Is General Sisi leading a coalition of civic nationalists?

Crown Center of Brandies University has posted an interesting brief on the US-Egypt relations ( See "Resetting" U.S.-Egypt Relations). The authors talk about the competing narratives of the US and Egyptian policymakers about the events since July 2013 and the gap and lack of understanding about the other side. The US policymakers see the last few months as the return of military authoritarianism and the abandonment of democracy. Although the mistakes of President Morsi are acknowledged by the US and the US government has refused to label the military takeover as a coup, nevertheless, it is hesitant to engage fully with the current Egyptian regime because it is clearly undemocratic. Banning of protests and mass killing of protesters has further alienated the US policymakers.

Egyptians, however, see the events of last ten month in a completely different light. They feel that July 2013 was a revolution against authoritarianism (comparable to January/February 2011 revolution) and saved Egypt from becoming a theocratic state. Muslim Brotherhood is considered a front for terrorists and its actions since July 2013 have left no doubt in Egyptian policymaker's minds that Brotherhood is against Egyptian national interest. Many Egyptians feel angry at the suspension of the US aid and consider that US/Obama administration bent on bringing Morsi back, completely ignoring Egyptian public opinion.

Source: Egypt's General al-Sisi: The man behind the image

What is interesting from our perspective is authors, Abdel Monem Said Aly and Prof. Shai Feldman, call the group, opposed to Muslim Brotherhood and leading Egypt now (defining the competing narrative), as 'Egypt's civic nationalists' or madaniyya and define them as follows:    

Egyptian civic nationalists accept Islam as the religion of the state, as stipulated in all Egyptian constitutions since 1923, but insist that all laws be enacted by the peoples’ elected representatives in Parliament, and that disputes be adjudicated by the judiciary—that is, by civilian courts. Accordingly, they objected strongly to Article 4 of the constitution proposed by the Muslim Brotherhood in 2012, providing that laws enacted would be subjected to review by al-Azhar University, which would be entrusted with verifying that they were consistent with Sharia law. They also objected to Article 219, which limited interpretation of Sharia law to a narrow school of Sunni thought, insisting instead that this task be left to the High Constitutional Court.

There are several problems with this labeling. First, the Salafist Al-Noor Party and al-Azhar University administration were part of the coalition that General Sisi used to topple President Morsi. These groups can hardly be defined as civic nationalists. Both of them argued for more role of religion in the constitution and were supporters of the Article 4. Second, although a large part of the group that supported July 2013 coup/revolution was civil nationalists, many were not. Egyptians criticized Morsi and Brotherhood not only because of their religious orientation but also due to the lack of governance and rising poverty, inequality and inefficiency. The dire economic conditions in Egypt played a prominent role in persuading Egyptians to join protests against Morsi (See Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi’s Biggest Challenge? The Economy, Stupid). To argue, without evidence, that all or most of the Egyptians joining the protests were angry because of Morsi/Brotherhood's religious nationalism is not correct. Moreover, since July 2013, it is clear that it is the Egyptian military that is controlling the state and civic nationalists are being used. Whenever civil society/nationalists tried to reign in the military or increase their freedoms, they were brutally suppressed (See Egypt another step backward on civil-society and Egypt’s Death Sentences, Ban of ‘April 6' Criminalize Political Opposition).  Therefore, the argument that Obama administration is not understanding civil nationalists' narrative is again not correct. Obama administration is willing to work with civil nationalists and has tried to accommodate them but military junta's undemocratic and brutal campaign against all types of opposition (including civic nationalists) cannot be ignored.

In conclusion, the brief tries to explain a very complex situation in terms of Islamists and civic nationalists. This simplifying attempt can be termed as simplistic at best and deceiving at worst. It extends the 'clash of civilizations' narrative, despite clear evidence to the contrary.      

Netanyahu: Need of a Jewish State

It seems I prematurely jettisoned the idea of a Jewish state (See End of prospects of a Jewish state?). Prime Minister Netanyahu, on Israel's independence day, announced that he is preceding to make the Jewish state a reality by amending Basic Law of Israel (that serves as Israel's Constitution) to highlight the Jewish character of Israel. He argued:

Israel gives full equal rights to all its citizens, but it is the nation-state of one people – the Jewish people – and no other. To fortify Israel's standing as the nation-state of the Jewish people, I intend to spearhead the legislation of a Basic Law that will enshrine this status.

Israel is a Jewish and democratic state. Our Basic Laws give full expression to the democratic aspect of the state. We do this by giving full equal rights to each and every citizen. The Basic Laws do this by means of two main laws – the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, and the Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation. It will define the national right of the Jewish people to the state of Israel, without infringing on the individual rights of any citizen of Israel. It will fortify the standing of the Law of Return as a Basic Law, it will anchor in the Basic Laws the standing of the national symbols – the flag, the national anthem, the language and other components of our national being...These components are under relentless and increasing attack from abroad, and even at home.

Of course, there are those who don't want Israel to be defined as the nation-state of the Jewish people...They want to see a Palestinian nation-state arise alongside us, and for Israel to gradually become a bi-national, Arab-Jewish state, within its narrow borders. But I say one simple thing: You can't hold the national stick by both ends. You can't say that you want to separate from the Palestinians in order to avoid a bi-national state, an argument that has a certain logic to it, and meanwhile sanctify a bi-national, Jewish-Arab state in Israel's permanent borders. (See Netanyahu: Israel is home to one people - Jewish)

Changing of Basic Law and giving preferential treatment to Jewish over democratic character of Israel would, of course, establish an overtly Jewish state. Let's look at the arguments. Is Israel's flag, anthem and language increasingly under attack? No. Is Israel itself increasingly under attack for being a Jewish state? Not so. The world's focus on Israel is because of Israel-Palestine conflict. Yes, there are concerns about the treatment of Arab minority but treating minorities badly is common in the Middle East and around the world so that is not the issue. Even being a religious nationalist state is not an issue because the Middle East has many such states. Netanyahu would like us to believe that it is anti-Semitism but it is not true. Increasingly Jewish people themselves are realizing, this is just a way to legitimize occupation of Palestinian lands.

1947 Zionist poster

Source: Zionist Postcards

The second argument is again problematic. Those, who promote a separate Palestinian state, also accept Israel's right to exist. They want both states to give rights to their minorities. Those, who favor the two-state solution, do not demand or accept an Islamic state in Palestine while denying Jews to establish a Jewish state in Israel. What many people are arguing for is two states for two communities, not two faiths. But the world can also live with two states for two faiths (i.e. states based on religious nationalism), if they are separate. What world, I think, is wary of is the conflict and Israel has tended not to resolve the conflict for at least the last twenty years. And this is jeopardizing Israel's Jewish character itself.  

BJP's religion is about order

Amit Chaudhuri, a novelist and ­professor of contemporary literature at the University of East Anglia, looks at BJP's Hindu nationalism in an interesting way (See India's new Hinduism is about order). Rather than focusing on Modi, he asks the readers to see how Hinduism has changed and is currently being used in India. Religion, 'the sacred is not meant to cause wonder, but to impose order and obedience and curb visceral urges.' He gives evidence to prove his point.

Let me provide an example. “Prophylactic Hindu tiles”, as I’ll call them, have been proliferating in India for the past two decades. You see them on walls, the sides of urinals, and staircases. They have on them a Hindu deity Shiva, Parvati, Ganesh painted in the European style that is a cliche of kitsch Hindu iconography. Their function is to discourage urinating and spitting on public surfaces, both compulsive national masculine pastimes. The argument they embody never actually inscribed in either ancient scripture or even a municipal text is that no one would dare urinate or spit betel juice on a deity. I can think of no more tasteless use of the sacred, but the bizarre interpretation of religion in contemporary India means that hardly anybody thinks the tiles an outrage.

Hinduism was always open and syncretic. What European had started is now bearing fruit. Hinduism has been changing into a modern semitic religion, with specific gods, precepts and practices. According to Chaudari, BJP has done two things to speed up this process. 

The BJP’s contribution to the reshaping of Hinduism has been twofold. First, by turning metaphorical moments such as the birth of Rama into historic events to be fought over, it has made Hinduism a literal-minded, Europeanised, Semitic-style faith. By taking away from Hinduism its complexity and contradictoriness, both the BJP and the free-market “new India” in which it has flourished have produced a generation that knows little about Hinduism.

Second, the political, instrumental use of Hinduism to defend and assert identity while assailing other identities, and a general ignorance of religious experience on the part of the most active religionists, means that not only do we live in an age when to be Hindu is to constantly take offence, but the line separating obeisance from offence, the holy from the disgusting, religious pride from poor taste, is blurred. Indians are being schooled to defend the sacred, but have absolutely no idea how to recognise it.

But why the markets love BJP/Modi? Markets love them because Hindutva promises to bring order to this humongous country. Modi's developmental model is all about completing projects and not worrying about niceties. Maybe a poor and minorities are expendable, if it later results in stability and growth for the next twelve years. Maybe the argument is that if India has to compete with China, it has to be like China where human rights are not important. Read about Gujarat model and big business love for Modi here (See Narendra Modi a 'king among kings', says Anil Ambani at Vibrant Gujarat summit),   

Buddhist Violence: Is it possible?

In a recent family gathering at my home, a friend talked about the peaceful message of Buddhism as compared to the monotheist religions. I acknowledged that Buddhism has a very peaceful message and it does not insist on being the 'only' right path as religions like Christianity and Islam do. However, I argued that religions are multivocal and can be used for all kinds of purposes. Almost all religions promote peace and reject violence even against non-believers but there are also religious teachings and histories that can be used to incite killings, even of fellow believers. Buddhism is no different. It can be and has been used for inciting violence. I have discussed this issue at length in a blog (See Buddhist Nationalism in Sri Lanka and Burma).

An article in Huffington Post in May 2014 discusses the same issue and links it to three countries, Sri Lanka, Burma and Thailand (See Asian Buddhism's Growing Fundamentalist Streak Signals Growth Of Religious Nationalism In Several Countries). Authors Anuradha Sharma and Vishal Arora refer to what was discussed at my home; the contrast between what Buddhism teaches and how it is usually perceived and what is happening in majority Buddhist countries, where it is used as a tool of the state. Authors first cited some examples of Buddhist violence:

In Sri Lanka, where about 70 percent of the population is Theravada Buddhist, a group of monks formed the Bodu Bala Sena or the Buddhist Power Force in 2012 to “protect” the country’s Buddhist culture. The force, nicknamed BBS, carried out at least 241 attacks against Muslims and 61 attacks against Christians in 2013, according to the Sri Lanka Muslim Congress.

In Myanmar, at least 300 Rohingya Muslims, whose ancestors were migrants from Bangladesh, have been killed and up to 300,000 displaced, according to Genocide Watch. Ashin Wirathu, a monk who describes himself as the Burmese “bin Laden,” is encouraging the violence by viewing the Rohingya presence as a Muslim “invasion.”

And in Buddhist-majority Thailand, at least 5,000 people have died in Muslim-Buddhist violence in the country’s South. The country’s Knowing Buddha Foundation is not a violent group, but it advocates for a blashemy law to punish anyone who offends the faith. It wants Buddhism declared the state religion and portrays popular culture as a threat to believers.

Later, authors contrast the views of  Maung Zarni, an exiled Burmese who is a visiting fellow at London School of Economics and who writes regularly on the violence in Burma/Myanmar and Sri Lanka, with the views of Wirathu and other Buddhists, who advocate militancy.

Zarni argues:

No Buddhist can be nationalistic...There is no country for Buddhists. I mean, no such thing as ‘me,’ ‘my’ community, ‘my’ country, ‘my’ race or even ‘my’ faith...For sure, Thailand has its own brand of ‘Buddhist’ racism towards non-Buddhists...But, I am not sure the Thai society will go the way of those two genocidal Theravada Buddhist societies (Sri Lanka and Myanmar) — where racism of genocidal nature has enveloped the mainstream ‘Buddhist’ society.

Zarni warns that there are links among the fundamentalist 'anti-Dharma Buddhist networks' in Burma, Sri Lanka, and Thailand that are 'toxic, cancerous and deeply harmful to all humans anywhere.' Zarni is also concerned about the demand for an anti-blasphemy law in Thailand and considers it a distortion of Buddhism, a religion that is against allowing any 'organization that policies or regulates the faithful’s behavior or inner thoughts.

But Buddhist fundamentalists supported by the state argue that Buddhism needs protection and point toward the past when Buddhists were persecuted and their institutions destroyed. They demand laws and argue that state should promote knowledge of Buddhism to protect Buddhist culture which is again under threat. And they are proud to be called 'radical' by the West.

Sounds familiar, right?

Michael Jerryson, the co-author of the book Buddhist Warfare, with Mark Juergensmeyer, also had difficulty acknowledging that Buddhists could be violent. He called it a "bittersweet experience" that started with researching about peaceful Buddhism but culminated in writing about the "dark side" of Buddhism.

Jerryson, in an article, talked about military monks and why people have trouble accepting monks with guns:

One day after teaching an English class for Buddhist novices at a monastery a young monk came over and pulled back the folds of his robe to reveal a Smith & Wesson. I later learned that he was a military monk—one of many covert, fully ordained soldiers placed in monasteries throughout Thailand. To these monks, peacemaking requires militancy.

Since my initial realization in 2004 [about Buddhist violence], I began to look critically at my earlier perspective on Buddhism—one that shielded an extensive and historical dimension to Buddhist traditions: violence. Armed Buddhist monks in Thailand are not an exception to the rule; they are contemporary examples of a long historical precedence. For centuries monks have been at the helm, or armed in the ranks, of wars. How could this be the case? But more importantly, why did I (and many others) hold the belief that Buddhism=Peace (and that other religions, such as Islam, are more prone to violence)?

It was then that I realized that I was a consumer of a very successful form of propaganda. Since the early 1900s, Buddhist monastic intellectuals such as Walpola Rahula, D. T. Suzuki, and Tenzin Gyatso, the Fourteenth Dalai Lama, have labored to raise Western awareness of their cultures and traditions. In doing so, they presented specific aspects of their Buddhist traditions while leaving out others. These Buddhist monks were not alone in this portrayal of Buddhism. As Donald S. Lopez Jr. and others have poignantly shown, academics quickly followed suit, so that by the 1960s U.S popular culture no longer depicted Buddhist traditions as primitive, but as mystical.

Although the book only arrived at bookstores last month, it apparently touched some nerves in the academic community before its release. Some have objected to the cover, which they feel is not an appropriate subject for Buddhism. Ironically, that is the very reason this collection of essays is so important: to address the apparent and widespread inability to acknowledge the violent side to religious traditions. It is this inability that robs its adherents of their humanity.

In a way, I wish I could return to that dream of Buddhist traditions as a purely peaceful, benevolent religion that lacks mortal failures and shortcomings. But I cannot. It is, ultimately, a selfish dream and it hurts other people in the process.

Buddhism, like other religions, is multivocal and can be used, like other religions, to commit atrocities. What is happening to Rohingyas in Myanmar is inconceivable for many but it is not rare or unusual.

End of prospects of a Jewish State?

It's so obvious. Hard to fathom how they cannot see it. Jewish settlers and religious nationalists are the most ardent supporters of a Jewish state and yet they are the ones who are bent on ending the hope of establishing a Jewish state for next many centuries. Can it be more ironic? A Jewish state established after thousands of years of persecution, destroyed by its most passionate Jewish supporters! 

The failure of latest peace process led by Secretary Kerry was expected as Israeli government had no intention of changing the status quo. What was astounding were the accusations hurled toward Kerry for speaking, sorry whispering, the truth about the future apartheid state, by Israeli ministers and other supporters of Jewish state (See Kerry's warning to Israel lost in furor over 'apartheid' ). 

How is it possible for these people to establish a Jewish and democratic state, if they are not ready to deal and give Palestinians their own state? A state half Jewish and half Muslim cannot be a Jewish and democratic state. It will be a liberal democratic state or an apartheid state as Secretary Kerry said. Currently it is a Jewish state, with half of the population having fewer rights. In a decade or two, it will be a state where majority will be ruled by a ethnic/religious (Jewish) minority, a classic apartheid state. 

Considering those opposing two-state solution rational, it appears they maybe be thinking:

• The apartheid state would be acceptable to the world, the US and the Israelis as it is not much different than what is the situation now. If it is acceptable now, it will be acceptable in future
• Palestinians would migrate to other Arab countries and elsewhere as they feel more pressure from settlers.

Both these scenarios are improbable. The current situation is acceptable because the dream of two-state solution is alive and the present situation is considered temporary. Once this mirage ends, it will be clear to everyone that Israel is an apartheid state. Even many Israelis would not accept it, what to say of Americans and the world at-large. And Palestinians are not going to vanish or migrate. Infact, they are going to increase their number and demand their basic human rights. For many Palestinians and Israelis, one state would a best case scenario as extremists movements from both sides can never dictate in one unified state. 

For those who still fantasize about two-states solution, please see Reza Aslan's vlog (See The One State Solution). He argues that one state might not be the best solution and it might not be a favorite of most Israelis and Palestinians (as well as many others around the world) but it is 'the only solution' and 'it is already happening'. So, whether we like it or not, it is a done deal.

However, many still hope against hope, like The Economist. It accepts that time is not on Israel's side but argues that disaster would not follow immediately after the collapse of negotiations with Palestinians and sees a solution in future (See Take a break: Two state solution still the only one that makes sense. But it won't happen this time round). As more settlers find homes in the future Palestinian state, the probability of two-state solution is decreasing fast. BDS movement shows that apartheid state would not be acceptable so the only option left is a democratic state. The support of Jewish Americans for Israeli policies is declining as discussed in this blog before (See US Jews less committed to Israel because of their religiosity or because of Israel's politics). 

I agree with Reza, two-states solution is dead, long live the one-state reality.

Saudi rulers castigating other Islamic religious nationalists?

Madawi Al-Rashid yesterday wrote an article on Saudi-Wahhabi criticism of Turkish PM Erdogan (See Saudi Wahhabi Leaders See Turkish Caliphate Threat). In this article, she explains the criticism of Suleiman Aba al-Khayil, the director of Imam Muhammad Ibn Saud University of Erdogan and Turkey. 

The criticism is based on a theory that Erdogan wants to establish Islamic caliphate or revive Ottoman caliphate and become the new caliph or Sultan. And as Imam Muhammad Ibn Saud University is considered the center of Wahhabi theology and jurisprudence and a defender of pure Islamic (read Wahhabi) creed against innovations, Suleiman found it necessary to refute this theory. Madawi reports that Erdogan and Turkey's (perceived) claims to caliphate were rejected by pointing toward Turkish 'blasphemy, debauchery and, amusingly, Turkish nudist clubs'. Suleiman questioned how a good Wahhabi Saudi can think of Erdogan restoring the caliphate as Turkish society is immersed in sin and is far away from 'true Islam'. Obviously, the real message for Saudis is that if 'true' caliphate is revived, it would only be on the basis of 'true' creed and under those who believe, uphold and defend the 'true' creed i.e. There is no real, authentic revival of caliphate, without Wahhabi ideology and Saudi state leading it.   

Without going into the merits of director's message, its interesting to see how Saudis, despite believing in Islamic religious nationalism, are trying to counter, discredit and de-legitimize other countries and movements that also believe in Islamic religious nationalism. 

The tussle between Iran and Saudi Arabia is old story. Since Iranian Revolution, Saudi royals have led the fight against the Shiite rafida. Iran and Saudi Arabia are continuing their decades-old verbal jihad. It appears that Saudi royals are more afraid of still to be manufactured Iranian nuclear bomb than already existing Israel's large nuclear arsenal. 

Saudi royals have also come out clearly against Muslim Brotherhood, another movement that believes in Islamic religious nationalism. They are funding and abetting Egyptian military's cruel attempts to destroy Brotherhood, cheering mass killings and mass sentences. The hatred against Brotherhood is astonishing as Saudi were the ones that saved Brotherhood from the previous onslaught of Egyptian military in 1950s and 1960s. Brotherhood, in return, provided the counter narrative to Nasser's Arab nationalism that was becoming popular in Saudi Arabia as it was in other Arab countries. 

Now, attack on Erdogan, again someone that has roots in an Islamic religious nationalist movement, shows a pattern. Are Saudi royals worried that their legitimacy based on Islamic religious nationalism is under threat and that's why they are attacking anyone who can be considered more legitimate? Does this feeling heightened because of Arab Spring or because of recent cooling off relations with the US?  

Saudi rulers find themselves in difficult position. They want their people to reject the West, but they have very close relations with the West and that is not hidden (anymore) from ordinary Saudis. Similarly, they proclaim their allegiance to Islam but their own lives are far from Islamic. Another fact that is now open to all Saudis. Finally, they profess to be Islamic religious nationalists, but also trying to promote Saudi nationality to counter the threat of extremists groups, like Al-Qaida.   

    

Why not the other 49 Muslim-majority countries?

There are fifty Muslim majority countries in the world. BBC's Wusat Ullah Khan has asked a pertinent question. Why Pakistan is the only 'jihad' laboratory in the world (See Baqi unchas kuyu nahee (Why not the other 49)?.

He has argued that Pakistan should not be a safe heaven for Muslim extremists because Pakistan has a large, well-organized and efficient army that can control its borders. However, currently extremists enjoy control of almost one-fourth of Pakistan's territory. Why?  

Khan then debunks another myth. He contends that if extremism is linked to the first Afghan war in the 1980s, then extremists should also be present in other Muslim-majority states bordering Afghanistan but they are not. Extremists are only in Pakistan. Why?

Moreover, Khan clarifies that most of the young people who came for jihad in 1980s are now in their 60s while the extremists now seen in Pakistan are in their teens or twenties so they are not from the earlier era. So earlier Afghan jihad explains little. 

So, at the end of his article, he has asked why Pakistan is the only one ?

I think Pakistan is the only one infested with extremism because (unfortunately) several factors came together here in Pakistan at the same time:

1. Pakistan is a state based on religious nationalism so nationalist feeling helped population accept Muslims coming from other countries in the 1980s and 2000s. Even now there is large reservoir of sympathy for Taliban in Pakistan.
2. Pakistani state or state agencies helped extremists previously and some of them continue to help them. So, these extremists never felt the consistent power of Pakistan army for a long time. 
3. The area under extremists control (Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA)) was never under direct Pakistan control. Despite its name, it was never really administered. These were lawless borderlands so people in this area never knew state. There was hardly any political, economic or social development in this area in the first fifty years of Pakistan life. Obviously, now Pakistan and its people are paying the price of this neglect.
4. The border with Afghanistan is hilly and difficult to monitor. With people of same ethnicity living on both sides of the border, border management is not easy. Drug trade further complicate the situation, presently huge incentives to people who want this area to remain unstable.