminal penalties against draft evaders. However, the law doesn’t entail complete Haredi conscription, instead calling for a gradual annual increase in the number of ultra-Orthodox 18-year-olds drafted, and still allowing for small numbers of exemptions until 2017. (See Israel passes ultra-Orthodox draft law)

The Haredi parties vowed to change the 2014 law whenever they had the power to do so. In late 2014, there were policy disagreements within the government and elections were held in March 2015. The Likud Party won big in the elections and Netanyahu decided to form a government with primarily religious-right parties and not with centrist Yesh Atid, who was the main force behind the 2014 law. 

Source: Two new Supreme Court justices named

In November 2015, the ruling coalition, including Haredi parties Shas and United Torah Judaism, passed amendments to the 2014 law. These amendments diluted the original law and gave Haredi students more exemptions besides delaying the implementation of the law:

The amendment to the law for Haredi (ultra-Orthodox) conscription that was passed yesterday postpones the implementation of obligatory enlistment for full-time yeshiva students until 2020, though it was originally supposed to come into effect in 2017. It also gives the Defense Minister the authority to exempt yeshiva students after that date if he so wishes, “while bearing in mind” goals established by the government under the 2014 law. (See Analysis: Haredi parties wipe out Lapid's IDF draft law - but for how long?)

The crucial question was, however, will the Supreme Court accept it? Unlikely:

In this regard, it is worth looking back at the Tal Law, which provided a legal framework for haredi men to indefinitely postpone their military service until they reached the age of exemption, and at the reasons why the High Court declared it incommensurate with Israel’s basic laws.
The court said in 2012, that while there had been an increase in the number of haredi men enlisting to military or civilian service, the rate of increase was insufficient given the legal inequalities the Tal Law generated.
“Legislation that perpetuates the gaps and flaws of the lack of equality, to the extent which they currently exist, cannot be upheld,” wrote then-Supreme Court president Dorit Beinisch in the 2012 ruling.
In 2011, the last full year for which the High Court could see haredi enlistment statistics for their 2012 ruling, 1,282 ultra-Orthodox men enlisted to the IDF and 1,089 enlisted to the civilian service, totaling 2,371 haredi military or civilian service recruits.
This was just under 30% of the potential draft.
Bearing in mind the 30% rate of haredi enlistment in 2012 when the Tal Law was declared unconstitutional and the 33% rate of enlistment today, it seems highly unlikely that the High Court will deem the new amendment – which to all intents and purposes removes the legal obligation for haredi men to perform national service – commensurate with the requirements of equality before the law. (See Analysis: Haredi parties wipe out Lapid's IDF draft law - but for how long?)

In September 2017, the inevitable happened and the Supreme Court stuck down the law as unconstitutional and unreasonable.

The dramatic ruling on Tuesday set a one-year deadline to implement a different framework for handling the ultra-Orthodox draft.
The court was responding to four separate appeals — three of which claimed the current arrangement discriminated against non-Haredi Jews, and a fourth that argued it discriminated against Haredi Jews, who are being asked to increase their military draft rate while other minorities, especially Israeli Arabs, are not required to serve at all.
Eight justices, led by Chief Justice Miriam Naor, ruled that the current arrangement was increasing the inequality in the “draft burden,” rather than reducing it, which was the law’s stated purpose and the grounds for its constitutionality. That made it an “unconstitutional law,” the justices ruled.
One dissenter, Justice Noam Solberg, argued that the law had not been in effect long enough to determine its effect on the military draft, and therefore no determination could yet be made about its constitutionality. (See High Court strikes down law that postponed ultra-Orthodox draft)

The Haredi parties' leaders are furious and calling this decision unacceptable and dictatorial. Ya’acov Litzman, Israel's health minister and United Torah Judaism chairman said that the decision was "the worst and most wretched decision in the history of terrible decisions in the Jewish world." One of his party members, Yisrael Eichler,  called it "part of an all-out war on Judaism"(See Israel’s religious military exemption law is unconstitutional – Supreme Court and High Court strikes down the law that postponed ultra-Orthodox draft)). Religious Affairs Minister David Azulai and Shas party member claimed that the Supreme Court was fighting with the Jewish people, "In the Supreme Court ruling yesterday, the court said in effect that it wants to continue the dispute with the Jewish people. It chose to say it precisely a few days before Rosh Hashanah." The religious parties are now calling for passing a law to limit Supreme Court jurisdiction:

The time has come to make a legislative change and tell the High Court of Justice that you are not elected, but nominated" he said. Stop making disagreements with the Jewish people and ruling against the Knesset. (See Haredi MKs focus their rage on the Supreme Court)

Another way for religious parties to resolve this issue is to change the composition of the Supreme Court. The Justice minister, Ayelet Shaked, though not a member of a Haredi party, is working on making the court more conservative and more nationalist. She was able to bring two conservative judges on the Supreme Court in 2017. However, the change can take a long time. This means the issue will continue to bedevil Israeli leadership in the next few years.

Is "Trumpism" a new kind of nationalism?

Baylor University released the results of the fifth wave of the Baylor Religion Survey in September 2017 (See American Values, Mental Health and Using Technology in the Age of Trump). It is one of the most extensive surveys that is regularly conducted on religious attitudes in the United States. Around 11000 adults, chosen randomly from a stratified sample, were asked to respond to the survey and the 1501 complete responses were used for the analysis. 

The survey was conducted in the first few months of Donald Trump's presidency and, besides regular concerns, the survey focused on Trump voters. The survey found that people who voted for Trump in November 2016 generally believed:

• Themselves to be "very religious;"
• That the US is or was a Christian nation; 
• Muslims are a threat to America;
• In gender traditionalism; 
• In an Authoritative God. (p-6 of the Baylor Religion Survey (BRS) report)

From this information, the report writers conclude that a new form of nationalism is visible:

This collection of values and attitudes form the core ethos of what we might call Trumpism. It is a new form of nationalism which merges pro-Christian rhetoric with anti-Islam, anti-feminist, anti-globalist, and anti-government attitudes. (p-7 of the BRS report)

Is "Trumpism" a new kind of nationalism? Trumpism is a new phenomenon and journalists, analysts and academics are still trying to understand it and see where it fits in the political firmament.  Some are calling it a new type of conservatism and the biggest transformation of the conservative movement since the 1960s (See Is Trumpism the New Conservatism?), others tussle with the issue and argue that Trump is not a true conservative but he believes in true conservatism and is governing or will govern like a true conservative i.e. there will be no new type of conservatism as Trumpism will soon merge in the mainstream conservative movement (See Is Donald Trump a conservative? We asked the CPAC faithful).

So, again, is Trumpism a new kind of nationalism? The characteristics of Trump voters identified above give us a clue.

Source: BRS Wave 5, 2017

First, survey analysis shows that most of the Trump voters consider themselves to be very religious. Religion is important for them and many of them are evangelical Christians. 

Source: BRS Wave 5, 2017

Second, generally, Trump voters believe that America was or still is a Christian nation. The survey statistics show that almost 60% of Americans believe that American is or was a Christian nation, a sign of the overall strength of religious nationalism in the US. 

Source: BRS Wave 5, 2017

Most of the those who believed in Christian nationalism voted overwhelmingly for Trump in 2016. The report also acknowledges the strength of religious/Christian nationalism in the US and its association with Trumpism but did not call Trumpism a type of religious nationalism.

Source: BRS Wave 5, 2017

The BRS survey results also showed that Republicans generally subscribe more to religious/Christian nationalism than independents or Democrats. This survey result can be interpreted as indicating that Trumpism is not much different from the mainstream Republican Party that is currently moving closer to Christian nationalism. 

Source: BRS Wave 5, 2017

The third characteristic of the Trump voters, based on BRS survey results, was their Islamophobia or fear of Muslims. Generally, Americans feel threatened by both Muslims and conservative Christians. However, most conservative Christians, who voted for Trump, fear Muslims more than any group. 

Source: BRS Wave 5, 2017

Fear of other religions or "othering" of religions that are different from one's own is a characteristic of religious nationalists. Clearly, if one feels one's religion is the basis of nationalism, then people who do not believe in one's religion cannot be part of one's nation even if they live next door and speak the same language. The following graph demonstrates that people who believe that America was or is a Christian nation consider refugees from the Middle East, who are almost all Muslims, a terrorist threat.

Source: BRS Wave 5, 2017

The fourth characteristic of Trump voters is gender traditionalism i.e. men and women have different roles in life. Gender traditionalism is also associated with the belief that marriage is between a man and a woman. These characteristics are also associated with Christian nationalism in the US.
Source: BRS Wave 5, 2017

Source: BRS Wave 5, 2017

Source: BRS Wave 5, 2017

These characteristics are associated with religious nationalism worldwide. In fact, religious nationalists belonging to different traditions (Christian, Jewish, Hinduism, Islamic, etc.), though bitter enemies of each other, agree on this issue.

Finally, Trump voters generally believe in an "authoritative God." The concept of authoritative God was given by Baylor University professors Paul Froese and Christopher Bader in their book,  America's Four Gods: What We Say about God — & what that Says about Us, published in 2010. Matt Young explains the thesis of the book and the four types of God.

The thesis of the book is, in essence, that classifying people according to their religious denomination (or lack thereof) tells you little about, for example, their politics or their views on science. Instead, Froese and Bader classify people according to the kind of God they believe in: authoritative, benevolent, critical, and distant (not to mention none).
Froese and Bader pose 2 questions, “To what extent does God interact with the world? To what extent does God judge the world?” As a result of interviews and surveys, they conclude that

Americans differ radically in their beliefs about how closely God guides and judges their lives. These two dynamic dimensions of belief reveal four distinct images of God:

1. The Authoritative God—one who is both engaged and judgmental [31%]
2. The Benevolent God—one who is engaged but not judgmental [24%]
3. The Critical God—one who is not engaged but judgmental [16%]
4. The Distant God—one who is not engaged or judgmental [24%]
[5. Atheist [5%]]

But most important, do these different Gods matter? Unequivocally, yes. A person’s God is a direct reflection of his level of moral absolutism, his view of science, his understanding of economic justice, his concept of evil, and how he thinks we should respond to it. And these powerful relationships exist regardless of where he lives, the color of his skin, the amount of money he makes, how many years he has spend [sic] in school, or the church he attends.

Simply put, America’s four Gods lie at the heart of our moral, cultural, and political disagreements. (See America's Four Gods)

Froese and Bader argue that belief in a specific type of Church (or religion) is not a sure prediction of belief in a specific type of God. However, there is some statistical association, for instance, between belief in a distant God and belonging to "nones."

Coming back to Trumpism, most of the Trump voters believe in an authoritative God and those who believe in an authoritative God are more likely to be religious nationalists. Survey results revealed that those believe in an authoritarian God are more likely to want the declaration of the US as a Christian nation and are not likely to favor the strict enforcement of separation of church and state.

Source: BRS Wave 5, 2017

Source: BRS Wave 5, 2017

Is Trumpism a new type of nationalism, then? The above discussion indicates that of the five characteristics of Trumpism identified by the BRS Wave 5, at least four are also the characteristics of religious nationalism. So, Trumpism does not appear to be a new type of nationalism. 

BJP's cow cabinets, cow ministries and cow departments to create cow-friendly ecosystem

Cow protection is a controversial but old issue in India. Under the British Raj, some sections of Hindu society pleaded for laws to prevent the slaughter of cows in India. After Independence, there was more pressure and so the rationalist and socialist Nehru agreed to introduce cow-protection in the Directive Principles of State Policy. The Article 48 of the Indian Constitution declares, “The State shall endeavour to organise agriculture and animal husbandry on modern and scientific lines and shall, in particular, take steps for preserving and improving the breeds, and prohibiting the slaughter of cows and other milch and draught cattle.”

Cow protection has achieved prominence since Prime Minister Modi took control of the national government in 2014. There have been new laws, the extension of quondam bans and public lynchings to protect cows. Hard-line Hindu organizations, like Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP, trans. World Hindu Council) and Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS, trans. National Volunteer Organization), have long campaigned for cow protection and cow protection was one of their major demands from the BJP (along with building of Ram Mandir (where once Babri mosque stood) and legislation for a common civil code).  Currently, the BJP's popularity and control of the national government and many state governments have made the once unthinkable, possible.

In January 2014, the state government of Rajasthan, belonging to the BJP, decided to set-up a separate ministry for the protection and preservation of cows. Cow protection was part of the BJP manifesto for the December 2013 state elections and it has been part of the BJP national program and overall Hindutva agenda, so it was not surprising but still a first. Previously, leaders of many Indian states have come up with cow protection laws that impose a fine or prison term for not only the killing of cows/cattle but also for transporting them to the slaughter houses. However, there was no department/ministry for cows (See India’s First Ministry for Cows). It was the Gujarat state that had the distinction of establishing the first Gopalan Department in India. The name Gopalan comes from Hindu religion. Lord Krishna was the eighth avatar of Vishnu (one of the principal deities in Hindu religion) and a supreme Hindu god in his own right. According to the legend, he was a cow herder and one of his names was Gopala which means “the protector of the cows.” 

Source: http://hindutva.info/lord-krishna-and-holy-cows/

The vision-mission of the new Gopalan Department is "To improve State's cow wealth so in near future cow rearing will emerge as a major economic activity offering immense employment opportunities."

The objectives of the department are:

Encourage Research to popularize use of Panchgavya.

Gaushala Development and conservation, up-gradation and improvement of cattle in gaushalas.

Value Addition of Cattle Products through processing.

Regulation of temporary Migration or Export of Cattle.

Fodder Management during Scarcity.

Registration of Gaushalas and their development towards self-sufficiency. (See Directorate of Gopalan)

After the establishment of Gopalan department in Rajasthan, there was a fear that other BJP-ruled states would follow suit but it did not happen, although some states increased sentences for cow slaughter and cow trafficking. For instance, Gujarat made the slaughter of cows punishable with life imprisonment in March 2017.

Now (September 2017), there is a talk of a national ministry of cows. Perhaps this new initiative was the result of the India's Supreme Court's suspention of a newly passed national law that banned the sale of cattle for slaughter nationwide (See India Supreme Court suspends cattle slaughter ban).

The push for a national ministry has come from hard-line Hindu organizations. It was reported that the VHP would petition Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Utter Pradesh chief minister Yogi Adityanath for cow ministries at the center and the states. VHP’s Ayodhya-based spokesman Sharad Sharma said, “The issue of cow protection has always been dear to us. Now, we expect a dedicated ministry to support and boost an entire cow-friendly ecosystem.” Responding to questions about the VHP suggestions, BJP chief Amit Shah said, “Various suggestions have come. Discussions are on” (See VHP to push for separate cow ministry at the Centre and states).

Angshukanta Chakraborty has written a scathing critique of the impending decision (See No, Modi government. Cow ministry is ridiculous)

But a Union cow ministry for the whole of India? Is it really that unthought-of, given the broad tendencies that the Modi government has been displaying with brazen aggression, perfectly in line to promote and deliver by 2019 the dreamed-of goal of turning India into a Hindu Rashtra?

We have seminars on cow urine, dung being organised in hallowed institutions such as the IITs. IIT Delhi, last year, had a three-day seminar on the fabled anti-cancer properties of panchagavya, the concoction comprising cow dung, urine and other bovine derivatives. As we had said on DailyO then, it’s one thing to chance upon the anti-cancer properties, if any. It’s simply quite another to steer the whole course of research at a publicly-funded premier technology institute.

But again, not unexpected. Because we have a bevy of ministers and BJP leaders singing paeans to cow urine, including Nitin Gadkari, who wanted hospital floors to be washed with cow urine, to Devendra Fadnavis, and the latest joinees Shaina NC and Meenakshi Lekhi.

The logic behind cow ministry is all the more shrouded in mystery (beyond the usual political trappings) given we already have a National Institute of Animal Welfare, the Animal Welfare division under the Ministry of Environment and Forests. We have the Animal Welfare Board of India. In addition, we have the department of animal husbandry, dairying and fisheries under the Ministry of Agriculture and Farmers Welfare. The rationale behind a cow ministry – not a cattle or livestock ministry – is unavailable, when not viewed through a highly saffronised cow protection-tinted lens.

Then why the sounding out of the BJP-led Centre’s plans of setting up a cow ministry? The historian Mukul Kesavan writes: “The cow is so totemic for the BJP that the murder of human beings in this animal's cause makes responsible leaders resort to silence, deflection, denial, defensiveness or arguments in mitigation that would shame the moral sense of a three-year old.” ...

In the new scheme of things, the gau rakshak is on the same pedestal as the soldier, and is therefore unchallenged in the nationalist pecking order. And even as PM Narendra Modi gently admonishes the fake gau rakshaks in his speech and tweets, after a highly impactful #NotInMyName protest in Delhi’s Jantar Mantar against Junaid’s murder, he nevertheless ensures the fake gau rakshaks are regularly confused for the good gau rakshaks, thereby making justice beyond reach for those at the receiving end of the cow zeitgeist.

Exactly as the foreign press writes disparagingly of the India story, calling Modi a “constant tinkerer”, “not much of a reformer”, ridiculing “Modi’s strongman economics”, repeatedly underlining that foregoing the economics of a secular, tolerant India would be tantamount to an economic downward spiral, such bitter pills are being spat out with the newfound arrogance of this fast becoming bovine theocracy such as ours. Only the cows themselves have little to gain from the politics in their name.

The ministry is still a suggestion and it may remain so for a long time but Hindu nationalism is definitely increasing as a separate ministry for cows is primarily based on Hindu religion. A separate ministry is also justified and considered necessary to:

• Increase milk production;
• Save several Indian cow breeds that are near extinction;
• To save cattle/cows from cruelty;
• To save Gou Mata (mother cow) that is the symbol of life in Indian culture.

But all these reasons camouflage the real reason, which is the rise of the religious right and religious nationalism. The irony is that despite all the laws, bans and lynchings, India is still the largest exporter of beef. Most of the beef is of buffalos but it is still beef:

Despite the various bans, India is the world’s largest exporter of beef, according to the U.S. Department of Agriculture. India exported 2.4 million tons of beef last year, compared with 2 million tons by Brazil. India alone accounts for nearly 24% of global beef exports. (See Why an Indian Hindu Group Wants a Ministry of Cows?)

Previously, The Haryana state, under a BJP government, established Haryana Gau Seva Aayog ( Haryana Commission for Serving Cows) in 2010 after passing The Haryana Gau Seva Aayog Act, 2010. The main objective was to oversee the strict implementation of laws that prohibit the slaughter and/or cruelty to cows. 

In November 2020, Madhya Pradesh chief minister Shivraj Singh Chouhan established a Cow or Gau Cabinet. It consists of six departments and five ministers, all suppose to work together for the "conservation and welfare of cows".