Nationalism and Islamization: Is there a causal link?
(First chapter of my book State, Nationalism and Islamization: Historical Analysis of Turkey and Pakistan, 2017)
Defining Islam’s role in government is one of the most
pressing political issues facing the Muslim majority countries (MMCs) today.
Acerbic debates relating to Islam’s relationship to laws, decrees and
policies have polarized many of these countries, making social harmony and
economic growth difficult to achieve. Mass media also increasingly focuses on Islamization,
invariably linking it to human rights violations, religious discrimination, and
terrorism. The ready explanations for the
phenomenon are fundamentalism, misogyny, nativism, bigotry, or plain old hatred
towards the West. This media frenzy has raised the specter of Islamization not
only in the MMCs but also in the West. Many Westerners,
despite living in countries where Muslims form a small share of the population
and an even a smaller share of the political and economic elite, are worried
and ready to support anti-Sharia, anti-hijab or anti-minaret laws to thwart the
imminent Islamization of their countries.
News reports often seem to imply that the level of Islamization
of government is high in most MMCs and it
is increasing further. Yet, the growth
and level of Islamization of government vary
in the MMCs. In some MMCs, government policies and laws show a strong influence
of Islam. However, in many other MMCs, secular laws – mostly adaptations of
erstwhile colonial laws – prevail. On one
extreme are Saudi Arabia and Iran where the
judiciary is primarily controlled by the ulema
(religious scholars) and laws have to
conform to the principles of Sharia. On the
other extreme are secular MMCs in Central Asia, Southern Europe or Sub-Saharan
Africa, such as Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Albania, Turkmenistan, Senegal, Burkina
Faso, etc. In these countries, religion and state are
officially/constitutionally separate and
education and laws are secular. Between these two extremes lie most of the MMCs.
In some of them, the Islamization of government is limited to provisions of family
law but in others, it extends to diverse areas, such as religious education,
penal laws, and commercial regulations. What differentiates the latter group of
countries from Iran and Saudi Arabia is that, despite substantial Islamization,
the basic infrastructure of the legal system remains secular. Besides variances
in the level, there are also differences in the growth of Islamization of the government.
In some MMCs, the Islamization of government is increasing but in others, it is declining.
For example, while Malaysia recently decided to create a Sharia index to
evaluate how well its administrative policies conform to Islamic law, Egypt and
Pakistan introduced new restrictions on imams, mosques, and madrassas.
What is the primary source of this variation? A growing
literature on Islamist movements/parties argues that this variation in
Islamization is largely due to the differences in the popularity of these parties.
Popular Islamist parties, as compared to unpopular ones, are more likely to Islamize
the government themselves (after coming to power) or, as happens more often,
pressurize the rulers to Islamize the
government. Other scholars have countered this argument by pointing out that high-level
Islamization of government is often implemented
by authoritarian regimes to bolster their legitimacy in the MMCs where either Islamist parties do not exist or
are not very popular. Both these arguments, individually or in combination, explain
Islamization of government in some of the MMCs, but they do not explain its
variation across the Muslim world.
Due to the significance of this issue, it is
critical to analyze why, in some MMCs, does Islam play a large role in government
affairs while in others, it has only a minor influence?
This book contends that it is not the popularity of religious parties or
autocratic regimes’ need for legitimacy but Islam’s role in an MMC’s nationalism
that has the most influence on the Islamization of government. Two very dissimilar countries, Turkey (secular
nationalism dominant, with a low level of Islamization of government) and
Pakistan (religious nationalism dominant, with a high level of Islamization of
government), have been chosen to test this argument.
Academic literature on religious nationalism
supports the view that, irrespective of specific religious tradition, religion’s
role in nationalism and government are closely related (Rubin 2013; Rieffer
2003; Barker 2008, 68-69 and 107). Islam's role in
nationalism is frequently employed to explain Islamization of government in many
countries. For example, numerous country studies of Islamization in Pakistan,
Saudi Arabia, Iran or Gulf countries have
linked Islamization to the nationalism of these
countries. However, nationalism is often ignored when Islamization of
government is more broadly discussed, as a
phenomenon happening in multiple countries. In such studies, autocratic
rulers’ needs or Islamist parties’ popularity are prioritized as explanations. This inclination of downplaying religion’s role in
nationalism in fostering Islamization of government is especially perplexing as
even in non-Muslim countries, religion plays a much larger role in governments
of countries whose nationalism is closely linked with a particular religious
tradition. For example, religious
injunctions have influenced public policies in Israel, Malta, and Ireland and
this influence is legitimized on the keystone of religion’s special
relationship with the nation (Binder 1961; Weiss 1986; Yadgar 2010; Cohen 2012;
House 2013; Lacroix 2011).
THE PUZZLE: Why Islamization of government?
Sacralization of politics
is a phenomenon not limited to the MMCs. Religious precepts, values and
discourse influence politics in a large
number of dissimilar countries. In such countries, opinions of Popes, Ayatollahs,
Swamis, or Rabbis matter and politicians can
ignore them at their own peril. Emotional appeals to religion are common and policies
are presented as moral imperatives. The
pious are frequently warned of the vanishing of their creed, if they do not mobilize or vote in a certain way. The relegation
of religion to the private sphere, as predicted by many eminent sociologists in
the twentieth century, has evidently not transpired. Even in countries, which are constitutionally secular and/or have a large
number of religiously unaffiliated ‘nones’, there are regular instances of
politicians passing laws or making new rules to placate and pander to the religious
sentiments of the majority. Whether it is the defunding of Plan
Parenthood and usage of administrative procedures to shut down anti-abortion
clinics in the US or meat bans in India, religions continue to display their relevance
and resilience, even in secular countries.
Sacralization of politics (or
Islamization) in the MMCs, however, has garnered increasing attention because
of its alleged link with terrorism. The following section delineates the gaps
in understanding of the phenomenon of Islamization.
For many MMCs, independence came after more than hundred years
of bitter struggle against colonialism. People were, therefore, enthusiastic
about finally ending the external rule and gaining national sovereignty. Erwin Rosenthal
(1965) argues that after achieving independence, the national goals were
“self-expression and self-fulfillment” and the place of Islam/Sharia in the
laws and constitutions became a salient issue. Conservative groups considered enshrining
a prominent role for religion in the government not only beneficial but also a
sacred duty of the faithful. Many of them argued that the continuance of the
Western laws meant (Christian) colonial powers were still ruling their nation. However,
these groups, despite having sympathy of significant segments of the population,
were not very successful because most of the newly independent MMCs were led by
leaders, who were had no interest in Sharia. Often
educated in the West, they lived lives more similar to their former
colonial masters than to the majority of their countrymen. Some of them were
not even Muslim. Muhammad Ali Jinnah of Pakistan, Leopold Senghor of Senegal, François
Tombalbaye of Chad, and Habib Bourguiba of Tunisia are some of the prominent examples
of such leadership. These leaders
frequently had a very low opinion of ulema and considered Sharia an obstacle to
the craft a modern nation. Not surprisingly, under their rule, Islamization of
governments was limited to few insignificant changes in laws and MMCs' governments
remained largely secular. Ulema’s criticism of the government’s secularism and immorality were ignored for the most part. It was only in the 1970s, in some cases decades after
independence, that many MMCs took serious steps to Islamize the laws and
government policies and started to fashion a public sphere defined by religious
motifs (Hibbard 2015, 297-8). The Iranian
revolution, defeats in Arab-Israeli wars, disenchantment with other ideologies
(Arab nationalism, Baathism, socialism, capitalism, etc.), and the rise of rich
conservative Gulf monarchies are some of the international factors cited to
explain this change. However, despite these influences, Islamization of government
was often a domestic affair and most of
its motivations and repercussions were also domestic. Sinno's (2010) statement
about the use of Islam in Afghanistan may be true
for many MMCs:
The
strategic use of religion plays an important
role in the ability of some Afghan political actors to legitimize their
actions, mobilize support, undermine rivals, attract foreign aid, and control
populations.
Following are some the principal explanations given in the
literature for the Islamization of the government in the MMCs:
· Lack
of political legitimacy;
· Weak, heterogeneous state;
· Presence of popular Islamist parties/
movements.
There are also some essentialist
explanations that hold Islam as monolithic, primitive, and/or state-centric, uniquely
designed to impose its bigoted misogynist Sharia on Muslims and unsuspecting others.
However, as these explanations are getting rarer in academic literature and
have been appropriately critiqued, they are not being discussed here.
Lack of political legitimacy
In
October 2013, several Saudi women buckled up and drove their cars themselves,
instead of seeking the help of their male relatives or calling a cab. Some of
them were arrested and detained as women are not issued driving licenses in
Saudi Arabia. On both these occasions, Saudi regime was severely criticized not
only by Western media but also by commentators in many other MMCs. While Saudi
government cited religious reasons for the continuation of their anachronistic
policy, most experts blamed Saudi royals’
long-standing strategy of seeking political legitimacy through
Islamization of government. Using Islam as a tool to gain political legitimacy
is, however, not something peculiar to the Saudi monarchy. Numerous other autocratic regimes, lacking electoral
legitimacy, have also been guilty of instrumentalization of Islam. Using the examples of Righteous Caliphate (considered
by most Sunni Muslims as the golden age) or Shia Imams (considered by most Shia
Muslims to be the only ones fit to rule), they claim that it is the prerogative
of the righteous to rule. Examples of this phenomenon are numerous. In
Sudan, General Abbud and later General Numayri used Islam to gain legitimacy (Fluehr-Lobban
1991; 71-89). Similarly, in Bangladesh,
General Zia-ur-Rahman and General Ershad,
introduced Islamization policies to legitimize their military takeovers and to
prolong their rule (Raiz 2010). Colonel Qaddafi introduced
Sharia to consolidate his power in the early 1970s and in Iraq, Saddam Hussain, a secular Baathist, put restrictions on
alcohol and made religious education mandatory after his defeat in the ‘mother
of all battles’ (First Gulf War, 1990-91) to shore up his fast diminishing legitimacy
(Harris 1986; Sadi 2011, 27-8).
Like
autocrats, democratic leaders in the MMCs
have also Islamized the governments to buttress their rule. Electoral victories
provided them legitimacy but the democratic experiment was new, institutions
were weak, poverty widespread, bureaucracy corrupt, and difficulties enormous. Consequently,
many democratic leaders failed to fulfill
their promises of social justice and economic development, weakening support
for their rule. The religious right used this disillusionment to their
advantage and criticized democratic
leaders for their westernization, immoral practices and lack of attachment to
Islam. Many democratic leaders then
resorted to Islamization of government to deflect criticism. Pakistan’s Prime
Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, who was not a practicing Muslim, introduced many
Islamization policies to strengthen his government and weaken public support
for the religious right opposition (Saigol 1995, 470-1). In Malaysia too, Dr.
Mahathir recruited Anwar Ibrahim (a popular
Islamist activist and the leader of the Islamic Youth League) and increased
Islamization of government to scuttle challenges from his own party rivals and
to thwart the progress of the principal opposition party, the Pan-Malaysian
Islamic Party (Means 2009). More
recently, in Iraq, former Prime Minister Malaki also tried to use Islamization
to prolong his rule. (Mamouri 2013).
Weak, heterogeneous
state
Seyyed
Vali Nasr (2001), one of the most erudite scholars of political Islam, contended
that Islamization of government had also been
used as a strategy for consolidating a
weak state. Most post-colonial states had arbitrarily drawn borders that
cut across linguistic, ethnic, religious and sectarian communities. Creating a
unified state and a strong nation identity out of diverse communities, which
were cobbled together solely to serve colonial interests, was not an easy job (Ezrow
and Frantz 2013, 56-9). Therefore, post-independence leaders had to spend
considerable time, energy and money on the twin tasks of state and nation
building. In at least some MMCs, according to Nasr, centrifugal forces,
threatening the weak post-colonial state, were countered by using Islam as a
unifying element. Presenting Pakistan and Malaysia as examples, Nasr
demonstrated how rulers of these heterogeneous colonial states employed Islamization to counter separatists and to keep their states
united.
Presence of
popular Islamist movements/parties
Islamist
parties/movements (hereafter parties) contributed to the Islamization of the
government in two ways: sometimes formally and directly and at other times
indirectly. A few Islamist parties were gaining power and
introduced Sharia-based laws themselves. These Islamist parties were proponents
of Islamization of government, long before they came to power. Islamization was
not the side dish for them, it was the main course. It was the central
principle on which the party platform was built. The leaders of these parties pledged that
they would Islamize the government once they achieved power and they fulfilled their promises.
Ayatollah Khomeini vowed to increase Islam’s role in government and rejected
the Westoxification (Gharbzadegi),
toxic influences of the Western culture that were threatening Islam and the local
Persian culture. After the revolution, he delivered on his promises by
Islamization of laws and policies. More recently, former Egyptian President
Morsi also increased Islamization of the government as per decades of promises
by the Muslim Brotherhood movement and the manifesto of his Freedom and Justice
Party (FJP 2011).
More
often, however, popular Islamist parties
help increase the Islamization of government indirectly,
not by acquiring power but by threatening to acquire
power. To prevent these parties from becoming more popular and taking control of the state, rulers tried to steal
their thunder and Islamized the government themselves. President Hosni Mubarak
of Egypt, President Chadli Benjedid of Algeria, and President Abdullah Saleh of
Yemen all increased Islamization of government
due to the threat of Islamist parties.
The
foregoing reasons, however, fall short of giving a convincing explanation of
the Islamization of government. The lack of legitimacy does not always lead to
the Islamization of government. Most of the
MMCs have been ruled by authoritarian regimes since independence, but
Islamization of government has been a priority in only a few. Some countries
that have been under dictatorship for decades have a low level of Islamization of government while others that have
been democratic (albeit partially) have a higher level of Islamization of government. For instance, Kazakhstan has been
led by authoritarian President Nursultan Nazarbayev since independence in 1991.
During the last quarter of a century,
there have been elections but none of them was considered free and fair. In
April 2015, Nazarbayev was elected for the fifth term in office with more than ninety
percent of votes. However, despite his authoritarianism, Nazarbayev has never
tried to Islamize the government. In fact, he has cracked down on Islamists
(Rickleton 2015; Radio Free Europe 2015a). Similar is the case of Uzbekistan,
where former President Karimov suppressed Islamists and has ruled more
ruthlessly than Nazarbayev for more than two decades (Dyomkin 2014; Radio Free
Europe 2015b). Tunisia also did not become Islamized even after more than half
a century of dictatorships of President Bourguiba and Ben Ali. Islamization of
government is clearly less in these countries than in Malaysia, a longstanding
democracy, and in Pakistan, which has been a democracy for considerable periods
of time.
The
presence of strong Islamist parties in the MMCs increases the probability of
Islamization of government, but it is not a necessary or sufficient condition.
Examples of sheikhdoms in the Persian Gulf demonstrate that Islamization of
government does not require popular Islamist
parties. Conversely, popular Islamist parties in an MMC does not necessarily
mean a high level of Islamization of
government. Despite having no Islamist parties, governments in Saudi Arabia,
Qatar and Oman are more Islamized than governments of Egypt and Jordan, which
have popular Islamist parties. As Oliver Roy explains, regimes deal with Islamist
parties in contrasting ways, depending on how they (regimes) perceive they can
best control Islam, and the result is not always Islamization (or
re-Islamization as Roy calls it):
Either moderate Islamist parties are integrated into the political scene
without any particular concessions being made to them (Jordan, Kuwait, Turkey),
or integration is accompanied by a state-ordered re-Islamization (Pakistan,
Sudan, Egypt), or else ideological concessions are made toward re-Islamization
while Islamist political participation is blocked (the Maghreb), or, finally,
no concessions are made, the contradiction being too great between the founding
values of the state and Islamism (secularism for Iraq and Syria, Qaddafi’s
philosophy for Libya).
(Roy 1994, 124-6)
Finally, elite usage of Islamization of government as a way
to consolidate a weak, heterogeneous state is also rare. Many highly
heterogeneous MMCs, having a long history of conflicts,
like Chad and Sierra Leone, have a low level of Islamization of government. Conversely, some MMCs with low
ethnic diversity, like Saudi Arabia, have a high level of Islamization of government. It is particularly interesting and
enlightening to compare three neighboring MMCs of South East Asia as they
demonstrate, not positive, but an inverse relationship between heterogeneity
and Islamization of government. According to Nasr (2001), the Malaysian
government was Islamized to strengthen a weak heterogeneous state. However,
Indonesia, a vastly more heterogeneous and
weak state at the time of its inception, was not Islamized. Meanwhile, Brunei,
a tiny nation much less heterogeneous than Malaysia and Indonesia, became the
most Islamized of the three, when it adopted Sharia
as law in 2014 (Ozanick 2015).
Besides these reasons, geographical location also cannot
explain high Islamization of government. Although
most of the MMCs with a high level of Islamization of government are in the
Middle East, many others are not: Pakistan is in South Asia, Libya in North
Africa, Afghanistan in Central Asia, and Mauritania in Sub-Saharan Africa.
Furthermore, Islamization of government does not
seem to be linked with per capita income as high level of Islamization of
government is found in low per capita income (such as Afghanistan and Mauritania),
middle per capita income (such as Iran), and very high per capita income (such
as Qatar and Saudi Arabia) countries.
What, then, is primarily responsible for the Islamization of
governments in the MMCs? Pakistan, Iran, and Saudi Arabia are considered the
three most Islamized governments in the
world (The ARDA 2015). Studying them, one could not help but notice the
prominent role of Islam in their nationalisms. All three have been called
religious nationalist states and scholars have linked the Islamization of their
governments to Islam’s role in their nationalisms. But this causal link of Islam's role in nationalism and the
Islamization of government has not been pursued when the focus is on
Islamization of government in multiple
countries. This book intends to fill the gap. It will study two very dissimilar cases, Turkey
and Pakistan, and demonstrate that Islam’s role in nationalism is one of the key causes of the Islamization of government in
both these states.
State Nationalism
The story of nationalism mirrors history and modern history mirrors the story of nationalism; since about
the mid-nineteenth century no place in
the world remained untouched by its impact. (Harris 2009,
1)
For more than two centuries, nationalism is one of the most
powerful forces, if not the most powerful force, in the international arena. There have been debates about how or when nationalism originated, but few can deny its
significance. It is
argued that nationalism is powerful because people are interpellated with
nationalist ideology from their childhood. Not surprisingly, people internalize
nationalism and consider something natural and eternal. Education and media are
two vital agents of its socialization but as Michael Billig (1995) has
explained, there are hundreds of unnoticed routine practices that reinforce
nationalism. An outsider may notice these small things,
but local people do not. Color a piece of cloth one way and it becomes something
to die for and color it another way and it becomes a symbol of revulsion, deceit, and intense
hatred.
In the previous discussion, nationalism has been used in a
singular form. It might give rise to the idea that each country has a unique nationalism
and this book will analyze two unique ideas, Turkish and Pakistani nationalisms. Nothing can be further from the
truth. There is no unique Pakistani or Turkish nationalism or for that matter
unique French or Japanese nationalisms.
Every state has multiple versions of nationalism and these versions contest
each other for acceptance and prominence. It is,
therefore, necessary to clarify that this book employs a constructivist
approach to explore state nationalisms in Turkey and Pakistan – that is, the
idea of the nation as constructed/promoted by the state and displayed in state
symbols and official representations of state action and identity – and the
varying role of Islam in this state-produced and presented version of
nationalism.
State nationalism is the
nationalism propagated by the state (or
the state decision-makers) to promote a singular unified national identity.
This particular version of nationalism varies over time and is always contested. It is usually presented in contrast to the popular/cultural
nationalisms that the masses believe in. State
nationalism is sometimes defined as elite nationalism and explained as the
nationalism of groups ‘politically or administratively powerful, being rich or propertied,
having a title or high of social rank, being well-educated, being a star, and
so forth’ and popular nationalism is the nationalism of the non-elite
(Whitmeyer 2002). However, while emphasizing the distinction, it must be
acknowledged that state nationalism is constantly
influenced by popular nationalism(s) and it is not something ‘out there,’ completely immune and separate.
However, as the state is not a monolithic entity, prioritizing
state nationalism entails answering the secondary question, which state nationalism? Decision-makers/elites do
not always agree on the type of nationalism the state should promote. For
example, the political and military elites of Turkey and Pakistan have rarely
agreed on what should be promoted as Turkish and Pakistani nationalism. The
contestation within the state elite, as well as pressure from popular
nationalism(s), means state nationalism is not fixed or static. Figuring out
state nationalism – or Islam's role in state nationalism – is, therefore, not
easy. To deal with this issue, in this book,
Islam’s role in state nationalism is assessed by focusing on the presence of
Islamic themes in the widely accepted symbols of state nationalism such as anthems,
constitutions, flags, and images on the national
currency.[1]
These
indicators of state nationalism will receive more discussion later in the
chapter.
Religion and
State Nationalism
The
irrational emotional dimension and intrinsic divisiveness of nationalism
frequently give rise to an uneasiness about it. However, misgivings about nationalism
are nothing compared to the intense dislike that is evoked by the mention of religious
state nationalism. A mix of religion and nationalism is considered highly dangerous
and explosive (Juergensmeyer 1993).
It
is difficult to define the relationship
between majority religions and state nationalisms as they have been bitter
rivals as well as close friends, depending on the context. Two of the early
nations, France and Great Britain,
exemplify these contrasting trends. Catholicism,
the majority religion in France, had historically a difficult relationship with
French state nationalism, due to French revolutionary ideals, conflicts with the
Pope, and wars with other major Catholic monarchies (Spain and Austria).
In contrast, Anglican Christianity, the dominant religion in Great Britain, was
a key constituent of British state
nationalism.
Rogers
Brubaker, Mark Juergensmeyer, Philip Barker and Barbara-Ann Rieffer have made
notable contributions regarding the relationship between religion and
nationalism, albeit without distinguishing between state and popular
nationalism. Brubaker (2012) proposes four ways
to analyze the coupling of religion and nationalism connection that can also be considered four types of relationships
between religion and nationalism. In the first case, religion and nationalism
contest each other. Each tries to become the primary identity of the nation, to
the exclusion of the other. Nationalism becomes the new ‘religion’ that is
trying to replace the old one. In the second type, religion explains some
aspects of nationalism. Usually, these aspects are linked with the origin and
early development of the nation. This type of relationship is quite common and religion is an implicit part of
nationalisms of a large number of countries. In the third type, religion
contributes to nationalism. It is a visible part of the national identity and some national myths and symbols are also based on religion. This type of
relationship is also common. Finally, Brubaker defines a robust and intimate relationship
between religion and nationalism. In this type, nationalism is primarily based on the majority religion and it is difficult to separate the
two. As William Safran (2005, 1) implies, in such cases, ‘state was, more often
than not, a secular manifestation of the dominant faith.’
Barker (2008) argued that religious boundaries play a pivotal
role in blending religious and national identity. Giving examples from
‘secular’ Europe, he explains that religious and confessional boundaries and a
threat to national existence have helped the recognition of ‘other’ in
religious terms and made religion a key constitutive element of nationalisms of
Poland, Greece, and Ireland. In contrast, Juergensmeyer (1993; 2008) prioritizes
international developments like the fall of communism, disenchantment with
capitalism, globalization and the resulting ideological vacuum for making religious
metaphors and symbolism part of nationalism.
Citing the writings of Gellner, Anderson,
and Hobsbawm, Rieffer (2003) claimed that although religion contributed
significantly to the Western European nationalisms, religion’s contribution is
diluted by presenting it as part of the national culture.
She contended that religious nationalism often results in religion’s precepts becoming
‘institutionalized in laws and procedures governing the nation.' In the context of MMCs, this institutionalization of
religion’s precepts in laws and procedures governing the nation can be called
Islamization of government. Hence, her research supports the idea advanced in
this book that increased the role of Islam
in nationalism would lead to increased Islamization of government.
Popular scholarship on Islam and state nationalism after 1945
can be divided into two periods; the dividing point being the 1970s. Before the
1970s, as discussed above, the leadership of most MMCs was areligious. They downplayed
Islam and tried to put emphasis on economic development and secular
nationalism. Islam was considered a thing of past, part of the medieval,
pre-industrial age, related to the defunct empires. However, being anachronistic was not always a problem as in many MMCs,
myths of an even more distant pre-Islamic past were created and promoted to
present Islam (and Arabs in non-Arab countries) as a corrupting influence that
deviated the ‘nation’ from its true path.
The MMCs’ leadership
wanted to create modern, unified, powerful and industrial states, based on the
Western model. Prioritizing Islam went against both promoting national
uniqueness and unity, two essential ingredients of strong nationalism. Islam
was not unique to any MMC as it was majority religion of dozens of countries
spread over three continents. Islam also could not promote unity as most of the
MMCs had significant non-Muslim populations, making emphasis on Islam divisive. Therefore, the national elite emphasized non-religious
foundations of national identity to be more inclusive and to create more
compact nation-states. They focused on
ethnolinguistic (e.g. in Turkey) or dynastic (e.g. in Morocco, Jordan, Oman) or
ideological (e.g. in Syria, South Yemen, and Iraq) or territorial/historical
(Yemen, Lebanon) bonds and downplayed Islam.
Not surprisingly, in this political milieu, Islam appeared weak
and transient and many scholars thought that it had lost its battle against the
more powerful force, (secular) nationalism. Sylvia
Haim (1955) described (secular) nationalism as the most powerful trend in
modern Muslim Arab political thought; Nikki Keddie (1969, 17) suggested that
popular loyalty in the Muslim world has transferred to the modern nation; and Rosenthal
(1965, xii) witnessed ‘a vulnerable Islam gradually giving way before a secular
nationalism.’
In the 1970s, the environment both inside and outside the
MMCs changed. At the global level, the power of the West, primarily the US,
declined due to the Vietnam War and the end of post-World War II economic
expansion. It could not support as many repressive ‘modernizing’ regimes in the
MMCs as it did in the 1950s and 1960s. The Soviet
Union, facing economic decline and internal problems, was also not
aggressively vying for global leadership or communist ascendancy in the Muslim world. Furthermore, the two Arab-Israeli
Wars made Muslim populations more aware of the West’s role in propping up Israel. Previously, being aligned
with the West was considered a source of strength at the popular level, but
after the 1970s, it was a decision that had to be explained and rationalized. This was also the time of the rise of oil-rich religiously
conservative monarchies that were ready to offer thousands of employment
opportunities and millions of dollars in aid to other MMCs. To benefit from
these changes, governments in many MMCs, some of which were still led by areligious elites, decided to instrumentalize Islam.
Islam’s role in state nationalism was
highlighted and Sharia became the
source of constitutions and laws (Roy 1994, 26). Media, symbols, and education
were also used to propagate Islam and to link Islam with the state and the
government as Gregory Starrett described in Putting
Islam to Work (1998). These activities of governments increased Islam's
role in nationalism. Unlike previously, nationalism was no longer substituting
or downplaying Islam but accommodating it.
After 9/11, as Islam came under the global
spotlight, Islam's role in the state nationalisms of the MMCs was exaggerated
in a section of media and academia. In contrast to the
1960s, it was argued that secular
elements of state nationalism were weak and becoming
weaker by the day as compared to Islamism
or religious nationalism. The ‘clash of civilizations’ narrative was employed
to de-emphasize and deny not only the potency of secular elements of state
nationalisms but also the nation-state itself. The specter of Islam,
fundamentalism or Islamism was seen
descending on the MMCs (Tibi 2002).
For a brief period, Arab Spring (2010-11) undermined this
narrative as Islam and Islamists played, at best, a limited role in these
uprisings. However, when Islamist parties won
elections in Egypt and Tunisia, references to the ‘Islamist threat’ came back
and some analysts claimed that the post-Arab Spring is a period of Islamists’
ascendancy and prerogatives of (secular state) nationalism were shrinking
(Krauthammer 2012; Rubin 2012). Some of these writings have obviously been influenced by the Islamists’ regular denunciation
of nationalism. Two of the leading ideologues of
modern Islamist movements, Maududi and Sayyid Qutb, pleaded with Muslims to
shun nationalism as it had destroyed the unity of the Muslim Ummah by promoting
loyalty to land, language, or ethnicity (Nasr 1995; Toth 2013). Many
Muslim terrorist movements, most famously Al-Qaida and Daesh (Islamic State),
also reject secular nationalism. But is Islam’s role in state nationalism
increasing in the MMCs after 9/11? Researchers have not been able to answer
this question conclusively, one way or the other, for the whole Muslim world as
there are fifty MMCs, each with a unique history and a distinct culture. As
discussed earlier, in some MMCs, Islam's role in state nationalism is surging,
but in others it is declining. A definite answer, as in the case of religion’s
role in the nationalisms of Christian, Hindu or Buddhist-majority countries, is
only possible at the individual country level.
A definite answer about Islam's role in state nationalism in
a particular MMC, however, would only be true for the present period. Islam's
role in state nationalism, like the state nationalism itself, is constantly
evolving. The contrasting relationships between religion and (state)
nationalism, as defined by Brubaker (2012), can be found in the same country at
various points in its history. In Iran, for example, secular ethnolinguistic
nationalism reigned supreme in the 1930s
and 1940s and it had an antagonistic relationship with Islam. During the 1960s
and 1970s, the last Shah of Iran accepted an implicit role of Islam in state
nationalism. Although anti-clericalism was still dominant, the antagonistic
relationship with Islam was toned down. Since the 1980s, however, Iran is a
country where national and religious identities are inseparable. Similarly,
early Bangladeshi state nationalism emphasized ethnolinguistic ties but later
in the 1980s and 1990s, Islam became a significant part of Bangladeshi state
nationalism. Recently, tables have turned again,
and Islam’s role in Bangladeshi state nationalism is decreasing as the
government is promoting Bengali (ethnolinguistic) nationalism.
Islamization of government
Islamization, like
nationalism, is not an easy concept to define. Scholars have used Islamization,
Arabization, Muslimization, Shariatization, and, more recently, Talibanization interchangeably
(Singh 2007; Shaikh 2008; Lindley-Highfield 2008; Korotayev 2000). Add to it,
the secondary concepts of re-Islamization, de-Islamization and creeping
Islamization and the difficulty to
untangle the conceptual muddle increases.
Following are some
of the definitions of Islamization in the academic literature, amply demonstrating
the difficulty in defining the concept. Julian Lee acknowledges the elusiveness
of the concept and links Islamization
with ‘conservative, orthodox Islam’:
The perceived essence of any religious or
otherwise ideological movement is seldom if ever without significant variation
and contest among those who identify with it. By our referring to them as
Islamists … seem to be ascribed with the
default or most essential figuration of
what Islam is. But there is no entirely satisfactory way out of this quandary… “Islamization” refers in this book then to the process of instilling and creating that which is in ostensible accord with
orthodox conservative Islam.
(Lee 2010, 19)
Michael Buehler
links Islamization to the adoption of
Sharia law (2016, 1). Salim, in the following definition, also links
Islamization with Sharia and Islamic doctrines. However, to use the definitions
of Lee, Buehler, and Salim, one still has
to define conservative, orthodox Islam,
Islamic doctrines and Sharia, which is not an easy task:
A process of certain
measures and campaigns, regardless of the identity of the advocates and the
motives behind the actions, that call for the establishment of what are
regarded as Islamic doctrines in Muslim legal, political, and social systems…It
is clear that the proponents of the formal implementation of shari’a consider shari’a the foundation of Islamization…In sum, the assumption of the proponents of shari’a-based reform is that the more shari’a
rules are incorporated into the state
legal system, the deeper the Islamization of a country. Under this scheme,
moves toward Islamization ultimately lead to attempts at founding an Islamic
state. (Salim 2008, 45)
Farzana Shaikh
(2008) distinguishes between Islamization and Shariatization. She opines that
both ‘share an uncompromising emphasis on the enforcement of Islamic law at the
expense of the broader and vaguer commitment to the ethical principles of Islam.’
However, for her, leaders and supporters of Islamization and Shariatization are
dissimilar; Islamization’s major promoters are statist modernizing groups while
Shariatization’s key sponsors are non-Westernized groups, such as clerics. Shaikh’s
distinctions are, however, difficult to accept as Islamization of government is
always done with the help of clerics and Shariatization cannot be done without
the help of the state.
It is clear from
the above discussion that there is no agreement on what is Islamization of
government, except the linkage between Islam, Sharia,
and the government. Due to the wide variety of ways in which Islam and Sharia
are interpreted, there can be and are
many contending views of Islamization of government.
Operationalization of Variables
Like many other social science concepts, it is difficult to
operationalize state nationalism and Islamization of government. Finding indicators
that can simultaneously give valid, reliable and precise measurements of these
concepts is close to impossible. Researchers, however, have not been daunted by
the challenging situation and have used a wide variety of indicators to measure
these concepts. As elites decide and promote state nationalism, it has been measured directly by asking the
state elite (using interviews or surveys) or indirectly by analyzing their
speeches, books, and actions. State nationalism has also been estimated using
national symbols, such as flags or anthems. Similarly, Islamization of
government has been measured using a multiplicity
of indicators. Some scholars have examined
laws; others have studied constitutions and still others have conducted
public opinion surveys, ignoring the distinction between Islamization of
government and societal Islamization.
Measuring Islam’s Role in State
Nationalism
Measuring religion’s role in state nationalism is particularly
difficult. Nationalist struggles bring together a broad spectrum of ideas and
groups. However, there is usually a specific culture, religion, language,
ethnicity, or a blend that is prioritized, highlighted and so often mentioned
that it becomes inscribed on the nation’s memory. Even primordialists, who claim
nations are ancient, agree that
nationalists choose a few out of tens – if not hundreds – of battles, martyrs,
events, folktales, and myths to ‘awaken’ the nation.
Notwithstanding the difficulty, this book will make an effort to devise
criteria on the basis of which a reasonably fair assessment can be made and
state nationalisms of Turkey and Pakistan can be analyzed.
Three criteria have been selected to assess
Islam’s role in state nationalism: the featuring of Islam in general clauses of
the Constitution that describe the nation; the presence of Islam-inspired
national mottos, emblems, anthems, flags etc. that the state uses to identify
Islam with the nation; and Islamic themes on banknotes, which are the most
common everyday symbols of the state that reach the hands of the people.
As the focus here is on Islam’s role in state nationalism, only those constitutional
clauses, national symbols and banknote images will be identified and studied that
demonstrate an increase or decrease in Islam's role.
Constitutions are windows to the national identity and state
nationalism. More than mere lists of legal principles, they inform us about the
national narratives/beliefs. The constitution embodies the hopes and
aspirations of the nation. Therefore, the Turkish and Pakistani constitutions
are good proxies for estimating Islam’s role in state nationalism. Clauses
relating to religion or secularism will be
identified and changes in their number and content will be explored.
Banknotes’ iconography has recently been
recognized as an instrument used by states to promote state nationalism.
A national currency is intimately linked with the nation as it is ubiquitous in
the nation and difficult to use outside the national territory. The images chosen for banknotes are useful indicators
of the character of state nationalism, as they have been issued regularly by
the state throughout the history of both countries (more than sixty unique
images on Turkish banknotes and around forty unique images on Pakistani
banknotes), allowing one to minutely follow the changes in the representation
of the nation on state instruments.
National symbols (flags, emblems, etc.), anthems and
monuments are critical markers of national identity. They evoke deep emotions,
incite passions, identify nations and make them visible to their nationals as
well as foreigners. Perhaps the most obvious example of national symbols
revealing the link between state nationalism and religion are national flags.
Scores of national flags have either a cross or a crescent and star on them,
signifying a country’s link to Christianity or Islam respectively. Therefore,
national symbols are a good way to estimate Islam’s changing role in the state
nationalism of Turkey and Pakistan. As in the case
of other indicators, only national symbols that introduce or reduce religious
content will be examined.
Measuring Islamization of Government
Measuring Islamization of government is also difficult as
scholars cannot, as discussed above, agree on how to define it. Measuring Islamization
of government is part of the broader debate on how to approximate the role of
religion in the government in all countries.
Previously, scholars used to measure religion’s role in state affairs
solely by analyzing constitutional provisions and laws, embodying elements of the
religious precepts and practice. However, in the last two decades, research has
expanded to include many diverse criteria. While most of the work on this
subject has been qualitative case studies, there have been efforts to quantify
and standardize this estimation. The Bar Ilan University (Israel)’s Religion
and State Project, led by Jonathan Fox, is the most extensive and most successful
of these attempts (The ARDA 2015). Unfortunately, this data
on distinct aspects of the state-religion relationship is not available before
the late 1990s. As this book intends to investigate the Islamization of
government (or lack thereof) in Turkish and Pakistani Republics since their
formation, this data cannot be used.
Islamization of government in this study is,
therefore, estimated using the following three indicators: the clauses in the
family/personal status laws that are based on Islamic law (Sharia), the
presence and functions of the ministry
of religious affairs, and the
government’s support for private and public religious education.
These indicators have been used by various scholars to measure religion’s role
in the government or Islamization of government.[4]
Family law consists of the rules related to marriage,
divorce, inheritance, custody, etc.
Family law is key to gauging the extent of Islamization of government as family is at the center of Muslim culture.
Moreover, family law was the only part of the existing laws that was left
untouched by most European colonial powers, after they conquered the MMCs. It thus
became a symbol of Muslim identity and is still considered by many as such. The
degree to which the government patterns family law on secular or Western
principles or on traditional Muslim practices can, therefore, be considered as a crucial indicator of
Islamization of government.
Governmental institutions (ministries, departments, etc.) dealing specifically with
religious practice are usually established to regulate religion(s) or to give
preference to one or more religions. The presence of a Ministry of Religious
Affairs (MRA) demonstrates the significance government attaches to religion.
This significance might be due to the government considering religion as an
ally or as a competitor. An analysis of the MRA’s presence and its functions
can thus be employed to determine government’s relationship with the majority
religion (i.e. Islam) as well as the level of Islamization of government.
The salience of education in the socialization of next
generation cannot be over-emphasized. Islamists, secularists, and other groups,
therefore, try to control schooling so as to create the new generation in their
own image. Government’s support for religious education in both public and
private schools is, therefore, a good proxy for Islamization of government.
Islam’s Role in Turkish and Pakistani State Nationalisms
Before moving on to
research design and methodology, it is worthwhile to take a look at the
dominant narratives that explain Islam's role in Turkish and Pakistani state nationalism.
These narratives are not grounded on a rigorous
analysis of the past, but paint and promote a picture of the past that
strengthens a particular view, usually the view endorsed by the state.
In developing these narratives, as Fatma Gocek (2006, 85-103) has observed, events
are selectively highlighted or ignored depending on their perceived usefulness
for strengthening the narrative.
There are two
dominant historical narratives in the literature about Turkish state
nationalism. In the first type, Turkish state nationalism is considered largely secular and always in contention with
Muslim nationalism or Islamism (Lewis 1961; Berkes 1964). The origins of this
narrative can be traced back to the nineteenth century. It gradually gained
ascendancy and in the late 1920s and early 1930s it became the official state
narrative. Some scholars have explained this
dichotomous narrative in terms of center-periphery or state-society conflict in
Turkey, with the center/state representing secular state nationalism and the
periphery/society representing Muslim nationalism or Islamism (Mardin 1973;
Akcam 2004, 2). This narrative is based
on an earlier trend in scholarship that ‘juxtaposed Muslim societies against
secular states as mutually exclusive or inherently antagonistic categories,
albeit from different perspectives’ (Turam 2012, 3). The gradual rise of the
Refah Party and the current dominance of the AKP are thus presented as the defeat of Turkish state nationalism.
In the other
narrative, which is getting more popular after the 1970s, it is argued that Islam
has always been a vital constituent of the Turkish state nationalism. The Greek-Turkish population exchange, varlık vergisi
tax, immigration policies giving preference to Muslims, mistrust of the
(Christian) West, and the discrimination against non-Muslims in Turkey are
presented as evidence of what Ilker Ayturk calls the ‘harmony thesis’ (Gurbey
2012, 42-3, Ayturk 2014). It is contended
that even at the time of high Kemalism/aggressive secularism in the late 1920s
and 1930s, when the Turkish state promoted ethnolinguistic nationalism and
ostensibly rejected religion, Islam was a key component of Turkish state
nationalism (Cagaptay 2006, 156-7). According to this narrative, Islam
has been and always will be an important part of the Turkish state nationalism.
Both these
narratives are based on the assumption
that Islam’s role in Turkish state nationalism congealed into permanence around
the time of formation of modern Turkey. In the first narrative, Islam's role in
Turkish state nationalism is negligible and will always remain so. There is an
antagonistic relationship between the two for almost a century and this relationship will continue in the future. In the
second one, Islam’s contribution to Turkish state nationalism has always been significant
and will continue to be in the future.
In this book,
however, it shall be contended that Islam's role in Turkish state nationalism has
been mutable, not static or fixed. It was high during the war of independence and then it became very low in the 1930s, and since the 1950s it has
been slowly increasing. This dynamic view of
Islam’s role better explains the variations in Turkish state nationalism since
independence than assuming that Turkish state nationalism was always secular or
always had a strong religious component.
Another
argument that is gaining traction acknowledges Islam's role in the Turkish state
nationalism but claims that there are many Islams, not one Islam, and that the
Turkish state, in each era, chose an Islam that it perceived as most suitable
for achieving its objectives.
The early Turkish state chose a
modernist/rational Islam that also had an ethnic component. In the 1950s, 1960s
and 1970s, the ethnic component was de-emphasized and rationalism was toned down
and since the 1980s, it has chosen a conservative, neo-liberal Islam. Islam was
thus not discarded or dis-established in any era, but established in a unique
in each era of Turkish history as Davison (2003) explains the events of the
1920s:
The separation of religion from its
previous position of influence constituted a shift in Islam’s institutional and
legitimation position, not its formal, full elimination. How to explain, for
example, the new state religious establishment, the state religious educational interest, the marking of
religious identity on state identity cards, and the like? Islam was not disestablished; it was differently
established.
Laiklik (laicism/secularism
as practiced in early Republican Turkey), according to this argument, was thus
not anti-Islam, but a different version of Islam than what was ascendant during
the Ottoman Empire (Davison 1998, 154). Westernized Young Turks were not
against Islam; they were against obstructionist and medieval (Arabic) versions
of Islam. They wanted to rediscover ‘true’ or Turkish Islam that was rational
and compatible with modernity (Azak 2010, 5-6).
This
argument has an element of truth as Ataturk and other Turkish leaders in many
of their statements praised Islam and claimed that they were only against those
who are using a false version of Islam, based on Arab and Ottoman culture, to
halt progress. For example, Ataturk
said in 1923:
Our religion is a most reasonable and most
natural religion, and it is precisely for this reason that it has been the last
religion. In order for a religion to be
natural, it should conform to reason, technology, science, and logic. Our
religion is totally compatible with these. (Azak 2010, 14)
The difficulty a
researcher confronts after accepting this narrative is that it becomes
extremely tough to ascertain whether the adoption of some symbol (or a
constitutional clause) increases or decreases Islam's role in state
nationalism. For example, did removing all Islamic references from the Turkish
Constitution in 1928 lead to an increase (or decrease) in Islam's role in
Turkish state nationalism? On the basis of traditional interpretations of
Islam, Islam's role in Turkish state nationalism was decreased. However, a believer in a modernist interpretation of
Islam can argue, as many did, that ‘true Islam’ revived and its role increased
in Turkish nationalism as previously a ‘false Islam,’ which was mixed with
politics, was ascendant.
In the case of
Pakistan too, there are two dominant narratives. However, unlike the Turkish
narratives, the difference between the Pakistani narratives is not about the
presence or absence of Islam’s role in state nationalism. The major difference
between the two narratives is whether Islam's role in state nationalism has
always been dominant or whether it has only become dominant since the late
1970s. In the first narrative, Islam is
represented as the key component of Pakistani state nationalism and it is
stressed that Jinnah wanted to establish an Islamic state, although opinions
differ on whether the objective was a modern democratic or a traditional
Islamic state (Mujahid 1999, Ali 1967, Zaman 1985). According to this
narrative, since Pakistan was created on the premise of Muslim nationalism,
denying or lessening Islam’s role in Pakistani state nationalism means denying
Pakistani nationalism. General Zia presented this view in 1981:
Take out the Judaism from Israel and it
will fall like a house of cards. Take Islam out of Pakistan and make it a
secular state; it would collapse. (Tharoor 2014)
Nasim Jawed (2010,
15) calls proponents of this narrative ‘Islamic nationalists’:
To many Islamic
nationalists it was not a matter of choice for the Pakistanis whether to build
their nationhood on the foundation of Islam or on a common and truly secular
cultural heritage: the latter in their view, simply did not exist.
When
these Islamic nationalists are confronted with evidence that Jinnah did not
want to make Pakistan an Islamic state, they respond that it is immaterial
whether Jinnah or other leaders of Pakistan’s independence struggle were
secularists – using religion as a tool of mobilization or as a ploy – or not as
most of the people voted for an Islamic state when they voted for Pakistan in
the 1946 elections. Some even go
further and contend that it is the responsibility of Muslims, who are sovereign
over a piece of land, to establish Sharia (Nadeem 2001, 13). Ian Talbot (2005,
152-3) has aptly described this narrative as ‘the two nation theory of
Pakistani nationalism dealt in primordial certitudes’ that are fixed and
monolithic. According to this narrative, most of the difficulties Pakistan is facing
today and has faced since independence are due to the fact that Pakistani elite
has not embraced the paramount role of Islam in Pakistan and have often worked
to reduce it. Although proponents of this narrative accept that elite is now more accepting of Islam’s role than they
were in the 1950s and 1960s, they do not think it is enough.
Many experts also
accept this narrative and acknowledge Islam’s principal role in Pakistani state
nationalism. However, for them, this defining role constitutes a serious handicap. Sectarianism, terrorism, the separation of East Pakistan, the
rise of Taliban, etc. are all linked to the Islam’s dominant role in Pakistan’s
state nationalism. They, not surprisingly, advice a reduction in Islam’s role
and argue that even Jinnah was only using Islam and an Islamic Pakistan was not
his aim.
In
the other narrative, the critical significance of Islam for the creation of
Pakistan is acknowledged but its dominance and current (usually deemed
pernicious) manifestation is considered the result of the genesis of the mullah-military
alliance in the 1970s. Many Pakistani
scholars and others, who subscribe to this narrative, reminisce about the
halcyon period when General Ayub Khan, and later Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, ruled
Pakistan and Islam’s role in state nationalism was
less dominant. The contrast is
made between Jinnah’s Pakistan, which was tolerant, open and liberal,
and Zia’s Pakistan, which is dogmatic, illiberal and xenophobic.
An example of this
narrative is the following passage:
So, how do we contend with the legacy of
Gen Zia ul Haq? Why was it possible for a
villainous military dictator to subvert the very spirit of the nation and sow
the seeds of religious militancy in a country founded by Mohammad Ali Jinnah?
We can pose that question once again: is this Jinnah's Pakistan or is it Zia's? (Salahuddin 2010)
Similarly, Rasul B.
Rais, one of the leading political scientists in Pakistan, writes in his
article titled, ‘Is this Jinnah’s Pakistan?’
Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the
father of our nation, must be turning in his grave if angels were to carry the
news and pictures of today’s Pakistan to him — targeted killings of Shias,
persecution of Christians and public conversion of Hindus on live media.
This is not the Pakistan he or other
founders powered by a dream of an independent country envisioned. Were they around today, they would have launched
another independent movement — this time, to liberate the country from three
powerful influences that have taken the form of institutions and have, in many
ways, established their control over the soul of the country. They are
the mullahs, the military and the feudal
elites. (Rais 2012)
In
this narrative, Islam's role in Pakistani state nationalism was stagnant or
largely inconsequential for the first thirty years and then it started
increasing in the late 1970s because of General Zia’s coup and the (first)
Afghan war. Since then, due to
the continuing alliance between religious forces and a powerful military,
Islam's role in state nationalism has been increasing.
The commonality
between these two narratives is that Islam’s role in the Pakistani state
nationalism is seen as increasing since
the 1980s. However, as the following
three chapters will show, a careful examination demonstrates that Islam's role
in the Pakistani state nationalism has been
decreasing for the last sixteen
years. Amid the rise of religious terrorism
inside Pakistan, this dramatic change in Islam's role in the Pakistani state
nationalism has been happening under the radar and has not been noticed by many.
Research Design and Methodology
This study employs comparative
case study method for analysis. The key
benefit of the case study method is its focus and attention to detail. The
researcher using this method concentrates on a single case or a few cases and tries to understand all of their
aspects/dimensions, leading to an explanation of the past and the present as
well as predictions regarding the future. The major disadvantage of this method
is that since the research is limited to,
at the most, few cases, the results are
often not generalizable. The case study method
has, therefore, been considered less appropriate for discovering general laws
and more suitable for answering the ‘how’ and ‘why’ questions and for
investigating a ‘contemporary phenomenon in depth and within some real-life
context’ (Yin 2009).
The choice of the
case study method for this study is based on the research puzzle of why and how
Islamization of government varies over time, which requires a comparative
historical analysis of the two countries’ politics. Many other scholars have also used multiple case studies
and comparative historical analysis for answering challenging political
questions (Collier & Collier 2002; Mahoney 2001; Moore 1993; Rueschemeyer
1992; Goldstone 1991).
To explore the possibility of a causal link between Islam’s
role in state nationalism and Islamization of government, the following
chapters intend to fulfill the requirements of causality advanced by scholars. Russell
Schutt (2012, 184-93) lists five requirements for drawing causal connections
between variables. The absence of one or more of the following criteria makes
the connection doubtful:
- Empirical Association: This criterion requires the
correlation between the explanatory and response variable(s). Variation in
one group may lead to variation in
the other;
- Appropriate Time Order: This criterion requires the
appearance of explanatory variable(s) before the response variable(s);
- Non-Spuriousness: This criterion requires that the association
between the explanatory variable(s) and response variable(s) may not be
because of other variable(s);
- Causal mechanisms: The criterion identifies the mechanisms
that link explanatory variable(s) and response variable(s); and
- Context: This criterion pinpoints the specific conditions in
which causal mechanisms will be operative.
In the next six chapters, the
correlation and appropriate time order between Islam's role in state
nationalism and Islamization of government will be established. In each of these
chapters, the focus will be on the evolution of one indicator during the
histories of Turkey and Pakistan. The first three chapters will study the three
indicators of Islam's role in state nationalism and the last three on the
indicators of Islamization of government discussed above. The last chapter will
summarize the whole argument presented earlier and will restate the major
conclusions.
Selection of Cases
Turkey and Pakistan have been selected on the basis of being the most different
cases. There are many dissimilarities between these two countries that make them contrasting cases. First, Turkey,
being the successor state of the Ottoman Empire, was a colonizer, while
Pakistan was a British colony for at least a hundred years. Secondly, in terms
of the state-Islam linkage, Turkey was the first and one of the few MMCs in the
world that espoused secularism. Secularism was one of the most cherished
principles of the Kemalist state and is still considered part of Turkish state
nationalism. Pakistan’s creation, on the other hand, is directly linked to
Islam and its state nationalism is viewed as an exemplar of religious
nationalism. Finally, Turkey is the only MMC that
has seen continued success of Islamic parties at the ballot box. The AKP has won
six national elections (five parliamentary and one presidential election) in a
row.[9] In
contrast, despite Islamization of government and support from the military, Islamic parties in Pakistan have been
unpopular and unsuccessful. Choosing the most different cases of Turkey and
Pakistan also provides the strongest justification for generalization.
Outline of the book
There are eight chapters in this book. After this chapter – which introduces the topic and
the research problem, lays out the conceptual framework, and describes the
research design and methodology – the next six chapters present research on the
indicators of Islam's role in state nationalism and Islamization of government.
Each of these six chapters traces the history of an indicator from the inception of Turkish and Pakistani republics
to the present era. The historical analysis challenges the dominant conventional
narratives of Turkish and Pakistani nationalisms
and lays out the permutations each indicator has gone through. After giving a
brief introduction, each chapter is divided into two parts. The first part
discusses the indicator’s journey through Turkey’s history and the second part,
through Pakistan’s history. The chapters
end with a brief comparative analysis of the two journeys. The first three
chapters (chapter two to chapter five) investigate the indicators of the explanatory
variable, Islam’s role in state nationalism. Chapter two examines four constitutions
of Turkey and three constitutions of Pakistan, focusing on articles related to
Islam or secularism. Chapter three and four highlight Islamic themes that
inform national symbols and banknote images respectively. Chapters five, six
and seven cover the three indicators of the response variable, Islamization of
government. Chapter five analyzes family laws of Turkey and Pakistan and reveals
their changing relationship with Islam. Chapter
six focuses on Presidency of Religious Affairs (Diyanet) of Turkey and Ministry
of Religious Affairs of Pakistan and explains how, paradoxically, Diyanet has
grown into a huge institution in a secular republic while the Ministry of Religious
Affairs remains a small part of the government of Islamic Republic of Pakistan.
The policies regarding government support for private/public religious education
are inspected in chapter seven. The concluding
chapter will demonstrate the causal link between the rise and fall of Islam in
state nationalism and the increase or decrease of Islamization of government.
This chapter will also highlight the implications of this research beyond
Turkey and Pakistan and identify further areas of research.
Implications
This study will contribute to two different areas of
research. First, it will help in understanding the politics of Turkey and
Pakistan. Both these countries have played a much larger role in international
affairs than their respective sizes or economies would suggest. As middle powers on
the rise, it appears that these two countries will play an even more
influential role in the 21st century than they played in the past
century. Furthermore, both countries are already among the twenty-five biggest
economies in the world, based on gross domestic product (purchasing power
parity) data (World Bank 2015). Therefore, understanding their politics is
important.
This study puts into
perspective the recent interactions between Islam and politics in both
countries. According to many experts, Turkey, a secular republic, is moving
toward Islamization of government, while Pakistan is being further Islamized
even as it suffers from the terrorism of
Islamic militants who want to impose Sharia in the country. Is this analysis an accurate picture of reality? What are the
reasons for changing of course in Turkey and policy continuity in Pakistan?
This study will attempt to shed some light on these issues.
Second, while the focus of the study is Turkey and Pakistan, its results may help explain events in
other MMCs. These two countries also represent the opposite ends of the
Islam-politics continuum. Turkish governments have tried to suppress Islam’s
public role and until recently, Islam had a negligible role in the making of
laws, rules, and policies in Turkey. In contrast, Pakistani governments have
amplified Islam’s role in politics and the public sphere. Comparing and
understanding these two countries, helps us understand a whole range of
interactions that can happen between Islam and politics in an MMC.
For example, after the success of Islamist parties in Egypt
and Tunisia in 2011, Islamization of government was considered unstoppable in
both countries. However, in both these countries, Islamists are now not in the
driving seat. The argument presented in this book (at least) gives a partial
explanation of what happened. It can be argued
that in Tunisia and Egypt, the Islamization of government was scuttled because
Islam’s role in the state nationalism of Tunisia and Egypt – although present – was not sufficient for
the kind of Islamization attempted by the Al-Nahda and Muslim
Brotherhood-controlled governments. It would have been
better for these parties to slow the pace of Islamization of government.
In sum, this book will demonstrate a causal link such that establishing
a strong role for Islam in state nationalism is shown to be necessary for a
strong Islamization of government.
Conversely, if Islam is weak, absent or diminishing in state
nationalism, Islamization of government will also falter.
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