Hinduism and Hindutva debate

An interesting debate on the differences between Hinduism and Hindutva between Shashi Tharoor and Vinay Sahasrabuddhe. Shashi Tharoor is a member of Lok Sabha member from Congress Party while Vinay Sahasrabuddhe is a Rajya Sabha member from the BJP. 

Issues discussed are triple talak, Sabarimala temple,  cow slaughter ban, lynchings, Gandhi's use of religion, Muslim appeasement, citizenship in Northeast India, etc.

Shashi is a well-versed scholar on this subject. He has published a book, Why I am a Hindu, on this subject that has been well-received and praised by many for the succinct analysis of a very complex subject. Some excerpts from Urmi Chanda-Vaz's review for Scroll.in are copied below. The review can be read here. 

Why I Am A Hindu, running close to 300 pages, is divided into two sections, the first of which offers a brief history of Hinduism. The first chapter is titled “My Hinduism”, presented in what can be called the Devdutt Pattanaik mode. It is a clever and necessary disclaimer underscoring subjectivity – especially useful for times when religious sentiments are easily hurt. Tharoor acquaints us with the kind of Hinduism he was raised with, and, along with a sprinkling of anecdotes, gives an overview of the religion...

The second part of the book is titled “Political Hinduism”. This is where Tharoor’s meticulous context-building through the history of Hinduism is particularly useful. He starts building his case with the idea of secularism, which becomes a moot point when viewed through the prism of Western political theory. The right term in the Indian context, he argues, is “pluralism”, for India is and has long been a land of many religions. Further, he says, religion when defined as “dharma” is impossible to divorce from the Hindu way of life...

The author explains the BJP’s brand of Hindutva politics as being based on a victim-turned-avenger complex, a narrative of failure and defeat, and hatred for the Muslim community. Even if one were to turn a blind eye to the clear lack of Muslim representation (at least in the Lok Sabha) in this government, one can hardly ignore visible and worrying trends such as lynching and cow vigilantism. Ideas like ghar waapsi and love jihad, and groups like gau rakshaks and “Anti Romeo squads” operate and thrive under the aegis of the ruling party, and Tharoor correctly echoes the alarm of peace-loving Indians in this context. 

He also critiques the “cultural project” of Hindutva, which aims to “nationalise and spiritualise”. By all means acknowledge the great accomplishments of ancient Indian science, but keep fact and fiction separate, he enjoins. 

“We should take pride in what our forefathers did but resolve to be inspired by them rather than rest on their laurels. We need to use the past as a springboard, not as a battlefield. Only then we can rise above it to create for ourselves a future worthy of our remarkable past.” 

He also strongly condemns the whitewashing, or saffronising, of India’s cultural past vis-à-vis the actions of vigilante groups such as the Bajrang Dal and, most recently, Karni Sena. Not just tolerance, but acceptance, is the hallmark of Hinduism, he reminds the reader again and again.

Iranian identity and nationalism: Shahnameh's Jamsheed or Biblical Cyrus

Professor Ali Ansari gave a very enlightening talk on Iranian identity at Simon Fraser University, Vancouver. He is a professor at St. Andrews and has written extensively on Iran, Iranian identity, Iranian nationalism, and Iran-US relations. He has written seven books on Iran: 

• Iran: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford University Press, 2014),
• The Politics of Nationalism in Modern Iran, (Cambridge University Press, 2012), 
• Crisis of Authority: Iran's 2009 Presidential Election, (Chatham House, 2010), 
• Iran Under Ahmadinejad (Routledge, 2008), 
• Iran, Islam & Democracy - The Politics of Managing Change ( RIIA, London, 2000), 
• The History of Modern Iran Since 1921: the Pahlavis & After (Longman, Pearson Education, London, 2003), and 
• Confronting Iran: The Failure of American Foreign Policy and the Roots of Mistrust, (C Hurst and co, 2006).

Professor Ansari starts his talk by criticizing the ahistorical approach of studying Iranian history through the lens of the 1979 Revolution. He laments that scholars start from the 1979 Revolution and then look back for reasons why it happened as if it was the most important event in modern Iranian history. He contends that it is actually the 1906 Constitutional Revolution that is the most significant event and if one wants to understand Iran, one has to prioritize the 1906 Revolution. 

Professor Ansari explains that his talk is not about the politics of nationalism but about the ideas and myths that formed the basis or have fashioned Iranian identity and nationalism. He argues that it is the national mythology that defines nations, informs people who they are. 

In his talk, Professor Ansari dismisses the usual five periods division of modern Iranian history that he has also used in some of his works: the Constitutional Revolution, Reza Shah and modernization, Second World War and Mussaddeq, Second autocracy under Muhammad Reza Shah, and the post-Islamic Revolution period. He divides modern Iranian history into three periods on the basis of ideas prevalent about Iranian identity:

1. The age of enlightenment (1890-1963?)
2. The age of extremes (1963-1989): the unhappy consciousness?
3. The age of contestation (1989-present)

The age of enlightenment was the key period, according to Professor Ansari. During this formative age, ideas about nation and nationalism were absorbed from the West and then applied to Iran. Surprisingly, the level of engagement between the two sides was pretty sophisticated and a small but influential group of Iranians was debating ideas and was not ready to accept everything Western. The key problem faced by these Iranians was how to disseminate the ideas of civic nationalism to the wider public. They understood that for a nation, both history and myth are necessary. The myth they choose was Ferdowsi's Shahnameh (The Book of Kings). 

Professor Ansari does not explain Shahnameh as most of the people interested in Iran already know what it is but many readers here may be ignorant of its importance, so here is a short introduction. Shahnameh is a long epic Persian poem, consisting of some 50,000 couplets (two-line verses). It was written by Ferdowsi at the turn of the first millennium (977-1010 CE). It is the national epic of Greater Iran. The British Library website has the following Ferdowsi quote and a very, very short synopsis of the epic (more details about Shahnameh on the website can be read here):

"The houses that are the dwelling of today will sink beneath shower and sunshine to decay but storm and rain shall never mar the palace that I have built with my poetry." Ferdowsi.

The Shahnameh, literally meaning 'Book of Kings,' is structured according to the mythical and historical reign of 50 Persian Kings. The epic can be roughly divided into three parts: the first part tells of the mythical creation of Persia and its earliest mythical past; the second part tells of the legendary Kings and the heroes Rostam and Sohrab; the third part blends historical fact with legend, telling of the semi-mythical adventures of actual historical Kings.

Shahnameh was chosen because it was known to the Iranians. For centuries, millions of Iranians had listened to the epic and debated about the qualities of Jamsheed, Rostam, and Sohrab even when there was no historical evidence of their existence.  Even the British recognized the importance of Shahnameh and were using it to seek ordinary Iranians support for allies cause in WWII. In the propaganda pamphlet (published in 1942) below, Kaveh (the mythical blacksmith in Shahnameh who led the popular uprising against the cruel foreign ruler, Zahak) leads, while Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin follow him and Hitler (shown as Zahak) is bound on a horseback.

Source: Alamy.com

It's better to listen to Professor Ansari's lecture for understanding his argument, however, following is a summary of the rest of the talk. 

During the second period, according to Professor Ansari, the focus shifts from Shahnameh to Biblical Cyrus. The change is the result of the affinity that Mohammad Reza Shah felt for Cyrus, the Great. He perhaps thought Cyrus, the Great more useful for his own projection as an enlightened, liberal monarch who would emancipate his people and others from darkness, cruelty, and subjugation. The change also prioritizes 'real' history over myth. During the third period, Cyrus was initially rejected and Shahnameh was again promoted by the state as the basis of Iranian identity but more recently, Cyrus has also seen a revival. Can we see a synthesis in the near future?

To understand the tussle between religious and ethnolinguistic nationalism in Iran, here are some previous blog posts on Iranian nationalism: Iranian 'Persian-National' Identity, Shiite and Persian Nationalism are both myths, Afraid of Ahmadinejad,  Is Persian Identity rising again in Iran?, and More on the tussle between and merging of Islamic and Persian identity in Iran.

MBS and the evolving Saudi Nationalism

Saudi Arabian is evolving but which way? This question was discussed here three years ago (See Saudi Arabian Nationalism, MBS, Salafism and Yemen War). At that time, the role of Islam in Saudi nationalism was ebbing but the same could not be said about Salafism. One could rightly argue that Salafism is a form of Islam but Salafism and (moderate) Islam can sometimes lead one in different directions. It would be difficult to promote Iran as the most dangerous enemy if Islam was a major component of Saudi nationalism but it would be a facile victory if Saudi state subscribes to Salafi nationalism as Salafism (or Wahhabism as its detractors call it) has long designated Shiism as its enemy. For many Salafis, Shiites are infidels, beyond the pale of Islam. The other debate in the 2016 blogpost was about the strength of secular nationalism in the holy kingdom. In 2016, Prince Mohammad bin Salam was still Deputy Crown Prince but was amassing power and trying to lead the kingdom in a new direction. He was speaking against strict religious control and restrictions on Saudi women. Yemen War was being used by him to project himself as the new leader and as someone who would bring Saudis to the 21st century. 

Since then, things have moved swiftly. MBS has become the crown prince while his cousin and previous crown prince is nowhere to be seen. MBS has shown his power by detaining dozens of princes and rich Saudis and getting billions of dollars from them. He has also moved to decrease gender discrimination, although it is still too high even compared to other Muslim-majority and developing countries (See Women can drive in Saudi Arabia but is it really a big change?). This has resulted in some criticism from Salafi religious establishment but MBS has forged ahead.

King Salman (sitting) and the de facto king (MBS)

Source: Why Saudi Arabia Is Embracing a New Nationalism

What about nationalism or more particularly religious/Salafi nationalism? Stratfor in an article contends that Saudi state and MBS have realized that religious nationalism's utility now has diminished and a more territorial nationalism would help achieve national goals (See Why Saudi Arabia Is Embracing a New Nationalism):

At this point in its history, nationalism has stronger benefits to the Saudi state than religious conservatism. Tying identity to a specific place weakens the power of non-Saudi Islamists at home, for example; in a nationalist culture, verbal attacks by Turkish, Egyptian and Iranian Islamists would not represent salient criticisms from fellow Muslims, but rather unwelcome foreign interferences in domestic affairs. Moreover, shifting the Saudi mindset away from the tradition-bound reverence of religion toward the immediacy and secularity of a geographically defined space also opens up the potential for innovation and new ideas — key ingredients for bringing Vision 2030 to fruition.  

Critically, nationalism allows royals to limit domestic policy challenges based on religious opinions, conveniently weakening a check on their power as they embrace unprecedented behavior such as considering once-unthinkable ties with Israel. This also undercuts the ability of the conservative clerics to object to some of the kingdom's social reforms, like gender mixing, encouraging women to work and drive, and encouraging previously banned forms of art and entertainment...

While the contrast between Saudi Islamism and the Christian religious community in the United States has long been a complicating element of U.S.-Saudi ties, Prince Mohammed's meeting with Christian leaders illustrated a more relaxed attitude toward Christianity, which the kingdom hopes will improve relations with the United States. And any stories about non-Islamic worship being permitted publicly in Saudi Arabia, even if just for expatriates, weakens the image of a Saudi culture defined by hard-liners and encourages nationalist thought to expand in schools, media and art.

A recent article by Vivian Nereim (Bloomberg.com) echos the analysis and argues that the Saudi state under MBS is moving away from Salafi nationalism (See ‘Traitor’ Is the New ‘Infidel’ as Nationalism Grips Saudi Arabia). She contends that an aggressive and exclusivist nationalism is still being promoted but it is not primarily based on religion or sect:

Saudi Arabia’s undergoing an aggressive nationalist rebranding, downplaying an austere religious doctrine associated abroad with terrorism, and promoting veneration of de facto ruler Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman as he pursues an economic overhaul. Amid efforts to maintain domestic support while redesigning the contract between state and citizen, traitors, not infidels, are the enemy... 

“If a person is neutral or stands with the enemy against this country, it’s our right to call him a traitor,” Abdullah Al Fozan, a member of the [Saudi] consultative council [the nominated advisory council that functions in lieu of a legislature], said in a televised diatribe that went viral late last year... 

There’s an echo of the nativist triumphalism that accompanied political earthquakes in Europe and the U.S., with Donald Trump-inspired slogans like “Saudi First” and “Saudi The Great.” But what’s happening also has local flavors.

Such an aggressive nationalism can derail MBS plans of economic revival, religious and non-religious mega-tourism, and foreign investment but the Saudi officials are not relenting:

The risk is that baiting people to turn on fellow citizens under the guise of patriotism might rupture a society already under strain from the costs imposed by Prince Mohammed’s “Vision 2030” reforms, and deter the foreign investors and visitors he wants to attract. 

For now, officials aren’t hurrying to squash the spiteful mood -- a “with us or against us” mindset seen by some Saudis as needed to steer the country through a tough transition...
“Nationalism came in at a time when Saudi Arabia was not only trying to curtail the religious identity inside the country, but was also following a more assertive foreign policy,” said Eman Alhussein, a Saudi visiting fellow with the European Council on Foreign Relations... 

Whoever is responsible, they’re changing behavior. Stand-up comedian Yaser Bakr was forced to give a public apology last month after an old video surfaced of him making fun of the religious police. A social media campaign labeled him a traitor and called for him to be arrested and banned from comedy. Another young Saudi said he’s abandoned Twitter and holds back in family gatherings to avoid questions over loyalty.

The biggest test yet faced by the made over Saudi state, besides Yemen War, was Saudi dissident journalist and Washington Post columnist Jamal Khashoggi's murder. Khashoggi was once part of the ruling elite and close to the royal family. He was a Salafi and was against Iran. His only crime was criticizing MBS in the Western press and that cost him dearly in the hyper-nationalistic climate. 

Other analysts have also pointed to the close ties with the Trump administration, coordination with the Israeli government (although it is not publically acknowledged), and distance from the Palestinian administration as evidence of the lesser role of religion in the affairs of the Saudi state. True, but the lack of public acknowledgment also demonstrates that religious and Arab issues still carry weight. What is clear is that Islam and Salafism carry less weight now than they carried five years ago in Saudi Arabia. A new identity is being forged which is based not only on Islam or Salafism but also on territory and loyalty to Saudi royals.   

However, this new identity can create new problems. Stratfor article cautions that territorial nationalism can unite the people against the royal house as has happened in many other countries during the 20th century:

Though Saudi leaders are hoping that a swell of nationalism will reduce checks on royal power, nationalist thought itself — especially once regular citizens have fully embraced it — could replace those checks and even eclipse their power. Former Saudi kings saw nationalist thought as a danger to royal unilateralism, preferring the hierarchical and relatively predictable hard-line Islamists to the more rowdy and innovative nationalists of the 20th century. A new push for Saudi nationalism may challenge the monarchy in exactly the way that its 20th century rulers wanted to avoid. 

Identifying with a nation, after all, is far different than identifying with the ruling house of the nation's government. Asking Saudis for loyalty to national interests invites increasing citizen engagement with what, exactly, the national interests are — a question that until recently has been answered only by the royal family. As nationalism ascends, Saudi public opinion stands to grow more complex and less easily motivated by the tools of old, including handouts and religious scruples. 

Additionally, if nationalism is equated with the traditions of Najd province [the home of the royal family], where Riyadh is located, rather than being pan-Arabian, nominally suppressed or sidelined local identities may experience a resurgence. Places like Shiite-dominated Qatif in the Eastern province, Asir in the southwest and the Hejaz, which hosts the holy cities of Mecca and Medina, all have local identities that may be empowered by nationalism and may bristle against the state's imposition of Najdi symbols, rituals and culture.
 

Israel is not a country of all its citizens

Religious nationalism in Israel or Zionism achieved a new high on March 10, 2019. A sitting Prime Minister, who many expect to be sworn in again after the Knesset elections and become the longest-serving Israeli Prime Minister in history, publicly declared, " Israel is not a country of all its citizens." He was denying equal citizenship or full citizenship of Arab Israelis who make almost one-fifth of the Israeli population. Many would argue that most countries in the world do prioritize one religious, ethnic, or linguistic community over other communities so the statement was not something rare or surprising. Others would argue that Israel has never given equal rights to its Arab citizens in its 71-year history so the only people baffled by Benjamin Netanyahu's statement were the ignorant morons. Bibi's critics would point to his statement on the previous election day in March 2015 when he appealed to the rightwing voter by demonizing Arabs. He said that “the rule of the right is in danger” because "Arab voters were coming out in droves to the polls," bused by the left-wing NGOs. This appeal was decisive in winning him the last Knesset elections.

Source: Jerusalem Post

But the statement was stupefying because we live in a world where microaggressions are frowned upon and Israel claims to be a democracy. In fact, it prides itself as the only democracy in the Middle East. A former Prime Minister and Chief of Staff Ehud Barak said Israel was "a villa in the jungle," i.e. an outpost of civilization amidst the barbarism of the Middle East. Do other democratic leaders use Netanyahu's kind of rhetoric to win elections? No. Even dictators would not use this rhetoric today. So, it was astonishing for Netanyahu to write it and then he doubled down it and defended his statement before a cabinet meeting. 

Here is what prompted Netanyahu to proudly declare that Israeli Arabs are second-class citizens. Rotem Sela, a popular Israeli model and TV host, watching Miri Regev, the Israeli Culture Minister being interviewed by Rina Matsliah. Rotem became upset by Miri's racist attitude and wrote on her Instagram: “Miri Regev is sitting and explaining to Rina Matsliah that the public needs to beware, because if Benny Gantz is elected he will have to create a government with the Arabs. Rina Matsliah is silent. And I ask myself: why doesn’t Rina ask her in shock: ‘And what’s the problem with the Arabs???’ Dear God, there are also Arab citizens in this country. When will anyone in this government tell the public that this is a country of all its citizens, and all people are born equal.” The actress said that “the Arabs are also human beings. And also the Druze, and the gays, and the lesbians and... gasp... leftists.” 

Netanyahu responded on Facebook, "Dear Rotem, an important correction: Israel is not a state of all its citizens. According to the Nation-State Law that we passed, Israel is the nation-state of the Jewish people – and its alone. As you wrote, there is no problem with the Arab Israeli citizens – they have equal rights like everybody and the Likud government has invested in the Arab sector more than any other government."

Israeli President Rivlin criticized Netanyahu's “entirely unacceptable remarks about the Arab citizens of Israel” without naming him and added, "“There are no first-class citizens, and there are no second-class voters. We are all equal in the voting booth. We are all represented at the Knesset.” 

But Bibi was unapologetic and reaffirmed his anti-Arab stance before Sunday's Cabinet's meeting as Guardian reported:

As the comments caused waves in Israel, Netanyahu again spoke of the issue at the start of a cabinet meeting. He called Israel a “Jewish, democratic state” with equal rights, but “the nation state not of all its citizens but only of the Jewish people”.

Netanyahu has been accused of demonising Israeli Arabs, who make up about 17% of the population, in an attempt to boost rightwing turnout in elections due on 9 April. He has continually warned that his opponents will receive the support of Arab parties and that they will make significant concessions to the Palestinians.

Wonder woman star, Gal Gadot, supported her friend Rotem Sela:

“Love thy neighbor as thyself,” Gadot wrote in Hebrew on her own Instagram account in response. “It is not a matter of right or left, Jewish or Arab, religious or secular. It’s a matter of dialogue for peace, equality and tolerance for one another. It is our responsibility to plant hope and light for a better future for our children. Rotem, you are an inspiration for us all.” (See ynet news)