Saturday, March 23, 2019

MBS and the evolving Saudi Nationalism

Saudi Arabian is evolving but which way? This question was discussed here three years ago (See Saudi Arabian Nationalism, MBS, Salafism and Yemen War). At that time, the role of Islam in Saudi nationalism was ebbing but the same could not be said about Salafism. One could rightly argue that Salafism is a form of Islam but Salafism and (moderate) Islam can sometimes lead one in different directions. It would be difficult to promote Iran as the most dangerous enemy if Islam was a major component of Saudi nationalism but it would be a facile victory if Saudi state subscribes to Salafi nationalism as Salafism (or Wahhabism as its detractors call it) has long designated Shiism as its enemy. For many Salafis, Shiites are infidels, beyond the pale of Islam. The other debate in the 2016 blogpost was about the strength of secular nationalism in the holy kingdom. In 2016, Prince Mohammad bin Salam was still Deputy Crown Prince but was amassing power and trying to lead the kingdom in a new direction. He was speaking against strict religious control and restrictions on Saudi women. Yemen War was being used by him to project himself as the new leader and as someone who would bring Saudis to the 21st century. 

Since then, things have moved swiftly. MBS has become the crown prince while his cousin and previous crown prince is nowhere to be seen. MBS has shown his power by detaining dozens of princes and rich Saudis and getting billions of dollars from them. He has also moved to decrease gender discrimination, although it is still too high even compared to other Muslim-majority and developing countries (See Women can drive in Saudi Arabia but is it really a big change?). This has resulted in some criticism from Salafi religious establishment but MBS has forged ahead.

King Salman (sitting) and the de facto king (MBS)


What about nationalism or more particularly religious/Salafi nationalism? Stratfor in an article contends that Saudi state and MBS have realized that religious nationalism's utility now has diminished and a more territorial nationalism would help achieve national goals (See Why Saudi Arabia Is Embracing a New Nationalism):
At this point in its history, nationalism has stronger benefits to the Saudi state than religious conservatism. Tying identity to a specific place weakens the power of non-Saudi Islamists at home, for example; in a nationalist culture, verbal attacks by Turkish, Egyptian and Iranian Islamists would not represent salient criticisms from fellow Muslims, but rather unwelcome foreign interferences in domestic affairs. Moreover, shifting the Saudi mindset away from the tradition-bound reverence of religion toward the immediacy and secularity of a geographically defined space also opens up the potential for innovation and new ideas — key ingredients for bringing Vision 2030 to fruition.  
Critically, nationalism allows royals to limit domestic policy challenges based on religious opinions, conveniently weakening a check on their power as they embrace unprecedented behavior such as considering once-unthinkable ties with Israel. This also undercuts the ability of the conservative clerics to object to some of the kingdom's social reforms, like gender mixing, encouraging women to work and drive, and encouraging previously banned forms of art and entertainment...
While the contrast between Saudi Islamism and the Christian religious community in the United States has long been a complicating element of U.S.-Saudi ties, Prince Mohammed's meeting with Christian leaders illustrated a more relaxed attitude toward Christianity, which the kingdom hopes will improve relations with the United States. And any stories about non-Islamic worship being permitted publicly in Saudi Arabia, even if just for expatriates, weakens the image of a Saudi culture defined by hard-liners and encourages nationalist thought to expand in schools, media and art.


A recent article by Vivian Nereim (Bloomberg.com) echos the analysis and argues that the Saudi state under MBS is moving away from Salafi nationalism (See ‘Traitor’ Is the New ‘Infidel’ as Nationalism Grips Saudi Arabia). She contends that an aggressive and exclusivist nationalism is still being promoted but it is not primarily based on religion or sect:

Saudi Arabia’s undergoing an aggressive nationalist rebranding, downplaying an austere religious doctrine associated abroad with terrorism, and promoting veneration of de facto ruler Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman as he pursues an economic overhaul. Amid efforts to maintain domestic support while redesigning the contract between state and citizen, traitors, not infidels, are the enemy... 
“If a person is neutral or stands with the enemy against this country, it’s our right to call him a traitor,” Abdullah Al Fozan, a member of the [Saudi] consultative council [the nominated advisory council that functions in lieu of a legislature], said in a televised diatribe that went viral late last year... 
There’s an echo of the nativist triumphalism that accompanied political earthquakes in Europe and the U.S., with Donald Trump-inspired slogans like “Saudi First” and “Saudi The Great.” But what’s happening also has local flavors.

Such an aggressive nationalism can derail MBS plans of economic revival, religious and non-religious mega-tourism, and foreign investment but the Saudi officials are not relenting:

The risk is that baiting people to turn on fellow citizens under the guise of patriotism might rupture a society already under strain from the costs imposed by Prince Mohammed’s “Vision 2030” reforms, and deter the foreign investors and visitors he wants to attract. 
For now, officials aren’t hurrying to squash the spiteful mood -- a “with us or against us” mindset seen by some Saudis as needed to steer the country through a tough transition...
“Nationalism came in at a time when Saudi Arabia was not only trying to curtail the religious identity inside the country, but was also following a more assertive foreign policy,” said Eman Alhussein, a Saudi visiting fellow with the European Council on Foreign Relations... 
Whoever is responsible, they’re changing behavior. Stand-up comedian Yaser Bakr was forced to give a public apology last month after an old video surfaced of him making fun of the religious police. A social media campaign labeled him a traitor and called for him to be arrested and banned from comedy. Another young Saudi said he’s abandoned Twitter and holds back in family gatherings to avoid questions over loyalty.

The biggest test yet faced by the made over Saudi state, besides Yemen War, was Saudi dissident journalist and Washington Post columnist Jamal Khashoggi's murder. Khashoggi was once part of the ruling elite and close to the royal family. He was a Salafi and was against Iran. His only crime was criticizing MBS in the Western press and that cost him dearly in the hyper-nationalistic climate. 

Other analysts have also pointed to the close ties with the Trump administration, coordination with the Israeli government (although it is not publically acknowledged), and distance from the Palestinian administration as evidence of the lesser role of religion in the affairs of the Saudi state. True, but the lack of public acknowledgment also demonstrates that religious and Arab issues still carry weight. What is clear is that Islam and Salafism carry less weight now than they carried five years ago in Saudi Arabia. A new identity is being forged which is based not only on Islam or Salafism but also on territory and loyalty to Saudi royals.   

However, this new identity can create new problems. Stratfor article cautions that territorial nationalism can unite the people against the royal house as has happened in many other countries during the 20th century:
Though Saudi leaders are hoping that a swell of nationalism will reduce checks on royal power, nationalist thought itself — especially once regular citizens have fully embraced it — could replace those checks and even eclipse their power. Former Saudi kings saw nationalist thought as a danger to royal unilateralism, preferring the hierarchical and relatively predictable hard-line Islamists to the more rowdy and innovative nationalists of the 20th century. A new push for Saudi nationalism may challenge the monarchy in exactly the way that its 20th century rulers wanted to avoid. 
Identifying with a nation, after all, is far different than identifying with the ruling house of the nation's government. Asking Saudis for loyalty to national interests invites increasing citizen engagement with what, exactly, the national interests are — a question that until recently has been answered only by the royal family. As nationalism ascends, Saudi public opinion stands to grow more complex and less easily motivated by the tools of old, including handouts and religious scruples. 
Additionally, if nationalism is equated with the traditions of Najd province [the home of the royal family], where Riyadh is located, rather than being pan-Arabian, nominally suppressed or sidelined local identities may experience a resurgence. Places like Shiite-dominated Qatif in the Eastern province, Asir in the southwest and the Hejaz, which hosts the holy cities of Mecca and Medina, all have local identities that may be empowered by nationalism and may bristle against the state's imposition of Najdi symbols, rituals and culture.
 


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