Indonesian Elections: A Victory for Pancasila Nationalism

Indonesia is the third largest democracy in the world. Despite impressive economic development in the last four decades, it is still a fledgling democracy. Indonesia’s national ideology is Pancasila (literal meaning ‘five principles). These five principles are monotheism, humanism, unified nation, representative democracy and social justice. Pancasila is culturally, ethnically and religiously neutral, except perhaps the idea of monotheism (though the number of non-monotheist Indonesians is very small). Despite being predominantly Muslim and Javanese, Indonesian founding fathers chose a non-discriminatory civic nationalism over religious or ethnic nationalism. And Pancasila has been regarded as one of the main reasons of the continued unity of Indonesia.   

After the fall of General Suharto in 1998, many analysts argued that Indonesia is under threat from Islamism. They were afraid Pancasila would be replaced by religious nationalism. Last week, Indonesia held its fourth legislative elections. These elections showed that the news of the demise of Pancasila has been greatly exaggerated.

The 2014 Indonesian elections for its lower house of Parliament, DPR (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat) were a victory of the Pancasila in many ways.

First, Indonesian Democratic Party-Struggle (PDI-P), led by the daughter of Indonesian’s founder Soekarno, won the 2014 DPR elections. Soekarno was the leader who gave Pancasila its shape and popularized it. With PDI-P’s Joko Widodo (called Jokowi), currently, the mayor of Jakarta, most likely to win presidential elections in July, Pancasila’s future is in secure hands. 

Moreover, Golkar, the party formed by General Suharto, took the second largest share of votes. Despite his differences with Soekarno, Suharto never deviated from Pancasila. He rather forcefully imposed it on Indonesians during his three decades in power. The wins of PDI-P and Golkar parties, staunch believers in Pancasila, is good news for Indonesia. 

Source: Indonesian Legislative election 2014 – Provisional results

It is true that Democratic Party of President Yudhoyono, that won DPR elections in 2009, also supported Pancasila. However, lately, it seemed that Democratic Party, despite its commitment to Pancasila, was ready to give in to discriminatory policies against minorities.

Party	Vote share in 2004	Vote share in 2009	Vote share in 2014
PDI-P	19%	14%	19%
Golkar	22%	14.5%	14.3%
Democratic Party	8%	20.9%	9.7%

Secondly, while Islamic parties defied predictions and achieved their traditional 30% share of votes, the division of votes between different Islamic parties was a victory for Pancasila. The fight among the Islamic parties was won by the Pancasila-believing traditional Islamic forces and those believing in Islamism lost. National Awakening Party and National Mandate Party won the elections. The main loser was the Prosperous Justice Party. Modeled on Muslim Brotherhood, it became the biggest Islamic party in the DPR in 2009 and aspired to become one of the big three political parties and the pre-eminent Islamic party in Indonesia. However, 2014 election results crashed its dreams as its vote share dropped. In contrast, all traditional Islamic parties, devotees of Pancasila, increased their vote share as shown below.

Islamic Party	Vote share in 2004	Vote share in 2009	Vote share in 2014
National Awakening Party	11%	4.9%	9.2%
National Mandate Party	6%	6%	7.5%
Prosperous Justice Party	7%	7.9%	6.9%
United Development Party	8%	5.3%	6.7%

Finally, the major change in the elections was the rise of Great Indonesia Movement Party (Gerindra), another victory for Pancasila. Gerindra doubled its vote share, from less than 7% in 2009 to around 12% in 2014. It is led by former Special Forces commander and former son-in-law of Suharto, Lt. Gen. Prabowo Subianto. He intends to use his party’s success to win the July presidential elections. Gerindra, as its name shows, is a nationalist party and Prabowo poses himself as the only true believer in Pancasila. 

So, Pancasila is secure and religious nationalism does not have much scope in Indonesia, in the short term at least. 

Women, Religious Extremism and Nationalism

International Civil society Action Network (ICAN) recently published a report on mainstreaming of extremism in Muslim majority countries (MMCs) and its effects on women (See Extremism as Mainstream: Implications for Women, Development & Security in the MENA/Asia Region).

After clarifying that religious extremism is not limited to one religion, the report argues that religious extremism is mainstreaming in many MMCs recently. The following reasons are given for this dangerous development:

• The extremist movements appear to be the ones who care for the young, disenfranchised and unemployed. As states refuse to accept their responsibility, these movements offer answers, values, a sense of community and economic support
• Militarized responses by from Muslim majority states and the West, such as drone attacks, makes these movements and their narrative acceptable and increases their support.
• States in MMCs have grown weaker and the instability and conflict in the MENA region have resulted in power vacuums that extremist groups have used to spread their violent message
• Rich countries and individuals, mainly from Persian Gulf, continue to finance these movements and their regressive social message. People employed in these countries are also influenced by their repressive message
• Modern extremists are adept at using latest technology to their advantage. They are using television and social media to spread their message
• Women are deliberately targeted to limit their civic, legal and political rights. Violence is frequently used to silence women and men speaking against these movements
• Decision-makers at international and national level ignore opposition to the extremist movements and do not openly condemn them as these movements 'have accrued so much political and economic capital'.
• Islam is increasingly being meshed up with nationalism and anti-West/US feelings

Although there is no data provided in the report, there is evidence of mainstreaming of anti-women message. The authors of the report should be applauded for the first two recommendations they give for countering extremism. The relevant section is reproduced below.

Challenging the monopoly of religious authorities over definitions and interpretations of Islamic text: Activists are expanding awareness of Islam and its many interpretations. Recognizing that it is very difficult to de-radicalize youth, these initiatives focus on prevention through education. They aim to disentangle patriarchy and culturally-specific practices that condone violence or the subservience of women from religion. They also attempt to separate fiqh (human constructed texts and interpretations) from the statements of the Qur’an. For example, the Malaysian-based network Musawah uses religious texts and women’s life experiences to deconstruct the idea of male authority and start a new discourse on gender. “Musawah believes that religious authorities and governments do not have the monopoly to define what Islam is and how it should regulate citizens’ lives, in private or in public. In a society where Islam is used a source of law and public policy, everyone has the right to speak out on Islam.”

Infusing rights-based approaches to religious discourse and texts: There are also many ongoing efforts to identify the commonalities between Islamic teachings and values and universal human rights frameworks. Women’s initiatives engage religious scholars and clerics in such discussions to raise awareness of universal human rights norms and dispel notions that human rights are Western and therefore an anathema to Islam. These programs share the roots of plurality and democracy in Islam.

Without using a religious discourse and legitimizing women rights through Islam, it would be difficult to decrease extremism and misogyny. Report also calls for more open support for women movements from international community. This is not surprising as the report is prepared by an international NGO. The important thing, as far as I am concerned, is that international community has to accept that religion/Islam can be pro-women. If it continues to hold its preconceived notions, shared by many Muslim women activists, that Islam is anti-women then it will lose the war against extremists. As the report acknowledges, West has not much legitimacy in the MMCs and international human rights discourse is assumed as a way of the West to colonize Muslims again. Islam has been nationalized and has become an important part of the national identity. Decrying Islam will not help and will be used by extremists to prove that the agenda of pro-women movements is not women but Islam. Therefore, West and Western NGOs have to decide whether they wants to liberate women or they wants to defeat Islam. 

Iran and Israel: Changing Places?

Being two states based on religious nationalism and also critical for world peace and economy, Israel and Iran have been focus of this blog. So, it is fascinating to read a comparison of these two states. 

Two academics, one Iranian and the other Israeli, from the prestigious Stanford University have penned a wonderful op-ed in New York Times Sunday Review (See Are Iran and Israel trading places?). They argue that Iran and Israel are trading places in terms of religious nationalism, democracy, human rights and international acceptance. Iran is now considered undemocratic, authoritarian, radically religious nationalist and international pariah while Israel is considered democratic, liberal and is internationally accepted. Soon, however, Iran can become today's Israel and Israel today's Iran, if Israelis and Iranians do not change their current trajectories. 

Message of the authors is clear. While Israelis should change their trajectory, Iranians should stick to it.

After first listing the similarities between Iran and Israel (old civilizations; primarily non-Arab states in a mostly Arab region; and bastions of secular nationalism in the 1950s), Milani and Waismel-Manorapril contend that a critical cultural and demographic shift is happening and Israelis and Iranians are changing both inside their countries and outside. 

Iranian intellectuals, previously supporting religious authoritarianism, are now voicing their dissent against the regime. The argument that democracy and human rights are against Islam has been rejected. The patriarchal society established by the ruling elite, disproportionately old and male, has been challenged by Iranian women, who make up almost two-third of country’s science and engineering graduates. Gender apartheid has failed and Iranian women are asserting themselves. Birthrate in Iran is falling. Most of the Iranians are under thirty and believe in individual liberty. The rise of Mr. Rouhani and the current pragmatism is the consequence of these major changes. So, expect more pragmatism, democracy and better relations with the West. These trends inside Iran are supported by Iranian diaspora that is strong, liberal and increasingly successful.

Milani and Waismel-Manorapril then contrast this situation with Israel. While Iranian elite are moving toward West/US, Israeli elite are increasingly antagonistic as seen by their recent statements. These changes are again based on an underlying cultural and demographic shift. Orthodox Jews are gradually controlling the state that was once more liberal. Demographically, they have grown much faster as their average birthrate of 6.5 children per family is much more than the 2.6 children per family for the rest of Israelis. This change has obvious political consequences. Orthodox Jewish parties hold about around one-fourth of Knesset seats. They want to make Israel less democratic and more Jewish, with not many rights for its Arab population. Most of them are also against any agreement with the Palestinians and support settlements. Their support has been critical for continued expansion of settlements and rejection of any real peace deal. Internationally, these Israeli policies have led to increasingly strong support for the boycotts, divestment and sanctions (BDS) campaign against Israeli companies and institutions, an existential threat to Israel. Jewish diaspora is also changing and is becoming less religious and less uncritically pro-Israel. European and American Jews are mostly liberal and have difficulty accepting Israel's attitude toward Palestinians and its refusal to end occupation.

While I agree with much of Milani and Waismel-Manorapril's argument, there are few observations I want to make:

• Both Israel and Iran were not bastion of secularism in 1950s. Muhammad Reza Shah was for modernization but if secularism means separation of religion from politics, Shah clearly didn't want secularism. He used to pray at religious shrines; tell stories about how he had dreams in which he met Shia Imams; used to seek supplications from Tehran's prayer leader before going to foreign visits; and had no problems with the ascendancy of Shia sect. While his father (Reza Shah)'s regime can be called a 'bastion of secularism', his cannot. 
• Israel was even less of a bastion of secularism. Although, it was ruled by secular Jews, Judaism had a special place in Israel from the start. Israel's national anthem, language and flag and more particularly establishment of Chief Rabbinate clearly showed a tendency against secularism. Interestingly, it was in the 1950s that religious courts established their control over matters of marriage and divorce in Israel. So, while both countries have become more religious, they were not secular in 1950s.
• It is true that Iranians want a more liberal and open society but do they want a Western society? There is a difference and it should be recognized. Iranians maybe against their ruling clerics but they are also strongly nationalistic and this nationalism is largely based on West's injustice and its efforts to control Iran since 1850s. Therefore, expect better Iranian relations with the West but if Iranian felt they are being unjustly humiliated (again), then all bets are off. The recent refusal of the US government that it would not give visa to Iran's designated ambassador to the UN is one example how things can go the 'other' way.  

Turkish Secularism or State Islam?

Two articles contesting Turkish secularism are summarized below. Both articles claim convincingly that there is no secularism in Turkey, if secularism means separation of state and religion.

So, what is it then ? David Boyajian argues that Turkey has a state religion, Sunni Islam.  Orhan does not go that far but accepts that Turkish state promotes Islam. The argument for promoting Islam was, however, to control it. Nominal Islam was to be instrumentally used as a unifying ideology to create a modern, homogeneous nation.  

David Boyajian writes in dissident voices (See The Myth of Turkish Secularism) that ‘In civilized, democratic countries, secularism means not only a respectful separation between church and state but also freedom of religion. As we shall demonstrate, Turkish policies have long been the antithesis of secularism’.

He argues that Turkish system might be more properly considered ‘state Islam’ as Turkish government supports and funds Sunni Islam and discriminates and represses other religions and sects. Many people would think that he is talking about changes brought about under Prime Minister Erdogan but this not true. He contends that Turkish state has been promoting Sunni Islam for decades and some of the discrimination against religious minorities can be traced back to Ataturk. 

His main arguments for calling Turkish system as State Islam are the existence and reach of Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet) and persecution of religious minorities for the last ninety years. 

Diyanet, a powerful department, was established in 1924 under Article 136 of Turkish Constitution. It has a $2 billion annual outlay and is the employer of all Sunni clergy. Until recently, it also wrote the sermons for Friday prayers all over Turkey. It also controls all (around 80,000) Sunni mosques in the country. Diyanet is involved in religious activities outside Turkey too. It funds Sunni Islam projects in other countries such as building mosques and paying imam salaries.

Boyajian also points out to the long history of religious persecution of minorities in Turkey to claim that secularism of Turkey is a myth. Christians have persecuted and not allowed to propagate their religion. Even maintenance of Christianity is difficult as many sects are not allowed to train clergy or establish foundations to fund religious activities and hundreds of churches have been seized by the state during the last ninety years. Non-Muslim have also been discriminately taxed, such as the infamous capital tax during World War II. Even non-Sunni Muslims, such as Alevis, are discriminated. Their prayer halls(cem evi) are not accepted as religious places.

Boyajian concludes by saying:

If Turkey is ever to be secular, it must allow the free exercise of all religions – including Islam – and guarantee the rights of the faithful to be free from harassment and compulsion. The Turkish government’s acknowledgement of its past and present wrongs, especially to the non-Turkish and non-Muslim communities, and making genuine amends, must be part of this process. Until then – particularly in the West – mainstream media, governments, religious leaders, academicians, and political analysts should cease swallowing Turkey’s fraudulent claim of secularism.

Boyajian makes powerful arguments and certainly there is no separation of religion and state in Turkey. Secularism, as commonly understood, is not present in Turkey. 

While Boyajian points out the contradictions or absence of Turkish secularism, Özgüç Orhan takes the next step and unpacks why these paradoxes were there in the first place and why they continue to exist today (See The Paradox of Turkish Secularism). Orhan explains that Turkish secularism is more about the control of Islam by state rather than the separation of state and religion or neutrality of state toward all religions, two characteristics that define the US secularism. Some scholars have linked Turkish secularism with French secularism (e.g. Kuru calls US secularism as passive secularism, while French and Turkish secularisms are called assertive secularisms). However, Turkish secularism goes much beyond the French model. 

Orhan unpacks origins of unique Turkish 'secularism' by claiming that Kemalists perceived religion/Islam as having a grip on Turkish society. This grip had to be broken to bring Turkey at par with the modern world. So, state independence from Islam was not considered sufficient. State was made to regulate Islam to free the minds of people from old, archaic precept and practices. Using a narrative of enlightenment and modernization, it was decided that state had to continue prescribing  (and later teaching and promoting) good Islam. Islam, according to this view, was inherently political and if allowed to function independently, it would invade the public sphere again and threaten modernization.

Using Constitutional Court ruling from 1971, Orhan explains the official understanding of the laiklik principle in the constitution:

(1) Religion should neither influence nor dominate the state affairs; (2) With respect to the part of the religious faith pertaining to the spiritual life of the individuals, religions are protected by constitutional guarantees giving them unlimited freedom without any discrimination; (3) With respect to the part of the religious faith pertaining to the actions and behavior of the individual affecting social life beyond the spiritual life, restrictions can be made to protect public order, security, and interest; and the abuse and exploitation of religion is prohibited; (4) As the guardian of public order and rights, the state has supervisory authority over religious rights and liberties. 

As Boyajian above, Orhan asserts that Diyanet was (and is) the main instrument of control used by Turkish state. Founded a year after Republic,  Diyanet mission was to ‘execute matters related to Islam’s beliefs, prayers and morals, educate society about religion and administer prayer locations’. Secularizing mission of Diyanet moved further in 1940s with state training and employing Imams, ironically making Turkey less of a secular state. 

Orhan links Diyanet mission to efforts of the Turkish state to create a new national identity. Although, this identity was based on Turkish ethnicity and language but Islam was an implicit component of this identity. So, to bring all the people together and form a homogeneous modern nation led to another contradiction: state began propagating Sunni Islam (the religion of vast majority of Turkish citizens) to secularize people, thus undermining rights of religious minorities. Attempts to nationalize Islam or coming up with a Turkish Islam resulted in something that was close to state religion.

Islam has remained a part of Turkish identity from the start, despite pronouncements to the contrary. In Lausanne Treaty and later debates in the Grand National Assembly, Islam was accepted as a crucial component of Turkish identity. Non-Turkish Muslims from rump empire could become Turks but not Turkish-speaking Christians or Jews who have lived in Anatolia for centuries. Orhan explains:  

So “even under staunch secularism” Islam was an indispensable instrument of the nationalist project of Turkifying the Muslim minorities. 

Using this foundation, later democratic governments made Islam a more explicit part of national identity. A major change came in 1980, when Turkish military (a staunchly secularist institution that had defended Kemalist project many times, even toppling elected governments) allowed the use of Islam to defeat the communists/radical left. ‘Turkish-Islamic Synthesis’ was not throwing in of towel by Turkish military as claimed by many scholars. According to Orhan, it was more ‘an outcome of political conjuncture’ and an instrumental use of Islam, something that Turkish leaders have done for the last hundred years atleast. 

Shiaphobia: Is there evidence of millennium-long tradition of Shia persecution in South Asia?

National identity is mainly about setting boundaries and creating two groups, ‘us’ and ‘them’. ‘Us’ are the good guys, having all the noble qualities and inheritors of a marvelous civilization. ‘They’ are the bad guys, always cheating and scheming to defeat the good guys. Obviously, these two groups cannot be alike (otherwise there is no need of a separate nation), so their differences are highlighted. Complex world of interactions spread over centuries between the two groups is simplified. Narratives expounding the differences go into great lengths in telling people how these two groups were always very dissimilar. This focus on differences sometimes leads to politics of purity (or as according to Freud, the ‘narcissism of small differences’) and even ‘us’ group is scrutinized and some people are declared not pure or worthy enough to be part of ‘us’. 

Not surprisingly, in states based on ethnic nationalism, the focus of scrutiny is on ethnicity while in states based on religious nationalism, religion is center of emphasis as it is the main marker of national identity. This issue was discussed in this previously (See Religious Nationalism and Sectarianism)

Pakistan, being a state based on religious nationalism, has to deal with sectarianism.  

Kunwar Khuldune Shahid wrote an interesting article on Shiaphobia (See Shiaphobia). In this article,  he presents the evidence of a ‘millennium-long tradition of Shia persecution in this region’. Please read the article and following are my comments. 

Before commenting on the article, I want to clarify that I am against the persecution of minorities in Pakistan and ashamed of how Pakistani state has collaborated with militant groups involved in the harassment and oppression of minorities, including Shias. So, I share author’s concern about the recent upturn in horrible incidents against Shias.

However, as a budding historian, I feel it necessary to point out that (as senator Moynihan said) author is entitled to have his own opinion but not his own facts. I suppose author does not like creating long narratives by picking and choosing facts as he starts his article with the phrase, ‘When Muhammad bin Qasim was busy becoming the first Pakistani 1,200 years before the country actually came into being’, however, he commits the same mistake.

Let’s start with Mahmud of Ghazni. In his history of Mahmud’s reign, Persian Shia historian Mahmud Qasim Hindu Shah Ferishte, while giving account of Mahmud’s one of the earlier attack on Multan, writes that Mahmud decided to attack Multan’s Ismaili ruler Abul Fateh because he failed to pay tribute as Abul Fateh’s father and grandfather used to do. Later, when Mahmud was about to defeat Abul Fateh, Abul Fateh pleaded and Mahmud went back to Ghanzi with the promise of twenty thousand gold mohurs, enforcement of sharia and renouncement of Ismaili faith. It was only in a later expedition that he captured Multan and killed Ismailis. Sultan Mahmud also fought with other Sunni Muslims rulers during his lifetime and killed many Muslims, so it is difficult to prove that he was killing people because of their religion or because he wanted power and gold. The account by Ferishte shows loss of tribute was certainly a big part of what Mahmud was doing. So, author’s claim that it was a pre-mediated Shia genocide seems to be somewhat exaggerated.

Again claim that Shias were persecuted from 16th to 19th century is difficult to accept. Except for Aurangzeb, there is not much evidence that other Great Mughals (1526-1707) were trying to systematically persecute Shias. As Humayun was helped by Iranian Shias regain his throne, it is difficult to think he would persecute Shias and Akbar was certainly not persecuting any major religion.

After Aurangzeb, Mughals generally lost their power and were unable to pursue any policy in the whole of their empire as provincial governors became the main decision-makers in their own areas. So, claim for systematic persecution is improbable in the later Mughal period (1707-1856), although some individual rulers/governors might be doing it.

I also find it difficult to believe that there was a campaign against Shias during the 1950s to 1970s. There were some incidents but the proof of a campaign is not there. I personally think most of the groups that later on led the anti-Shia front were busy against Ahmedis. However, if author has more evidence to prove his theory, everyone would be happy to consider it.

Since 1980s, I agree that Shia phobia has increased in strength in both state and society and this is reprehensible. Moreover, involvement of Pakistan in Syria would be disastrous for country to say the least. We have enough troubles already. We should return the few billion dollars and say, ‘Thanks, but no thanks’.

However, there is not much evidence of ‘millennium-long tradition of Shia persecution in this region’.

Egyptian Politics, Islam and Muslim Brotherhood

This week an Egyptian academic and journalist Atef Said posted a blogpost on Immanent Frame: Secular, Religion and the Public Sphere. The blogpost is about the current impasse in Egyptian politics and Muslim Brotherhood future (See Three Observations on Religion, Politics and the Muslim Brotherhood).

Said made three observations. Commenting on 'Religion and Politics', he argued that religion is not out of Egyptian politics because General Sisi is himself arguing that he is saving moderate Islam from extremism and has tried to woo Salafi Al-Nour party; Sisi has also received religious endorsements; and despite somewhat less than the Constitution approved in 2012, Islam remains part of new constitution. Secondly, Said does not see an explicit participation of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) in electoral politics in the near future. Said argues that although MB was banned under Mubarak too, it is different than under general Sisi because of anti-MB hysteria promoted by the current military regime; alienation and (possible) dissatisfaction of MB youth with electoral politics because of recent severe repression; and absence of any negotiations between MB and regime, a contrast to MB's negotiated electoral participation under Mubarak. Finally, Said called for a new theoretical framework to explain the four paradoxes of MB politics. MB is both an organization and a movement; it is both religious and political; it is working for both a democratic state and a Islamic state; and it is dogmatic internally and pragmatic externally.

My comments on the post are reproduced below.

An interesting article that highlights the present paradoxes and contradictions of Egyptian politics but shies away from taking sides, a difficult task in the current polarized atmosphere.

I would, however, like the author to use his detailed knowledge of Egyptian society and wider Muslim world in a more clear way. For example, while talking about religion and politics in the current Egypt, he ignores the similarities of what is happening in Egypt now with what happened under other authoritarian regimes in the past. What Sisi is doing is nothing new. Starting from Reza Shah Pahlevi of Iran (1925-41), authoritarian regimes have often posed as defender of moderate/real Islam against extremism (i.e. Islam of their enemies). They have often gotten endorsements from some religious authorities and Islam has remained part of constitutions/national identities. Other rulers that followed this trend were Afghanistan’s King Amanullah Khan (1919-29), Pakistan’s General Ayub Khan (1958-69), Iran’s Muhammad Reza Pahlevi (1941-79), Qaddafi (1969-2011), General Musharraf of Pakistan (1999-2008) and of course Egypt’s Nasser and Sadat.

Nasser’s absence is particularly conspicuous as author is himself Egyptian and we can learn a lot about what is happening now to MB from what happened to MB under Nasser. Author’s second observation offers three reasons why politics were possible under Mubarak but are not possible under Sisi:

• There is anti-MB hysteria

• MB’s youth are alienated because of repression and may opt for violence instead of electoral politics

• MB’s political participation under Mubarak was negotiated

All three of these elements were present under Nasser in the late 1950s and 1960s. Supporters of General Sisi compare him to Nasser and while Sisi is different from Nasser (due to the absence of vision, ideology and other endearing features), he is a Nasser redux in terms of his relationship with MB. Nasser banned MB; used extreme repression against them; and courts under him sentenced hundreds of MB supporters to death, including Sayyid Qutb.
Author is right to call for a new theoretical framework to analyze MB and its politics. This framework can learn from research on West European Communist parties. These ‘anti-system’ parties faced all the four paradoxes that MB faces today:

• West European Communist parties were both parties and movements as becoming a member had strict requirements and some negative consequences;

• West European Communist parties were both ideological and political. Doctrinal purity regularly clashed with the reality of politics.

• Communist ideology had some anti-democratic features so these parties were both for and against democracy. They were trying to bring a worker’s revolution while running in elections;

• West European Communist parties were internally dogmatic but had a pragmatic behavior externally. Internal debate was not encouraged in these parties but their leaders were ready to form coalitions with other political parties.

In ‘When Victory Is Not an Option: Islamist Movements in Arab Politics’, Nathan J. Brown explores the contradictions in Islamist organizations and compares them with Communist and Green parties.

Mahathir and Erdogan: Similarities and use of nationalism

A lot has been written about the superb economic stewardship of both leaders and it has certainly been crucial for their popularity and electoral success. However, not many people know of another key ingredient behind their success – their management of ‘nationalism’.

My article published on Express Tribune Blog. A portion is reproduced below, rest can be read at Will Sharif be able to follow Mahathir and Erdogan?

Like Pakistan, the basis of nationalism is still open for debate in both Malaysia and Turkey. There are ethnic nationalists, religious nationalists and a large group of civic nationalists fighting over the raison d’être of their respective countries.

Mahathir and Erdogan both used this disagreement to their advantage and led coalitions of different nationalists at different times in their careers. Both adopted civic, ethnic or religious nationalism as the situation demanded.

Source: Will Sharif be able to follow Mahathir and Erdogan?

Mahathir began his career as an ethnic nationalist but later won popularity and even premiership as a Malay nationalist. He wrote a controversial book, The Malay Dilemma, to promote special policies for the people of Malaysia. However, once he attained power, he moved to the centre and tried to win overall Malaysians. And by the end of his rule, he started propagating a form of ethnoreligious nationalism, highlighting the special role of Malays and Islam in the creation of Malaysia.

On the other hand, Erdogan began his political career as a civic nationalist and despite his Muslim roots, presented himself as a leader for all Turkish people. He disparaged discrimination on the basis of ethnicity, gender or religion. However, in order to curtail the power of the Turkish military, he later became an ethnic nationalist and unashamedly claimed to be the redeemer of the ethnic nationalism of Ataturk and the early Turkish Republic.

His current stance is that of an ethnoreligious nationalist fighting against the world for his country, just like Mahathir near the end of his career.