Hinduism and Hindutva debate

An interesting debate on the differences between Hinduism and Hindutva between Shashi Tharoor and Vinay Sahasrabuddhe. Shashi Tharoor is a member of Lok Sabha member from Congress Party while Vinay Sahasrabuddhe is a Rajya Sabha member from the BJP. 

Issues discussed are triple talak, Sabarimala temple,  cow slaughter ban, lynchings, Gandhi's use of religion, Muslim appeasement, citizenship in Northeast India, etc.

Shashi is a well-versed scholar on this subject. He has published a book, Why I am a Hindu, on this subject that has been well-received and praised by many for the succinct analysis of a very complex subject. Some excerpts from Urmi Chanda-Vaz's review for Scroll.in are copied below. The review can be read here. 

Why I Am A Hindu, running close to 300 pages, is divided into two sections, the first of which offers a brief history of Hinduism. The first chapter is titled “My Hinduism”, presented in what can be called the Devdutt Pattanaik mode. It is a clever and necessary disclaimer underscoring subjectivity – especially useful for times when religious sentiments are easily hurt. Tharoor acquaints us with the kind of Hinduism he was raised with, and, along with a sprinkling of anecdotes, gives an overview of the religion...

The second part of the book is titled “Political Hinduism”. This is where Tharoor’s meticulous context-building through the history of Hinduism is particularly useful. He starts building his case with the idea of secularism, which becomes a moot point when viewed through the prism of Western political theory. The right term in the Indian context, he argues, is “pluralism”, for India is and has long been a land of many religions. Further, he says, religion when defined as “dharma” is impossible to divorce from the Hindu way of life...

The author explains the BJP’s brand of Hindutva politics as being based on a victim-turned-avenger complex, a narrative of failure and defeat, and hatred for the Muslim community. Even if one were to turn a blind eye to the clear lack of Muslim representation (at least in the Lok Sabha) in this government, one can hardly ignore visible and worrying trends such as lynching and cow vigilantism. Ideas like ghar waapsi and love jihad, and groups like gau rakshaks and “Anti Romeo squads” operate and thrive under the aegis of the ruling party, and Tharoor correctly echoes the alarm of peace-loving Indians in this context. 

He also critiques the “cultural project” of Hindutva, which aims to “nationalise and spiritualise”. By all means acknowledge the great accomplishments of ancient Indian science, but keep fact and fiction separate, he enjoins. 

“We should take pride in what our forefathers did but resolve to be inspired by them rather than rest on their laurels. We need to use the past as a springboard, not as a battlefield. Only then we can rise above it to create for ourselves a future worthy of our remarkable past.” 

He also strongly condemns the whitewashing, or saffronising, of India’s cultural past vis-à-vis the actions of vigilante groups such as the Bajrang Dal and, most recently, Karni Sena. Not just tolerance, but acceptance, is the hallmark of Hinduism, he reminds the reader again and again.

Iranian identity and nationalism: Shahnameh's Jamsheed or Biblical Cyrus

Professor Ali Ansari gave a very enlightening talk on Iranian identity at Simon Fraser University, Vancouver. He is a professor at St. Andrews and has written extensively on Iran, Iranian identity, Iranian nationalism, and Iran-US relations. He has written seven books on Iran: 

• Iran: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford University Press, 2014),
• The Politics of Nationalism in Modern Iran, (Cambridge University Press, 2012), 
• Crisis of Authority: Iran's 2009 Presidential Election, (Chatham House, 2010), 
• Iran Under Ahmadinejad (Routledge, 2008), 
• Iran, Islam & Democracy - The Politics of Managing Change ( RIIA, London, 2000), 
• The History of Modern Iran Since 1921: the Pahlavis & After (Longman, Pearson Education, London, 2003), and 
• Confronting Iran: The Failure of American Foreign Policy and the Roots of Mistrust, (C Hurst and co, 2006).

Professor Ansari starts his talk by criticizing the ahistorical approach of studying Iranian history through the lens of the 1979 Revolution. He laments that scholars start from the 1979 Revolution and then look back for reasons why it happened as if it was the most important event in modern Iranian history. He contends that it is actually the 1906 Constitutional Revolution that is the most significant event and if one wants to understand Iran, one has to prioritize the 1906 Revolution. 

Professor Ansari explains that his talk is not about the politics of nationalism but about the ideas and myths that formed the basis or have fashioned Iranian identity and nationalism. He argues that it is the national mythology that defines nations, informs people who they are. 

In his talk, Professor Ansari dismisses the usual five periods division of modern Iranian history that he has also used in some of his works: the Constitutional Revolution, Reza Shah and modernization, Second World War and Mussaddeq, Second autocracy under Muhammad Reza Shah, and the post-Islamic Revolution period. He divides modern Iranian history into three periods on the basis of ideas prevalent about Iranian identity:

1. The age of enlightenment (1890-1963?)
2. The age of extremes (1963-1989): the unhappy consciousness?
3. The age of contestation (1989-present)

The age of enlightenment was the key period, according to Professor Ansari. During this formative age, ideas about nation and nationalism were absorbed from the West and then applied to Iran. Surprisingly, the level of engagement between the two sides was pretty sophisticated and a small but influential group of Iranians was debating ideas and was not ready to accept everything Western. The key problem faced by these Iranians was how to disseminate the ideas of civic nationalism to the wider public. They understood that for a nation, both history and myth are necessary. The myth they choose was Ferdowsi's Shahnameh (The Book of Kings). 

Professor Ansari does not explain Shahnameh as most of the people interested in Iran already know what it is but many readers here may be ignorant of its importance, so here is a short introduction. Shahnameh is a long epic Persian poem, consisting of some 50,000 couplets (two-line verses). It was written by Ferdowsi at the turn of the first millennium (977-1010 CE). It is the national epic of Greater Iran. The British Library website has the following Ferdowsi quote and a very, very short synopsis of the epic (more details about Shahnameh on the website can be read here):

"The houses that are the dwelling of today will sink beneath shower and sunshine to decay but storm and rain shall never mar the palace that I have built with my poetry." Ferdowsi.

The Shahnameh, literally meaning 'Book of Kings,' is structured according to the mythical and historical reign of 50 Persian Kings. The epic can be roughly divided into three parts: the first part tells of the mythical creation of Persia and its earliest mythical past; the second part tells of the legendary Kings and the heroes Rostam and Sohrab; the third part blends historical fact with legend, telling of the semi-mythical adventures of actual historical Kings.

Shahnameh was chosen because it was known to the Iranians. For centuries, millions of Iranians had listened to the epic and debated about the qualities of Jamsheed, Rostam, and Sohrab even when there was no historical evidence of their existence.  Even the British recognized the importance of Shahnameh and were using it to seek ordinary Iranians support for allies cause in WWII. In the propaganda pamphlet (published in 1942) below, Kaveh (the mythical blacksmith in Shahnameh who led the popular uprising against the cruel foreign ruler, Zahak) leads, while Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin follow him and Hitler (shown as Zahak) is bound on a horseback.

Source: Alamy.com

It's better to listen to Professor Ansari's lecture for understanding his argument, however, following is a summary of the rest of the talk. 

During the second period, according to Professor Ansari, the focus shifts from Shahnameh to Biblical Cyrus. The change is the result of the affinity that Mohammad Reza Shah felt for Cyrus, the Great. He perhaps thought Cyrus, the Great more useful for his own projection as an enlightened, liberal monarch who would emancipate his people and others from darkness, cruelty, and subjugation. The change also prioritizes 'real' history over myth. During the third period, Cyrus was initially rejected and Shahnameh was again promoted by the state as the basis of Iranian identity but more recently, Cyrus has also seen a revival. Can we see a synthesis in the near future?

To understand the tussle between religious and ethnolinguistic nationalism in Iran, here are some previous blog posts on Iranian nationalism: Iranian 'Persian-National' Identity, Shiite and Persian Nationalism are both myths, Afraid of Ahmadinejad,  Is Persian Identity rising again in Iran?, and More on the tussle between and merging of Islamic and Persian identity in Iran.

MBS and the evolving Saudi Nationalism

Saudi Arabian is evolving but which way? This question was discussed here three years ago (See Saudi Arabian Nationalism, MBS, Salafism and Yemen War). At that time, the role of Islam in Saudi nationalism was ebbing but the same could not be said about Salafism. One could rightly argue that Salafism is a form of Islam but Salafism and (moderate) Islam can sometimes lead one in different directions. It would be difficult to promote Iran as the most dangerous enemy if Islam was a major component of Saudi nationalism but it would be a facile victory if Saudi state subscribes to Salafi nationalism as Salafism (or Wahhabism as its detractors call it) has long designated Shiism as its enemy. For many Salafis, Shiites are infidels, beyond the pale of Islam. The other debate in the 2016 blogpost was about the strength of secular nationalism in the holy kingdom. In 2016, Prince Mohammad bin Salam was still Deputy Crown Prince but was amassing power and trying to lead the kingdom in a new direction. He was speaking against strict religious control and restrictions on Saudi women. Yemen War was being used by him to project himself as the new leader and as someone who would bring Saudis to the 21st century. 

Since then, things have moved swiftly. MBS has become the crown prince while his cousin and previous crown prince is nowhere to be seen. MBS has shown his power by detaining dozens of princes and rich Saudis and getting billions of dollars from them. He has also moved to decrease gender discrimination, although it is still too high even compared to other Muslim-majority and developing countries (See Women can drive in Saudi Arabia but is it really a big change?). This has resulted in some criticism from Salafi religious establishment but MBS has forged ahead.

King Salman (sitting) and the de facto king (MBS)

Source: Why Saudi Arabia Is Embracing a New Nationalism

What about nationalism or more particularly religious/Salafi nationalism? Stratfor in an article contends that Saudi state and MBS have realized that religious nationalism's utility now has diminished and a more territorial nationalism would help achieve national goals (See Why Saudi Arabia Is Embracing a New Nationalism):

At this point in its history, nationalism has stronger benefits to the Saudi state than religious conservatism. Tying identity to a specific place weakens the power of non-Saudi Islamists at home, for example; in a nationalist culture, verbal attacks by Turkish, Egyptian and Iranian Islamists would not represent salient criticisms from fellow Muslims, but rather unwelcome foreign interferences in domestic affairs. Moreover, shifting the Saudi mindset away from the tradition-bound reverence of religion toward the immediacy and secularity of a geographically defined space also opens up the potential for innovation and new ideas — key ingredients for bringing Vision 2030 to fruition.  

Critically, nationalism allows royals to limit domestic policy challenges based on religious opinions, conveniently weakening a check on their power as they embrace unprecedented behavior such as considering once-unthinkable ties with Israel. This also undercuts the ability of the conservative clerics to object to some of the kingdom's social reforms, like gender mixing, encouraging women to work and drive, and encouraging previously banned forms of art and entertainment...

While the contrast between Saudi Islamism and the Christian religious community in the United States has long been a complicating element of U.S.-Saudi ties, Prince Mohammed's meeting with Christian leaders illustrated a more relaxed attitude toward Christianity, which the kingdom hopes will improve relations with the United States. And any stories about non-Islamic worship being permitted publicly in Saudi Arabia, even if just for expatriates, weakens the image of a Saudi culture defined by hard-liners and encourages nationalist thought to expand in schools, media and art.

A recent article by Vivian Nereim (Bloomberg.com) echos the analysis and argues that the Saudi state under MBS is moving away from Salafi nationalism (See ‘Traitor’ Is the New ‘Infidel’ as Nationalism Grips Saudi Arabia). She contends that an aggressive and exclusivist nationalism is still being promoted but it is not primarily based on religion or sect:

Saudi Arabia’s undergoing an aggressive nationalist rebranding, downplaying an austere religious doctrine associated abroad with terrorism, and promoting veneration of de facto ruler Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman as he pursues an economic overhaul. Amid efforts to maintain domestic support while redesigning the contract between state and citizen, traitors, not infidels, are the enemy... 

“If a person is neutral or stands with the enemy against this country, it’s our right to call him a traitor,” Abdullah Al Fozan, a member of the [Saudi] consultative council [the nominated advisory council that functions in lieu of a legislature], said in a televised diatribe that went viral late last year... 

There’s an echo of the nativist triumphalism that accompanied political earthquakes in Europe and the U.S., with Donald Trump-inspired slogans like “Saudi First” and “Saudi The Great.” But what’s happening also has local flavors.

Such an aggressive nationalism can derail MBS plans of economic revival, religious and non-religious mega-tourism, and foreign investment but the Saudi officials are not relenting:

The risk is that baiting people to turn on fellow citizens under the guise of patriotism might rupture a society already under strain from the costs imposed by Prince Mohammed’s “Vision 2030” reforms, and deter the foreign investors and visitors he wants to attract. 

For now, officials aren’t hurrying to squash the spiteful mood -- a “with us or against us” mindset seen by some Saudis as needed to steer the country through a tough transition...
“Nationalism came in at a time when Saudi Arabia was not only trying to curtail the religious identity inside the country, but was also following a more assertive foreign policy,” said Eman Alhussein, a Saudi visiting fellow with the European Council on Foreign Relations... 

Whoever is responsible, they’re changing behavior. Stand-up comedian Yaser Bakr was forced to give a public apology last month after an old video surfaced of him making fun of the religious police. A social media campaign labeled him a traitor and called for him to be arrested and banned from comedy. Another young Saudi said he’s abandoned Twitter and holds back in family gatherings to avoid questions over loyalty.

The biggest test yet faced by the made over Saudi state, besides Yemen War, was Saudi dissident journalist and Washington Post columnist Jamal Khashoggi's murder. Khashoggi was once part of the ruling elite and close to the royal family. He was a Salafi and was against Iran. His only crime was criticizing MBS in the Western press and that cost him dearly in the hyper-nationalistic climate. 

Other analysts have also pointed to the close ties with the Trump administration, coordination with the Israeli government (although it is not publically acknowledged), and distance from the Palestinian administration as evidence of the lesser role of religion in the affairs of the Saudi state. True, but the lack of public acknowledgment also demonstrates that religious and Arab issues still carry weight. What is clear is that Islam and Salafism carry less weight now than they carried five years ago in Saudi Arabia. A new identity is being forged which is based not only on Islam or Salafism but also on territory and loyalty to Saudi royals.   

However, this new identity can create new problems. Stratfor article cautions that territorial nationalism can unite the people against the royal house as has happened in many other countries during the 20th century:

Though Saudi leaders are hoping that a swell of nationalism will reduce checks on royal power, nationalist thought itself — especially once regular citizens have fully embraced it — could replace those checks and even eclipse their power. Former Saudi kings saw nationalist thought as a danger to royal unilateralism, preferring the hierarchical and relatively predictable hard-line Islamists to the more rowdy and innovative nationalists of the 20th century. A new push for Saudi nationalism may challenge the monarchy in exactly the way that its 20th century rulers wanted to avoid. 

Identifying with a nation, after all, is far different than identifying with the ruling house of the nation's government. Asking Saudis for loyalty to national interests invites increasing citizen engagement with what, exactly, the national interests are — a question that until recently has been answered only by the royal family. As nationalism ascends, Saudi public opinion stands to grow more complex and less easily motivated by the tools of old, including handouts and religious scruples. 

Additionally, if nationalism is equated with the traditions of Najd province [the home of the royal family], where Riyadh is located, rather than being pan-Arabian, nominally suppressed or sidelined local identities may experience a resurgence. Places like Shiite-dominated Qatif in the Eastern province, Asir in the southwest and the Hejaz, which hosts the holy cities of Mecca and Medina, all have local identities that may be empowered by nationalism and may bristle against the state's imposition of Najdi symbols, rituals and culture.
 

Israel is not a country of all its citizens

Religious nationalism in Israel or Zionism achieved a new high on March 10, 2019. A sitting Prime Minister, who many expect to be sworn in again after the Knesset elections and become the longest-serving Israeli Prime Minister in history, publicly declared, " Israel is not a country of all its citizens." He was denying equal citizenship or full citizenship of Arab Israelis who make almost one-fifth of the Israeli population. Many would argue that most countries in the world do prioritize one religious, ethnic, or linguistic community over other communities so the statement was not something rare or surprising. Others would argue that Israel has never given equal rights to its Arab citizens in its 71-year history so the only people baffled by Benjamin Netanyahu's statement were the ignorant morons. Bibi's critics would point to his statement on the previous election day in March 2015 when he appealed to the rightwing voter by demonizing Arabs. He said that “the rule of the right is in danger” because "Arab voters were coming out in droves to the polls," bused by the left-wing NGOs. This appeal was decisive in winning him the last Knesset elections.

Source: Jerusalem Post

But the statement was stupefying because we live in a world where microaggressions are frowned upon and Israel claims to be a democracy. In fact, it prides itself as the only democracy in the Middle East. A former Prime Minister and Chief of Staff Ehud Barak said Israel was "a villa in the jungle," i.e. an outpost of civilization amidst the barbarism of the Middle East. Do other democratic leaders use Netanyahu's kind of rhetoric to win elections? No. Even dictators would not use this rhetoric today. So, it was astonishing for Netanyahu to write it and then he doubled down it and defended his statement before a cabinet meeting. 

Here is what prompted Netanyahu to proudly declare that Israeli Arabs are second-class citizens. Rotem Sela, a popular Israeli model and TV host, watching Miri Regev, the Israeli Culture Minister being interviewed by Rina Matsliah. Rotem became upset by Miri's racist attitude and wrote on her Instagram: “Miri Regev is sitting and explaining to Rina Matsliah that the public needs to beware, because if Benny Gantz is elected he will have to create a government with the Arabs. Rina Matsliah is silent. And I ask myself: why doesn’t Rina ask her in shock: ‘And what’s the problem with the Arabs???’ Dear God, there are also Arab citizens in this country. When will anyone in this government tell the public that this is a country of all its citizens, and all people are born equal.” The actress said that “the Arabs are also human beings. And also the Druze, and the gays, and the lesbians and... gasp... leftists.” 

Netanyahu responded on Facebook, "Dear Rotem, an important correction: Israel is not a state of all its citizens. According to the Nation-State Law that we passed, Israel is the nation-state of the Jewish people – and its alone. As you wrote, there is no problem with the Arab Israeli citizens – they have equal rights like everybody and the Likud government has invested in the Arab sector more than any other government."

Israeli President Rivlin criticized Netanyahu's “entirely unacceptable remarks about the Arab citizens of Israel” without naming him and added, "“There are no first-class citizens, and there are no second-class voters. We are all equal in the voting booth. We are all represented at the Knesset.” 

But Bibi was unapologetic and reaffirmed his anti-Arab stance before Sunday's Cabinet's meeting as Guardian reported:

As the comments caused waves in Israel, Netanyahu again spoke of the issue at the start of a cabinet meeting. He called Israel a “Jewish, democratic state” with equal rights, but “the nation state not of all its citizens but only of the Jewish people”.

Netanyahu has been accused of demonising Israeli Arabs, who make up about 17% of the population, in an attempt to boost rightwing turnout in elections due on 9 April. He has continually warned that his opponents will receive the support of Arab parties and that they will make significant concessions to the Palestinians.

Wonder woman star, Gal Gadot, supported her friend Rotem Sela:

“Love thy neighbor as thyself,” Gadot wrote in Hebrew on her own Instagram account in response. “It is not a matter of right or left, Jewish or Arab, religious or secular. It’s a matter of dialogue for peace, equality and tolerance for one another. It is our responsibility to plant hope and light for a better future for our children. Rotem, you are an inspiration for us all.” (See ynet news)

Grand Ayatollah criticized by Religious Nationalists for not toeing the line

As discussed previously in this blog, religious nationalist states (and many other states) have three prominent groups in politics, the secularists, the religious nationalists and the deeply religious, who do not feel comfortable with how religious nationalists instrumentalize religion to achieve their political ends. While the focus is always on the tussle between the secularists (who are mostly not atheists or agnostics) and the religious nationalists, it is much more enlightening to probe the scrimmage between the religious nationalists and the deeply religious ones who do not agree with each other.

Marja' (Grand Ayatollah) Mousa Shubairi Zanjani is a 90-year-old marja-e-taqlid (meaning authority to be followed) or marja', the highest authority in Twelver Shiite religious tradition. This highest rank is the attained after decades of scholarship and only a few ayatollahs reach this rank. By the strict standards of the tradition, even Iran's Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei does not qualify to be one, although he is accepted by many as a marja'. Every Shia is bound to follow one of the living marja'.

The recent controversy, which pitted religious nationalists against a marja', started in early October 2018 when former president Mohammad Khatami (1997-2005) and some other members of the reformist camp met Marja' Mousa Shubairi Zanjani. Khatami has been rejected by the official conservative circles since the end of his presidency but hardliners, close to Rahbar (Supreme Leader) Ali Khamenei, became especially angry after he supported Mir-Hossein Mousavi candidacy and mass protests after the controversial 2009 elections. He has since been banned from official media and is not allowed to leave the country.

Ayatollah Yazdi(L) and Marja' Zanjani (R)

Source: Radio Farda

The meeting drew a severe rebuke from a hardline conservative Ayatollah Mohammad Yazdi, who is close to Khamenei. Khamenei has repeatedly appointed him as one of the members of the influential Guardian Council and also helped him get elected as the current Chairman of the Assembly of Experts. Previously, Khamenei appointed him the head of judiciary for 10 years (1989-99). Ayatollah Yazdi not only wrote a stinging letter to Marja' Zanjani but also released it to the public. He wrote:

Following the publication of pictures on social media of you alongside some problematic individuals who have no respect for the system of the Islamic Republic and the supreme leader, I hereby state that this issue has caused concern and upset among followers and in the seminaries...I would like to remind you that your status and respect are tied to your respect for the ruling Islamic system, the leadership and the status of marjas... and take steps to ensure such matters are not repeated again. 

This was unprecedented in many ways. Ayatollahs usually do not indulge in public spats and nobody criticizes marja's, especially not the lower-ranked ayatollahs. Marja' are the highest authority in the Shiite hierarchical system after are meant to be followed reverently and blindly, not questioned.

The response of Marja' Zanjani was befitting his office as Al-monitor explains:

Zanjani’s office released a statement saying that the senior cleric would not respond to the letter and would remain silent, but that his students and junior clerics who study under him would respond. The Qom Seminary, the largest and oldest Islamic seminary in Iran, issued a statement condemning the letter, saying, “Slandering a grand ayatollah for a personal action and determining [who he can meet with], with the excuse of defending the Islamic Republic and the supreme leader, will have no result but weakening the Islamic Republic and the seminary." The letter, which was signed by 84 clerics, stated ominously, “No government which insults its figures and threatens them is sustainable.”

This episode informs us about the working of religious nationalist states. Such states give great prominence to religion and its political leadership regularly reaffirms its loyalty to the religious leadership and doctrine but, in reality, their loyalty is instrumental and when there is a choice between religion and power, the power always triumphs.

Atif Main, Imran Khan and Pakistan

The newly minted government in Pakistan removed Professor Atif Mian, an eminent economist belonging to the Ahmadi minority, from its Economic Advisory Council (EAC) on September 7th. This news was heard by many with profound disbelief. Pakistan is facing a balance of payment crisis and Princeton Professor Atif Mian, who was included in the list of the top 25 young economists in the world by the IMF, could have helped plan a fast recovery. But it was not to be. Religious nationalism and the fear of the other prevented not only Professor Atif Mian but also Harvard Professor Asim Khwaja and University College London Professor Imran Rasul, both of whom resigned from the EAC in protest over the removal of Professor Atif Mian. 

Pakistan became an independent state in 1947 but after more than seventy years and one bloody and traumatic separation (when East Pakistan became Bangladesh), the debate over whether Pakistan was created for Muslims to live their lives freely without persecution or for implementing Islamic Shariah goes on. However, almost everyone agrees that Islam’s contribution to Pakistani nationalism is significant and instrumental. Muslims, living in different parts of British India, did not have much else in common except the fear of Hindu persecution after independence. The marker of difference was Islam even if the desire for implementation of Islamic Shariah was not universal.

Professor Atif Mian

Source: Princeton University

Pakistan is not known for ensuring equal rights for its religious minorities. In fact, it is known to be one of the countries where religious minorities regularly face official and social discrimination. So, Pakistanis and others should not have been surprised by Professor Atif Mian’s expulsion but it was a shock for a number of reasons. First, the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) party, which won the 25th July elections, claimed to be the harbinger of a more inclusive Pakistan. Its election slogan was Do Nahi Aik Pakistan (translation: Not two, but one Pakistan). Second, Prime Minister Imran Khan, the charismatic cricketer-turned politician that led Pakistan the PTI to victory, does not subscribe to conservative religious views, though he has not refrained from using Islam to gain an edge over his political rivals.  Imran Khan lived in the United Kingdom for almost twenty years and his children are British citizens, living, with his former wife, Jemima Goldsmith, a rich journalist and heiress of Jewish descent, near London.,

Finally, the PTI government knew that Professor Atif Mian was an Ahmadi and not only still appointed him to the EAC but also forcefully defended his appointment when the backlash started. Fawad Chaudhry, the Federal Minister for Information and Broadcasting, called those protesting against the appointment extremists and said that the government would not bow to the extremists. He also announced ‘Protecting minorities is our responsibility. It is the religious duty of each Muslim, not just the government, to protect minorities and respect those that they live with.’ However, two days after this statement, the PTI government capitulated and removed Professor Atif Main from the EAC. 

What contributed to this capitulation? Many analysts would blame religious nationalism but that is not the whole truth. Besides religious nationalism, weak political institutions and the lack of a democratic culture also contributes to surrender before the religious hardliners. Prime Minister Imran Khan is socially a liberal but joined an onslaught of religious groups last year to weaken the previous government. The issue was again related to Ahmadis. The Ahmadis or Ahmadiyyah consider themselves Muslim but do not consider Prophet Muhammad as the last and final prophet. They were initially considered a Muslim sect but gradually many Muslim-majority countries and societies have come to regard them as heretic and non-Muslim. They are persecuted not only in Pakistan but also in Bangladesh, Saudi Arabia, Gulf sheikhdoms, Iran, Indonesia and Malaysia. Pakistan declared Ahmadis non-Muslim is 1974 and then placed additional restrictions on their freedom of religion in the 1980s. The last government, while working on electoral reforms, proposed an inconsequential change in the oath of major office holders that contained an assertion that there was no prophet after Prophet Muhammad. This proposal was approved by the opposition parties, including the PTI, after lengthy deliberations. However, when some religious groups started protesting against the change and claimed that the government had made the change on the demand of the Ahmadis, all the opposition parties joined them. The Pakistan military, which because of four successful coups has ruled Pakistan for more than thirty years and is the strongest political player, also not so clandestinely supported the religious groups to weaken the civilian government. The media, under pressure of the military, also bolstered the opposition and in the end, the change was dropped and the law minister had to resign. The issue did not end even after that and the PTI and other opposition parties portrayed the previous government as a supporter of Ahmadis and this contributed to the loss of its support – and defeat –  in the July national elections.

The succumbing to the religious groups by the current PTI government is thus linked to religious nationalism and a political landscape where democratic governments cannot assert themselves because the religious groups and the military constantly harass them. Sometimes, media groups, opposition parties and the judiciary also join them in keeping civilian democratic governments weak and ineffective. Three different political parties have ruled Pakistan since 2008. Each one of them has faced opposition from the same quarters and each one of them has yielded to pressure from the religious right because the religious right is not alone. 

Ataturk Cultural Center

Mr. Zik has written a fascinating account of the iconic Ataturk Cultural Center (One building, several facades: political showcasing in contemporary Turkey) on Open Democracy website. This historic building has now been demolished. Mr. Zik has linked this demolition with religious nationalism:

An iconic building is erased, together with the successive faces it has worn as Turkey hurtled from secular modernity via Gezi Park, to the latest experiment in religious nationalism. 

While Turkey's movement towards religious nationalism is undeniable and President Erdogan's animosity towards Republican project, with its aggressive secularism, is obvious and well-documented, is Ataturk Cultural Center's demolition related to religious nationalism? Mr. Zik is not convincing enough. Particularly, when one knows that the new building will retain some aspect of the old historic building, will be named Ataturk Cultural Center and will not have any distinguishing motifs of Islamic architecture. The architectural designs of the new building are shown below.

Source: Tabanlioglu Architects Revives Ataturk Cultural Center As A "World-Class" Arts And Culture Venue

Anyways, the article is engrossing as it recounts the history of this iconic building, linking it with the broader developments of the Turkish nation. Enjoy

Atatürk Cultural Center (the AKM) is gone. An iconic building for modernist architecture and prominent space for cultural production is to be replaced with a massive cultural complex that will host an opera house and exhibition center among other facilities, according to Turkey’s popular newspaper, Hürriyet Daily News.  

Atatürk Kültür Merkezi under demolition, March 2018. Wikicommons/MHIRM. Some rights reserved. 

Atatürk Cultural Center (Atatürk Kültür Merkezi in Turkish and AKM in short) was an important example of 1960s’ architecture and a physical focal point in Taksim Square in the Beyoğlu district, a major transport hub where crossroads connect the various multicultural neighborhoods of Istanbul. The square gives onto Istiklal Street, a street long synonymous with social and cultural events, eateries, bars, pubs, and entertainment around the clock. Being a popular spot for more than a century, it went through several architectural changes in its lifetime. 

Atatürk Cultural Center in Taksim quarter of Istanbul, Turkey, 2007. Wikicommons/ Chapultepec. Some rights reserved. 

Besides its architectural and topographical value, the AKM is considered a Republican project, a symbol of the Turkish modernism that aimed to westernize the country’s cultural life. It was no coincidence that the building was named after Atatürk in 1978, having  survived a fire that accompanied one of the peak moments of political polarization and violence. A number of institutes, departments and buildings in Turkey are named after him, which might be also seen as a statement, especially when (or where) the nation-state as such, democracy, and most of all, secularism are under challenge. Traditionally, these public buildings and sites are decorated with Turkish flags and Atatürk posters on national days. 

AKM, 2004. Wikicommons/ Bryce Edwards. Some rights reserved. 

The first president of the modern Republic of Turkey, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk (1881-1938), is considered more than a mere national hero. When the Ottoman Empire was falling apart after the First World War, he was the leader of a national movement and succeeded in establishing a nation-state of a modern and secular character, taking a clear distance from all religious influences. The last step certainly was not favored by all, however, public and private efforts remained strong for decades to come in maintaining a repressive hegemony around this legacy. There was unquestioned, constant exposure to his legacy in every corner of daily life.
Following his rigorous secular agenda is considered by many to be the true way to maintain Turkey’s democracy. This replacement of religion by a quasi-sacred secularism, embodied in Atatürk, became a cult that was even protected by law against any insult. Such democracy came at the expense of repressive measures on freedom of speech, freedom of association, and the right to education, among other systematic violations of human rights of people who were found not to be secular enough – and also towards those who were not Turkish, heterosexual, white etc. enough. Several incidents in the 1990s, such as the ban on the veil in public institutions and universities, and the imprisonment of Erdoğan in 1998, then mayor of Istanbul, for inciting religious hatred through reading a poem, are still fresh in the living memory of Turks. When Erdoğan left prison and made his way to the parliament in 2002, many felt that secularism, synonymous to democracy in Turkey for decades, was at stake. When the AKM came onto the government’s radar, it was also suspected that Erdoğan wanted to erase Atatürk’s secular legacy from Taksim Square, a location that had served as a showcase on various occasions. The government’s move to pursue a long-existing idea of building a mosque in the square further supported this suspicion.
The plans to demolish the building began to be conceived as early as 2005 and were soon joined by several other urban transformation projects. The plan received considerable public criticism, claiming that the political and cultural legacy of AKM was more important than its material value. Several art and architecture platforms and grassroots organizations came together to start a legal process, which only succeeded in slowing down the overall project. Shut down and evacuated in 2008, AKM stayed unused for a decade. The demolishing work began on February 13, 2018 and President Erdoğan announced the date of inauguration of the new building as early 2019, while identifying those who were against the project as terrorists: “…Those Gezi protestors also yelled against this. You can yell as much as you want. Eat your hearts out! Rant and rave, (but) we demolished it.” It is no secret that Turkey’s president often adopts an angry tone, but one may still wonder quite what the building has to do with a social movement that started as a sit-in protest aimed at protecting a few trees in Gezi Park. 

The Gezi movement Before growing into one of the biggest social movements in modern Turkish political history, the Gezi movement, or Gezi in short, initiated as a small resistance with an environmental aim: to prevent Gezi Park, right next to the AKM, from turning into a shopping mall. From the first day of the protests, May 28, 2013 until the first week of September, approximately 3.6 million people joined the protests in the streets, participating in 5,532 actions in 80 provinces out of 81, according to official reports.
Clashes with the police left more than 10 dead and thousands injured. Failure of the mainstream media to properly cover the protests resulted in protesters finding alternative ways to communicate and reach out. A dramatic increase in social media subscription numbers was followed by creative practices and interactions filled with humor, satire, and irony, which were unprecedented in this country’s annals of collective activism. The movement stood against the transformation of Gezi Park into another in that series of massive urban projects that pose a threat to environment and neglect the intangible values of the asset. The AKM was certainly on the list as well. As a familar showcase, the facade of the AKM was soon to be singled out for attention (and decorated) by the Gezi activists. 

Screenshot detail of posters, banners and flags on AKM building, 7 June 2013. Wikicommons/ Infestor. Some rights reserved. 

This photograph tells us a lot about the composition and the atmosphere of the Gezi movement. In addition to the urban and environmental issues, the movement sported a great diversity in the motivations of participants, varying from women’s rights to LGBTQI issues, from worker’s rights to Internet bans. A major concern also crystallized around the deterioration of the secular state and popular belief in the government’s growing tendency towards involving religious values in politics.
The first banner, which is top centre in the image reads BOYUN EĞME (meaning “do not bow down” in Turkish), and was placed on AKM’s facade on June 2, shortly after the start of the protests in Gezi Park. Several other banners quickly followed this first one and gave the building a colorful look. BOYUN EĞME is the title of the weekly magazine of the Turkish Communist Party, although the title itself and the visual features of the banner (a red brush effect on a white background with text in black and white font) do not reveal much about the party identity for an average viewer with untrained eyes.
But it was a privilege to be placed top centre as the first-comer, and obviously it had to share the spot with a Turkish flag and Atatürk’s poster portrait. Another flag in the centre of the facade, is joined by one on the rooftop right. These were probably arranged arbitrarily or due to the practicalities of fixing banners. The rest of the composition is an odd but straightforward depiction of how unusual people rubbed against each other, shoulder to shoulder at Gezi. A photo of Didier Drogba, an Ivorian football player, then playing for Galatasaray football club, soon joined the collection, placed right under the banner of ÇARŞI, which is the ultra group of Beşiktaş. It read in English: “We have Drogba, they don’t!” Both clubs, as well as Fenerbahçe, were well-known to be eternal foes. However, the prominent presence and friendly collaboration of all three in the protest actions, and their humorous posts on social media attracted thousands, regardless of team affiliation.
Another easily recognizable face is of Deniz Gezmiş (1947-1972), who was a political activist sentenced to death for attempting to overthrow the constitutional order, after engaging in armed struggle. Images of some other martyrs of the political left and renowned figures such as Marx, Stalin, and Lenin are also on the facade, along with banners of several other grassroots initiatives and groups with slogans such as “shut up tayyip!” (addressing Erdoğan by his second name). One banner added later read “Don’t Touch Mor Gabriel!” (aiming to protect an Assyrian monastery in the city of Mardin from being confiscated by the government), joining calls that invited the Government to resign and trade unions to go on strike, and demands for women’s rights. A number of banners are written in Kurdish or Turkish/Kurdish bilingual.
When compared to all the other protest actions that have taken place in Turkey, the number and size of images of Atatürk and the Turkish flag must be regarded as modest. These two visual elements were extremely high profile in earlier protests and demonstrations, especially those concerned with secularism. The photograph of the facade shows that besides being “safe symbols” to represent democracy, secularism, and national identity, both the Turkish flag and Atatürk’s poster were only a small part of the mosaic that constituted Gezi. Indeed, a number of groups that participated and supported Gezi were considered antipathetic to these two visual items. In this sense, while raising a strong voice against the deterioration of human rights over the previous 11 years under the same party government, Gezi did not favour the old paradigm either. It did not demand a democracy enforced through rigorous secularism. This was a particular strength of the movement, emerging as a new collective demand on the political scene of Turkey, taking no particular sides in the conventional secular/non-secular divide in that society, despite the fact that a fair proportion of its participants were secular. 

Across borders and boundariesThe AKM facade, along with the overall imagery of the movement, was a visual statement of the multiplicity of identities, demands, and hopes. Gezi was home to an exciting companionship of erstwhile foes, where all looked for ways to coexist and collaborate. Even if it did not always work, a determined collective effort to transgress the long-standing borders of social divides, such as class, ethnicity, religion etc. was evident. 

AKM after police intervention, June 2013. Barış Karadeniz/Flickr. Cropped from the original. Some rights reserved. 

Gezi Park stayed occupied for more than two weeks, while the protesters created an environment of festive solidarity, where many cultural and artistic activities took place. A day before it was evacuated by force, the police also charged the AKM building and took the banners down. The facade was quickly dressed with Turkish flags and a large poster of Atatürk, not a favorite figure in the eyes of the government by then. It was an attempt to give the square a “safe and normal” look, but more thn this, a reluctant concession to soften secular indignation.
In the aftermath of the evacuation of the park, activists continued to gather in the neighborhood parks throughout the summer of 2013, holding more discussions andplanning further local initiatives. However, soon afterwards, several participants in Gezi and the movement itself were suddenly accused of being associated with a newly-identified terror organization named FETO (Fethullahist Terror Organization). Fethullah Gülen, a US-based cleric of Turkish origin and a long-term ally of Erdoğan’s, was accused of committing a plot to overthrow the government by force and take control of the constitutional order.
Although a number of people faced arbitrary arrests and charges in this period, most of the solidary networks and grassroots initiatives that were established and/or grew bigger throughout the Gezi days are still functional today. Some of these have continued to voice their concerns regarding the hazards of urban transformation projects, including the demolition of the AKM building. When Erdoğan assumed presidential office in 2014, there was no expectation that tensions would cool down. However, these voices found little purchase in the mainstream media, as the country descended into political turmoil, punctuated by a series of violent attacks and the imprisonment of politicians of opposing parties, as well as activists and journalists. Soon, Turkey was to be hit by another major incident. 

Coup attempt changes politicsOn the evening of July 15, 2016, the country was shaken by a military coup threat. Erdoğan called for mass resistance through a live video conference connection on the news and immediately found a response. Thousands of people, mostly either AKP local branch members or simply sympathizers of the party, took to the streets and risked their lives to stop the military advance. Several hours of clashes left more than 300 dead and long-lasting damage to the country.
When the threat was over and the soldiers surrendered, more people took to the streets with Turkish flags to celebrate. The morning after, enthusiastic crowds in streets and squares rejoiced in the victory of people over military firepower, while many others  mourned the loss of life. FETO was soon blamed for the attempt and the government declared a state of emergency. The AKM building was quickly dressed again, this time most probably by a pro-government group. 

Screenshot twitter. AKM after military coup attempt. Courtesy of Alev Scott. All rights reserved. 

A banner on the AKM facade, accompanied by two Erdoğan portraits read: “(You) FETO (Gülen), the dog of Satan, we will hang you and your dogs by your own leash. With God’s will, we’ll have the flag of democracy flutter in the sky.” The signature in the bottom line said: “The brave men of this beloved nation.” The photograph of this hateful banner was swiftly and widely circulated  in social media with an additional upper script: “Let the Gezists, who claim Taksim their stronghold, see a (real) banner.” The belief (and propaganda) that the Gezi movement had been incited by FETO only became stronger after the coup attempt, while the discontent around Erdoğan and his government was also growing. Now the banner marked a shift from the long-existing secular/non-secular tension into a new decisive division in Turkish society, between supporters of Erdoğan and his opponents, including Gezi activists and FETO supporters among others.
It is not common practice for public buildings to feature the portraits of presidents, apart from those of Atatürk, regarded as the founding father. But this now seems to be part of the ongoing efforts to build a cult around Erdoğan’s personality that is to compete with that of Atatürk: an omnipresent and omnipotent leader, whose single-handed guidance helps the nation to thrive. So, the visual presence of Atatürk and his iconography has been slowly vanishing, as Erdoğan’s, at least partially, takes over.
The banner, threatening FETO, stayed on display for two days before it was replaced with a massive Turkish flag, covering the overall facade of AKM and bearing the firm message: “Sovereignty Belongs to the Nation.” 

 

The phrase, an Atatürk quote, has spawned an article in the Turkish Constitution since 1921 and it is written on the main wall of the parliament. Although the original phrase was in Ottoman Turkish, it was translated into modern Turkish within years. The selection of wording on the flag is a simplified Ottoman version, a version frequently used by Erdoğan himself. The flag was not any more in its Gezi context, a single component of its diversity, and was not even used in a relatively modest way next to an image of Atatürk. Küçük and Türkmen observe that this is a symbol of the etent to which a mixture of religiosity and nationalism has come to penetrate and occupy all sections of social and political life. The AKM facade, once claimed by Gezi activists as a public space to acknowledge diversity and coexistence, has been usurped in the name of a particular section of the society.
Now, Erdoğan urged people to flood the squares and start democracy watches, emulating the organised sit-ins of Gezi and other Occupy movements. Certain scenes such as the occupation of squares with tents, the organization of culture and art events, and marriages taking place during the watches reminded everyone of Gezi and other protest events as well. However, they lacked the collective decision-making and practice mechanisms and remained government-controlled performances tsow 'our' strength against the archenemies: foreign powers, terrorists, FETO and its alleged extension, Gezi.
The democracy watches came to an end upon Erdoğan’s suggestion after a few weeks, but the state of emergency continued for a period of two years, solidifying Erdoğan’s executive powers as president. Societal polarization and indignation was skillfully managed into an exacerbated state of fear, terror and instability. The usual division of the society across a secular/non-secular axis was upgraded into a religious nationalism embodied within the new cult of Erdoğan. This embodiment eventually laid the grounds for constitutional change in 2017 towards a presidential system, and for Erdoğan to win the elections in 2018.    

ConclusionThe state of emergency was lifted shortly after the presidential elections, and a new system secured a permanent state of exception, whereby Erdoğan, as president, has consolidated and expanded his administrative powers. Denouncing those who opposed the demolition of AKM and the Gezi protesters as "terrorists" was a reminder of his power and commitment to smash any  dissent.
The struggle over the AKM reveals one permanent aspect of political contention in contemporary Turkey, formed traditionally through leader-embodied ideologies. Meanwhile, solidarity networks and grass-roots initiatives promise today more ways to communicate and interact than ever. These may one day inspire our thinking and acting beyond the usual paradigms.